Opinion

Hannah David v. Gina Kaulukukui

  • 38 F.4th 792
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jun 27, 2022
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Civil
Cited by
40 cases
Authority
More cited than 80.2%

allegation that officer worked with child’s father to circumvent mother’s custody order stated claim under due process and unreasonable seizure principles

How later courts described this case

  • allegation that officer worked with child’s father to circumvent mother’s custody order stated claim under due process and unreasonable seizure principles
  • “The interest of parents 19 in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 20 interests recognized by the Supreme Court.”
  • “[P]arents and children have a right 12 to be free from judicial deception in child custody proceedings and removal orders.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HANNAH DAVID, Individually and on No. 21-15731

behalf of her minor daughter B.D.,

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

1:20-cv-00002-

v. JMS-WRP

GINA KAULUKUKUI,

Defendant-Appellant, OPINION

and

CATHY BETTS, Director of the

Department of Human Resources,

State of Hawaii; AIMEE LESKOVIC;

SHAWN LATHROP; IWALANI

KAAUWAI-HERROD; PENNY CHO;

DINO ST. AUGUSTINE; WILLIAM

KEAHIOLALO; SHAYLENE ISERI;

DOES, Jane and/or John Does 1–25;

Doe Entities 1–10,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 15, 2022

Honolulu, Hawaii

2 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

Filed June 27, 2022

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Ryan D. Nelson, and

Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Forrest

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of

defendant’s motion to dismiss, on the basis of qualified

immunity, an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging violations of plaintiff’s right to familial association.

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her minor

daughter, alleged that defendant Gina Kaulukukui, an

employee of the Kauai County Police Department, deceived

the Hawaii family court when she assisted the non-custodial

father of plaintiff’s daughter in obtaining a temporary

restraining order that prevented plaintiff, the sole custodial

parent, from having any contact with her daughter. Plaintiff

further alleged that Kaulukukui conspired with the non-

custodial father and state officials to extract the daughter

from her school and place her in the father’s custody without

plaintiff’s knowledge or a court order.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 3

The panel stated that although Kaulukukui may

ultimately prove that plaintiff’s allegations were false, at the

pleading stage, the panel must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true. When the alleged events in this

case occurred, the law clearly established that a parent and

child’s constitutional right to familial association is violated

when a state official interferes with a parent’s lawful custody

through judicial deception. The law also clearly established

that a state official cannot remove a child from a lawful

custodial parent without consent or a court order unless the

official has reasonable cause to believe that the child is in

imminent danger and, even then, the scope and duration of

the removal must be reasonable. Here, plaintiff plausibly

alleged that Kaulukukui violated these rights by deliberately

failing to inform the family court of a custody order when

assisting the non-custodial father in obtaining a temporary

restraining order that prevented contact between plaintiff

and her daughter, and by assisting the other defendants in

removing plaintiff’s daughter from plaintiff’s custody and

separating them for 21 days. As such, Kaulukukui was not

entitled qualified immunity at this early stage.

COUNSEL

Charles A. Foster (argued), Office of the County Attorney,

Lihue, Hawaii, for Defendant-Appellant.

Kevin A. Yolken (argued), Eric A. Seitz, and Jonathan M.F.

Loo, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

4 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

If what Plaintiff Hannah David alleges is true, she and

her daughter suffered a blatant abuse of government power.

David claims that Defendant Gina Kaulukukui, an employee

of the Kauai County Police Department, deceived the

Hawaii family court when she assisted the non-custodial

father of David’s daughter in obtaining a temporary

restraining order (TRO) that prevented David, the sole

custodial parent, from having any contact with her daughter.

David further claims that Kaulukukui conspired with the

father (who works for the Kauai County Fire Department)

and other state officials to extract the daughter from her

school and place her in the father’s custody on a different

island—all without David’s knowledge or a court order—

and then prevented David and her daughter from having any

contact for 21 days.

Whether these shocking allegations are true is for

another day. The question here is whether qualified

immunity requires dismissal of David’s denial-of-familial-

association claim brought against Kaulukukui under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because we conclude that David and her

daughter’s constitutional right to familial association was

clearly established such that a reasonable official in

Kaulukukui’s shoes would have understood that her alleged

actions were a constitutional violation, we affirm the district

court’s denial of Kaulukukui’s motion to dismiss. David and

her daughter deserve nothing less than the opportunity to

have their claims heard.

