Opinion

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization

  • 597 U.S. 215
  • 213 L. Ed. 2d 545
  • 142 S. Ct. 2228
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 24, 2022
Status
Published
On the bench
Samuel Alito
Cited by
503 cases
Authority
More cited than 97.9%

holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”
  • holding that any Fourteenth Amendment right “not mentioned in the Constitution[] . . . must be ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))
  • recognizing that “[m]anuals for justices of the peace printed in the Colonies in the 18th century typically restated the common law rule on abortion,” under which “a pre-quickening abortion was not itself considered homicide” or otherwise proscribed
  • explaining that “the goal of preventing abortion does not constitute invidiously discriminatory animus against women” such that abortion restrictions are a sex- based classification under the Equal Protection Clause (quotation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v.

JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–1392. Argued December 1, 2021—Decided June 24, 2022

Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act provides that “[e]xcept in a medical

emergency or in the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall

not intentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abortion of an

unborn human being if the probable gestational age of the unborn hu-

man being has been determined to be greater than fifteen (15) weeks.”

Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191. Respondents—Jackson Women’s Health

Organization, an abortion clinic, and one of its doctors—challenged the

Act in Federal District Court, alleging that it violated this Court’s prec-

edents establishing a constitutional right to abortion, in particular Roe

v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.

v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833. The District Court granted summary judg-

ment in favor of respondents and permanently enjoined enforcement

of the Act, reasoning that Mississippi’s 15-week restriction on abortion

violates this Court’s cases forbidding States to ban abortion pre-viabil-

ity. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Before this Court, petitioners defend

the Act on the grounds that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and

that the Act is constitutional because it satisfies rational-basis review.

Held: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey

are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the

people and their elected representatives. Pp. 8–79.

(a) The critical question is whether the Constitution, properly un-

derstood, confers a right to obtain an abortion. Casey’s controlling

opinion skipped over that question and reaffirmed Roe solely on the

basis of stare decisis. A proper application of stare decisis, however,

requires an assessment of the strength of the grounds on which Roe

2 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Syllabus

was based. The Court therefore turns to the question that the Casey

plurality did not consider. Pp. 8–32.

(1) First, the Court reviews the standard that the Court’s cases

have used to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s refer-

ence to “liberty” protects a particular right. The Constitution makes

no express reference to a right to obtain an abortion, but several con-

stitutional provisions have been offered as potential homes for an im-

plicit constitutional right. Roe held that the abortion right is part of a

right to privacy that springs from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. See 410 U. S., at 152–153. The Casey Court

grounded its decision solely on the theory that the right to obtain an

abortion is part of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amend-

ment’s Due Process Clause. Others have suggested that support can

be found in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but

that theory is squarely foreclosed by the Court’s precedents, which es-

tablish that a State’s regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classifi-

cation and is thus not subject to the heightened scrutiny that applies

to such classifications. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, 496,

n. 20; Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 273–

274. Rather, regulations and prohibitions of abortion are governed by

the same standard of review as other health and safety measures.

Pp. 9–11.

(2) Next, the Court examines whether the right to obtain an abor-

tion is rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition and whether it is an

essential component of “ordered liberty.” The Court finds that the

right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradi-

tion. The underlying theory on which Casey rested—that the Four-

teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides substantive, as well

as procedural, protection for “liberty”—has long been controversial.

The Court’s decisions have held that the Due Process Clause pro-

tects two categories of substantive rights—those rights guaranteed by

the first eight Amendments to the Constitution and those rights

deemed fundamental that are not mentioned anywhere in the Consti-

tution. In deciding whether a right falls into either of these categories,

the question is whether the right is “deeply rooted in [our] history and

tradition” and whether it is essential to this Nation’s “scheme of or-

dered liberty.” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (internal quotation

marks omitted). The term “liberty” alone provides little guidance.

Thus, historical inquiries are essential whenever the Court is asked to

recognize a new component of the “liberty” interest protected by the

Due Process Clause. In interpreting what is meant by “liberty,” the

Court must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse

what the Fourteenth Amendment protects with the Court’s own ardent

views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy. For this reason,

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3

Syllabus

the Court has been “reluctant” to recognize rights that are not men-

tioned in the Constitution. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125.

Guided by the history and tradition that map the essential compo-

nents of the Nation’s concept of ordered liberty, the Court finds the

Fourteenth Amendment clearly does not protect the right to an abor-

tion. Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no support in

American law for a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. No state

constitutional provision had recognized such a right. Until a few years

before Roe, no federal or state court had recognized such a right. Nor

had any scholarly treatise. Indeed, abortion had long been a crime in

every single State. At common law, abortion was criminal in at least

some stages of pregnancy and was regarded as unlawful and could

have very serious consequences at all stages. American law followed

the common law until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s ex-

panded criminal liability for abortions. By the time the Fourteenth

Amendment was adopted, three-quarters of the States had made abor-

tion a crime at any stage of pregnancy. This consensus endured until

the day Roe was decided. Roe either ignored or misstated this history,

and Casey declined to reconsider Roe’s faulty historical analysis.

Respondents’ argument that this history does not matter flies in the

face of the standard the Court has applied in determining whether an

asserted right that is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution is never-

theless protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Solicitor Gen-

eral repeats Roe’s claim that it is “doubtful . . . abortion was ever firmly

established as a common-law crime even with respect to the destruc-

tion of a quick fetus,” 410 U. S., at 136, but the great common-law au-

thorities—Bracton, Coke, Hale, and Blackstone—all wrote that a post-

quickening abortion was a crime. Moreover, many authorities as-

serted that even a pre-quickening abortion was “unlawful” and that,

as a result, an abortionist was guilty of murder if the woman died from

the attempt. The Solicitor General suggests that history supports an

abortion right because of the common law’s failure to criminalize abor-

tion before quickening, but the insistence on quickening was not uni-

versal, see Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633; State v. Slagle, 83

N. C. 630, 632, and regardless, the fact that many States in the late

18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-quickening abor-

tions does not mean that anyone thought the States lacked the author-

ity to do so.

Instead of seriously pressing the argument that the abortion right

itself has deep roots, supporters of Roe and Casey contend that the

abortion right is an integral part of a broader entrenched right. Roe

termed this a right to privacy, 410 U. S., at 154, and Casey described

it as the freedom to make “intimate and personal choices” that are

“central to personal dignity and autonomy,” 505 U. S., at 851. Ordered

4 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Syllabus

liberty sets limits and defines the boundary between competing inter-

ests. Roe and Casey each struck a particular balance between the in-

terests of a woman who wants an abortion and the interests of what

they termed “potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; Casey, 505 U. S.,

at 852. But the people of the various States may evaluate those inter-

ests differently. The Nation’s historical understanding of ordered lib-

erty does not prevent the people’s elected representatives from decid-

ing how abortion should be regulated. Pp. 11–30.

(3) Finally, the Court considers whether a right to obtain an abor-

tion is part of a broader entrenched right that is supported by other

precedents. The Court concludes the right to obtain an abortion cannot

be justified as a component of such a right. Attempts to justify abor-

tion through appeals to a broader right to autonomy and to define one’s

“concept of existence” prove too much. Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. Those

criteria, at a high level of generality, could license fundamental rights

to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. What sharply distin-

guishes the abortion right from the rights recognized in the cases on

which Roe and Casey rely is something that both those decisions

acknowledged: Abortion is different because it destroys what Roe

termed “potential life” and what the law challenged in this case calls

an “unborn human being.” None of the other decisions cited by Roe

and Casey involved the critical moral question posed by abortion. Ac-

cordingly, those cases do not support the right to obtain an abortion,

and the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such

a right does not undermine them in any way. Pp. 30–32.

(b) The doctrine of stare decisis does not counsel continued ac-

ceptance of Roe and Casey. Stare decisis plays an important role and

protects the interests of those who have taken action in reliance on a

past decision. It “reduces incentives for challenging settled prece-

dents, saving parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.”

Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455. It “contrib-

utes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827. And it restrains judicial hubris

by respecting the judgment of those who grappled with important

questions in the past. But stare decisis is not an inexorable command,

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 233, and “is at its weakest when

[the Court] interpret[s] the Constitution,” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S.

203, 235. Some of the Court’s most important constitutional decisions

have overruled prior precedents. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educa-

tion, 347 U. S. 483, 491 (overruling the infamous decision in Plessy v.

Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, and its progeny).

The Court’s cases have identified factors that should be considered

in deciding when a precedent should be overruled. Janus v. State,

County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. ___, ___–___. Five factors

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5

Syllabus

discussed below weigh strongly in favor of overruling Roe and Casey.

Pp. 39–66.

(1) The nature of the Court’s error. Like the infamous decision in

Plessy v. Ferguson, Roe was also egregiously wrong and on a collision

course with the Constitution from the day it was decided. Casey per-

petuated its errors, calling both sides of the national controversy to

resolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey necessarily declared a win-

ning side. Those on the losing side—those who sought to advance the

State’s interest in fetal life—could no longer seek to persuade their

elected representatives to adopt policies consistent with their views.

The Court short-circuited the democratic process by closing it to the

large number of Americans who disagreed with Roe. Pp. 43–45.

(2) The quality of the reasoning. Without any grounding in the

constitutional text, history, or precedent, Roe imposed on the entire

country a detailed set of rules for pregnancy divided into trimesters

much like those that one might expect to find in a statute or regulation.

See 410 U. S., at 163–164. Roe’s failure even to note the overwhelming

consensus of state laws in effect in 1868 is striking, and what it said

about the common law was simply wrong. Then, after surveying his-

tory, the opinion spent many paragraphs conducting the sort of fact-

finding that might be undertaken by a legislative committee, and did

not explain why the sources on which it relied shed light on the mean-

ing of the Constitution. As to precedent, citing a broad array of cases,

the Court found support for a constitutional “right of personal privacy.”

Id., at 152. But Roe conflated the right to shield information from dis-

closure and the right to make and implement important personal de-

cisions without governmental interference. See Whalen v. Roe, 429

U. S. 589, 599–600. None of these decisions involved what is distinc-

tive about abortion: its effect on what Roe termed “potential life.”

