Hjalmar Rodriguez, Jr. v. Edward H. Burnside

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 1 of 20

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-11218

____________________

HJALMAR RODRIGUEZ, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

EDWARD H. BURNSIDE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:17-cv-00010-MTT-CHW

____________________

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 2 of 20

2 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

Before JILL PRYOR, GRANT, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

To test whether a state prison regulation violates an

inmate’s constitutional rights, courts ask whether the regulation is

reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. That

inquiry is intended to ensure that prison officials respect

constitutional boundaries without frustrating their efforts to fulfill

the difficult responsibility of prison administration.

Here we consider two Georgia prison policies that control

how officers transport inmates to showers, and we ask whether

those policies interfere with an inmate’s First Amendment right to

free exercise of religion. Although the inmate suggests ways the

prison could make an exception to accommodate his religious

requests, he does not show that the policies were unconstitutional

in the first place. And even if they were, qualified immunity would

protect the officials because the types of shower rights the inmate

seeks are not clearly established. We affirm the district court.

I.

Hjalmar Rodriguez was imprisoned at Hays State Prison

after he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. While he lived

there, Rodriguez killed another inmate by stabbing him with a

knife during a fight. Understandably concerned that he was a safety

risk, prison officials moved him into the Special Management Unit

at the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison. That unit

handles “offenders who commit or lead others to commit violent,

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 3 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 3

disruptive, predatory, or riotous actions, or who otherwise pose a

serious threat to the security of the institution.” The unit’s

rigorous policies reflect the greater risk those inmates pose to

prison safety and security.

For most of his time in that unit, Rodriguez was housed in

wings with single-occupancy cells. These cells were not equipped

with showers, but prison policy was to escort each inmate to a

separate shower three times per week. To ensure safety and

security during the shower transports, prison officers in the unit

followed a set of strict procedures. To start, each transport

required the dedicated attention of between two and five officers.

Clothing was also kept to a minimum—inmates could wear only

boxers and shower shoes when walking to the shower, and could

not bring along any other clothes. Before leaving their cells,

inmates handed any necessary items through a cell-door port so

that an officer could “thoroughly check” for contraband. Only the

bare necessities were allowed—soap and a towel. Once the items

were searched, the officers handcuffed the inmate through the

door port, opened the door, and finally secured the inmate in leg

shackles.

Only then could an inmate be taken to the shower. With

yet another step-by-step process, the inmate was unshackled,

locked in the shower, and unhandcuffed. After the shower, the

process then went in reverse—the inmate was again searched and

secured before being taken back to his cell by a group of officers.

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 4 of 20

4 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

Though tedious, these steps were meant to ensure “that the

escorting officers were safe and that the prison remained secure.”

As the deputy warden explained, the “shower security protocol”

helped stop the flow of contraband and weapons that could be

hidden in clothing and taken to the shower.

Rodriguez, however, disagreed with those policies and

believed that the restrictions infringed his constitutional rights. As

a Muslim, Rodriguez practiced ghusl, a ritual bathing that involves

washing the whole body multiple times and that must be

completed every 24 hours. He complained that ghusl was

impossible to perform using the sink and towel in his cell because

it “requires a large amount of water” and would have produced a

slipping hazard. Rodriguez conceded that the sink and towel were

helpful, enabling him to perform a simpler and more frequent

religious washing called wudu. But because prison officials were

not providing him with daily showers, they were—at least as he

saw it—violating his First Amendment right to freely exercise his

religion.

Rodriguez’s religious beliefs also dictated that he dress

modestly “by wearing garments that cover from mid-stomach or

the naval to the bottom of the knees” around anyone but

immediate family. Of course, the shower transport policy did not

allow for that much clothing—he could wear only boxers and

shower shoes. The policy thus contravened his religious modesty

obligations by requiring him to expose both his lower stomach and

a portion of his leg above his knee.

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 5 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 5

To challenge these policies and raise a host of other

complaints, Rodriguez sued several prison officials under the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc–1, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory,

injunctive, and monetary relief. In his complaint, Rodriguez

claimed that the shower policies intruded on his First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The district court granted summary judgment to the prison

officials on his shower policy claims. Adopting the magistrate

judge’s report, the court held that prison officials had not violated

Rodriguez’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they

enforced the prison’s shower policies. The policies were

“reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests in

securing the prison.” It also held that he was not entitled to relief

under RLUIPA because his injunctive claims were mooted when

he was transferred out of the Special Management Unit.