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 5

I. BACKGROUND

As this appeal comes to us from a denial of Kaulukukui’s

motion to dismiss, we must “accept[] as true all well-pleaded

allegations of material fact, and construe[] them in the light

most favorable to [David].” Hernandez v. City of San Jose,

897 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Padilla v. Yoo,

678 F.3d 748, 757 (9th Cir. 2012)).

A. Family Background and Custody Order

David is the mother and sole custodial parent of her 11-

year-old daughter, B.D. William Keahiolalo is B.D.’s

biological father. David alleges that Keahiolalo raped and

impregnated her when she was underage. David reported the

alleged rape, but no criminal charges were filed against

Keahiolalo. Shortly after B.D.’s birth, David alleged that

Keahiolalo abused B.D. In the wake of these serious

allegations, the parties engaged in “prolonged and bitter

litigation in the Family Court,” and “[i]n order to avoid an

evidentiary hearing on the custody and abuse allegations,”

Keahiolalo “agreed to stipulate to any and all of [David]’s

demands with regard to the custody of B.D.”

In 2012, the parties filed a stipulated custody agreement

with the Hawaii family court, and the court issued an order

granting David full legal and physical custody of B.D.

(Custody Order). The Custody Order denied Keahiolalo

visitation rights and ordered that he “stay away from and

have no contacts whatsoever with [David].” 1 The Custody

Order also contained a provision stating that “in the absence

1

David alleges that the Custody Order also prohibits Keahiolalo

from having contact with B.D., but the district court noted that the

redacted version of the Order appears to prohibit contact only with

David.

6 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

of a compelling emergency that affects [B.D.’s] health or

safety, Mr. Keahiolalo stipulates and agrees not to file any

motions in the Family Court of the State of Hawaii or

another jurisdiction.” The Custody Order “has never been

amended, modified, or vacated, and remains in full force and

effect.”

B. Altercation and TRO

During the relevant period, David and B.D. lived on the

island of Hawaii, while Keahiolalo lived on Kauai. From

issuance of the Custody Order until November 2019,

Keahiolalo had “virtually no contacts” with his daughter.

However, in November 2019, David and B.D. flew to Kauai

for Thanksgiving to visit David’s family. While there, B.D.

participated in a modeling show at a local shopping center.

Keahiolalo showed up at this event with two of his other

daughters and introduced himself to B.D. David ordered to

him leave, but he “continued to follow [David] and B.D.,

encouraged his daughters to approach B.D., and videotaped

the children’s reaction.”

The following day, David took B.D. to Keahiolalo’s

workplace and demanded that he apologize to B.D. When he

refused, David yelled at, pushed, and taunted Keahiolalo

until the police arrived and arrested her on misdemeanor

harassment and third-degree assault charges. After David

posted bail, she and B.D. returned to the island of Hawaii.

A few days after the altercation, Keahiolalo met with

Kaulukukui at the Kauai County Police Department.

Kaulukukui prepared and filed a petition for a protective

order (the Petition) in the Hawaii family court on

Keahiolalo’s behalf seeking to prohibit David from

contacting Keahiolalo or any of his family members,

including B.D. The Petition did not mention the existing

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 7

Custody Order or inform the family court that Keahiolalo

lacked legal, custodial, or visitation rights to B.D.

On December 4, 2019, the family court granted the

Petition and issued a TRO prohibiting David from having

contact with B.D. or Keahiolalo. The TRO did not discuss

any custodial issues or authorize Keahiolalo to take custody

of B.D.

C. State Officials Place B.D. with Keahiolalo

Approximately two weeks after Keahiolalo received the

TRO, a Hawaii Child Welfare Services (CWS) official

visited David’s home and performed a Comprehensive

Strengths and Risk Assessment Rating to determine whether

the home was safe for B.D. David received a risk score of 3

on a scale of 0–51, with a low/moderately low risk score

ranging from 1 to 17. During the home visit, David explicitly

informed the official of the terms of the Custody Order.

Around this same time, at least two other CWS officials were

also explicitly informed of the Custody Order.

Nevertheless, a few days after the home visit, on

December 20, several CWS officials (accompanied by

Keahiolalo and multiple state police officers) conducted a

“grab and go” of B.D. without a court order or prior notice

to David. State officials took B.D. from her school, placed

her in Keahiolalo’s custody, immediately escorted

Keahiolalo and B.D. to the airport, and flew them to Kauai

“to avoid any encounter with [David].”