When the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it imposed on

the country, it asserted that its rules were “consistent with,” among

other things, “the relative weights of the respective interests involved”

and “the demands of the profound problems of the present day.” Roe,

410 U. S., at 165. These are precisely the sort of considerations that

legislative bodies often take into account when they draw lines that

accommodate competing interests. The scheme Roe produced looked

like legislation, and the Court provided the sort of explanation that

might be expected from a legislative body. An even more glaring defi-

ciency was Roe’s failure to justify the critical distinction it drew be-

tween pre- and post-viability abortions. See id., at 163. The arbitrary

viability line, which Casey termed Roe’s central rule, has not found

much support among philosophers and ethicists who have attempted

to justify a right to abortion. The most obvious problem with any such

6 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Syllabus

argument is that viability has changed over time and is heavily de-

pendent on factors—such as medical advances and the availability of

quality medical care—that have nothing to do with the characteristics

of a fetus.

When Casey revisited Roe almost 20 years later, it reaffirmed Roe’s

central holding, but pointedly refrained from endorsing most of its rea-

soning. The Court abandoned any reliance on a privacy right and in-

stead grounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth Amend-

ment’s Due Process Clause. 505 U. S., at 846. The controlling opinion

criticized and rejected Roe’s trimester scheme, 505 U. S., at 872, and

substituted a new and obscure “undue burden” test. Casey, in short,

either refused to reaffirm or rejected important aspects of Roe’s analy-

sis, failed to remedy glaring deficiencies in Roe’s reasoning, endorsed

what it termed Roe’s central holding while suggesting that a majority

might not have thought it was correct, provided no new support for the

abortion right other than Roe’s status as precedent, and imposed a new

test with no firm grounding in constitutional text, history, or prece-

dent. Pp. 45–56.

(3) Workability. Deciding whether a precedent should be over-

ruled depends in part on whether the rule it imposes is workable—that

is, whether it can be understood and applied in a consistent and pre-

dictable manner. Casey’s “undue burden” test has scored poorly on the

workability scale. The Casey plurality tried to put meaning into the

“undue burden” test by setting out three subsidiary rules, but these

rules created their own problems. And the difficulty of applying Ca-

sey’s new rules surfaced in that very case. Compare 505 U. S., at 881–

887, with id., at 920–922 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-

ing in part). The experience of the Courts of Appeals provides further

evidence that Casey’s “line between” permissible and unconstitutional

restrictions “has proved to be impossible to draw with precision.” Ja-

nus, 585 U. S., at ___. Casey has generated a long list of Circuit con-

flicts. Continued adherence to Casey’s unworkable “undue burden”

test would undermine, not advance, the “evenhanded, predictable, and

consistent development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827.

Pp. 56–62.

(4) Effect on other areas of law. Roe and Casey have led to the

distortion of many important but unrelated legal doctrines, and that

effect provides further support for overruling those decisions. See Ra-

mos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in

part). Pp. 62–63.

(5) Reliance interests. Overruling Roe and Casey will not upend

concrete reliance interests like those that develop in “cases involving

property and contract rights.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 828. In Casey, the

controlling opinion conceded that traditional reliance interests were

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7

Syllabus

not implicated because getting an abortion is generally “unplanned ac-

tivity,” and “reproductive planning could take virtually immediate ac-

count of any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions.”

505 U. S., at 856. Instead, the opinion perceived a more intangible

form of reliance, namely, that “people [had] organized intimate rela-

tionships and made choices that define their views of themselves and

their places in society . . . in reliance on the availability of abortion in

the event that contraception should fail” and that “[t]he ability of

women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Na-

tion has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive

lives.” Ibid. The contending sides in this case make impassioned and

conflicting arguments about the effects of the abortion right on the

lives of women as well as the status of the fetus. The Casey plurality’s

speculative attempt to weigh the relative importance of the interests

of the fetus and the mother represent a departure from the “original

constitutional proposition” that “courts do not substitute their social

and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson

v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729–730.

The Solicitor General suggests that overruling Roe and Casey would

threaten the protection of other rights under the Due Process Clause.

The Court emphasizes that this decision concerns the constitutional

right to abortion and no other right. Nothing in this opinion should be

understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.

Pp. 63–66.

(c) Casey identified another concern, namely, the danger that the

public will perceive a decision overruling a controversial “watershed”

decision, such as Roe, as influenced by political considerations or pub-

lic opinion. 505 U. S., at 866–867. But the Court cannot allow its de-

cisions to be affected by such extraneous concerns. A precedent of this

Court is subject to the usual principles of stare decisis under which

adherence to precedent is the norm but not an inexorable command. If

the rule were otherwise, erroneous decisions like Plessy would still be

the law. The Court’s job is to interpret the law, apply longstanding

principles of stare decisis, and decide this case accordingly. Pp. 66–69.

(d) Under the Court’s precedents, rational-basis review is the appro-

priate standard to apply when state abortion regulations undergo con-

stitutional challenge. Given that procuring an abortion is not a funda-

mental constitutional right, it follows that the States may regulate

abortion for legitimate reasons, and when such regulations are chal-

lenged under the Constitution, courts cannot “substitute their social

and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson,

372 U. S., at 729–730. That applies even when the laws at issue con-

cern matters of great social significance and moral substance. A law

regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a

8 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Syllabus

“strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319. It

must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature

could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests. Id.,

at 320.

Mississippi’s Gestational Age Act is supported by the Mississippi

Legislature’s specific findings, which include the State’s asserted in-

terest in “protecting the life of the unborn.” §2(b)(i). These legitimate

interests provide a rational basis for the Gestational Age Act, and it

follows that respondents’ constitutional challenge must fail. Pp. 76–

78.

(e) Abortion presents a profound moral question. The Constitution

does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohib-

iting abortion. Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. The Court

overrules those decisions and returns that authority to the people and

their elected representatives. Pp. 78–79.

945 F. 3d 265, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, GOR-

SUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., and KA-

VANAUGH, J., filed concurring opinions. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion

concurring in the judgment. BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., filed

a dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 19–1392

_________________

THOMAS E. DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF

THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S

HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 24, 2022]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Amer-

icans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently

that a human person comes into being at conception and

that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as

strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman’s

right to control her own body and prevents women from

achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think

that abortion should be allowed under some but not all cir-

cumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of

views about the particular restrictions that should be im-

posed.

For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitu-

tion, each State was permitted to address this issue in ac-

cordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this

Court decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113. Even though the

Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held

that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim

that American law or the common law had ever recognized

2 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the con-

stitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in an-

tiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abor-

tion was probably never a crime under the common law).

After cataloging a wealth of other information having no

bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion

concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that

might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

Under this scheme, each trimester of pregnancy was reg-

ulated differently, but the most critical line was drawn at

roughly the end of the second trimester, which, at the time,

corresponded to the point at which a fetus was thought to

achieve “viability,” i.e., the ability to survive outside the

womb. Although the Court acknowledged that States had

a legitimate interest in protecting “potential life,”1 it found

that this interest could not justify any restriction on pre-

viability abortions. The Court did not explain the basis for

this line, and even abortion supporters have found it hard

to defend Roe’s reasoning. One prominent constitutional

scholar wrote that he “would vote for a statute very much

like the one the Court end[ed] up drafting” if he were “a

legislator,” but his assessment of Roe was memorable and

brutal: Roe was “not constitutional law” at all and gave “al-

most no sense of an obligation to try to be.”2

At the time of Roe, 30 States still prohibited abortion at

all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third

of the States had liberalized their laws, but Roe abruptly

ended that political process. It imposed the same highly

restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively

struck down the abortion laws of every single State.3 As

——————

1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973).

2 J. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82

Yale L. J. 920, 926, 947 (1973) (Ely) (emphasis deleted).

3 L. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of

Life and Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1973) (Tribe).

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3

Opinion of the Court

Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision

represented the “exercise of raw judicial power,” 410 U. S.,

at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has em-

bittered our political culture for a half century.4

Eventually, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.

Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992), the Court revisited Roe, but the

Members of the Court split three ways. Two Justices ex-

pressed no desire to change Roe in any way.5 Four others

wanted to overrule the decision in its entirety.6 And the

three remaining Justices, who jointly signed the controlling

opinion, took a third position.7 Their opinion did not en-

dorse Roe’s reasoning, and it even hinted that one or more

of its authors might have “reservations” about whether the

Constitution protects a right to abortion.8 But the opinion

concluded that stare decisis, which calls for prior decisions

to be followed in most instances, required adherence to

what it called Roe’s “central holding”—that a State may not

constitutionally protect fetal life before “viability”—even if

that holding was wrong.9 Anything less, the opinion

claimed, would undermine respect for this Court and the

rule of law.

Paradoxically, the judgment in Casey did a fair amount

of overruling. Several important abortion decisions were

——————

4 See R. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N. Y. U. L. Rev.

1185, 1208 (1992) (“Roe . . . halted a political process that was moving in

a reform direction and thereby, I believed, prolonged divisiveness and

deferred stable settlement of the issue”).

5 See 505 U. S., at 911 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part); id., at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judg-

ment in part, and dissenting in part).

6 See id., at 944 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and

dissenting in part); id., at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part

and dissenting in part).

7 See id., at 843 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).

8 Id., at 853.

9 Id., at 860.

4 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

overruled in toto, and Roe itself was overruled in part.10 Ca-

sey threw out Roe’s trimester scheme and substituted a new

rule of uncertain origin under which States were forbidden

to adopt any regulation that imposed an “undue burden” on

a woman’s right to have an abortion.11 The decision pro-

vided no clear guidance about the difference between a

“due” and an “undue” burden. But the three Justices who

authored the controlling opinion “call[ed] the contending

sides of a national controversy to end their national divi-

sion” by treating the Court’s decision as the final settlement

of the question of the constitutional right to abortion.12

As has become increasingly apparent in the intervening

years, Casey did not achieve that goal. Americans continue

to hold passionate and widely divergent views on abortion,

and state legislatures have acted accordingly. Some have

recently enacted laws allowing abortion, with few re-

strictions, at all stages of pregnancy. Others have tightly

restricted abortion beginning well before viability. And in

this case, 26 States have expressly asked this Court to over-

rule Roe and Casey and allow the States to regulate or pro-

hibit pre-viability abortions.

