Opinion

Von Drake v. Rogers

  • 312 F. App'x 690
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Mar 4, 2009
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Higginbotham, Barksdale, Elrod
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 6.2%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 4, 2009

No. 08-30824 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Summary Calendar Clerk

ERIC VON DRAKE

Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant

v.

EDGAR LYNN ROGERS; ANGELA ROGERS

Defendants - Counter Claimants - Appellees

GARY LOFTIN; ROY L. BRUN; CHARLES R. SCOTT, RONALD LEE IRVIN

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

No. 08-cv-0038

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Eric Von Drake sued his brother, Edgar Rogers, and his brother’s wife in

tort over a property dispute. His complaint also included actions against three

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .

R. 47.5.4.

No. 08-30824

Louisiana state court judges, Defendants Brun, Scott, and Irvin, and a clerk of

court, Defendant Loftin, alleging racial discrimination.

In an order rendered June 13, 2008 the district court dismissed the action

against the three judges based on judicial immunity. In a July 28, 2008 order,

the district court dismissed the claims against the Rogers and Loftin. Drake

appeals.

Regarding the district court’s June 13 order dismissing the actions against

the judges, although Defendants argue that Drake failed to file a separate notice

of appeal within 30 days,1 Drake did file a general notice of appeal from the final

judgment entered July 28, 2008. Regardless, the district court found that the

alleged conduct of the judges fell within their official judicial capacity and it did

not err in dismissing the action against the judges on the grounds of judicial

immunity.2

The district court’s July 28, 2008 order dismissed Drake’s claims against

clerk of court, Gary Loftin, and the Rogers. The district court’s order dismissed

the claims against Loftin because Drake failed to file a Rule 7 reply after Loftin

answered Drake’s complaint with a defense of qualified immunity. With his

answer, Loftin filed a motion requesting the court to order Drake to file a Rule

7 reply, which the district court granted.3 Drake never filed the reply. We find

that the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing the claims against

Loftin.4

1

28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); FED . R. APP . P. 4(a).

2

See Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005).

3

See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995).

4

See Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1518–20 (5th Cir.

1985).

2

No. 08-30824

On the claims against the Rogers, the district court found that Drake did

not produce any evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact on any of

the elements of his state law tort claims. We note that Drake has come forward

with no facts to support his alleged causes of action in response to either of the

Rogers’ summary judgment motions, the second of which was granted.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.5

The district court also addressed the Rogers’ counterclaim against Drake

for $1,500 as damages for Drake’s frivolous action. While the district court order

labels its action as granting the Rogers’ motion for summary judgment, the

district court was effectively imposing sanctions on Drake. A trial court is given

wide discretion over the imposition of sanctions.6 Drake never came forward

with any evidence supporting any of the claims he brought in this action and

failed to file responsive pleadings. We cannot find that the sanctions amounted

to an abuse of discretion.

The district court’s order of July 28, 2008 is AFFIRMED.

5

See Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 257–58 (5th Cir. 2001)

(“[I]f the nonmovant fails to establish facts in support of an essential element of his prima

facie claim, summary judgment is appropriate.”) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322–23 (1986)).

6

Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 548 (5th Cir. 2001).

3

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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