Collier v. Montgomery

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 20, 2009

No. 08-30665 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

RODNEY MICHAEL COLLIER; SARAH ELIZABETH COLLIER,

Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

PERRY GREG MONTGOMERY, Individually; GLENN PAUL SPROLES,

Individually; RODNEY D. HARRIS, Individually; KEN MICHAEL HALPHEN,

Individually,

Defendants–Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

Before GARWOOD, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:

Officers Perry Greg Montgomery, Glenn Paul Sproles, Rodney D. Harris,

and Ken Michael Halphen appeal the district court’s denial of their summary

judgment motion based on qualified immunity. We reverse and render.

I

Harris, a Bossier City officer working on the Seat Belt Task Force, saw

Rodney Collier driving a pickup truck with the seatbelt not extending forward

No. 08-30665

and across Collier’s shoulder as required by Louisiana law. Harris made a

traffic stop and decided to issue a ticket.

As Harris was attempting to explain the consequences of failing to honor

a written promise to appear, as required by Louisiana Revised Statutes § 32:391,

Collier interrupted and attempted to grab a pen from Harris’s hand. Harris

retrieved a pair of handcuffs from his belt and informed Collier that he was

under arrest. When Harris reached for Collier’s left wrist, Collier pulled his

hand back and turned away from the officer. The two men grappled as Harris

attempted to place the handcuffs on a resisting Collier. At one point during the

struggle, Harris pushed Collier onto the hood of the police cruiser and forced

Collier’s right arm behind his back. After Harris placed the handcuffs on Collier,

he directed Collier into the back seat of the police cruiser.

At that point, Collier began complaining of chest pain, and Harris

immediately called the Bossier City Fire Department to the scene. However,

Collier refused treatment and executed a Fire Department Patient Refusal

Information Sheet. Collier was later taken to the LSU Health Sciences Center,

but he also refused treatment there.

Collier was charged with resisting arrest, simple battery, and failing to

wear his seatbelt. During his criminal trial, Collier admitted that he told Harris

that he did not have his shoulder harness on but that he had the lap belt

fastened. The City of Bossier Court found that “Officer Harris had probable

cause to initiate the stop when he saw what he reasonably believed was an

unbelted driver.” But the City Court found that there was reasonable doubt as

to whether the seatbelt was being utilized and, therefore, found Collier not guilty

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No. 08-30665

of the seatbelt violation. Collier was also acquitted of the other charges against

him.

Rodney Collier and Sarah Elizabeth Collier subsequently filed suit

claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Bossier City, Coregis

Insurance Company, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, and Officers

Michael Stanley Szempruch, Montgomery, Sproles, Harris, and Halphen.

The claims against Coregis Insurance Company and Officer Szempruch

have been dismissed. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity. In a one-page opinion, the district court denied the

defendants’ motion, stating, “[h]aving reviewed the film of the arrest, the Court

finds that genuine issues of material fact remain in the case.” The defendants

timely appealed. This court later dismissed the appeal as to all parties except

Montgomery, Sproles, Harris, and Halphen, in their individual capacities.

II

Although nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden

to negate the assertion of qualified immunity once properly raised.1 This court

reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis

of qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit de novo.2

In Saucier v. Katz,3 the Supreme Court held that a court addressing a

claim of qualified immunity must determine first whether the plaintiff has

1

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

2

Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2007).

3

533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).

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No. 08-30665

adduced facts sufficient to establish a constitutional or statutory violation 4

before determining “whether [the officers’] actions were objectively unreasonable

in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question.” 5 In

Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court has since held that this sequential two-

step analysis was no longer mandatory.6 Instead, lower courts are “permitted

to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the

circumstances of the particular case at hand.” 7 The Court noted, however, that

the Saucier formulation often is the appropriate analytical sequence.8 In this

case, we find it appropriate to determine initially whether a constitutional

violation occurred.

III

A

Collier argues that Harris violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

making an unlawful arrest. Harris stopped Collier based on a belief that Collier

was not wearing his seatbelt properly. According to Louisiana Revised Statutes

§ 32:295.1(A)(1), a driver is required to have a “safety belt properly fastened

about his or her body at all times when the vehicle is in forward motion.”

4

Id. at 201; see McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2002)

(en banc).

5

Freeman, 483 F.3d at 411.

6

129 S. Ct. at 821.

7

Id. at 818.

8

Id.

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Probable cause for such violation “shall be based solely upon a law enforcement

officer’s clear and unobstructed view of a person not restrained as required by

[Louisiana law].” 9

At the time of the arrest, Louisiana had not identified what “properly

fastened about his or her body” meant. However, the Louisiana Attorney

General later issued an opinion in an unrelated matter stating that “when the

driver’s clasp is fastened, but the shoulder and/or chest harness is not properly

across the chest and shoulder, then the safety belt is not ‘properly fastened about

the body’ and La. R.S. 32:295.1 has been violated.” 10

Although Collier claims that Harris had an obstructed view of Collier’s

seatbelt due to the distance between the vehicles and because Collier’s tinted

window was up, the video evidence shows that no cars passed between Harris

and Collier at the applicable time. Additionally, during his criminal trial and in

his deposition, Collier admitted that he was not wearing his seatbelt with the

shoulder strap across his chest. Therefore, we agree with the criminal trial court

that Harris had probable cause to arrest Collier. Accordingly, Harris did not

violate the Fourth Amendment in making the arrest.11

9

LA . REV . STAT . § 32:295.1(F).