David was not informed that B.D. had been taken from

school and transported to Kauai until after B.D. was placed

in Keahiolalo’s custody and police officers served the TRO

on David at her home. David and her attorney attempted to

contact CWS, the police, and the Kauai court to get

8 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

information about B.D.’s whereabouts, but they were

unsuccessful. David again informed CWS of the terms of the

existing Custody Order. David also reported to the Kauai

County Police Department “that B.D. had been kidnapped

and was in the custody of an allegedly abusive, non-custodial

parent.” But Kaulukukui and the other named defendants

worked together to prevent David’s allegations from being

investigated or a police report from being filed.

Eleven days later, during which time David had no

contact with her daughter, the family court held a hearing on

the TRO. The court learned of the Custody Order for the first

time and dismissed the prohibition against David having

contact with B.D. due to Keahiolalo’s “lack of authority . . .

to file on behalf of [B.D.].” But the court declined to issue

any additional orders and “directed counsel, as officers of

the court, to discuss and work out the custody matters.”

Despite the court’s direction, the Kauai County Prosecutor

refused to (1) speak with David’s counsel, (2) produce any

authority permitting Keahiolalo to maintain physical

custody, or (3) allow David or her mother to see or talk to

B.D.

After the hearing, David’s counsel repeatedly attempted

to contact CWS representatives on the islands of Kauai and

Hawaii and have B.D. returned to David or removed from

Keahiolalo, all to no avail. CWS initially attempted to deny

involvement in the seizure to make it appear that Keahiolalo

“simply took custody of B.D. himself,” but it later informed

David that it would “be filing something” in the family court.

Several days later, CWS removed B.D. from Keahiolalo’s

home and placed her in a foster home on Kauai, still without

allowing David to communicate with her daughter.

Having made no progress working with state officials,

on January 2, 2020, David moved for a TRO in federal

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 9

district court requiring the state to return B.D. to her custody.

Four days later, the Hawaii Department of Human Services

filed a petition for temporary custody of B.D. in the Hawaii

family court. After an evidentiary hearing, the family court

denied the Department’s petition. Finally—21 days after

being grabbed from her school without her mother’s

knowledge and without being able to even talk to her

mother—B.D. was returned home.

D. This Lawsuit

David, individually and on behalf of B.D., sued several

individuals, including Kaulukukui, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violating their constitutional right to familial

association. 2 In addition to the facts included above, David

alleged in her First Amended Complaint (FAC) that:

• Kaulukukui “acted in concert with [CWS

officials], among others, to file and serve

the [P]etition in the family court, to provide

Defendant Keahiolalo with advice

enabling him to obtain the protective order

and thus circumvent the existing [Custody

Order], and to orchestrate and carry out the

seizure of B.D. and placement with

Defendant Keahiolalo without any

authority to do so.”

• After the seizure of B.D. from her school,

several Defendants, including Kaulukukui,

2

While David named multiple CWS workers, the State Director of

the Department of Human Services, Keahiolalo, and Keahiolalo’s

attorney as defendants, this appeal concerns only Kaulukukui because

she is the only defendant who moved to dismiss asserting qualified

immunity.

10 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

“were communicating amongst each other

and acting in concert to prevent . . . [a]

police report from being filed, to prevent

[David’s] claims from being investigated

and to perpetuate what they knew to be the

unlawful placement of B.D. in the custody

of Defendant Keahiolalo.”

• From December 2 to December 31, all

Defendants, including Kaulukukui, “had

frequent and direct contacts with

Defendant Keahiolalo in the form of text

messages, emails, phone conversations,

and in-person visits – both formal and

informal – in which Defendants worked

together at every step with Defendant

Keahiolalo to assist with and prepare

documents that deliberately misled the

Family Court, to conspire to orchestrate the

‘grab and go’ abduction of B.D., and to

maintain the appearance that the actions

taken were appropriate and lawful.”

