Opinion

Gabbi Lemos v. County of Sonoma

  • 40 F.4th 1002
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jul 19, 2022
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Civil
Cited by
78 cases
Authority
More cited than 86.0%

explaining that to “decide whether success on a section 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, we must determine which acts formed the basis for the conviction” and analyze whether the § 1983 claim negates an element of the convicted offense

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that to “decide whether success on a section 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, we must determine which acts formed the basis for the conviction” and analyze whether the § 1983 claim negates an element of the convicted offense
  • holding that “[the plaintiff]’s success in the section 1983 action would not necessarily contradict the verdict [finding her guilty of resisting arrest]” because the jury was instructed that she could be found guilty “based on one of several different events”
  • explaining that “[w]hen the 6 conviction is based on a guilty plea, we look at the record to see which acts formed the basis for 7 the plea”
  • holding if a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred by Heck, 10 “filing an amended complaint would be a futile act.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GABBI LEMOS, No. 19-15222

Plaintiff-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 4:15-cv-05188-

YGR

COUNTY OF SONOMA; STEVE

FREITAS; MARCUS HOLTON,

Defendants-Appellees. OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc March 23, 2022

Pasadena, California

Filed July 19, 2022

Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and William A.

Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon, Consuelo M. Callahan,

Andrew D. Hurwitz, John B. Owens, Michelle T.

Friedland, Eric D. Miller, Kenneth K. Lee, Daniel A. Bress

and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Miller;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

2 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

SUMMARY *

Section 1983 / Excessive Force

The en banc court reversed the district court’s summary

judgment for defendants County of Sonoma, Sheriff Steve

Freitas, and Deputy Marcus Holton in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action brought by Gabrielle Lemos alleging that a sheriff’s

deputy used excessive force in arresting her.

The district court held that Lemos’s claim was barred by

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Lemos

was convicted of willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing

the deputy during the same interaction in violation of Cal.

Penal Code section 148(a)(1).

The preclusion doctrine established in Heck requires a

court to “consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.”

512 U.S. at 487.

The en banc court held that because the record did not

show that Lemos’s section 1983 action necessarily rested on

the same event as her criminal conviction, success in the

former would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the

latter. Heck would bar Lemos from bringing an excessive-

force claim under section 1983 if that claim were based on

force used during the conduct that was the basis for her

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 3

section 148(a)(1) conviction. Crucially, the criminal jury

was told that it could find Lemos guilty based on any one of

four acts she committed during the course of her interaction

with Deputy Holton. Because the jury returned a general

verdict, it is not known which act it thought constituted an

offense. Although any of the four acts could be the basis for

the guilty verdict, Lemos’s section 1983 action was based on

an allegation that Holton used excessive force during only

the last one. The court held that if Lemos were to prevail in

her civil action, it would not necessarily mean that her

conviction was invalid; and the action was therefore not

barred by Heck.

The en banc court remanded for further proceedings.

Judge Callahan, joined by Lee, dissented, and would

affirm the district court’s application of the Heck bar to

Lemos’s § 1983 claim. She wrote that the majority’s reason

wrongfully presupposed that an uninterrupted interaction

with no temporal or spatial break between a § 1983

plaintiff’s unlawful conduct and an officer’s alleged

excessive force can be broken down into distinct isolated

events to avoid the application of the Heck bar.

4 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

COUNSEL

Izaak D. Schwaiger (argued), Schwaiger Law Firm,

Sebastopol, California; John Houston Scott and Lizabeth N.

de Vries, Scott Law Firm, San Francisco, California; for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Richard W. Osman (argued) and Sheila D. Crawford,

Bertrand Fox Elliot Osman & Wenzel, San Francisco,

California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

MILLER, Circuit Judge:

Gabrielle Lemos appeals from the district court’s

dismissal of her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that

a sheriff’s deputy used excessive force in arresting her. The

district court held that Lemos’s claim was barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Lemos was

convicted of willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing the

deputy during the same interaction. Under Heck, a section

1983 action may not proceed if its success would

“necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness

of his conviction.” Id. at 486. But because the record does

not show that Lemos’s section 1983 action necessarily rests

on the same event as her criminal conviction, success in the

former would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the

latter. We therefore reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

Late in the evening of June 13, 2015, Sonoma County

Sheriff’s Deputy Marcus Holton was on patrol in Petaluma,

California, when he came upon a pickup truck with a large

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 5

trailer stopped in the road in front of a house. Hearing raised

voices and a reference to a “fight,” he got out of his car to

investigate. His body camera recorded what happened next.