10

La. Att’y. Gen. Op. No. 06-0189, 2006 WL 3616631 (Nov. 9, 2006).

11

See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (finding an arrest for the

failure to wear a seatbelt constitutional and holding that “an officer [who] has probable cause

to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his

presence . . . may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender”).

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No. 08-30665

B

Collier contends that Harris used excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.12 To prevail on an excessive-

force claim, Collier must establish: “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and

only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of

which was clearly unreasonable.”13 “[A]n injury is generally legally cognizable

when it results from a degree of force that is constitutionally

impermissible—that is, objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.”14

“The objective reasonableness of the force, in turn, depends on the facts and

circumstances of the particular case, such that the need for force determines how

much force is constitutionally permissible.” 15 The test for reasonableness must

consider “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to

evade arrest by flight.” 16

Collier suffered abdominal bruising and bruises on his back and legs, and

he claims that he experienced episodes of chest pain with significantly elevated

blood pressure and heart rate during the arrest. We conclude that the force

applied was constitutionally permissible under these particular circumstances.

12

See Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 102 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The Fourth Amendment’s

protection against unreasonable seizures of the person has been applied in causes of action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to impose liability on police officers who use excessive force against

citizens.”).

13

Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005).

14

Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501 (5th Cir. 2008).

15

Id.

16

Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (emphasis added).

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The video evidence shows that Collier physically resisted when Harris attempted

to place handcuffs on him. Harris grappled with Collier for several seconds and

was able to subdue Collier after pushing him onto the hood of the cruiser.

Harris’s use of force and the resulting bruises were not excessive under the

circumstances. Additionally, Collier’s alleged chest pain and elevated blood

pressure and heart rate did not make Harris’s use of force unreasonable.17

Accordingly, we hold that Harris did not violate Collier’s Fourth Amendment

right against unreasonable seizure.

C

Collier asserts that Harris’s failure to advise Collier of his Miranda rights

was a violation of the Fifth Amendment and that Sergeant Kevin Peddington of

the City of Bossier Police Department used a statement by Collier in Collier’s

criminal trial against him. Sergeant Peddington testified that Collier told him

“I just want to let you know that this officer didn’t do this. . . . He didn’t do

anything wrong. I did this when I fell against the car.”

The alleged statements made by Collier did not relate to whether Collier

had committed a crime. Instead, the statements pertained to whether Harris

had used excessive force to subdue Collier during the arrest. Therefore,

regardless of whether Collier was read his Miranda rights, such statements were

17

See Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that an arrest

was not made unreasonable by the fact that the plaintiff was left in an unventilated vehicle

for approximately thirty minutes, despite the plaintiff’s allegation that “her multiple sclerosis

was exacerbated by the heat”).

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No. 08-30665

not introduced in an incriminating manner.18 Accordingly, Collier’s Fifth

Amendment rights were not violated.

D

Collier further argues that the officers violated his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Collier claims that “[t]he

treatment, or lack thereof, by the EMT was woefully inadequate and insulting.”

However, Collier does not claim that the officers failed to provide him with

medical care; Collier only complains that the officers refused to contact his

cardiologist, Dr. Cole. We have previously held that liability will not attach

“unless the official had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious

harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate indifference to that

risk.” 19 Collier twice refused treatment for his complained-of chest pains.

Because the officers attempted to provide Collier with medical care, the officers

did not violate Collier’s Eighth Amendment rights.

E

Collier also claims that Officers Montgomery, Sproles, and Halphen failed

to intervene to prevent the aforementioned alleged constitutional violations from

occurring. It is undisputed that no other officer was present at the scene during

the arrest. Therefore, Montgomery, Sproles, and Halphen could not have failed

to intervene to prevent the alleged unlawful arrest and alleged use of excessive

force. Additionally, because we conclude that Collier’s constitutional rights were

not otherwise violated, this claim fails.

18

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.33 (1966) (stating that a criminal

defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated “if his conviction is based, in whole or in

part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity”).

19

Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

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F

Collier’s final argument is that the officers conspired to violate his First

and Eighth Amendment rights. Collier has not produced any evidence of an

agreement between the officers to violate Collier’s constitutional rights.

Therefore, this argument is meritless.

* * *

Because we hold that the officers did not violate Collier’s constitutional

rights, we REVERSE the decision of the district court denying summary

judgment and RENDER judgment for the officers in their individual capacities.

9