Opinion

Jose Hernandez v. Merrick Garland

  • 47 F.4th 908
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jun 28, 2022
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Agency
Cited by
132 cases
Authority
More cited than 96.7%

finding that the petitioner had forfeited an argument where he challenged an issue “only in a single sentence” and failed to “‘coherently develop[]’ the argument” (quoting United States v. Kimble, 107 F.3d 712 , 715 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997))

How later courts described this case

  • finding that the petitioner had forfeited an argument where he challenged an issue “only in a single sentence” and failed to “‘coherently develop[]’ the argument” (quoting United States v. Kimble, 107 F.3d 712 , 715 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997))
  • holding that the petitioner forfeited an argument by failing to develop it “specifically and distinctly” in his opening brief (quoting Velasquez- Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020))
  • holding that the petitioner forfeited an argument by failing to “specifically and distinctly” raise it in his opening brief (quoting Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020))
  • stating that issues not “specifically and distinctly” argued in the opening brief are forfeited (citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ALBERTO HERNANDEZ, No. 21-70493

Petitioner,

Agency No.

v. A094-447-896

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted December 9, 2021

Pasadena, California

Filed June 28, 2022

Before: Paul J. Kelly, Jr., * Milan D. Smith, Jr., and

Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Forrest

*

The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

2 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

SUMMARY **

Immigration

Denying Jose Alberto Hernandez’s petition for review of

a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel

held that: (1) Hernandez’s receipt of temporary protected

status (“TPS”) was not an admission, and he therefore could

not meet the statutory requirement that he have seven years

of continuous residence in the United States after admission

for purposes of lawful permanent resident cancellation of

removal; and 2) the Board properly concluded that

Hernandez’s domestic-violence conviction was a

particularly serious crime (“PSC”) that barred him from

obtaining asylum.

Considering the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 1809 (2021), and the plain

language of the TPS statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(5), the

panel concluded that the granting of TPS does not constitute

being “admitted in any status” under the cancellation statute,

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). The panel held that Sanchez effectively

overruled circuit precedent requiring consideration of the

benefits conferred by an alien’s immigration status in

determining whether the alien had been admitted. The panel

explained that circuit precedent judicially expanding the

statutory definition of admission was clearly irreconcilable

with Sanchez’s holding that lawful status and admission are

distinct concepts in immigration law. The panel wrote that

Sanchez is clear that TPS does not constitute an admission

to the United States no matter how great its benefits.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 3

The panel wrote that the plain language of the TPS

statute reinforced its conclusion that receiving TPS does not

constitute an admission under the cancellation statute. Most

compelling is the statute’s express statement that a grant of

TPS does not constitute an admission. Moreover, certain

other language indicates that TPS is a disfavored way to

establish any of the cancellation-of-removal requirements,

and notably absent from the statute’s list of benefits is

admission. Accordingly, the panel agreed with the BIA that

Hernandez failed to satisfy the 7-year continuous residence

requirement after having been admitted in any status, and he

was therefore not eligible for lawful permanent resident

cancellation of removal.

The panel rejected Hernandez’s argument that the BIA

legally erred in its PSC determination by considering the

cumulative effect of his three domestic-violence

convictions, instead of considering his third conviction in

2016 alone. The panel concluded that the BIA’s specific

references to Hernandez’s third domestic-violence

conviction made clear that it did not hold that all three

convictions, considered collectively, constituted a

particularly serious crime. Rather, the agency held only that

the third conviction was particularly serious in light of the

previous convictions. The panel concluded that it need not

address whether the BIA properly considered Hernandez’s

prior convictions in deciding that his third conviction was

particularly serious because Hernandez did not “specifically

and distinctly” argue that this was error in his opening brief,

and thus forfeited the issue.

4 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

COUNSEL

Niels W. Frenzen (argued) and Jean E. Reisz, University of

Southern California, Gould School of Law, Immigration

Clinic, Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner.

Lindsay Corliss (argued), Trial Attorney; Brianne Whelan

Cohen, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied

Petitioner Jose Alberto Hernandez cancellation of removal

concluding that his receipt of temporary protected status

(TPS) was not an admission and, therefore, he could not

meet the statutory requirement that he have seven years of

continuous residence in the United States after admission.