Holton approached the driver’s side of the truck and

asked the driver to leave the vehicle. The driver complied

and said that the passenger, Karli Labruzzi, was his

girlfriend, that she was drunk, and that she was upset because

she had lost her phone. Holton then walked around the truck

to confirm the story with Labruzzi. She was leaning out the

window and talking to a group of three women standing

nearby: her two sisters (one of whom was Lemos) and their

mother.

When Holton asked, “Is everything ok?,” all four women

began yelling at him. After further discussion, Holton said,

“I’m not going to leave until I’ve resolved this,” and they

answered, “Nothing to resolve.” Holton then opened the

truck door to see if Labruzzi was injured, at which point

Lemos—who would later explain that she had “just

graduated from high school” and had consumed “three Jack

Daniels and Cokes” earlier in the evening—stepped between

him and the door, pointed her finger at him, and shouted,

“You’re not allowed to do that!” Holton told Lemos to step

back and pushed her hand away. After Lemos’s mother

moved her away, Holton closed the door. The women

protested, with Lemos insisting, “You cannot go in the car!

You have to have a warrant!” Holton asked them to calm

down so that he could explain why he wished to speak to

Labruzzi. When they did not do so, he called for backup. The

responding deputy, Robert Dillion, later said that he could

hear the women’s screams over the radio.

Labruzzi eventually got out of the truck. During the next

few minutes, all four women continued to remonstrate with

Holton, arguing that he should not have opened the door of

6 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

the truck and that the investigation should be conducted, in

Lemos’s words, by “a woman cop.” After Dillion arrived,

Holton separated Lemos’s mother from her daughters to

explain that he was trying to investigate whether Labruzzi

had been the victim of a “domestic incident.” Dillion,

meanwhile, made repeated but futile efforts to instruct the

daughters, “I need one person to talk at a time.” They

responded by concurrently requesting “a woman cop,”

claiming to be sober, accusing Holton of “assault,” and

disparaging Holton and his mother in sexual terms.

Lemos’s mother was apparently not convinced by

Holton’s explanations and twice returned to where her

daughters were standing. The second time she returned,

some five minutes after the initial encounter at the truck

door, she told Lemos to go inside the house. Lemos began to

do so, walking past Holton and ignoring his orders to stop.

Holton ran after Lemos and grabbed her wrist in an attempt

to handcuff her, but she pulled away. He then tackled her and

placed her under arrest. Later that night, Lemos was taken to

a hospital, where she was treated and released for injuries

she sustained when tackled.

Lemos brought this action against Holton, Sonoma

County Sheriff Steve Freitas, and Sonoma County, alleging

that Holton had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be

free from excessive force. (Lemos also asserted a claim

under the First Amendment, but she has now abandoned it.)

Soon thereafter, the Sonoma County District Attorney

charged Lemos with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a

peace officer, in violation of California Penal Code

section 148(a)(1). The district court stayed proceedings in

the civil action while the criminal prosecution was pending.

The criminal case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury was

instructed that to find Lemos guilty, it needed to find beyond

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 7

a reasonable doubt that Holton was “lawfully performing or

attempting to perform his duties as a peace officer,” that

Lemos “knew, or reasonably should have known, that [he]

was a peace officer performing or attempting to perform his

duties,” and that she “willfully resisted, obstructed, or

delayed [him] in the performance or attempted performance

of those duties.” The jury was further instructed that “[a]

peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if

he or she is unlawfully arresting or detaining someone or

using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties.”