Rodriguez appeals, contending that the shower policies fail

First Amendment scrutiny. The prison officials disagree, and argue

that they are entitled to qualified immunity in any event.

Rodriguez also argues that the magistrate judge was incorrect to

reject motions related to discovery requests and appointment of

counsel.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the prison officials on Rodriguez’s free exercise claim.

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 6 of 20

6 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

See Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc., 764 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir.

2014). We view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment is

proper when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Id.

A.

“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison

inmates from the protections of the Constitution.” Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). But those protections can be limited,

because they sometimes conflict with an inmate’s “status as a

prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the

corrections system.” Pesci v. Budz, 935 F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir.

2019) (quotation omitted); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,

822 (1974).

Deciding what limits are permissible is tricky—running a

prison “is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires

expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which

are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive

branches of government.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85. Respect for

the separation of powers thus requires us to exercise “judicial

restraint regarding prisoner complaints.” Id. at 85 (quotation

omitted). And when critiquing a state penal system, principles of

federalism “bolster that deference.” Pesci, 935 F.3d at 1165.

To allow prison officials “to remain the primary arbiters of

the problems that arise in prison management,” we evaluate a

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 7 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 7

prisoner’s constitutional claim under a “unitary, deferential

standard.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229–30 (2001). Under

that standard, a prison regulation burdening an inmate’s exercise

of constitutional rights must be “reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

To succeed on a constitutional claim, an inmate must show

that “the logical connection between the regulation and the

asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or

irrational.” Id. at 89–90. We do not inquire whether the prison

could make an individualized exception for the complaining

inmate—we assess “only the relationship between the asserted

penological interests and the prison regulation.” Shaw, 532 U.S. at

230.

The Supreme Court in Turner outlined four factors that

frame our analysis. To decide whether the prison’s policies

impermissibly burden Rodriguez’s First Amendment right to free

exercise, we ask

(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection

between the prison regulation and the legitimate

governmental interest put forward to justify it”;

(2) whether “alternative means” of exercising the

right “remain open to prison inmates,” such that they

may “freely observe a number of their religious

obligations”;

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 8 of 20

8 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

(3) what “impact accommodation of the asserted

constitutional right will have on guards and other

inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources

generally”; and

(4) whether any “obvious, easy alternatives” to the

current regulation exist, which would suggest that

the policy is an “exaggerated response to prison

concerns.”

See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91 (quotations omitted); O’Lone v. Est.

of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987).

To be quite clear, we do not balance these factors to see if

some outweigh the others. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 532–33

(2006) (plurality opinion). The last three factors are valuable

because they provide more angles from which to view the

fundamental inquiry: whether the prison regulation is reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

If that rational connection is missing, “the regulation fails,

irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its favor.” Shaw,

532 U.S. at 229–30; Pesci, 935 F.3d at 1167. And if the connection

exists, the policy will stand. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 533.

B.

We start with the three-showers-per-week limitation.

Rodriguez does not dispute that the prison officials’ asserted

interests in this rule are legitimate. He accepts that transporting an

inmate to the shower “involved ‘safety and security risks’ and was

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 9 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 9

‘time- and labor- intensive’ for correctional officers.” No doubt

that is true—promoting prison security is “perhaps the most

legitimate of penological goals.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126,

133 (2003); Prison Legal News v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 890

F.3d 954, 967 (11th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court has long

recognized that prisons make do with “limited resources for

preserving institutional order” and thus deserve deference in how

they allocate those resources. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.

Turning to the first Turner factor, a rational connection

exists between limiting the frequency of showers and furthering

safety and security. The policy requires multiple officers during

the shower transport to help if an inmate resists returning to his

cell, refuses to be handcuffed, or threatens the transporting officers.

And the safety risk to officers is real—the unit houses the most

“violent, disruptive, predatory” inmates in the Georgia prison

system. In fact, some inmates are classified as so dangerous that

they may be transported only if three officers are present and two

of them are armed. Rodriguez himself demonstrates why such

extreme care is called for—he was moved to the Special

Management Unit after killing another inmate. The prison’s

precautions are reasonably calculated responses to the risks

involved in transporting this category of inmates.