Before us now is one such state law. The State of Missis-

sippi asks us to uphold the constitutionality of a law that

generally prohibits an abortion after the 15th week of preg-

nancy—several weeks before the point at which a fetus is

now regarded as “viable” outside the womb. In defending

this law, the State’s primary argument is that we should

reconsider and overrule Roe and Casey and once again allow

each State to regulate abortion as its citizens wish. On the

other side, respondents and the Solicitor General ask us to

——————

10 Id., at 861, 870, 873 (overruling Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-

tive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American Col-

lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986)).

11 505 U. S., at 874.

12 Id., at 867.

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 5

Opinion of the Court

reaffirm Roe and Casey, and they contend that the Missis-

sippi law cannot stand if we do so. Allowing Mississippi to

prohibit abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, they argue,

“would be no different than overruling Casey and Roe en-

tirely.” Brief for Respondents 43. They contend that “no

half-measures” are available and that we must either reaf-

firm or overrule Roe and Casey. Brief for Respondents 50.

We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Con-

stitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right

is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, in-

cluding the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey

now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee

some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but

any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-

tory and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721

(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The right to abortion does not fall within this category.

Until the latter part of the 20th century, such a right was

entirely unknown in American law. Indeed, when the Four-

teenth Amendment was adopted, three quarters of the

States made abortion a crime at all stages of pregnancy.

The abortion right is also critically different from any other

right that this Court has held to fall within the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protection of “liberty.” Roe’s defenders char-

acterize the abortion right as similar to the rights recog-

nized in past decisions involving matters such as intimate

sexual relations, contraception, and marriage, but abortion

is fundamentally different, as both Roe and Casey acknowl-

edged, because it destroys what those decisions called “fetal

life” and what the law now before us describes as an “un-

born human being.”13

Stare decisis, the doctrine on which Casey’s controlling

——————

13 Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b) (2018).

6 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

opinion was based, does not compel unending adherence to

Roe’s abuse of judicial authority. Roe was egregiously

wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally

weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences.

And far from bringing about a national settlement of the

abortion issue, Roe and Casey have enflamed debate and

deepened division.

It is time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of

abortion to the people’s elected representatives. “The per-

missibility of abortion, and the limitations, upon it, are to

be resolved like most important questions in our democ-

racy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then

voting.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in

judgment in part and dissenting in part). That is what the

Constitution and the rule of law demand.

I

The law at issue in this case, Mississippi’s Gestational

Age Act, see Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191 (2018), contains

this central provision: “Except in a medical emergency or in

the case of a severe fetal abnormality, a person shall not

intentionally or knowingly perform . . . or induce an abor-

tion of an unborn human being if the probable gestational

age of the unborn human being has been determined to be

greater than fifteen (15) weeks.” §4(b).14

To support this Act, the legislature made a series of fac-

tual findings. It began by noting that, at the time of enact-

ment, only six countries besides the United States “per-

mit[ted] nontherapeutic or elective abortion-on-demand

after the twentieth week of gestation.”15 §2(a). The legisla-

——————

14 The Act defines “gestational age” to be “the age of an unborn human

being as calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period of the

pregnant woman.” §3(f ).

15 Those other six countries were Canada, China, the Netherlands,

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 7

Opinion of the Court

ture then found that at 5 or 6 weeks’ gestational age an “un-

born human being’s heart begins beating”; at 8 weeks the

“unborn human being begins to move about in the womb”;

at 9 weeks “all basic physiological functions are present”; at

10 weeks “vital organs begin to function,” and “[h]air, fin-

gernails, and toenails . . . begin to form”; at 11 weeks “an

unborn human being’s diaphragm is developing,” and he or

she may “move about freely in the womb”; and at 12 weeks

the “unborn human being” has “taken on ‘the human form’

in all relevant respects.” §2(b)(i) (quoting Gonzales v. Car-

hart, 550 U. S. 124, 160 (2007)). It found that most abor-

tions after 15 weeks employ “dilation and evacuation proce-

dures which involve the use of surgical instruments to

crush and tear the unborn child,” and it concluded that the

“intentional commitment of such acts for nontherapeutic or

elective reasons is a barbaric practice, dangerous for the

maternal patient, and demeaning to the medical profes-

sion.” §2(b)(i)(8).

Respondents are an abortion clinic, Jackson Women’s

Health Organization, and one of its doctors. On the day the

Gestational Age Act was enacted, respondents filed suit in

Federal District Court against various Mississippi officials,

alleging that the Act violated this Court’s precedents estab-

lishing a constitutional right to abortion. The District

——————

North Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. See A. Baglini, Charlotte Lozier

Institute, Gestational Limits on Abortion in the United States Compared

to International Norms 6–7 (2014); M. Lee, Is the United States One of

Seven Countries That “Allow Elective Abortions After 20 Weeks of Preg-

nancy?” Wash. Post (Oct. 8, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-

checker/wp/2017/10/09/is-the-united-states-one-of-seven-countries-that-

allow-elective-abortions-after-20-weeks-of-preganacy (stating that the

claim made by the Mississippi Legislature and the Charlotte Lozier In-

stitute was “backed by data”). A more recent compilation from the Cen-

ter for Reproductive Rights indicates that Iceland and Guinea-Bissau are

now also similarly permissive. See The World’s Abortion Laws, Center

for Reproductive Rights (Feb. 23, 2021), https://reproductiverights.org/

maps/worlds-abortion-laws/.

8 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

Court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents

and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act, reason-

ing that “viability marks the earliest point at which the

State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to

justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions” and

that 15 weeks’ gestational age is “prior to viability.” Jack-

son Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d 536,

539–540 (SD Miss. 2019) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 945 F. 3d 265 (2019).

We granted certiorari, 593 U. S. ___ (2021), to resolve the

question whether “all pre-viability prohibitions on elective

abortions are unconstitutional,” Pet. for Cert. i. Petition-

ers’ primary defense of the Mississippi Gestational Age Act

is that Roe and Casey were wrongly decided and that “the

Act is constitutional because it satisfies rational-basis re-

view.” Brief for Petitioners 49. Respondents answer that

allowing Mississippi to ban pre-viability abortions “would

be no different than overruling Casey and Roe entirely.”

Brief for Respondents 43. They tell us that “no half-

measures” are available: We must either reaffirm or over-

rule Roe and Casey. Brief for Respondents 50.

II

We begin by considering the critical question whether the

Constitution, properly understood, confers a right to obtain

an abortion. Skipping over that question, the controlling

opinion in Casey reaffirmed Roe’s “central holding” based

solely on the doctrine of stare decisis, but as we will explain,

proper application of stare decisis required an assessment

of the strength of the grounds on which Roe was based. See

infra, at 45–56.

We therefore turn to the question that the Casey plurality

did not consider, and we address that question in three

steps. First, we explain the standard that our cases have

used in determining whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s

reference to “liberty” protects a particular right. Second,

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 9

Opinion of the Court

we examine whether the right at issue in this case is rooted

in our Nation’s history and tradition and whether it is an

essential component of what we have described as “ordered

liberty.” Finally, we consider whether a right to obtain an

abortion is part of a broader entrenched right that is sup-

ported by other precedents.

A

1

Constitutional analysis must begin with “the language of

the instrument,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 186–189

(1824), which offers a “fixed standard” for ascertaining

what our founding document means, 1 J. Story, Commen-

taries on the Constitution of the United States §399, p. 383

(1833). The Constitution makes no express reference to a

right to obtain an abortion, and therefore those who claim

that it protects such a right must show that the right is

somehow implicit in the constitutional text.

Roe, however, was remarkably loose in its treatment of

the constitutional text. It held that the abortion right,

which is not mentioned in the Constitution, is part of a right

to privacy, which is also not mentioned. See 410 U. S., at

152–153. And that privacy right, Roe observed, had been

found to spring from no fewer than five different constitu-

tional provisions—the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 152.

The Court’s discussion left open at least three ways in

which some combination of these provisions could protect

the abortion right. One possibility was that the right was

“founded . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of

rights to the people.” Id., at 153. Another was that the

right was rooted in the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendment,

or in some combination of those provisions, and that this

right had been “incorporated” into the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment just as many other Bill of

Rights provisions had by then been incorporated. Ibid; see

10 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

also McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 763–766 (2010)

(majority opinion) (discussing incorporation). And a third

path was that the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments

played no role and that the right was simply a component

of the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause. Roe, 410 U. S., at 153. Roe expressed

the “feel[ing]” that the Fourteenth Amendment was the pro-

vision that did the work, but its message seemed to be that

the abortion right could be found somewhere in the Consti-

tution and that specifying its exact location was not of par-

amount importance.16 The Casey Court did not defend this

unfocused analysis and instead grounded its decision solely

on the theory that the right to obtain an abortion is part of

the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause.

We discuss this theory in depth below, but before doing

so, we briefly address one additional constitutional provi-

sion that some of respondents’ amici have now offered as

yet another potential home for the abortion right: the Four-

teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for

United States as Amicus Curiae 24 (Brief for United

States); see also Brief for Equal Protection Constitutional

Law Scholars as Amici Curiae. Neither Roe nor Casey saw

fit to invoke this theory, and it is squarely foreclosed by our

precedents, which establish that a State’s regulation of

abortion is not a sex-based classification and is thus not

subject to the “heightened scrutiny” that applies to such

classifications.17 The regulation of a medical procedure that

——————

16 The Court’s words were as follows: “This right of privacy, whether it

be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty

and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court

determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the peo-

ple, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to

terminate her pregnancy.” 410 U. S., at 153.

17 See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U. S. 47, ___ (2017) (slip

op., at 8).