The BIA also denied Hernandez’s application for asylum

concluding that his 2016 domestic-violence conviction was

a “particularly serious crime” that barred him from relief.

Hernandez challenges the BIA’s decision raising two

primary arguments: (1) under our precedent, his TPS does

constitute an admission “in any status” under the

cancellation statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and (2) the BIA

applied an improper legal standard in deciding that his 2016

conviction was for a particularly serious crime.

We reject both arguments. In doing so, we hold that the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sanchez v. Mayorkas,

141 S. Ct. 1809 (2021), effectively overruled our precedent

HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 5

requiring that the benefits conferred by an alien’s

immigration status be analyzed to determine if the alien had

been “admitted in any status,” see Miller v. Gammie,

335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), and we

conclude that under Sanchez and the plain language of the

relevant immigration statutes, Hernandez’s TPS does not

constitute an admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). We

also conclude that the BIA did not err in classifying his 2016

domestic-violence conviction as a particularly serious crime

that bars him from obtaining asylum.

I. BACKGROUND

Hernandez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered

the United States unlawfully in 1999. The Government

granted him TPS in 2003. The TPS program “provides

humanitarian relief to foreign nationals in the United States

who come from specified countries.” Sanchez, 141 S. Ct.

at 1812; 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). The Government may

designate a country for protection if the country suffers from

dangerous conditions arising from armed conflicts or natural

disasters. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). Citizens of the designated

country who are already present in the United States may

then obtain TPS. Id. § 1254a(c)(1). TPS protects aliens from

removal for the duration of their country’s designation and

allows them to work in the United States. Id. § 1254a(a). An

alien’s unlawful entry generally does not preclude them from

being granted TPS. Id. § 1254a(c)(2)(A)(ii).

In 2010, approximately seven years after Hernandez

received TPS, the Government admitted him into the United

States as a lawful permanent resident. Hernandez was

convicted of multiple crimes after becoming a lawful

permanent resident. He was convicted in 2014, 2015, and

2016 of “domestic violence with injury” under California

Penal Code § 273.5(A) and sentenced to increasingly longer

6 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

terms of imprisonment for each offense—four days, 30 days,

and 364 days, respectively. The victim in all three cases was

Hernandez’s now ex-wife. Hernandez also was convicted of

taking a vehicle without the owner’s permission, California

Vehicle Code § 10851A, and receiving or purchasing stolen

property, California Penal Code § 496d(a). For his

receiving-stolen-property conviction, he was sentenced to

16 months’ imprisonment and served 200 days.

In August 2016, the Government charged Hernandez as

removable based on his 2016 domestic-violence conviction,

which was based on acts committed approximately five

years after Hernandez became a lawful permanent resident.

Hernandez conceded removability and sought cancellation

of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (LPR cancellation)

and asylum. In 2017, the BIA denied his applications for

relief based on his receiving-stolen-property conviction, not

his 2016 domestic-violence conviction, and ordered him

removed. But two years after Hernandez sought review of

the BIA’s decision, the California Superior Court vacated his

receiving-stolen-property conviction upon which the BIA

had based its denial of relief, and we granted the

Government’s unopposed motion to remand to the BIA.

On remand, the BIA returned the case to an Immigration

Judge (IJ) for an analysis of how the vacatur of Hernandez’s

conviction affected his eligibility for LPR cancellation and

asylum. 1 At a hearing, the IJ assumed without deciding that

1

In its remand order to the IJ, the BIA noted that it did not construe

our remand order to “disturb[] [its] prior determination that [Hernandez]

did not meet his burden of proving eligibility on the merits of his

applications” for withholding of removal or CAT protection.

Accordingly, Hernandez’s eligibility for those forms of relief is not at

issue here.

HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 7

Hernandez’s vacated 2 receiving-stolen-property conviction

did not bar him from either form of relief. Hernandez

confirmed that the Government admitted him as a lawful

permanent resident on April 29, 2010. Although he was

charged with removability for acts committed only five years

later, Hernandez argued that he had nonetheless established

the required seven years of continuous residence based on

his 2003 grant of TPS. Because the Government argued that

his 2016 domestic-violence conviction was a particularly

serious crime that barred him from receiving asylum,

Hernandez’s testimony about his convictions focused on his

domestic-violence convictions.