Kaulukukui moved to dismiss the claim brought against

her based on qualified immunity. The district court denied

her motion, concluding that David plausibly alleged that

Kaulukukui violated a clearly established constitutional

right to familial association. The district court first explained

that the FAC could plausibly be read to infer that Kaulukukui

knew about the Custody Order when she filed the Petition

and, therefore, knew that Keahiolalo did not have any

authority to move for a protective order on B.D.’s behalf. In

addition, the district court held that the FAC stated several

allegations that, after the Petition was filed, Kaulukukui

“knowingly assisted in the wrongful removal of B.D. from

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 11

David’s custody in violation of [their] rights to familial

association.” While the district court noted that Kaulukukui

might ultimately be able to show that David’s allegations

were not true, it concluded that “those questions cannot be

definitively answered at this motion-to-dismiss stage.”

Kaulukukui timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

We generally lack jurisdiction to hear interlocutory

appeals from denials of a motion to dismiss. See Hernandez,

897 F.3d at 1132. However, there is an exception to this rule

for denials based on qualified immunity. Id. This exception

exists “because qualified immunity is immunity from suit,

not just a defense to liability, and the immunity is effectively

lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Andrews

v. City of Henderson, __ F.4th __ (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned

up). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion

to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Benavidez v. County

of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2021). We

“accept[] as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact,

and construe[] them in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party.” Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1132 (quoting

Padilla, 678 F.3d at 757). “If the operative complaint

contains even one allegation of a harmful act that would

constitute a violation of a clearly established constitutional

right, then plaintiffs are entitled to go forward with their

claims.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir.

2018) (quoting Pelletier v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F.,

968 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Qualified immunity shields government officials from

liability for civil damages unless their conduct “violated a

clearly established constitutional right.” Williamson v. City

of Nat’l City, 23 F.4th 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Monzon v. City of Murrieta, 978 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir.

12 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

2020)). To determine whether an official is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court asks “(1) whether the

[official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right, and

(2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of

the events at issue.” Id. (internal quotation marks citation

omitted).

Kaulukukui does not dispute that David and her daughter

have a constitutional right to familial association—nor could

she. “[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and

control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the

fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme]

Court.” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1235–36 (quoting Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion)). Our

caselaw has long recognized this right for parents and

children under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See,

e.g., Keates, 883 F.3d at 1235–38 (explaining the origins of

the right); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136–37 (9th

Cir. 2000). For parents, the right to familial association is

generally grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause, while claims brought by children are

evaluated under the more “specific” Fourth Amendment

right to be free from unreasonable seizures. See Kirkpatrick

v. County of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 788–89 & n.2 (9th Cir.

2016) (en banc). However, “the same legal standard applies

in evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for

the removal of children.” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236 (quoting

Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1137 n.8).

Kaulukukui instead argues that the violations that David

alleges were not “clearly established” under the specific

facts presented in this case. We disagree. A right is clearly

established if its contours are “sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what [s]he is doing

violates that right.” Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1125

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 13

(9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640 (1987)). “This exacting standard gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken

judgments by protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Hardwick v. County

of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting

City & County of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015)).

Although the “law does not require a case directly on point

for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct.

4, 7–8 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S.

73, 7–8 (2017)).

A. The TRO Petition

David alleges that Kaulukukui violated her and B.D.’s

right to familial association by helping Keahiolalo file the

Petition asking the family court to prevent David from

having any contact with B.D., despite knowing that the

Custody Order severely limited Keahiolalo’s rights related

to B.D. Our caselaw clearly establishes that, as part of the

right to familial association, parents and children have a

“right to be free from judicial deception” in child custody

proceedings and removal orders. Greene v. Camreta, 588

F.3d 1011, 1034 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part on other

grounds, 563 U.S. 692 (2011), 661 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir.

2011). Indeed, we recently reiterated that by 2016, “well

before” the events of this case, it was clearly established that

“material omissions and misrepresentations with a deliberate

disregard for the truth to a juvenile court would violate the

Constitution.” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1152; see also

Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101,

1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]eliberately fabricating evidence in

civil child abuse proceedings violates the Due Process clause

14 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

of the Fourteenth Amendment when a liberty or property

interest is at stake.”); Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070,

1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing as “virtually self-evident”

the constitutional due process right to not be subjected to

criminal charges based on deliberately false evidence).

In Greene, for example, the plaintiff alleged that her

children were removed from her custody after a social

worker intentionally included false statements in his petition

for a protective custody order. 588 F.3d at 1018–19, 1034.