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 11

Opinion of the Court

only one sex can undergo does not trigger heightened con-

stitutional scrutiny unless the regulation is a “mere pre-

tex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against

members of one sex or the other.” Geduldig v. Aiello, 417

U. S. 484, 496, n. 20 (1974). And as the Court has stated,

the “goal of preventing abortion” does not constitute “invid-

iously discriminatory animus” against women. Bray v. Al-

exandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 273–274

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

laws regulating or prohibiting abortion are not subject to

heightened scrutiny. Rather, they are governed by the

same standard of review as other health and safety

measures.18

With this new theory addressed, we turn to Casey’s bold

assertion that the abortion right is an aspect of the “liberty”

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. 505 U. S., at 846; Brief for Respondents 17;

Brief for United States 21–22.

2

The underlying theory on which this argument rests—

that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause pro-

vides substantive, as well as procedural, protection for “lib-

erty”—has long been controversial. But our decisions have

held that the Due Process Clause protects two categories of

substantive rights.

The first consists of rights guaranteed by the first eight

Amendments. Those Amendments originally applied only

to the Federal Government, Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor

of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247–251 (1833) (opinion for the

Court by Marshall, C. J.), but this Court has held that the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “incor-

porates” the great majority of those rights and thus makes

them equally applicable to the States. See McDonald, 561

——————

18 We discuss this standard in Part VI of this opinion.

12 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

U. S., at 763–767, and nn. 12–13. The second category—

which is the one in question here—comprises a select list of

fundamental rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the

Constitution.

In deciding whether a right falls into either of these cat-

egories, the Court has long asked whether the right is

“deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition” and whether

it is essential to our Nation’s “scheme of ordered liberty.”

Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 3)

(internal quotation marks omitted); McDonald, 561 U. S.,

at 764, 767 (internal quotation marks omitted); Glucksberg,

521 U. S., at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).19 And

in conducting this inquiry, we have engaged in a careful

analysis of the history of the right at issue.

Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Timbs is a re-

cent example. In concluding that the Eighth Amendment’s

protection against excessive fines is “fundamental to our

scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Na-

tion’s history and tradition,” 586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7)

(internal quotation marks omitted), her opinion traced the

right back to Magna Carta, Blackstone’s Commentaries,

and 35 of the 37 state constitutions in effect at the ratifica-

tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 586 U. S., at ___–___

(slip op., at 3–7).

A similar inquiry was undertaken in McDonald, which

held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to

keep and bear arms. The lead opinion surveyed the origins

of the Second Amendment, the debates in Congress about

——————

19 See also, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 148 (1968) (asking

whether “a right is among those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and

justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions’ ”); Palko

v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937) (requiring “a ‘principle of justice

so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked

as fundamental’ ” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105

(1934))).

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 13

Opinion of the Court

the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state con-

stitutions in effect when that Amendment was ratified (at

least 22 of the 37 States protected the right to keep and bear

arms), federal laws enacted during the same period, and

other relevant historical evidence. 561 U. S., at 767–777.

Only then did the opinion conclude that “the Framers and

ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to

keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights nec-

essary to our system of ordered liberty.” Id., at 778; see also

id., at 822–850 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concur-

ring in judgment) (surveying history and reaching the same

result under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Im-

munities Clause).

Timbs and McDonald concerned the question whether

the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights that are ex-

pressly set out in the Bill of Rights, and it would be anom-

alous if similar historical support were not required when a

putative right is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitu-

tion. Thus, in Glucksberg, which held that the Due Process

Clause does not confer a right to assisted suicide, the Court

surveyed more than 700 years of “Anglo-American common

law tradition,” 521 U. S., at 711, and made clear that a fun-

damental right must be “objectively, deeply rooted in this

Nation’s history and tradition,” id., at 720–721.

Historical inquiries of this nature are essential when-

ever we are asked to recognize a new component of the “lib-

erty” protected by the Due Process Clause because the term

“liberty” alone provides little guidance. “Liberty” is a capa-

cious term. As Lincoln once said: “We all declare for Lib-

erty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the

same thing.”20 In a well-known essay, Isaiah Berlin re-

ported that “[h]istorians of ideas” had cataloged more than

——————

20 Address at Sanitary Fair at Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 18, 1864), reprinted

in 7 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 301 (R. Basler ed. 1953).

14 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

200 different senses in which the term had been used.21

In interpreting what is meant by the Fourteenth Amend-

ment’s reference to “liberty,” we must guard against the

natural human tendency to confuse what that Amendment

protects with our own ardent views about the liberty that

Americans should enjoy. That is why the Court has long

been “reluctant” to recognize rights that are not mentioned

in the Constitution. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S.

115, 125 (1992). “Substantive due process has at times been

a treacherous field for this Court,” Moore v. East Cleveland,

431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion), and it has

sometimes led the Court to usurp authority that the Con-

stitution entrusts to the people’s elected representatives.

See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 225–

226 (1985). As the Court cautioned in Glucksberg, “[w]e

must . . . exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked

to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty protected

by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the

policy preferences of the Members of this Court.” 521 U. S.,

at 720 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

On occasion, when the Court has ignored the “[a]ppropri-

ate limits” imposed by “ ‘respect for the teachings of his-

tory,’ ” Moore, 431 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion), it has

fallen into the freewheeling judicial policymaking that

characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New

York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). The Court must not fall prey to

such an unprincipled approach. Instead, guided by the his-

tory and tradition that map the essential components of our

Nation’s concept of ordered liberty, we must ask what the

Fourteenth Amendment means by the term “liberty.” When

we engage in that inquiry in the present case, the clear an-

swer is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect

——————

21 Four Essays on Liberty 121 (1969).

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 15

Opinion of the Court

the right to an abortion.22

B

1

Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no

support in American law for a constitutional right to obtain

an abortion. No state constitutional provision had recog-

nized such a right. Until a few years before Roe was handed

down, no federal or state court had recognized such a right.

Nor had any scholarly treatise of which we are aware. And

although law review articles are not reticent about advocat-

ing new rights, the earliest article proposing a constitu-

tional right to abortion that has come to our attention was

published only a few years before Roe.23

——————

22 That is true regardless of whether we look to the Amendment’s Due

Process Clause or its Privileges or Immunities Clause. Some scholars

and Justices have maintained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause

is the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that guarantees substan-

tive rights. See, e.g., McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 813–850

(2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Dun-

can, 391 U. S., at 165–166 (Black, J., concurring); A. Amar, Bill of Rights:

Creation and Reconstruction 163–180 (1998) (Amar); J. Ely, Democracy

and Distrust 22–30 (1980); 2 W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution

in the History of the United States 1089–1095 (1953). But even on that

view, such a right would need to be rooted in the Nation’s history and

tradition. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–552 (No. 3,230) (CC

ED Pa. 1823) (describing unenumerated rights under the Privileges and

Immunities Clause, Art. IV, §2, as those “fundamental” rights “which

have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states”);

Amar 176 (relying on Corfield to interpret the Privileges or Immunities

Clause); cf. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 819–820, 832, 854 (opinion of

THOMAS, J.) (reserving the question whether the Privileges or Immuni-

ties Clause protects “any rights besides those enumerated in the Consti-

tution”).

23 See R. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforce-

ment and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N. C. L. Rev. 730

(1968) (Lucas); see also D. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality 334–335 (1994)

(Garrow) (stating that Lucas was “undeniably the first person to fully

16 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

Not only was there no support for such a constitutional

right until shortly before Roe, but abortion had long been a

crime in every single State. At common law, abortion was

criminal in at least some stages of pregnancy and was re-

garded as unlawful and could have very serious conse-

quences at all stages. American law followed the common

law until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s ex-

panded criminal liability for abortions. By the time of the

adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, three-quarters of

the States had made abortion a crime at any stage of preg-

nancy, and the remaining States would soon follow.

Roe either ignored or misstated this history, and Casey

declined to reconsider Roe’s faulty historical analysis. It is

therefore important to set the record straight.

2

a

We begin with the common law, under which abortion

was a crime at least after “quickening”—i.e., the first felt

movement of the fetus in the womb, which usually occurs

between the 16th and 18th week of pregnancy.24

——————

articulate on paper” the argument that “a woman’s right to choose abor-

tion was a fundamental individual freedom protected by the U. S. Con-

stitution’s guarantee of personal liberty”).

24 The exact meaning of “quickening” is subject to some debate. Com-

pare Brief for Scholars of Jurisprudence as Amici Curiae 12–14, and

n. 32 (emphasis deleted) (“ ‘a quick child’ ” meant simply a “live” child,

and under the era’s outdated knowledge of embryology, a fetus was

thought to become “quick” at around the sixth week of pregnancy), with

Brief for American Historical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6, n. 2

(“quick” and “quickening” consistently meant “the woman’s perception of

fetal movement”). We need not wade into this debate. First, it suffices

for present purposes to show that abortion was criminal by at least the

16th or 18th week of pregnancy. Second, as we will show, during the

relevant period—i.e., the period surrounding the enactment of the Four-

teenth Amendment—the quickening distinction was abandoned as

States criminalized abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See infra, at 21–

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 17

Opinion of the Court

The “eminent common-law authorities (Blackstone,

Coke, Hale, and the like),” Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. ___,

___ (2020) (slip op., at 7), all describe abortion after quick-

ening as criminal. Henry de Bracton’s 13th-century trea-

tise explained that if a person has “struck a pregnant

woman, or has given her poison, whereby he has caused

abortion, if the foetus be already formed and animated, and

particularly if it be animated, he commits homicide.” 2 De

Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 279 (T. Twiss ed.

1879); see also 1 Fleta, c. 23, reprinted in 72 Selden Soc. 60–

61 (H. Richardson & G. Sayles eds. 1955) (13th-century

treatise).25

Sir Edward Coke’s 17th-century treatise likewise as-

serted that abortion of a quick child was “murder” if the

“childe be born alive” and a “great misprision” if the “childe

dieth in her body.” 3 Institutes of the Laws of England 50–

51 (1644). (“Misprision” referred to “some heynous offence

under the degree of felony.” Id., at 139.) Two treatises by

Sir Matthew Hale likewise described abortion of a quick

child who died in the womb as a “great crime” and a “great

misprision.” Pleas of the Crown 53 (P. Glazebrook ed.