The IJ denied Hernandez’s application for LPR

cancellation concluding that Hernandez failed “to show

seven years of continuous residence in the United States

after having been admitted in any status.” The BIA rejected

Hernandez’s argument that, under our precedent, receiving

TPS is a grant of admission. Instead, the IJ found that

Hernandez was admitted to the United States in April 2010,

when he became a lawful permanent resident. The IJ also

found that Hernandez stopped accruing continuous

residency five years later—two years short of the

requirement—when he committed the assault for which he

was convicted in 2016.

Regarding Hernandez’s application for asylum, the IJ

concluded that Hernandez was ineligible for this relief

because his 2016 domestic-violence conviction was a

2

The California Superior Court vacated Hernandez’s receiving-

stolen-property conviction under a statute that requires that the movant

have already finished serving his sentence. See Cal. Penal Code

§ 1473.7. On remand, the IJ did not determine whether the evidence

established that the vacatur constituted a complete vacatur for

immigration purposes.

8 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

particularly serious crime. The IJ concluded that

Hernandez’s own testimony established this fact—

Hernandez acknowledged that he was convicted of hitting

his ex-wife in the face after two prior incidents where he

became angry and hit her and rejected Hernandez’s attempts

to minimize the severity of the conduct and harm underlying

his 2016 conviction. The IJ also considered the length of

Hernandez’s sentence for his 2016 conviction, which was

one day short of this conviction being an aggravated felony

and nondiscretionary particularly serious crime. See

8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (defining an aggravated felony

as a “particularly serious crime”), 1101(a)(43)(F) (defining

an aggravated felony for immigration purposes as a crime of

violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least

365 days).

The BIA dismissed Hernandez’s appeal. It agreed with

the IJ that Hernandez was not eligible for LPR cancellation

because he had not shown seven years of continuous

residence after admission. The BIA also found that a grant

of TPS did not qualify as being “admitted in any status.” In

addition, the BIA rejected Hernandez’s challenge to his 2016

domestic-violence conviction being classified as a

particularly serious crime. The BIA found that the IJ

properly considered the nature of Hernandez’s crime, an

assault committed with physical force, and the length of his

sentence. The BIA also concluded that it was “significant”

that Hernandez continued to engage in abusive behavior

after his first two domestic-violence convictions and that

“[t]hese circumstances . . . were properly considered in[] the

overall assessment of whether [Hernandez’s] third

conviction for domestic violence in a little over a year was

‘particularly serious.’”

HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 9

II. DISCUSSION

“[W]e review de novo the BIA’s determinations of

questions of law and its legal conclusions.” Rodriguez v.

Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012). If the BIA’s

decision “adopts or relies on the IJ’s reasoning,” we review

both decisions; otherwise, we review only the BIA’s.

Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019). Where,

as here, the BIA’s decision was not published or “directly

controlled by a published decision,” we review issues of

statutory construction de novo and give no deference to the

BIA’s decision. Eleri v. Sessions, 852 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir.

2017) (citation omitted); Route v. Garland, 996 F.3d 968,

975 (9th Cir. 2021). We review for abuse of discretion

whether the BIA “relied on the appropriate factors and

proper evidence” to reach its determination that an alien

committed a “particularly serious crime.” Bare v. Barr,

975 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks,

alterations, and citation omitted).

A. Cancellation of Removal

To be eligible for LPR cancellation, an alien must

establish that he “has resided in the United States

continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any

status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (emphasis added); see

Alanniz, 924 F.3d at 1065. “Admission” is defined as “the

lawful entry of the alien into the United States after

inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.”

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A); Posos-Sanchez v. Garland,

3 F.4th 1176, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2021); see also In re Reza-

Murillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 296, 297 (BIA 2010) (citing

§ 1101(a)(13)(A) for the definition of “admitted”). This

definition, however, does not cover circumstances like

Hernandez’s where an alien enters the United States without

inspection and is later admitted to the United States based on

10 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

a “post-entry adjustment of status.” Negrete-Ramirez v.

Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014); see Alanniz,

924 F.3d at 1069–70 (noting that a person who enters the

United States without inspection is subsequently admitted to

the United States when he or she becomes a lawful

permanent resident).