We denied the social worker qualified immunity at summary

judgment because, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, the court would not have granted

the order and the plaintiff would not have lost custody of her

children absent the social worker’s deliberately false

statements. Id. at 1035–36. In doing so, we held that the right

to be free from judicial deception in child custody

proceedings was clearly established by our precedent,

including numerous decisions in the Fourth Amendment

context holding that officers who make false or misleading

statements in an affidavit to a court are not entitled to

qualified immunity. Id. at 1034–35 (citing Whitaker v.

Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2007); Butler v. Elle,

281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002); Hervey v. Estes, 65

F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1995)).

More recently, in Hardwick, we denied qualified

immunity to social workers who deliberately submitted false

testimony to a court during a custody proceeding that

ultimately resulted in the removal of the minor plaintiff from

her mother’s custody. 844 F.3d. at 1114–15. There, the

defendants argued that the right to be free from judicial

deception had not yet been clearly established in civil child

dependency proceedings, only in criminal proceedings

against parents. Id. at 1117. We squarely rejected that

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 15

argument, explaining that regardless of whether the

proceeding occurred in the criminal or civil context, a

reasonable official would have fair notice that “the knowing

use of false evidence [is] absolutely and obviously

irreconcilable with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee

of Due Process in our court.” Id. at 1119. In light of these

decisions, the right to be free from judicial deception in

matters of child custody “is beyond debate.” Id. at 1117. 3

To state a violation of the constitutional right to familial

association through judicial deception, a plaintiff must allege

“(1) a misrepresentation or omission (2) made deliberately

or with a reckless disregard for the truth, that was

(3) material to the judicial decision.” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at

1147; see Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035. A misrepresentation or

omission is “material” if a court “would have declined to

issue the order had [the defendant] been truthful.” Greene,

588 F.3d at 1035.

Here, David alleges that the Petition that Kaulukukui

prepared omitted any reference to the Custody Order or its

terms and that neither Keahiolalo nor Kaulukukui otherwise

informed the family court of the Custody Order. David also

alleges that Kaulukukui “acted in concert” with other

Defendants to (1) “file and serve the [P]etition in the family

court,” (2) “provide Defendant Keahiolalo with advice

enabling him to obtain the protective order,” and in doing so,

(3) “circumvent the existing [Custody Order].” She states

that beginning on December 2, 2019—the day the Petition

3

Although Greene and Hardwick concerned affirmative false

statements rather than omissions (as is alleged here), we have

consistently held that judicial deception may occur through deliberate

omission or affirmative misrepresentation. See Greene, 588 F.3d at

1035; KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004).

16 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

was filed—Kaulukukui (and the other defendants) “worked

together at every step with Defendant Keahiolalo to assist

with and prepare documents that deliberately misled the

Family Court.” (emphasis added).

In order to “circumvent” the Custody Order and

“deliberately misle[ad] the Family Court,” Kaulukukui

necessarily must have known of the Custody Order and

intentionally decided not to discuss it in the Petition or bring

it to the family court’s attention. 4 Accordingly, based on

these allegations, we conclude that the FAC plausibly

alleges that Kaulukukui deliberately made a

“misrepresentation or omission” to a court of law. 5

Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1147.

4

Notably, in her opening brief, Kaulukukui acknowledged that “the

[C]omplaint essentially alleges that . . . [she] conspired at every step to

circumvent the terms of the [Custody Order] . . . by intentionally omitting

reference in the TRO application to the [Custody Order], in order to

deliberately mislead the family court into issuing a TRO, and using the

TRO to pry B.D. from Ms. David’s custody.” Op. Br. at 14–15 (emphasis

added). Although she pointed out in a footnote that the district court held

that the FAC plausibly alleged that she knew about the Custody Order

prior to filing the Petition, or shortly thereafter, she did not challenge the

district court’s conclusion on this point until her reply brief. Therefore,

in addition to being unpersuasive for the reasons stated above, this

argument is likely waived. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S.

Dep't of Com., 672 F.3d 1160, 1166 n.8 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]rguments

raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)).

5

Our caselaw also clearly establishes that judicial deception may

occur when an omission or misrepresentation of material information is

made “recklessly.” Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035. However, because the

FAC alleges that Kaulukukui’s omission of the Custody Order from the

Petition was deliberate, we need not address whether it was reckless.