The instructions stated that the jury could find Lemos

guilty based on any one of four acts: (1) if she “made

physical contact with [Holton] as he was trying to open the

truck door”; (2) if she “placed herself between” Holton and

Labruzzi; (3) if she “blocked [Holton] from opening the

truck door and seeing or speaking with” Labruzzi; or (4) if

she “pulled away when [Holton] attempted to grab her” (just

before he tackled her). Although the instructions required the

jury to agree unanimously on which act Lemos committed,

the verdict form did not require the jury to identify a specific

act. The jury found Lemos guilty.

Once the criminal proceedings concluded, the district

court lifted its stay. The parties agreed that the defendants

would file a motion for summary judgment limited to the

argument that Lemos’s action was barred by Heck.

The district court granted summary judgment to the

defendants. The court reasoned that “[g]iven [Lemos’s] and

her cohorts’ continuous screaming and provoking,” there

was “no temporal or spatial distinction or other separation

between the conduct for which Lemos was convicted, by a

jury, and the conduct which forms the basis of her Section

1983 claim.” The court concluded that “Holton’s actions . . .

form[ed] one uninterrupted interaction and the jury’s finding

8 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

that he did not use excessive force would be inconsistent

with a Section 1983 claim based on an event from that same

encounter.”

A divided three-judge panel of this court affirmed.

Lemos v. County of Sonoma, 5 F.4th 979 (9th Cir. 2021); see

id. at 987 (Berzon, J., dissenting). We voted to rehear the

case en banc. Lemos v. County of Sonoma, 22 F.4th 1179

(9th Cir. 2022). We review the district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo. Stephens v. Union Pac. R.R.

Co., 935 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2019).

We begin by reviewing the preclusion doctrine

established in Heck. In that case, the plaintiff had been

convicted of voluntary manslaughter and, while serving his

sentence, brought a section 1983 action against prosecutors

and a police officer who had allegedly engaged in unlawful

acts that resulted in his conviction. 512 U.S. at 478–79. The

Supreme Court held that the action could not proceed

because “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for

challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”

Id. at 486. Under Heck, a section 1983 action is barred if

success in the action would “necessarily require the plaintiff

to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.”

Id. But if a criminal conviction has already been reversed,

expunged, or otherwise set aside, then a section 1983 action

may proceed. Id. at 486–87.

Heck thus requires us to “consider whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the

complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487. By contrast, if “the plaintiff’s

action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity

of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff,

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 9

the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of

some other bar to the suit.” Id. (footnote omitted).

The Supreme Court has since emphasized that it was

“careful in Heck to stress the importance of the term

‘necessarily,’” as, for example, when the Court

“acknowledged that an inmate could bring a challenge to the

lawfulness of a search pursuant to § 1983 in the first

instance, even if the search revealed evidence used to convict

the inmate at trial, because success on the merits would not

‘necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was

unlawful.’” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7). “To hold otherwise,”

the Court explained, “would have cut off potentially valid

damages actions as to which a plaintiff might never obtain

favorable termination—suits that could otherwise have gone

forward had the plaintiff not been convicted.” Id.

To decide whether success on a section 1983 claim

would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, we

must determine which acts formed the basis for the

conviction. When the conviction is based on a guilty plea,

we look at the record to see which acts formed the basis for

the plea. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 696–97

(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117,

1119–20 (9th Cir. 2001). We follow the same approach

when the conviction is based on a jury verdict. As several

other courts of appeals have recognized, a court must look at

the record of the criminal case—including the jury

instructions—to determine which facts the jury necessarily

found. See Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t Station #4,

977 F.3d 1185, 1194 (11th Cir. 2020) (examining what “a

jury could have found” to determine that the “facts required

for [the plaintiff] to prove his § 1983 case do not necessarily

logically contradict the essential facts underlying [his]

10 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

convictions,” and concluding that “Heck does not bar the

§ 1983 action from proceeding” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Lora-Pena v. FBI, 529 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir.

2008) (examining the jury instructions to conclude that “the

question of whether the officers used excessive force was not

put before the jury,” so the plaintiff’s criminal convictions

“would not be inconsistent with a holding that the officers,

during a lawful arrest, used excessive (or unlawful) force”);

see also Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 716–17 (6th Cir.