1972); 1 History of the Pleas of the Crown 433 (1736) (Hale).

And writing near the time of the adoption of our Constitu-

tion, William Blackstone explained that abortion of a

“quick” child was “by the ancient law homicide or man-

slaughter” (citing Bracton), and at least a very “heinous

misdemeanor” (citing Coke). 1 Commentaries on the Laws

of England 129–130 (7th ed. 1775) (Blackstone).

English cases dating all the way back to the 13th century

corroborate the treatises’ statements that abortion was a

crime. See generally J. Dellapenna, Dispelling the Myths

——————

25.

25 Even before Bracton’s time, English law imposed punishment for the

killing of a fetus. See Leges Henrici Primi 222–223 (L. Downer ed. 1972)

(imposing penalty for any abortion and treating a woman who aborted a

“quick” child “as if she were a murderess”).

18 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

of Abortion History 126, and n. 16, 134–142, 188–194, and

nn. 84–86 (2006) (Dellapenna); J. Keown, Abortion, Doctors

and the Law 3–12 (1988) (Keown). In 1732, for example,

Eleanor Beare was convicted of “destroying the Foetus in

the Womb” of another woman and “thereby causing her to

miscarry.”26 For that crime and another “misdemeanor,”

Beare was sentenced to two days in the pillory and three

years’ imprisonment.27

Although a pre-quickening abortion was not itself consid-

ered homicide, it does not follow that abortion was permis-

sible at common law—much less that abortion was a legal

right. Cf. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 713 (removal of “com-

mon law’s harsh sanctions did not represent an acceptance

of suicide”). Quite to the contrary, in the 1732 case men-

tioned above, the judge said of the charge of abortion (with

no mention of quickening) that he had “never met with a

case so barbarous and unnatural.”28 Similarly, an indict-

ment from 1602, which did not distinguish between a pre-

quickening and post-quickening abortion, described abor-

tion as “pernicious” and “against the peace of our Lady the

Queen, her crown and dignity.” Keown 7 (discussing R. v.

Webb, Calendar of Assize Records, Surrey Indictments 512

(1980)).

That the common law did not condone even pre-

quickening abortions is confirmed by what one might call a

proto-felony-murder rule. Hale and Blackstone explained a

way in which a pre-quickening abortion could rise to the

level of a homicide. Hale wrote that if a physician gave a

woman “with child” a “potion” to cause an abortion, and the

woman died, it was “murder” because the potion was given

“unlawfully to destroy her child within her.” 1 Hale 429–

430 (emphasis added). As Blackstone explained, to be

——————

26 2 Gentleman’s Magazine 931 (Aug. 1732).

27 Id., at 932.

28 Ibid.

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 19

Opinion of the Court

“murder” a killing had to be done with “malice afore-

thought, . . . either express or implied.” 4 Blackstone 198

(emphasis deleted). In the case of an abortionist, Black-

stone wrote, “the law will imply [malice]” for the same rea-

son that it would imply malice if a person who intended to

kill one person accidentally killed a different person:

“[I]f one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is

murder; because of the previous felonious intent, which

the law transfers from one to the other. The same is

the case, where one lays poison for A; and B, against

whom the prisoner had no malicious intent, takes it,

and it kills him; this is likewise murder. So also, if one

gives a woman with child a medicine to procure abor-

tion, and it operates so violently as to kill the woman,

this is murder in the person who gave it.” Id., at 200–

201 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).29

Notably, Blackstone, like Hale, did not state that this

proto-felony-murder rule required that the woman be “with

quick child”—only that she be “with child.” Id., at 201. And

it is revealing that Hale and Blackstone treated abortion-

ists differently from other physicians or surgeons who

caused the death of a patient “without any intent of doing

[the patient] any bodily hurt.” Hale 429; see 4 Blackstone

197. These other physicians—even if “unlicensed”—would

not be “guilty of murder or manslaughter.” Hale 429. But

a physician performing an abortion would, precisely be-

cause his aim was an “unlawful” one.

In sum, although common-law authorities differed on the

severity of punishment for abortions committed at different

——————

29 Other treatises restated the same rule. See 1 W. Russell & C.

Greaves, Crimes and Misdemeanors 540 (5th ed. 1845) (“So where a per-

son gave medicine to a woman to procure an abortion, and where a per-

son put skewers into the woman for the same purpose, by which in both

cases the women were killed, these acts were clearly held to be murder”

(footnotes omitted)); 1 E. East, Pleas of the Crown 230 (1803) (similar).

20 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

points in pregnancy, none endorsed the practice. Moreover,

we are aware of no common-law case or authority, and the

parties have not pointed to any, that remotely suggests a

positive right to procure an abortion at any stage of preg-

nancy.

b

In this country, the historical record is similar. The “most

important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commen-

taries,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 594

(2008), reported Blackstone’s statement that abortion of a

quick child was at least “a heinous misdemeanor,” 2 St.

George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries 129–130

(1803), and that edition also included Blackstone’s discus-

sion of the proto-felony-murder rule, 5 id., at 200–201.

Manuals for justices of the peace printed in the Colonies in

the 18th century typically restated the common-law rule on

abortion, and some manuals repeated Hale’s and Black-

stone’s statements that anyone who prescribed medication

“unlawfully to destroy the child” would be guilty of murder

if the woman died. See, e.g., J. Parker, Conductor Generalis

220 (1788); 2 R. Burn, Justice of the Peace, and Parish Of-

ficer 221–222 (7th ed. 1762) (English manual stating the

same).30

——————

30 For manuals restating one or both rules, see J. Davis, Criminal Law

96, 102–103, 339 (1838); Conductor Generalis 194–195 (1801) (printed in

Philadelphia); Conductor Generalis 194–195 (1794) (printed in Albany);

Conductor Generalis 220 (1788) (printed in New York); Conductor Gen-

eralis 198 (1749) (printed in New York); G. Webb, Office and Authority

of a Justice of Peace 232 (1736) (printed in Williamsburg); Conductor

Generalis 161 (1722) (printed in Philadelphia); see also J. Conley, Doing

It by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in Eight-

eenth Century America, 6 J. Legal Hist. 257, 265, 267 (1985) (noting that

these manuals were the justices’ “primary source of legal reference” and

of “practical value for a wider audience than the justices”).

For cases stating the proto-felony-murder rule, see, e.g., Common-

wealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263, 265 (1845); People v. Sessions, 58 Mich.

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 21

Opinion of the Court

The few cases available from the early colonial period cor-

roborate that abortion was a crime. See generally Del-

lapenna 215–228 (collecting cases). In Maryland in 1652,

for example, an indictment charged that a man “Mur-

therously endeavoured to destroy or Murther the Child by

him begotten in the Womb.” Proprietary v. Mitchell, 10 Md.

Archives 80, 183 (1652) (W. Browne ed. 1891). And by the

19th century, courts frequently explained that the common

law made abortion of a quick child a crime. See, e.g., Smith

v. Gaffard, 31 Ala. 45, 51 (1857); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48,

55 (1851); State v. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52, 52–55 (1849); Com-

monwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. 263, 264–268 (1845).

c

The original ground for drawing a distinction between

pre- and post-quickening abortions is not entirely clear, but

some have attributed the rule to the difficulty of proving

that a pre-quickening fetus was alive. At that time, there

were no scientific methods for detecting pregnancy in its

early stages,31 and thus, as one court put it in 1872: “[U]ntil

the period of quickening there is no evidence of life; and

whatever may be said of the feotus, the law has fixed upon

this period of gestation as the time when the child is en-

dowed with life” because “foetal movements are the first

clearly marked and well defined evidences of life.” Evans v.

People, 49 N. Y. 86, 90 (emphasis added); Cooper, 22

N. J. L., at 56 (“In contemplation of law life commences at

the moment of quickening, at that moment when the em-

bryo gives the first physical proof of life, no matter when it

first received it” (emphasis added)).

——————

594, 595–596, 26 N. W. 291, 292–293 (1886); State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128,

131–132 (1868); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 54–55 (1851).

31 See E. Rigby, A System of Midwifery 73 (1841) (“Under all circum-

stances, the diagnosis of pregnancy must ever be difficult and obscure

during the early months”); see also id., at 74–80 (discussing rudimentary

techniques for detecting early pregnancy); A. Taylor, A Manual of Medi-

cal Jurisprudence 418–421 (6th Am. ed. 1866) (same).

22 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

The Solicitor General offers a different explanation of the

basis for the quickening rule, namely, that before quicken-

ing the common law did not regard a fetus “as having a ‘sep-

arate and independent existence.’ ” Brief for United States

26 (quoting Parker, 50 Mass., at 266). But the case on

which the Solicitor General relies for this proposition also

suggested that the criminal law’s quickening rule was out

of step with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of

law, noting that “to many purposes, in reference to civil

rights, an infant in ventre sa mere is regarded as a person

in being.” Ibid. (citing 1 Blackstone 129); see also Evans,

49 N. Y., at 89; Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633

(1850); Morrow v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537 (1849); Hall v. Han-

cock, 32 Mass. 255, 258 (1834); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4

Ves. 227, 321–322, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (1789).

At any rate, the original ground for the quickening rule

is of little importance for present purposes because the rule

was abandoned in the 19th century. During that period,

treatise writers and commentators criticized the quicken-

ing distinction as “neither in accordance with the result of

medical experience, nor with the principles of the common

law.” F. Wharton, Criminal Law §1220, p. 606 (rev. 4th ed.

1857) (footnotes omitted); see also J. Beck, Researches in

Medicine and Medical Jurisprudence 26–28 (2d ed. 1835)

(describing the quickening distinction as “absurd” and “in-

jurious”).32 In 1803, the British Parliament made abortion

——————

32 See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 204, 209–210 (1879) (ac-

knowledging the common-law rule but arguing that “the law should pun-

ish abortions and miscarriages, willfully produced, at any time during

the period of gestation”); Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa., 631, 633 (1850)

(the quickening rule “never ought to have been the law anywhere”); J.

Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Statutory Crimes §744, p. 471

(1873) (“If we look at the reason of the law, we shall prefer” a rule that

“discard[s] this doctrine of the necessity of a quickening”); I. Dana, Re-

port of the Committee on the Production of Abortion, in 5 Transactions

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 23

Opinion of the Court

a crime at all stages of pregnancy and authorized the impo-

sition of severe punishment. See Lord Ellenborough’s Act,

43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803). One scholar has suggested that Par-

liament’s decision “may partly have been attributable to the

medical man’s concern that fetal life should be protected by

the law at all stages of gestation.” Keown 22.

In this country during the 19th century, the vast majority

of the States enacted statutes criminalizing abortion at all

stages of pregnancy. See Appendix A, infra (listing state

statutory provisions in chronological order).33 By 1868, the

year when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, three-

quarters of the States, 28 out of 37, had enacted statutes

making abortion a crime even if it was performed before

quickening.34 See ibid. Of the nine States that had not yet

——————

of the Maine Medical Association 37–39 (1866); Report on Criminal Abor-

tion, in 12 Transactions of the American Medical Association 75–77

(1859); W. Guy, Principles of Medical Forensics 133–134 (1845); J.

Chitty, Practical Treatise on Medical Jurisprudence 438 (2d Am. ed.

1836); 1 T. Beck & J. Beck, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence 293 (5th

ed. 1823); 2 T. Percival, The Works, Literary, Moral and Medical 430

(1807); see also Keown 38–39 (collecting English authorities).

33 See generally Dellapenna 315–319 (cataloging the development of

the law in the States); E. Quay, Justifiable Abortion—Medical and Legal

Foundations, 49 Geo. L. J. 395, 435–437, 447–520 (1961) (Quay) (same);

J. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Stat-

utes and The Fourteenth Amendment, 17 St. Mary’s L. J. 29, 34–36

(1985) (Witherspoon) (same).

34 Some scholars assert that only 27 States prohibited abortion at all

stages. See, e.g., Dellapenna 315; Witherspoon 34–35, and n. 15. Those

scholars appear to have overlooked Rhode Island, which criminalized

abortion at all stages in 1861. See Acts and Resolves R. I. 1861, ch. 371,

§1, p. 133 (criminalizing the attempt to “procure the miscarriage” of “any

pregnant woman” or “any woman supposed by such person to be preg-

nant,” without mention of quickening). The amicus brief for the Ameri-

can Historical Association asserts that only 26 States prohibited abortion

at all stages, but that brief incorrectly excludes West Virginia and Ne-

braska from its count. Compare Brief for American Historical Associa-

tion 27–28 (citing Quay), with Appendix A, infra.

24 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

criminalized abortion at all stages, all but one did so by

1910. See ibid.

The trend in the Territories that would become the last

13 States was similar: All of them criminalized abortion at

all stages of pregnancy between 1850 (the Kingdom of Ha-

waii) and 1919 (New Mexico). See Appendix B, infra; see

also Casey, 505 U. S., at 952 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring

in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Dellapenna

317–319. By the end of the 1950s, according to the Roe

Court’s own count, statutes in all but four States and the

District of Columbia prohibited abortion “however and

whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the

life of the mother.” 410 U. S., at 139.35

This overwhelming consensus endured until the day Roe

was decided. At that time, also by the Roe Court’s own

count, a substantial majority—30 States—still prohibited

abortion at all stages except to save the life of the mother.

See id., at 118, and n. 2 (listing States). And though Roe

discerned a “trend toward liberalization” in about “one-

third of the States,” those States still criminalized some

abortions and regulated them more stringently than Roe

would allow. Id., at 140, and n. 37; Tribe 2. In short, the

——————

35 The statutes of three States (Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Penn-

sylvania) prohibited abortions performed “unlawfully” or “without lawful

justification.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Massachusetts, case law held that abortion was allowed when, accord-

ing to the judgment of physicians in the relevant community, the proce-

dure was necessary to preserve the woman’s life or her physical or emo-

tional health. Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 395, 53 N. E.

2d 4, 5 (1944). In the other two States, however, there is no clear support

in case law for the proposition that abortion was lawful where the

mother’s life was not at risk. See State v. Brandenberg, 137 N. J. L. 124,

58 A. 2d 709 (1948); Commonwealth v. Trombetta, 131 Pa. Super. 487,

200 A. 107 (1938).

Statutes in the two remaining jurisdictions (the District of Columbia

and Alabama) permitted “abortion to preserve the mother’s health.” Roe,

410 U. S., at 139. Case law in those jurisdictions does not clarify the

breadth of these exceptions.

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 25

Opinion of the Court

“Court’s opinion in Roe itself convincingly refutes the notion

that the abortion liberty is deeply rooted in the history or

tradition of our people.” Thornburgh v. American College of

Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 793 (1986)

(White, J., dissenting).

d

The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is

not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions. On

the contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion

on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest

days of the common law until 1973. The Court in Roe could

have said of abortion exactly what Glucksberg said of as-

sisted suicide: “Attitudes toward [abortion] have changed

since Bracton, but our laws have consistently condemned,

and continue to prohibit, [that practice].” 521 U. S., at 719.

3

Respondents and their amici have no persuasive answer

to this historical evidence.

Neither respondents nor the Solicitor General disputes

the fact that by 1868 the vast majority of States criminal-

ized abortion at all stages of pregnancy. See Brief for Peti-

tioners 12–13; see also Brief for American Historical Asso-

ciation et al. as Amici Curiae 27–28, and nn. 14–15

(conceding that 26 out of 37 States prohibited abortion be-

fore quickening); Tr. of Oral Arg. 74–75 (respondents’ coun-

sel conceding the same). Instead, respondents are forced to

argue that it “does [not] matter that some States prohibited

abortion at the time Roe was decided or when the Four-

teenth Amendment was adopted.” Brief for Respondents

21. But that argument flies in the face of the standard we

have applied in determining whether an asserted right that

is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution is nevertheless

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Not only are respondents and their amici unable to show

26 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

that a constitutional right to abortion was established when

the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but they have

found no support for the existence of an abortion right that

predates the latter part of the 20th century—no state con-

stitutional provision, no statute, no judicial decision, no

learned treatise. The earliest sources called to our atten-

tion are a few district court and state court decisions de-

cided shortly before Roe and a small number of law review

articles from the same time period.36

A few of respondents’ amici muster historical arguments,

but they are very weak. The Solicitor General repeats Roe’s

claim that it is “ ‘doubtful’ . . . ‘abortion was ever firmly es-

tablished as a common-law crime even with respect to the

destruction of a quick fetus.’ ” Brief for United States 26

(quoting Roe, 410 U. S., at 136). But as we have seen, great

common-law authorities like Bracton, Coke, Hale, and

Blackstone all wrote that a post-quickening abortion was a

crime—and a serious one at that. Moreover, Hale and

Blackstone (and many other authorities following them) as-

serted that even a pre-quickening abortion was “unlawful”

and that, as a result, an abortionist was guilty of murder if

the woman died from the attempt.

Instead of following these authorities, Roe relied largely

on two articles by a pro-abortion advocate who claimed that

Coke had intentionally misstated the common law because

of his strong anti-abortion views.37 These articles have

——————

36 See 410 U. S., at 154–155 (collecting cases decided between 1970 and

1973); C. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or

Ninth-Amendment Right About To Arise From the Nineteenth-Century

Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty? 17

N. Y. L. Forum 335, 337–339 (1971) (Means II); C. Means, The Law of

New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664–1968:

A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N. Y. L. Forum 411 (1968)

(Means I); Lucas 730.

37 See 410 U. S., at 136, n. 26 (citing Means II); 410 U. S., at 132–133,

n. 21 (citing Means I).

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 27

Opinion of the Court

been discredited,38 and it has come to light that even mem-

bers of Jane Roe’s legal team did not regard them as serious

scholarship. An internal memorandum characterized this

author’s work as donning “the guise of impartial scholar-

ship while advancing the proper ideological goals.”39 Con-

tinued reliance on such scholarship is unsupportable.

The Solicitor General next suggests that history supports

an abortion right because the common law’s failure to crim-

inalize abortion before quickening means that “at the

Founding and for decades thereafter, women generally

could terminate a pregnancy, at least in its early stages.”40

Brief for United States 26–27; see also Brief for Respond-

ents 21. But the insistence on quickening was not univer-

sal, see Mills, 13 Pa., at 633; State v. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630,

632 (1880), and regardless, the fact that many States in the

——————

38 For critiques of Means’s work, see, e.g., Dellapenna 143–152, 325–

331; Keown 3–12; J. Finnis, “Shameless Acts” in Colorado: Abuse of

Scholarship in Constitutional Cases, 7 Academic Questions 10, 11–12

(1994); R. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-

Protective Amendment, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 1250, 1267–1282 (1975); R. Byrn,

An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 Ford. L. Rev.

807, 814–829 (1973).

39 Garrow 500–501, and n. 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).

40 In any event, Roe, Casey, and other related abortion decisions im-

posed substantial restrictions on a State’s capacity to regulate abortions

performed after quickening. See, e.g., June Medical Services L. L. C. v.

Russo, 591 U. S. ___ (2020) (holding a law requiring doctors performing

abortions to secure admitting privileges to be unconstitutional); Whole

Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582 (2016) (similar); Casey, 505

U. S., at 846 (declaring that prohibitions on “abortion before viability”

are unconstitutional); id., at 887–898 (holding that a spousal notification

provision was unconstitutional). In addition, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179

(1973), has been interpreted by some to protect a broad right to obtain

an abortion at any stage of pregnancy provided that a physician is willing

to certify that it is needed due to a woman’s “emotional” needs or “famil-

ial” concerns. Id., at 192. See, e.g., Women’s Medical Professional Corp.

v. Voinovich, 130 F. 3d 187, 209 (CA6 1997), cert. denied, 523 U. S. 1036

(1998); but see id., at 1039 (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certio-

rari).

