plea judge not required to explain inapplicability of "good time deductions"
How later courts described this case
- plea judge not required to explain inapplicability of "good time deductions"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
The defendant appeals from the denial, after hearing, of his motion to vacate his plea of guilty to an indictment charging carnal knowledge of a female child, G. L. c. 265, § 23, as appearing in St. 1966, c. 291, and for a trial thereon, on the ground that his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. The defendant argues that a judge, on taking a guilty plea to a violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23, fails to fulfil his constitutional duty to insure that the plea is knowingly and voluntarily made (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [1969]), if he does not inform the defendant that he will be ineligible, under G. L. c. 127, § 129, to receive good time deductions from his sentence. The procedure for accepting a guilty plea was discussed in Commonwealth v. Stanton, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 614 (1974), where, at 622, we stated that a judge is not required to advise a defendant of the "practical complexities of the parole law.” Good time, like parole eligibility and the operation of G. L. c. 123A, is but a "contingent consequence of being confined.” Commonwealth v. Morrow, 363 Mass. 601, 606 (1973).
Judgment affirmed.