2006). An action under section 1983 is barred if—but only

if—success in the action would undermine the jury’s

findings in a way that “would necessarily imply or

demonstrate that the plaintiff’s earlier conviction was

invalid.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 699.

This case involves a conviction for resisting, delaying, or

obstructing a peace officer, in violation of California Penal

Code section 148(a)(1). That offense has three elements:

“(1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed

a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the

performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew

or reasonably should have known that the other person was

a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her

duties.” Yount v. City of Sacramento, 183 P.3d 471, 479 (Cal.

2008) (quoting In re Muhammad C., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21,

24 (Ct. App. 2002)). The second element is particularly

significant because California courts have held that an

officer who uses excessive force is acting unlawfully and

therefore is not engaged in the performance of his or her

duties. People v. White, 161 Cal. Rptr. 541, 544–45 (Ct. App.

1980); see In re Manuel G., 941 P.2d 880, 885 (Cal. 1997);

People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1178–79 (Cal. 1990).

For that reason, the jury at Lemos’s criminal trial was

instructed that “[a] peace officer is not lawfully performing

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 11

his or her duties if he or she is . . . using unreasonable or

excessive force.”

It follows that Heck would bar Lemos from bringing an

excessive-force claim under section 1983 if that claim were

based on force used during the conduct that was the basis for

her section 148(a)(1) conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486

n.6. In that circumstance, to prevail in the section 1983

action, she would have to prove that Holton used excessive

force, thus “negat[ing] an element of the offense” of which

she was convicted. Id.; see McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619,

621 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a claim is Heck-barred “if

specific factual allegations in the complaint are necessarily

inconsistent with the validity of the conviction”).

But, crucially, the jury was told that it could find Lemos

guilty based on any one of four acts she committed during

the course of her interaction with Holton: making physical

contact with Holton at the door to the truck; placing herself

between Holton and Labruzzi; blocking Holton from

opening the truck door; and pulling away from Holton when

he attempted to grab her. Because the jury returned a general

verdict, we do not know which act it thought constituted an

offense. Although any one of the four acts could be the basis

for the guilty verdict, Lemos’s section 1983 action is based

on an allegation that Holton used excessive force during only

the last one; at oral argument, Lemos expressly stated that

she understood that act to refer to her pulling away from

Holton just before he tackled her, and she disavowed any

claim based on force used by Holton earlier in their

encounter. There would be no contradiction in concluding

(as the criminal jury may have) that Lemos obstructed

Holton during the lawful performance of his duties by, say,

blocking him from opening the truck door while also

concluding (as Lemos alleges in this action) that Holton used

12 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

excessive force when he tackled her five minutes later. Thus,

if Lemos were to prevail in her civil action, it would not

necessarily mean that her conviction was invalid. The action

is therefore not barred by Heck.

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court

reasoned that Holton’s acts “form[ed] one uninterrupted

interaction” and that there was “no temporal or spatial

distinction or other separation between the conduct for

which Lemos was convicted . . . and the conduct which

forms the basis of her Section 1983 claim.” Along similar

lines, Holton argues that Lemos’s conviction was “based on

the entire incident as a whole” and that Lemos could not have

been convicted “if any part of Deputy Holton’s use of force

during the incident was excessive.” If that were true, it would

not matter which of the four predicate acts the jury agreed

on because a finding that Holton used excessive force would

invalidate her conviction.

That reasoning, however, cannot be reconciled with the

jury instructions in Lemos’s underlying criminal case or with

California law. As we have explained, the instructions

allowed the jury to find Lemos guilty based on any of the

four charged acts. And while the instructions specified that

“[a] peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties

if he or she is . . . using unreasonable or excessive force,” the

use of the word “is”—in the present tense—is significant.

Under the instructions, an officer could have been lawfully

performing his duties at time A even if, at some later time B,

he used excessive force. So if the jury found that Lemos

resisted Holton at the truck and that Holton was acting

lawfully at the time, it should have found her guilty, even if

it also believed that Holton used excessive force when he

tackled her five minutes later. Lemos’s success in the section

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 13

1983 action thus would not necessarily contradict the

verdict.