Relying on our now-withdrawn opinion in Enriquez v.

Barr, 969 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2020), withdrawn on denial of

reh’g en banc sub nom. Enriquez v. Barr, 988 F.3d 1210 (9th

Cir. 2021), Hernandez assumes without analysis that the

language in the cancellation of removal and TPS statutes is

ambiguous, and he argues that, if an admission as defined in

Section 1101(a)(13)(A) has not occurred, then we must

analyze the benefits conferred by his TPS and determine if

applying the statutory definition of admission produces

absurd results or if other compelling reasons mandate a

judicial expansion of the statutory definition of admission.

This analysis requires comparing TPS benefits to benefits

conferred by other statuses that we have (or have not) held

constitute an admission. Hernandez argues that the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Sanchez does not control here

because it analyzed a different issue—whether TPS

constituted an admission for the purposes of an adjustment

of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255,

not LPR cancellation under Section 1229b(a). See Sanchez,

141 S. Ct. at 1811.

1. Ninth Circuit Precedent

In Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, we judicially expanded

the definition of “admission” in certain, narrow

circumstances. 455 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006),

abrogated by Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103, 1105

(9th Cir. 2015). Based on the benefits conferred by the

Family Unity Program (FUP), we concluded that

HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 11

Section 1101(a)(13)(A)’s definition of admission does not

always control and that FUP recipients should be deemed

admitted under Section 1229b(a)(2). Id. at 1015, 1020. Four

years later, however, the BIA rejected Garcia-Quintero,

holding in In Re Reza-Murillo that the statutory definition of

admission controls whether acceptance into the FUP

constitutes an admission for cancellation-of-removal

purposes. 25 I. & N. Dec. 296, 297–300 (BIA 2010). We

accepted the BIA’s narrower reading of “admitted in any

status” as reasonable, explaining:

We also have no trouble concluding that the

BIA’s decision in In re Reza-Murillo is

“otherwise entitled to Chevron deference.”

[Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X

Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005)

(“Brand X”).] It is reasonable for the BIA to

apply the statutory definition of the term

“admitted.” Nothing in the statutory text, the

BIA’s cases, or our own cases precludes the

BIA from relying on that definition.

Pursuant to Brand X, we must afford Chevron

deference to the BIA’s decision in In re Reza-

Murillo holding that acceptance into the

Family Unity Program does not constitute an

admission for purposes of § 1229b(a)(2). The

BIA therefore correctly denied Petitioner’s

application for cancellation of removal.

Medina-Nunez, 788 F.3d at 1105–06.

The year after our decision in Medina-Nunez, we held in

Fuentes v. Lynch that aliens “listed as derivative

beneficiaries on a parent’s asylum and [Nicaraguan

12 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

Adjustment and Central American Relief Act] applications

and who have been afforded authorization to work in the

United States” are not “admitted in any status.” 837 F.3d

966, 968 (9th Cir. 2016). We noted, however, that In re

Reza-Murillo left open the possibility that individuals could

be considered “‘admitted in any status’ notwithstanding their

lack of admission” under Section 1101(a)(13)(A) if there are

“compelling reasons” to depart from the statutory definition.

Id. Although our precedent does not identify what

constitutes a compelling reason to judicially expand

Section 1101(a)(13)(A)’s definition of admission, we have

generally adopted the approach that such reasons exist only

when the benefits that the status at issue confers are more

generous than those granted to those with FUP status. See,

e.g., Alanniz, 924 F.3d at 1066–67 (holding that an alien’s

parole did not qualify as admission because acceptance into

the FUP, which is a specialized form of parole, did not

qualify).

2. Sanchez v. Mayorkas

In Sanchez, the Supreme Court considered whether

conferral of TPS constituted an admission to the United

States for purposes of obtaining lawful permanent resident

status and concluded that it did not. 141 S. Ct. at 1811.

Applying a plain language analysis, the Court concluded that

“[l]awful status and admission . . . are distinct concepts in

immigration law: Establishing one does not necessarily

establish the other.” Id. at 1813. Accordingly, the Court held

that “because a grant of TPS does not come with a ticket of

admission, it does not eliminate the disqualifying effect of

an unlawful entry.” Id. at 1813–14.