28 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

late 18th and early 19th century did not criminalize pre-

quickening abortions does not mean that anyone thought

the States lacked the authority to do so. When legislatures

began to exercise that authority as the century wore on, no

one, as far as we are aware, argued that the laws they en-

acted violated a fundamental right. That is not surprising

since common-law authorities had repeatedly condemned

abortion and described it as an “unlawful” act without re-

gard to whether it occurred before or after quickening. See

supra, at 16–21.

Another amicus brief relied upon by respondents (see

Brief for Respondents 21) tries to dismiss the significance

of the state criminal statutes that were in effect when the

Fourteenth Amendment was adopted by suggesting that

they were enacted for illegitimate reasons. According to

this account, which is based almost entirely on statements

made by one prominent proponent of the statutes, im-

portant motives for the laws were the fear that Catholic im-

migrants were having more babies than Protestants and

that the availability of abortion was leading White

Protestant women to “shir[k their] maternal duties.” Brief

for American Historical Association et al. as Amici Curiae

20.

Resort to this argument is a testament to the lack of any

real historical support for the right that Roe and Casey rec-

ognized. This Court has long disfavored arguments based

on alleged legislative motives. See, e.g., Erie v. Pap’s A. M.,

529 U. S. 277, 292 (2000) (plurality opinion); Turner Broad-

casting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 652 (1994);

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968); Arizona

v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455 (1931) (collecting cases).

The Court has recognized that inquiries into legislative mo-

tives “are a hazardous matter.” O’Brien, 391 U. S., at 383.

Even when an argument about legislative motive is backed

by statements made by legislators who voted for a law, we

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 29

Opinion of the Court

have been reluctant to attribute those motives to the legis-

lative body as a whole. “What motivates one legislator to

make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what mo-

tivates scores of others to enact it.” Id., at 384.

Here, the argument about legislative motive is not even

based on statements by legislators, but on statements made

by a few supporters of the new 19th-century abortion laws,

and it is quite a leap to attribute these motives to all the

legislators whose votes were responsible for the enactment

of those laws. Recall that at the time of the adoption of the

Fourteenth Amendment, over three-quarters of the States

had adopted statutes criminalizing abortion (usually at all

stages of pregnancy), and that from the early 20th century

until the day Roe was handed down, every single State had

such a law on its books. Are we to believe that the hundreds

of lawmakers whose votes were needed to enact these laws

were motivated by hostility to Catholics and women?

There is ample evidence that the passage of these laws

was instead spurred by a sincere belief that abortion kills a

human being. Many judicial decisions from the late 19th

and early 20th centuries made that point. See, e.g., Nash

v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 301, 31 P. 2d 273, 280 (1934); State

v. Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 131–132, 167 P. 1019, 1022–1023

(1917); Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 488, 73 S. 834, 836

(1916); State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 233, 133 P. 878, 879

(1913); State v. Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 39–40, 105 N. E. 75,

77 (1913); State v. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 86, 90 (1881);

Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514, 522–523 (1873); State v.

Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 131–132 (1868); Smith, 33 Me., at 57;

see also Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery,

14 F. 4th 409, 446, and n. 11 (CA6 2021) (Thapar, J., con-

curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing

cases).

One may disagree with this belief (and our decision is not

based on any view about when a State should regard pre-

natal life as having rights or legally cognizable interests),

30 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

but even Roe and Casey did not question the good faith of

abortion opponents. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U. S., at 850

(“Men and women of good conscience can disagree . . . about

the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminat-

ing a pregnancy even in its earliest stage”). And we see no

reason to discount the significance of the state laws in ques-

tion based on these amici’s suggestions about legislative

motive.41

C

1

Instead of seriously pressing the argument that the abor-

tion right itself has deep roots, supporters of Roe and Casey

contend that the abortion right is an integral part of a

broader entrenched right. Roe termed this a right to pri-

vacy, 410 U. S., at 154, and Casey described it as the free-

dom to make “intimate and personal choices” that are “cen-

tral to personal dignity and autonomy,” 505 U. S., at 851.

Casey elaborated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to de-

fine one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-

verse, and of the mystery of human life.” Ibid.

The Court did not claim that this broadly framed right is

absolute, and no such claim would be plausible. While in-

dividuals are certainly free to think and to say what they

——————

41 Other amicus briefs present arguments about the motives of propo-

nents of liberal access to abortion. They note that some such supporters

have been motivated by a desire to suppress the size of the African-

American population. See Brief for African-American Organization et al.

as Amici Curiae 14–21; see also Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. and

Ky., Inc., 587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op.,

at 1–4). And it is beyond dispute that Roe has had that demographic

effect. A highly disproportionate percentage of aborted fetuses are Black.

See, e.g., Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention (CDC), K. Kortsmit et al., Abortion Surveillance—United

States, 2019, 70 Morbidity and Mortality Report, Surveillance Summar-

ies, p. 20 (Nov. 26, 2021) (Table 6). For our part, we do not question the

motives of either those who have supported or those who have opposed

laws restricting abortions.

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 31

Opinion of the Court

wish about “existence,” “meaning,” the “universe,” and “the

mystery of human life,” they are not always free to act in

accordance with those thoughts. License to act on the basis

of such beliefs may correspond to one of the many under-

standings of “liberty,” but it is certainly not “ordered lib-

erty.”

Ordered liberty sets limits and defines the boundary be-

tween competing interests. Roe and Casey each struck a

particular balance between the interests of a woman who

wants an abortion and the interests of what they termed

“potential life.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 150 (emphasis deleted);

Casey, 505 U. S., at 852. But the people of the various

States may evaluate those interests differently. In some

States, voters may believe that the abortion right should be

even more extensive than the right that Roe and Casey rec-

ognized. Voters in other States may wish to impose tight

restrictions based on their belief that abortion destroys an

“unborn human being.” Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b).

Our Nation’s historical understanding of ordered liberty

does not prevent the people’s elected representatives from

deciding how abortion should be regulated.

Nor does the right to obtain an abortion have a sound ba-

sis in precedent. Casey relied on cases involving the right

to marry a person of a different race, Loving v. Virginia, 388

U. S. 1 (1967); the right to marry while in prison, Turner v.

Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987); the right to obtain contracep-

tives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), Eisen-

stadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), Carey v. Population

Services Int’l, 431 U. S. 678 (1977); the right to reside with

relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); the

right to make decisions about the education of one’s chil-

dren, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), Meyer

v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); the right not to be steri-

lized without consent, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. William-

son, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); and the right in certain circum-

stances not to undergo involuntary surgery, forced

32 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

administration of drugs, or other substantially similar pro-

cedures, Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985), Washington

v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210 (1990), Rochin v. California, 342

U. S. 165 (1952). Respondents and the Solicitor General

also rely on post-Casey decisions like Lawrence v. Texas,

539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right to engage in private, consensual

sexual acts), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015)

(right to marry a person of the same sex). See Brief for Re-

spondents 18; Brief for United States 23–24.

These attempts to justify abortion through appeals to a

broader right to autonomy and to define one’s “concept of

existence” prove too much. Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. Those

criteria, at a high level of generality, could license funda-

mental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like.

See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F. 3d 1440,

1444 (CA9 1996) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of

rehearing en banc). None of these rights has any claim to

being deeply rooted in history. Id., at 1440, 1445.

What sharply distinguishes the abortion right from the

rights recognized in the cases on which Roe and Casey rely

is something that both those decisions acknowledged: Abor-

tion destroys what those decisions call “potential life” and

what the law at issue in this case regards as the life of an

“unborn human being.” See Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion

is “inherently different”); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852 (abortion

is “a unique act”). None of the other decisions cited by Roe

and Casey involved the critical moral question posed by

abortion. They are therefore inapposite. They do not sup-

port the right to obtain an abortion, and by the same token,

our conclusion that the Constitution does not confer such a

right does not undermine them in any way.

2

In drawing this critical distinction between the abortion

right and other rights, it is not necessary to dispute Casey’s

claim (which we accept for the sake of argument) that “the

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 33

Opinion of the Court

specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the

Fourteenth Amendment” do not “mar[k] the outer limits of

the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth

Amendment protects.” 505 U. S., at 848. Abortion is noth-

ing new. It has been addressed by lawmakers for centuries,

and the fundamental moral question that it poses is age-

less.

Defenders of Roe and Casey do not claim that any new

scientific learning calls for a different answer to the under-

lying moral question, but they do contend that changes in

society require the recognition of a constitutional right to

obtain an abortion. Without the availability of abortion,

they maintain, people will be inhibited from exercising

their freedom to choose the types of relationships they de-

sire, and women will be unable to compete with men in the

workplace and in other endeavors.

Americans who believe that abortion should be restricted

press countervailing arguments about modern develop-

ments. They note that attitudes about the pregnancy of un-

married women have changed drastically; that federal and

state laws ban discrimination on the basis of pregnancy;42

that leave for pregnancy and childbirth are now guaranteed

by law in many cases;43 that the costs of medical care asso-

——————

42 See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U. S. C.

§2000e(k) (federal law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination in employ-

ment); Dept. of Labor, Women’s Bureau, Employment Protections for

Workers Who Are Pregnant or Nursing, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/

wb/pregnant-nursing-employment-protections (showing that 46 States

and the District of Columbia have employment protections against preg-

nancy discrimination).

43 See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 9, 29

U. S. C. §2612 (federal law guaranteeing employment leave for preg-

nancy and birth); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Access to Paid and Unpaid

Family Leave in 2018, https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2019/access-to-paid-

34 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

ciated with pregnancy are covered by insurance or govern-

ment assistance;44 that States have increasingly adopted

“safe haven” laws, which generally allow women to drop off

babies anonymously;45 and that a woman who puts her new-

born up for adoption today has little reason to fear that the

baby will not find a suitable home.46 They also claim that

many people now have a new appreciation of fetal life and

that when prospective parents who want to have a child

view a sonogram, they typically have no doubt that what

they see is their daughter or son.

——————

and-unpaid-family-leave-in-2018.htm (showing that 89 percent of civil-

ian workers had access to unpaid family leave in 2018).