Holton’s understanding of the instructions and the

verdict makes particularly little sense in light of the

California Supreme Court’s decision in Yount. That case

involved a section 1983 claim by an arrestee who had

resisted being handcuffed by struggling with the officers and

kicking them. Yount, 183 P.3d at 475–76. Though the

officers eventually managed to restrain him, Yount

continued to resist, whereupon one officer, intending to tase

Yount, accidentally shot him. Id. at 476. Yount pleaded no

contest to a violation of section 148(a)(1) and then sued the

officer who shot him. Id. at 476–77. The California Supreme

Court held that the action was not barred by Heck because a

finding that the officer’s use of deadly force was excessive

would not necessarily be inconsistent with his conviction. Id.

at 481–82. The court explained that “[t]he subsequent use of

excessive force [did] not negate the lawfulness of the initial

arrest attempt, or negate the unlawfulness of the criminal

defendant’s attempt to resist it.” Id. at 482 (quoting Jones v.

Marcum, 197 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1005 n.9 (S.D. Ohio 2002)).

Even though the civil action and the criminal conviction both

arose from “one continuous chain of events, two isolated

factual contexts would exist, the first giving rise to criminal

liability on the part of the criminal defendant, and the second

giving rise to civil liability on the part of the arresting

officer.” Id. (quoting Jones, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 n.9).

More recently, in People v. Williams, 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d

587 (Ct. App. 2018), the California Court of Appeal applied

Yount’s reasoning and explained that “the validity of a

conviction of an offense involving a peace officer engaged

in the performance of his or her duties depends on whether

‘the officer was acting lawfully at the time the offense

14 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

against the officer was committed.’” Id. at 599 (quoting

Manuel G., 941 P.2d at 885). In other words, if the officer is

acting lawfully and the defendant resists him, the defendant

has violated section 148(a)(1). Whatever might happen later,

it cannot undo the violation: “The use of excessive force

after the completed section 148(a)(1) violation would not

invalidate the completed section 148(a)(1) violation.” Id. at

601. The jury instructions here reflected those principles.

Holton relies on a footnote in our decision in Smith, in

which we suggested a different approach to reviewing a jury

verdict in a section 148(a)(1) case. We observed that

“[w]here a defendant is charged with a single-act offense but

there are multiple acts involved each of which could serve as

the basis for a conviction, a jury does not determine which

specific act or acts form the basis for the conviction.” Smith,

394 F.3d at 699 n.5. So far, so good. But we went on to say

that “a jury’s verdict necessarily determines the lawfulness

of the officers’ actions throughout the whole course of the

defendant’s conduct, and any action alleging the use of

excessive force would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of

his conviction.’” Id. (quoting Susag v. City of Lake Forest,

115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 274 (Ct. App. 2002)). That statement

was dictum—Smith involved a guilty plea, not a jury

verdict—and it was decided before the California Supreme

Court decided Yount. See Hooper v. County of San Diego,

629 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). As we have already

explained, applying Heck requires looking at the factual

basis for a conviction, regardless of whether that conviction

is based on a jury verdict or a guilty plea. And where, as here,

a jury is instructed that it may find a defendant guilty based

on one of several different events, then a guilty verdict does

not necessarily “determine[] the lawfulness of the officers’

actions” throughout the entire encounter. Smith, 394 F.3d at

699 n.5. We therefore disapprove of that statement in Smith.

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 15

As Holton points out, the relevant language from Smith

reappeared in Beets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038

(9th Cir. 2012). But again, the statement was dictum.

Although Beets did involve a jury verdict, both the criminal

prosecution and the section 1983 action involved the same

event: Officers fatally shot a man who was driving a truck

toward them. Id. at 1040. The passenger in the truck was

convicted of aiding and abetting the driver’s assault on the

officers, and the parents of the deceased driver brought a

section 1983 claim, alleging that the officers used excessive

force. Id. at 1040–41. We held that Heck precluded the

section 1983 action because success would have necessarily

implied the invalidity of the passenger’s criminal conviction.