Nor does it matter that the prison officials have not

presented “evidence of an actual security breach.” Prison Legal

News, 890 F.3d at 968. To justify a security policy, prison officials

need not establish a causal link between the practice and a

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 10 of 20

10 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

reduction in violent incidents. Id. Instead, prison officials may

“anticipate security problems” and “adopt innovative solutions.”

Id. (quotation omitted). A policy like this one—directly mitigating

risk to prison safety and security—is reasonable.

The remaining three factors confirm this connection.

O’Lone guides how we review the second factor. There, the

prison’s work policy prevented Muslim inmates from attending

their Friday prayer service. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 345–47. Even so,

the Supreme Court held that the prisoners retained alternative

means of religious exercise because the prison allowed them “to

participate in other religious observances of their faith”—other

prayer meetings, access to a state-provided imam, special meals,

and modified mealtimes during the month of Ramadan. Id. at 352.

Rodriguez argues that refusing to provide him a daily

shower left him with no alternative means of exercising his

religion. But he misconstrues our inquiry. The question is not

whether the prison accommodated every aspect of his religious

practice, but whether he was allowed other means of practicing his

religious beliefs. See id., 482 U.S. at 352. And when we consider

the prisoner’s free exercise of religion, the right “must be viewed

sensibly and expansively.” See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.

401, 417 (1989). As long as a prisoner like Rodriguez retains “the

ability to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies,” the

second factor tips against him. See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352.

Rodriguez could exercise his religion in many other ways.

He could perform wudu, the other religious washing ritual, using

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 11 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 11

the sink in his cell. And the prison allowed Muslim inmates to

participate in “Friday Jumah service” by having the Muslim

chaplain “go cell by cell to individual inmates for their Friday

prayer.” The prison also adjusted the meal schedule during

Ramadan for those who wanted to observe the religious fast; they

were “provided a morning meal around dawn (before sunrise) and

an evening meal after sunset.” These steps show that Rodriguez

had many alternative means of practicing his religious faith despite

the shower policy.

The third factor, resource allocation, also suggests that the

prison’s policy was reasonable. Providing daily showers would

have been a severe drain on the prison’s limited resources, forcing

prison officers to more than double the time they spent making

shower transports. Requesting such a “significant reallocation” of

resources, the Supreme Court has explained, interferes with the

smooth functioning of a prison. Overton, 539 U.S. at 135. These

consequences confirm that the three-showers-per-week policy

rationally advances the prison’s security interests.

Our last consideration when deciding whether a prison rule

is reasonably related to a legitimate interest is whether any

“obvious, easy alternatives” to that regulation exist. Turner, 482

U.S. at 90. This is a “high standard,” designed to flush out whether

the current policy is an “exaggerated response” to the prison’s

concerns. Overton, 539 U.S. at 136; Turner, 482 U.S. at 90

(quotation omitted). To meet it, a proposed alternative must be a

simple and unmistakably effective choice.

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 12 of 20

12 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

Rodriguez argues that an alternative to the three-showers-

per-week policy would have been to move him to another cell

block where the cells contained personal showers. 1 But the fact

that the prison could have moved him to a cell where he would not

need shower transports does not suggest that the shower policy

itself was irrational. In fact, Rodriguez is not proposing an

alternative policy at all—he is asking for an individual exemption.

We commonly confront such requests when reviewing RLUIPA

claims. Under that standard (which is stricter on prisons than

Turner), we assess whether a prison policy as applied to an

individual prisoner is the “least restrictive means” of furthering a

“compelling governmental interest.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352,

362–63 (2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)); Dorman v.

Aronofsky, —F.4th—, No. 20-10770, 2022 WL 2092855, at *3–4

(11th Cir. June 10, 2022). The prison may also need to justify its

denial of “specific exemptions to particular religious claimants”

under RLUIPA’s “focused” inquiry. Id. (quotation omitted). That

framework is not relevant here, however, because Rodriguez

appealed the dismissal of his § 1983 claims, not his RLUIPA claims.