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 17

Additionally, David alleges that “had the presiding judge

in the Family Court been informed of the [Custody Order],

Defendant Keahiolalo’s application for a temporary

restraining order would not have been granted as to B.D.” In

other words, she claims that but-for Kaulukukui’s

misrepresentation or omission, David would not have been

deprived of custody over B.D., meaning that the omission

was material. See Greene, 588 F.3d at 1035. Thus, we

conclude that David has successfully stated a claim for

violation of her and B.D.’s right to familial association based

on judicial deception.

In arguing otherwise, Kaulukukui contends that the

altercation between David and Keahiolalo made it

reasonable for her to believe that she could assist Keahiolalo

in filing the Petition on B.D.’s behalf given the plain

language of the Hawaii Domestic Violence Protective

Orders statute and the “Compelling Emergency” provision

of the Custody Order. Moreover, she asserts that no statute

or caselaw affirmatively required her to address the Custody

Order in the Petition. Thus, she argues that it was not clear

to a reasonable official in her position that assisting a non-

custodial parent in obtaining a protective order without

informing the family court of the Custody Order was

unlawful.

Kaulukukui’s arguments fail for two reasons. First,

regardless of Hawaii’s generally applicable Protective

Orders statute, the Custody Order that defined David’s and

Keahiolalo’s parental rights deprived Keahiolalo of the

ability to seek judicial relief related to B.D. absent a

“compelling emergency that affects [her] health or safety.”

There is no indication that Kaulukukui was led to believe

there were any circumstances presenting an emergent risk to

B.D. Additionally, as the district court noted, Kaulukukui's

18 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

reliance on the Compelling Emergency provision

necessarily admits that she knew when she filed the Petition

that (1) David had sole custody of B.D., (2) Keahiolalo

lacked any custody or visitation rights, and (3) Keahiolalo

was generally prohibited from seeking relief on B.D.’s

behalf. Nevertheless, Kaulukukui deliberately chose not to

inform the family court of the Custody Order’s terms.

Second, regardless of whether there is specific authority

requiring that a custody order be included in a petition for a

protective order, the FAC alleges more than just that

Kaulukukui prepared and filed the Petition on Keahiolalo’s

behalf; it alleges that Kaulukukui knowingly and

deliberately omitted material custody information from the

Petition to mislead the family court into issuing the TRO that

allowed Defendants to deprive David of custody. While

Kaulukukui’s arguments focus on whether a reasonable

official could believe that the terms of a custody order are

not affirmatively required to be included in a petition for a

protective order, they do not address whether an official may

reasonably believe she can deliberately conceal material

custody information from a court for the purpose of

depriving a custodial parent of her child.

We conclude that any reasonable official would

understand that the latter behavior—if proven—violates the

law. As such, it is “hardly conduct for which qualified

immunity is either justified or appropriate.” See Hardwick,

844 F.3d at 1119.

B. Removal of B.D.

David also alleges that Kaulukukui’s participation in

removing B.D. and placing her in Keahiolalo’s custody was

a constitutional violation. Again, our caselaw clearly

establishes that the right to familial association is violated “if

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 19

a state official removes children from their parents without

their consent, and without a court order, unless information

at the time of the seizure, after reasonable investigation,

establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is in

imminent danger of serious bodily injury.” Keates, 883 F.3d

at 1237–38. Additionally, even if there is reasonable cause

to believe that the initial removal of a child without a court

order or consent is necessary, the continued separation of a

child from her custodial parent is constitutional only if “the

scope, degree, and duration of the intrusion” is “reasonably

necessary to avert the specific injury at issue.” Id.; see

Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138.

For example, in Wallis, police officers seized the

plaintiffs’ children without a court order after the mother’s

institutionalized, mentally ill sister reported to her therapist

that the children’s father was going to sacrifice his son to

Satan on the Fall Equinox and cover it up with a car accident.

202 F.3d at 1131. After the therapist reported this threat to

Child Protective Services, police entered the family’s home

around midnight, took the children into custody without a

court order, and transported them to a hospital where they

were subjected to internal body cavity examinations without

the plaintiffs’ presence or consent. Id. at 1134–35. The

children were not returned to the plaintiffs’ custody for two

and a half months. Id. at 1034. There, we concluded that

because the officers failed to investigate the institutionalized

sister’s “bizarre tale,” interview the children’s mother, or

otherwise conduct a sufficient background investigation, “a

reasonable jury could find that the officers did not have

reasonable cause to remove the children without a court

order.” Id. at 1040.