Id. at 1047–48. We explained that “there are not multiple

factual bases for [the passenger’s] conviction for aiding and

abetting in the assault.” Id. at 1045 (emphasis added). In

other words, the section 1983 action was predicated on the

same conduct that the criminal jury had already determined

was lawful. Id. at 1045, 1048. Although we disapprove of

Beets’s repetition of the Smith dictum, the reasoning of Beets

does not undermine our holding here. In this case, unlike in

Beets, the jury was instructed that multiple acts could serve

as the predicate for the criminal conviction, and we do not

know which the jury chose.

Because the district court erred in holding that Lemos’s

action was barred by Heck, we reverse the grant of summary

judgment to the defendants. We express no view on the

merits of Lemos’s claim or on any other defenses that the

defendants may assert. We leave those matters for the district

court to consider on remand.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

16 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, joined by LEE, Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

Like a wolf in sheep’s clothing, the majority opinion may

appear at first blush to simply dispense with the Heck

preclusion doctrine due to the unique factual scenario

presented, but something more troubling lingers beneath the

surface. The majority’s reasoning presupposes that an

uninterrupted interaction with no temporal or spatial break

between a § 1983 plaintiff’s unlawful conduct and an

officer’s alleged excessive force can be broken down into

distinct isolated events to avoid the application of the Heck

bar. In this way, the decision creates an escape hatch to

Heck.

The outcome, which reflects a misapprehension of

California criminal law, violates the very purposes cited by

the Supreme Court when it established the Heck preclusion

doctrine. Specifically, it undermines the strong policy

against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out

of a single transaction, and ignores the Supreme Court’s

concerns for finality and consistency between criminal and

civil judgments. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484

(1994); see also McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2157

(2019) (discussing the purposes underlying Heck). For these

reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district

court’s application of the Heck bar to Lemos’s § 1983 claim.

The majority’s analysis begins and ends with its parsing

of the jury instructions provided in Lemos’s criminal trial for

her violation of California Penal Code section 148(a)(1).

The majority recognizes that “Heck would bar Lemos from

bringing an excessive-force claim under section 1983 if that

claim were based on the same conduct as her section

148(a)(1) conviction.” That is because to prevail on her

§ 1983 claim, Lemos would have to prove that Deputy

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 17

Holton used excessive force, thereby negating an element of

the offense of which she was convicted 1. Cal. Penal Code

§ 148(a)(1). “But,” the majority reasons, “crucially, the jury

was told that it could find Lemos guilty based on any one of

four acts she committed during the course of her interaction

with Holton.” Thus, the majority concludes that because

“we do not know which act” the jury convicted her on,

Lemos’s § 1983 action cannot be barred by Heck.

There are at least two problems with the majority’s

reasoning—first, it ignores California’s continuous course of

conduct rule, and second, under the facts presented, there

was no break between any of Lemos’s illegal acts and the

excessive force she alleges in her § 1983 complaint.

Under California’s continuous course of conduct rule,

Lemos’s conviction for violating section 148(a)(1)

necessarily includes all of the acts that comprise a

continuous or indivisible transaction. People v. McFarland,

376 P.2d 449, 455–56 (Cal. 1962). As we correctly

explained in our dissent in Smith v. City of Hemet:

The major considerations in determining

whether similar acts are part of the same

transaction are the amount of time elapsed

1

The majority “disapproves” of what it construes as dicta in Smith

(repeated later in Beets) which states that “a jury’s verdict necessarily

determines the lawfulness of the officers' actions throughout the whole

course of the defendant’s conduct, and any action alleging the use of

excessive force would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction.’” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 699 n.5 (9th Cir.

2005) (en banc). I continue to think this language accurately reflects

California law and the spirit of Heck, but nevertheless this court remains

bound by California’s interpretation of what is required for a jury to

convict under section 148(a)(1).

18 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

between the discrete incidents, and whether

there was any break in the criminal activity.