The Court rejected the argument that without providing

admission, TPS “accomplishes precious little” and listed the

benefits that an alien gains from nonimmigrant status. Id.

HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 13

at 1815. TPS allows an alien to become a lawful permanent

resident, and “[s]ome TPS recipients need exactly that

assistance—without needing a constructive admission.” Id.

For example, “a foreign national who entered the country

legally on a tourist visa” but overstayed the visa’s expiration

can satisfy the lawful-permanent-resident statute’s

admission requirement but cannot show nonimmigrant

status without a grant of TPS. Id. The Court acknowledged

that “Congress . . . could have gone further”—granting TPS

recipients nonimmigrant status and admission—but it did

not. Id. It recognized, however, that despite not deeming

TPS recipients lawfully admitted, “the statute does

something—and this Court does not get to say that the

something it does is not enough.” Id.

Our precedent judicially expanding the statutory

definition of “admission” based on the benefits conferred by

a lawful status is “clearly irreconcilable,” Gammie, 335 F.3d

at 893, with Sanchez’s holding that “[l]awful status and

admission . . . are distinct concepts in immigration law.”

141 S. Ct. at 1813. As Hernandez argues, TPS recipients

enjoy substantial benefits based on their lawful status. But

Sanchez is clear that, no matter how great those benefits,

TPS does not constitute an admission to the United States.

See id. It is irrelevant that Sanchez analyzed whether a TPS

recipient had been “admitted . . . into the United States” for

purposes of adjusting his status rather than cancellation of

removal. See id. at 1812–13. Instead, what matters is what

Sanchez held that TPS did not do—confer admission. See id.

at 1813. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f) (not including

admission in the list of benefits and status conferred by

TPS). Accordingly, we hold that Sanchez “effectively

overrule[s]” our precedent judicially expanding the statutory

definition of admission and also establishes that

Hernandez’s TPS does not constitute an admission “in any

14 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

status” under Section 1229b(a). See United States v.

Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Gammie, 335 F.3d at 900).

3. Statutory Text

The plain language of the TPS statute reinforces our

conclusion that receiving this status does not constitute an

admission under the cancellation statute. See Lamar, Archer

& Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1759 (2018)

(interpretation of statutory text starts “where all such

inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself”

(quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also In re Sosa

Ventura, 25 I. & N. Dec. 391, 392 (BIA 2010) (“There is

nothing in the language of the statue to indicate that a grant

of TPS renders an alien admissible to the United States.”).

Most compelling is the express statement that a grant of TPS

does not constitute an admission. The statute specifies that it

“shall [not] be construed as authorizing an alien to apply for

admission to, or to be admitted to, the United States in order

to apply for temporary protected status under this section.”

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(5) (emphasis added). This language

establishes that the statute presumes that an alien who is

eligible for TPS already has been admitted to the United

States. See Sanchez v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

967 F.3d 242, 246 (3rd Cir. 2020), aff’d sub nom. Sanchez,

141 S. Ct. at 1815. Accordingly, a conclusion that TPS

constitutes an admission under the cancellation statute

contradicts the statutory text.

Moreover, the TPS statute states that “the period of such

status shall not be counted as a period of physical presence

in the United States for purposes of § 1229b(a) of this title,

unless the Attorney General determines that extreme

hardship exists.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(e) (emphasis added).

Although Hernandez seeks to use his TPS to establish the

HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 15

cancellation statute’s admission requirement, not its

residence requirement, this language indicates that TPS is a

disfavored way to establish any of the cancellation-of-

removal requirements. See id. Additionally, as discussed

above, notably absent from the statute’s list of benefits is

admission. See generally id. § 1254a(f); see also Bates v.

United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (declining to “read[]

words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its

face”); In re H-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 617, 626 (Admin. App.

Off. 2019) (observing that the TPS statute provided many

benefits but did “not provide for the inspection, admission,

or parole of an alien, as the terms are entirely absent”).

Finally, the statute requires that an alien must be present

in the United States to be eligible for TPS. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i). In contrast, the statutory definition of

admission requires an entry into the United States and

inspection by an immigration officer. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(13)(A). These requirements are contradictory—

an alien outside the United States cannot receive TPS status

and an alien inside the United States cannot cross the border.