1 The prison officials argue that Rodriguez waived this issue by not properly

objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. But in doing so, they

fail to construe Rodriguez’s pro se district court filings liberally. See Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Rodriguez sufficiently proposed the daily-

shower alternative below, so the officials should have addressed the merits of

his argument.

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 13 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 13

And Turner makes no comparable, individualized demands.

It only requires a prison’s policy to be rationally related to a

legitimate government interest. To bring his First Amendment

challenge to the policies under Turner, Rodriguez must do more

than propose a personal accommodation. He must present an

obvious alternative policy that could replace the current one on a

prison-wide scale. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 93. For example, in

Prison Legal News a publisher challenging a prison’s magazine ban

suggested that the prison could restrict inmates’ access to

prohibited services rather than banning its magazine for

advertising those services. 890 F.3d at 974. And in Overton v.

Bazzetta, a prison policy excluded most minor visitors other than

immediate family; the suggested alternative was to allow “nieces

and nephews or children for whom parental rights have been

terminated” to visit. 539 U.S. at 129–30, 136. Rodriguez, on the

other hand, falls short of proposing any alternative policy.

Instead, he insists that the prison officials had to “explain

their refusal” to move him. But the Supreme Court has held

otherwise: a prison need not “shoot down every conceivable

alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s

constitutional complaint.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91. The prison

regulation need only be reasonable. The three-showers-per-week

policy thus survives scrutiny.

C.

We apply the same Turner factors to consider whether it

was reasonable to limit prisoners to wearing only boxers and shoes

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 14 of 20

14 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

to the shower. The prison limited what prisoners wore to the

shower because “contraband could be hidden in clothing and

weapons could be taken to the shower.” The same interests—

safety and security—also justify this shower policy. And the

validity of these interests, as we said earlier, is “beyond question.”

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415.

Turning to the first factor, the policy rationally advances

safety and security. Limiting the places where a prisoner could

hide a weapon reduces the risk that an officer will be harmed, as

well as the risk that the weapon will be conveyed to other

prisoners. Rodriguez argues that the officials said that transporting

prisoners in “full dress” rather than in boxers and shower shoes

would threaten prison safety; allowing him to add a t-shirt to his

shower garb would make no difference in his view given their

justification. But we do not nitpick whether a policy could be

adjusted to accommodate a prisoner’s interest—this is not a “least

restrictive alternative” test. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (quotation

omitted). Quite simply, more clothing presents a greater safety

threat. Because limiting what prisoners wear and carry to the

shower makes it harder to move weapons or contraband, the

policy is rationally related to advancing prison safety.

The remaining three factors implicate much of the same

reasoning behind the other policy, so we do not rehash every

detail. The second factor translates unchanged: Rodriguez was

allowed alternative means of exercising his religious beliefs. As for

the third factor, requiring the prison to allow prisoners to wear

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 15 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 15

t-shirts during shower transports would introduce the specific risk

to prison safety and security that the policy sought to prevent.

Other methods of mitigating the risk would require officers to

dedicate more time and energy to carefully searching the extra

clothing. Those added burdens confirm that the security policy

rationally advances the prison’s interest in safety. See Beard, 548

U.S. at 532–33.

Under the fourth factor, Rodriguez again suggests that the

prison should have moved him to another cell. And again this

suggestion is for a personal exemption rather than a policy change.

Rodriguez does, however, present another solution that qualifies

as an alternative policy.

He relies on the unit’s “Standard Operating Procedures,”

which say that prisoners must never be removed from their cells in

anything more than a t-shirt, boxers, and shower shoes. He argues

that this policy is good enough for shower transports too. It may

be true that in other instances the prison allowed prisoners to be

transported while still wearing t-shirts. But the fact that the prison

offers inmates the comparative dignity and comfort of wearing a

shirt during other activities does not render it illogical or

unreasonable to allow less clothing on the way to the shower. See

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 419. Because Rodriguez’s proposal would

introduce the exact risk of harm the prison is working to prevent,

it is not an obvious, easy alternative to the existing policy.

The prison officials therefore did not violate Rodriguez’s

First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion. Even if these

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 16 of 20

16 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

particular policies substantially burdened Rodriguez’s religious

exercise, they were rationally related to the prison’s legitimate

interests in maintaining safe and secure conditions while providing

prisoners with the opportunity to shower.