See People v. Jefferson, 123 Cal.App.2d 219,

221, 266 P.2d 564 (1954) (holding that two

distinct acts of assault with a deadly weapon

taking place within a fifteen minute period

“were a part of the same incident, and they

could not reasonably be held to constitute two

separate offenses, each complete in itself, and

each of which would require a separate

charge”); People v. Mota, 115 Cal.App.3d

227, 233, 171 Cal.Rptr. 212 (1981).

394 F.3d 689, 709 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Silverman, J.,

dissenting). Applying those considerations, People v.

Moreno, 108 Cal. Rptr. 338, 342–43 (1973) held that two

instances of violating section 148 were two separate offenses

because thirty minutes elapsed between the two incidents

and “[i]n the intervening space of time the defendant had

completely calmed down, and ceased his criminal activity.”

By contrast, Lemos never cooperated with the officers—

rather, as the body camera footage presented to the jury

confirms, throughout the roughly seven minutes that elapsed

between Lemos’s first obstructive encounter with Deputy

Holton at the truck and the time of her eventual arrest, Lemos

resisted, obstructed, and delayed Deputy Holton in the

performance of his duties at every turn. There can be no

dispute regarding the facts here, but a narrative description

of the conduct simply cannot do it justice. Instead, the video

depicting what occurred from start to finish supports the

continuous nature of the interaction, which involved not just

Lemos but her mother (who was also convicted under

section 148(a)(1)) and Lemos’s two sisters.

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 19

It makes sense then why Lemos was charged and

convicted of just a single count of violating section

148(a)(1)—the continuous course of conduct rule bars the

state from prosecuting a defendant again for acts that were

part and parcel of the same continuous transaction, a rule

designed to protect criminal defendants. Again, our dissent

in Smith explained this well:

It is this rule that now prevents the State of

California from charging Smith anew for the

conduct occurring after he first refused to

take his hands out of his pockets. And again

for refusing to put his hands on his head. And

again for not turning around. And again for

not coming off the porch. And again for

refusing to submit to handcuffing. Smith was

charged and convicted of one count of

resisting an officer that necessarily

encompassed the entire sequence of events

leading up to his arrest. If, for whatever

reason, Smith wanted to waive the protection

of that rule and plead guilty to one identified

act, leaving himself open to possible

prosecution for acts that otherwise would be

dead letters, it was incumbent upon him to

say so.

394 F.3d at 709 (Silverman, J., dissenting). For that reason,

to paraphrase the California Supreme Court in Yount v. City

of Sacramento, 183 P.3d 471, 481 (Cal. 2008), “[i]t would

be anomalous to construe [Lemos’s] criminal conviction

broadly for criminal law purposes so as to shield [her] from

a new prosecution arising from these events but then, once

[she] had obtained the benefits…, to turn around and

construe the criminal conviction narrowly so as to permit

20 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

[her] to prosecute a section 1983 claim arising out of the

same transaction.” Id. (alterations added). The majority

opinion fails to appreciate California law on this issue and

thereby creates tension with this legal principle.

Of course, an allegation of excessive force by a police

officer is not barred by Heck if the alleged act is distinct

temporally or spatially from the factual basis for the section

148(a)(1) conviction, because such an allegation would not

“necessarily” imply the invalidity of the conviction. See

Beets v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1042–43 (9th

Cir. 2012). But the court must determine whether there is a

legitimate analytical way to parse the individual’s

obstructive acts from the officer’s use of force. The majority

apparently concludes that the four acts identified in the jury

instructions provide all the court needs to make its Heck

determination.

For that reason, I believe some context is useful here.

Counsel admitted at en banc oral argument that the defense

requested this instruction because they had concerns about

whether their clients’ verbal conduct would be considered

resisting, obstructing, or delaying by the jury. Had the

prosecutor not agreed to satisfy defense counsel’s concerns,

perhaps this case would not be before us at all. And, as Yount

cautioned, it would “anomalous” to allow defense counsel to

use this jury instruction as a shield for criminal law purposes,

but as a sword to permit Lemos’s § 1983 claim to proceed.