This weighs against concluding that a grant of TPS satisfied

the admission requirement for cancellation.

Turning specifically to the LPR-cancellation statute’s

seven-year residency requirement, the plain language of this

provision also supports our holding that Section 1101(a)’s

definition of admission controls whether an alien is admitted

for purposes of cancellation. See Appling, 138 S. Ct. at 1759.

An alien must have resided continually in the United States

“after having been admitted in any status.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a). The “admission in any status” requirement

focuses on admission statuses, not on a unique definition of

admission based on an assessment of the benefits conferred

by an alien’s lawful status. See Bates, 522 U.S. at 29. This

16 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

makes sense given the numerous statuses under which an

alien can gain lawful admission to the United States—for

example, family-sponsored statuses, employment-based

statuses, refugees, and special agricultural workers. See, e.g.,

8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(c)–(d), 1157, and 1160. In sum, “in any

status” refers to the various ways that an alien may be

admitted to the United States.

For all these reasons, we hold that receiving TPS is not

an admission to the United States. Therefore, because

Hernandez initially entered the United States unlawfully, he

was not “admitted” until he became a lawful permanent

resident in 2010. Accordingly, Hernandez cannot satisfy the

requirement that he “reside[] in the United States

continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any

status, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and he is not eligible for

cancellation of removal.

B. Asylum

An alien who has been convicted of a “particularly

serious crime” is ineligible for asylum. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). The question here is whether

Hernandez’s 2016 domestic-violence conviction was a

particularly serious crime. Because the BIA relied on the IJ’s

reasoning in determining that Hernandez’s conviction was

particularly serious, “we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s

decisions.” Alanniz, 924 F.3d at 1065.

In determining whether a crime is particularly serious

such that it bars an alien from receiving asylum, the IJ and

BIA must conduct a case-specific, factual analysis that

considers the “nature of the conviction, the circumstances

and underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence

imposed, and most importantly, whether the type and

circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a

HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 17

danger to the community.” Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d

878, 884 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Frentescu, 18 I. &

N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982)); see 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), 1252(a)(2)(C). Hernandez argues that

the agency applied an improper legal standard when it

determined that his 2016 domestic-violence conviction was

a particularly serious crime by considering the cumulative

effect of his three domestic-violence convictions, instead of

considering his third conviction in 2016 alone. We disagree.

The record establishes that the IJ and BIA based their

particularly-serious-crime determination specifically on

Hernandez’s 2016 domestic-violence conviction. For

example, the IJ concluded that Hernandez’s “March 2, 2016

conviction . . . is particularly serious” and that “his third

conviction is particularly serious in nature.” And the BIA

recognized that the IJ’s particularly-serious-crime finding

was based on Hernandez’s “last domestic violence

conviction,” and it likewise concluded that his “third

conviction for domestic violence in a little over a year was

‘particularly serious.’” These specific references to

Hernandez’s third domestic-violence conviction make clear

that the BIA did not hold that all three convictions,

considered collectively, constituted a particularly serious

crime. Rather, the agency held only that the third conviction

was particularly serious in light of the previous convictions.

See Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1108 (9th Cir. 2011)

(en banc) (distinguishing between a conclusion that “three

convictions, when viewed cumulatively, rise to the level of a

particularly serious crime” and that “one of the

convictions—presumably the third—rises to the level of a

particularly serious crime in light of Delgado’s two earlier

convictions”).

18 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

We need not address whether the BIA’s consideration of

Hernandez’s prior convictions in deciding that his third

conviction was particularly serious was proper because

Hernandez did not “specifically and distinctly” argue that

this was error in his opening brief. Velasquez-Gaspar v.

Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020). Most of the

relevant portion of his brief focuses on his mistaken

argument that the agency considered his convictions

cumulatively. To the extent Hernandez challenges the

agency’s ability to give any consideration to his prior

convictions in concluding that his third conviction was

particularly serious, he did so only in a single sentence, and

without “coherently develop[ing]” the argument. See United

States v. Kimble, 107 F.3d 712, 715 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997).

Therefore, to the extent Hernandez raised this issue at all, it

is forfeited. See id.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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