Additionally, we held that even if the children’s initial

removal was reasonable, there was a genuine dispute as to

20 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

whether “the actions taken by the officers—removing the

children from their mother and placing them in an

institution—exceeded the permissible scope of the action

necessary to protect them from that immediate threat.” Id. at

1138. Because the alleged danger to the plaintiffs’ son “was

to occur specifically and only on [the Fall Equinox],” there

was a genuine dispute “as to whether the emergency

continued to exist for more than the brief day or two.” Id. at

1140. In addition, because “the police had no information

whatsoever that implicated the children’s mother in any past

or future abuse,” there was a genuine dispute whether

placing the children “in a county institution for an indefinite

period, was sufficiently strictly circumscribed by the

exigency that justified the [defendants’] intrusion into the

children’s lives.” Id. at 1140–41 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Turning to this case, David sufficiently alleges that

Kaulukukui participated in removing B.D. from her custody

without a court order, placed B.D. in Keahiolalo’s custody,

and prevented David from having contact with B.D. or

regaining custody. These allegations, if true, violate a clearly

established constitutional right to familial association. Based

on the allegations in the FAC, there was no reason, much

less “reasonable cause,” to believe that B.D. was in any

“imminent danger of serious bodily injury.” Id. at 1138. In

fact, the FAC indicates quite the contrary—shortly before

the surreptitious “grab-and-go” operation, a CWS official

visited David’s home, performed a Comprehensive

Strengths and Risk Assessment Rating, and rated David a 3

on a risk scale of 0–51, meaning that there was a

low/moderately low risk of harm in David’s home.

Additionally, the FAC alleges that CWS officials surveilled

David for several days before deciding to take custody of

DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI 21

B.D., demonstrating that there was sufficient time to obtain

a court order.

Not only did Kaulukukui and the other Defendants

remove B.D. and place her with someone they knew had no

custodial rights without legal justification, David also

alleges that they conspired to prevent her from filing a police

report or otherwise having her claims regarding Keahiolalo’s

unlawful custody investigated. These allegations state a

plausible claim for a violation of a clearly established

constitutional right to familial association.

Moreover, even if B.D.’s initial removal was supported

by reasonable cause, David alleges facts plausibly indicating

that the Defendants, including Kaulukukui, “exceeded the

scope of any intrusion necessary to protect [B.D.].” Keates,

883 F.3d at 1239. The FAC states that David was not able to

speak with or see B.D. for 21 days. Nor was she informed of

B.D.’s whereabouts. With no indication that B.D. faced any

past abuse by David or that B.D. was at risk of future abuse,

“there was no basis for preventing [David] from having

contact with [B.D.]” or for separating B.D. from David for

21 days. Id. Again, the FAC alleges that CWS itself had

deemed David’s home to be at the lowest risk level just days

before B.D. was removed from her mother’s care. Based on

these allegations, the 21-day separation was significantly

longer than “reasonably necessary to alleviate [a] threat of

immediate harm.” Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1140 (citation

omitted).

*****

When the alleged events in this case occurred, the law

clearly established that a parent and child’s constitutional

right to familial association is violated when a state official

interferes with a parent’s lawful custody through judicial

22 DAVID V. KAULUKUKUI

deception. The law also clearly established that a state

official cannot remove a child from a lawful custodial parent

without consent or a court order unless the official has

reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent

danger and, even then, the scope and duration of the removal

must be reasonable. Here, David has plausibly alleged that

Kaulukukui violated these rights by deliberately failing to

inform the family court of the Custody Order when assisting

Keahiolalo in obtaining a TRO that prevented contact

between David and B.D. and by assisting the other

Defendants in removing B.D. from David’s custody and

separating them for 21 days.

Kaulukukui may ultimately prove that David’s

allegations are false. But at the pleading stage, we must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.

Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1132; see also Wong v. United

States, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile

government officials have the right . . . to raise and

immediately appeal the qualified immunity defense on a

motion to dismiss, the exercise of that authority is not a wise

choice in every case.”). As such, we conclude that

Kaulukukui is not entitled qualified immunity at this early

stage and affirm the district court’s denial of her motion to

dismiss.

AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.