Yount, 183 P.3d at 481.

Accordingly, the fact that the jury instructions offered

four acts which could form the basis for Lemos’s section

148(a)(1) conviction cannot alone be determinative of

whether the Heck bar applies. Under California law, the

question remains whether Lemos’s obstructive acts can be

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 21

separated, temporally or otherwise, from Deputy Holton’s

alleged excessive force. Here, they cannot.

The cases tend to fall into two categories: the first, where

the alleged excessive force occurs after the chain of events

underlying the section 148(a)(1) conviction 2, such as in

Hooper v. Cnty. of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir.

2011) and Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir.

2001) (the Heck bar does not apply), and the second, where

the alleged excessive force occurs during the chain of events

underlying the section 148(a)(1) conviction, such as in Beets

and Sanders v. City of Pittsburg, 14 F.4th 968, 970 (9th Cir.

2021) (the Heck bar applies). Thus, if Lemos had been bitten

by a police dog after she had been arrested for violating

section 148(a)(1), for example, her conviction for resisting

an officer would not have barred her § 1983 lawsuit. But the

facts underlying Lemos’s conviction, including each of the

four acts listed in the jury instructions and Deputy Holton’s

alleged excessive force, all occurred during a single

indivisible chain of events before her arrest, and therefore

her § 1983 is barred by Heck.

This distinction is reflected in Sanders, a decision

published just months after the underlying opinion in Lemos

and absent from discussion in the majority opinion. In

Sanders, the defendant fled from police after being spotted

in a stolen car. 14 F.4th at 970. The defendant led police on

a car chase and then a foot chase. Id. When an officer caught

up to the defendant, he resisted. Id. The officer then

commanded a police dog to bite the defendant’s leg, which

2

Even Yount, which the majority heavily relies upon, falls into this

second category, as it involved an officer’s “subsequent” accidental use

of deadly force after Yount had been handcuffed. See Yount, 183 P.3d

at 475–76, 482.

22 LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA

it did. Id. The defendant was finally arrested and charged

with a violation of section 148(a)(1). Id. The defendant

pleaded no contest to the charge and stipulated that the

factual basis for his plea was “based on the preliminary

hearing transcript,” which described multiple instances of

the defendant resisting. Id. Meanwhile, the defendant filed

a § 1983 claim against the officer for excessive force in

using the police dog. Id.

Relying on Yount, we rejected the defendant’s argument

that his § 1983 claim was not Heck barred, finding that it

could not separate out which of the defendant’s several

obstructive acts led to his conviction since all of them did.

Id. at 972–73. Because the dog bite was part of the section

148(a)(1) conviction’s factual basis, it was necessarily

lawful for purposes of the Heck analysis. Id. at 972. While

Sanders involved a plea rather than a jury trial, its logic

applies with equal force here—we may not “slice up the

factual basis of a § 148(a)(1) conviction to avoid the Heck

bar.” Id.

***

“[U]nless one believes (as [the Supreme Court] do[es]

not) that a § 1983 action for damages must always and

everywhere be available,” the long-standing Heck preclusion

doctrine must not be interpreted in a manner that threatens

to swallow the rule. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17

(1998).

Nevertheless, the majority engages in the “temporal hair-

splitting” cautioned against by courts time and again in

search of a distinct break between Lemos’s criminal act and

Deputy Holton’s alleged use of force where none

meaningfully exists. See Fetters v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 196

Cal. Rptr. 3d 848, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). Because no

LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 23

such break exists, Lemos could only have been convicted if

the jury found that Deputy Holton did not use excessive

force throughout the interaction, an element of the

conviction which the jury was instructed on. But Lemos can

only prevail on her § 1983 claim if she proves that Deputy

Holton did use excessive force during that same interaction.

Thus, allowing Lemos’s § 1983 action to proceed violates

the holding of Heck and creates conflicting resolutions

arising out of a single event.

Because the majority opinion “expand[s] opportunities

for collateral attack” on criminal convictions despite clear

Supreme Court guidance to the contrary, I respectfully

dissent. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–85.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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