III.

The prison officials also argue that, regardless of our answer

to the First Amendment question, they are entitled to qualified

immunity. They say that it was not clearly established that the

shower policies infringed the First Amendment.

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials

may not be held liable for damages under § 1983 unless it is shown

that they violated “a constitutional right that was clearly

established at the time of the challenged action.” Echols v. Lawton,

913 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). Qualified

immunity covers officials when they are acting within the scope of

their discretionary authority; Rodriguez does not dispute that was

the case here. See id. Qualified immunity therefore applies unless

he produces evidence showing (1) that the officials violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) “that the right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Wade v. United

States, 13 F.4th 1217, 1225 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted).

Rodriguez concedes that no materially similar case clearly

establishes that these kinds of policies violate prisoners’ First

Amendment rights. Nevertheless, he argues, Turner was so

decisive that it formed a “broader, clearly established principle that

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 17 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 17

should control the novel facts of the situation.” Id. at 1226

(quotation omitted). But that is true only if the case drew a “bright

line” between “lawful and unlawful” policies. Post v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1993), modified on other

grounds, 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994). Turner drew no such line.

Nor did it ask courts to fine tune a prison’s policy to accommodate

a prisoner’s individual request. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91.

Rodriguez thus has not shown that a reasonable official would have

had “fair and clear warning” that his particular conduct was

“unlawful and unconstitutional.” Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317,

1335–36 (11th Cir. 2008). Even if the prison’s policies were

improper, the prison officials would be entitled to qualified

immunity.

IV.

Turning to the district court’s denials of a discovery motion

and appointment-of-counsel motions, we review them for abuse of

discretion. Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1365

(11th Cir. 2007). Under this standard, a district court “has a range

of choice” when managing the discovery process and “its decision

will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not

influenced by any mistake of law.” Knight through Kerr v. Miami-

Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 811 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted).

Rodriguez asked the magistrate judge to order prison

officials to help him depose other prisoners as he developed his

claim that contaminated vegan meals violated the Eighth

Amendment. Rejection of that motion did not preclude Rodriguez

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 18 of 20

18 Opinion of the Court 20-11218

from collecting evidence; he acquired affidavits from four other

inmates to support his Eighth Amendment claim. And as the

magistrate judge explained, Rodriguez failed to show a good-faith

attempt to resolve the discovery dispute with the prison officials.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Part of the problem, the magistrate

judge concluded, was that seeking depositions was a “particularly

burdensome” method of gathering information and

disproportionate to the needs of the case. We see no abuse of

discretion.

Nor was the district court obliged to appoint counsel to help

with discovery. Appointment of counsel in civil cases is a privilege

“justified only by exceptional circumstances,” not a constitutional

right. Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985). A

district court has “broad discretion” when ruling on such a motion.

Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, the

magistrate judge determined that Rodriguez set forth the essential

facts underlying his claims and that the applicable legal doctrines

were readily apparent. See id. Although we appointed counsel to

represent Rodriguez on appeal, it was not an abuse of its discretion

for the district court to conclude that no exceptional circumstances

justified the appointment of counsel below. See Norelus v.

Denny’s, Inc., 628 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2010).

* * *

Prisons are tasked with providing safety and security for the

inmate population as well as for prison staff—but cannot do so by

disregarding prisoners’ constitutional rights. Here, Rodriguez had

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 19 of 20

20-11218 Opinion of the Court 19

a First Amendment right to free exercise even while he was

incarcerated in the Special Management Unit. Though that right

was sometimes curtailed because of the prison’s legitimate

penological requirements, the prison’s policies hit the right mark

under Turner. Rodriguez’s constitutional challenge fails.

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 20-11218 Date Filed: 06/30/2022 Page: 20 of 20

20-11218 JILL PRYOR, J., Concurring 1

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, Concurring in part, concurring in the

judgment:

I join Parts III and IV of the majority opinion and concur in

its judgment affirming the district court. Because I agree with Part

III of the majority opinion that the First Amendment right the

defendants stand accused of violating was not clearly established, I

would not decide whether Mr. Rodriguez’s First Amendment right

to free exercise of his religion was violated. See Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).