44 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires non-grandfathered health

plans in the individual and small group markets to cover certain essen-

tial health benefits, which include maternity and newborn care. See 124

Stat. 163, 42 U. S. C. §18022(b)(1)(D). The ACA also prohibits annual

limits, see §300gg–11, and limits annual cost-sharing obligations on such

benefits, §18022(c). State Medicaid plans must provide coverage for

pregnancy-related services—including, but not limited to, prenatal care,

delivery, and postpartum care—as well as services for other conditions

that might complicate the pregnancy. 42 CFR §§440.210(a)(2)(i)–(ii)

(2020). State Medicaid plans are also prohibited from imposing deduc-

tions, cost-sharing, or similar charges for pregnancy-related services for

pregnant women. 42 U. S. C. §§1396o(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(B).

45 Since Casey, all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted

such laws. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Children’s Bureau, Infant

Safe Haven Laws 1–2 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/

safehaven.pdf (noting that safe haven laws began in Texas in 1999).

46 See, e.g., CDC, Adoption Experiences of Women and Men and De-

mand for Children To Adopt by Women 18–44 Years of Age in the United

States 16 (Aug. 2008) (“[N]early 1 million women were seeking to adopt

children in 2002 (i.e., they were in demand for a child), whereas the do-

mestic supply of infants relinquished at birth or within the first month

of life and available to be adopted had become virtually nonexistent”);

CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, Adoption and Nonbiological

Parenting, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nsfg/key_statistics/a-keystat.htm#

adoption (showing that approximately 3.1 million women between the

ages of 18–49 had ever “[t]aken steps to adopt a child” based on data

collected from 2015–2019).

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 35

Opinion of the Court

Both sides make important policy arguments, but sup-

porters of Roe and Casey must show that this Court has the

authority to weigh those arguments and decide how abor-

tion may be regulated in the States. They have failed to

make that showing, and we thus return the power to weigh

those arguments to the people and their elected represent-

atives.

D

1

The dissent is very candid that it cannot show that a con-

stitutional right to abortion has any foundation, let alone a

“ ‘deeply rooted’ ” one, “ ‘in this Nation’s history and tradi-

tion.’ ” Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721; see post, at 12–14

(joint opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.).

The dissent does not identify any pre-Roe authority that

supports such a right—no state constitutional provision or

statute, no federal or state judicial precedent, not even a

scholarly treatise. Compare post, at 12–14, n. 2, with su-

pra, at 15–16, and n. 23. Nor does the dissent dispute the

fact that abortion was illegal at common law at least after

quickening; that the 19th century saw a trend toward crim-

inalization of pre-quickening abortions; that by 1868, a su-

permajority of States (at least 26 of 37) had enacted stat-

utes criminalizing abortion at all stages of pregnancy; that

by the late 1950s at least 46 States prohibited abortion

“however and whenever performed” except if necessary to

save “the life of the mother,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 139; and that

when Roe was decided in 1973 similar statutes were still in

effect in 30 States. Compare post, at 12–14, nn. 2–3, with

supra, at 23–25, and nn. 33–34.47

The dissent’s failure to engage with this long tradition is

——————

47 By way of contrast, at the time Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S.

479 (1965), was decided, the Connecticut statute at issue was an extreme

outlier. See Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. as

Amicus Curiae in Griswold v. Connecticut, O. T. 1964, No. 496, p. 27.

36 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

devastating to its position. We have held that the “estab-

lished method of substantive-due-process analysis” re-

quires that an unenumerated right be “ ‘deeply rooted in

this Nation’s history and tradition’ ” before it can be recog-

nized as a component of the “liberty” protected in the Due

Process Clause. Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721; cf. Timbs,

586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). But despite the dissent’s

professed fidelity to stare decisis, it fails to seriously engage

with that important precedent—which it cannot possibly

satisfy.

The dissent attempts to obscure this failure by misrepre-

senting our application of Glucksberg. The dissent suggests

that we have focused only on “the legal status of abortion in

the 19th century,” post, at 26, but our review of this Na-

tion’s tradition extends well past that period. As explained,

for more than a century after 1868—including “another

half-century” after women gained the constitutional right

to vote in 1920, see post, at 15; Amdt. 19—it was firmly es-

tablished that laws prohibiting abortion like the Texas law

at issue in Roe were permissible exercises of state regula-

tory authority. And today, another half century later, more

than half of the States have asked us to overrule Roe and

Casey. The dissent cannot establish that a right to abortion

has ever been part of this Nation’s tradition.

2

Because the dissent cannot argue that the abortion right

is rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, it contends

that the “constitutional tradition” is “not captured whole at

a single moment,” and that its “meaning gains content from

the long sweep of our history and from successive judicial

precedents.” Post, at 18 (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). This vague formulation imposes no clear restraints on

what Justice White called the “exercise of raw judicial

power,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 (dissenting opinion), and

while the dissent claims that its standard “does not mean

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 37

Opinion of the Court

anything goes,” post, at 17, any real restraints are hard to

discern.

The largely limitless reach of the dissenters’ standard is

illustrated by the way they apply it here. First, if the “long

sweep of history” imposes any restraint on the recognition

of unenumerated rights, then Roe was surely wrong, since

abortion was never allowed (except to save the life of the

mother) in a majority of States for over 100 years before

that decision was handed down. Second, it is impossible to

defend Roe based on prior precedent because all of the prec-

edents Roe cited, including Griswold and Eisenstadt, were

critically different for a reason that we have explained:

None of those cases involved the destruction of what Roe

called “potential life.” See supra, at 32.

So without support in history or relevant precedent, Roe’s

reasoning cannot be defended even under the dissent’s pro-

posed test, and the dissent is forced to rely solely on the fact

that a constitutional right to abortion was recognized in Roe

and later decisions that accepted Roe’s interpretation. Un-

der the doctrine of stare decisis, those precedents are enti-

tled to careful and respectful consideration, and we engage

in that analysis below. But as the Court has reiterated time

and time again, adherence to precedent is not “ ‘an inexora-

ble command.’ ” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576

U. S. 446, 455 (2015). There are occasions when past deci-

sions should be overruled, and as we will explain, this is one

of them.

3

The most striking feature of the dissent is the absence of

any serious discussion of the legitimacy of the States’ inter-

est in protecting fetal life. This is evident in the analogy

that the dissent draws between the abortion right and the

rights recognized in Griswold (contraception), Eisenstadt

(same), Lawrence (sexual conduct with member of the same

sex), and Obergefell (same-sex marriage). Perhaps this is

38 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

designed to stoke unfounded fear that our decision will im-

peril those other rights, but the dissent’s analogy is objec-

tionable for a more important reason: what it reveals about

the dissent’s views on the protection of what Roe called “po-

tential life.” The exercise of the rights at issue in Griswold,

Eisenstadt, Lawrence, and Obergefell does not destroy a “po-

tential life,” but an abortion has that effect. So if the rights

at issue in those cases are fundamentally the same as the

right recognized in Roe and Casey, the implication is clear:

The Constitution does not permit the States to regard the

destruction of a “potential life” as a matter of any signifi-

cance.

That view is evident throughout the dissent. The dissent

has much to say about the effects of pregnancy on women,

the burdens of motherhood, and the difficulties faced by

poor women. These are important concerns. However, the

dissent evinces no similar regard for a State’s interest in

protecting prenatal life. The dissent repeatedly praises the

“balance,” post, at 2, 6, 8, 10, 12, that the viability line

strikes between a woman’s liberty interest and the State’s

interest in prenatal life. But for reasons we discuss later,

see infra, at 50–54, 55–56, and given in the opinion of THE

CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 2–5 (opinion concurring in judg-

ment), the viability line makes no sense. It was not ade-

quately justified in Roe, and the dissent does not even try

to defend it today. Nor does it identify any other point in a

pregnancy after which a State is permitted to prohibit the

destruction of a fetus.

Our opinion is not based on any view about if and when

prenatal life is entitled to any of the rights enjoyed after

birth. The dissent, by contrast, would impose on the people

a particular theory about when the rights of personhood

begin. According to the dissent, the Constitution requires

the States to regard a fetus as lacking even the most basic

human right—to live—at least until an arbitrary point in a

pregnancy has passed. Nothing in the Constitution or in

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 39

Opinion of the Court

our Nation’s legal traditions authorizes the Court to adopt

that “ ‘theory of life.’ ” Post, at 8.

III

We next consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis

counsels continued acceptance of Roe and Casey. Stare de-

cisis plays an important role in our case law, and we have

explained that it serves many valuable ends. It protects the

interests of those who have taken action in reliance on a

past decision. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 856 (joint opinion);

see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828 (1991). It

“reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, sav-

ing parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.”

Kimble, 576 U. S., at 455. It fosters “evenhanded” deci-

sionmaking by requiring that like cases be decided in a like

manner. Payne, 501 U. S., at 827. It “contributes to the

actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Ibid.

And it restrains judicial hubris and reminds us to respect

the judgment of those who have grappled with important

questions in the past. “Precedent is a way of accumulating

and passing down the learning of past generations, a font

of established wisdom richer than what can be found in any

single judge or panel of judges.” N. Gorsuch, A Republic, If

You Can Keep It 217 (2019).

We have long recognized, however, that stare decisis is

“not an inexorable command,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U. S. 223, 233 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted),

and it “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitu-

tion,” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997). It has

been said that it is sometimes more important that an issue

“ ‘be settled than that it be settled right.’ ” Kimble, 576

U. S., at 455 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,

285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). But

when it comes to the interpretation of the Constitution—

the “great charter of our liberties,” which was meant “to en-

40 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

dure through a long lapse of ages,” Martin v. Hunter’s Les-

see, 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816) (opinion for the Court by

Story, J.)—we place a high value on having the matter “set-

tled right.” In addition, when one of our constitutional de-

cisions goes astray, the country is usually stuck with the

bad decision unless we correct our own mistake. An erro-

neous constitutional decision can be fixed by amending the

Constitution, but our Constitution is notoriously hard to

amend. See Art. V; Kimble, 576 U. S., at 456. Therefore, in

appropriate circumstances we must be willing to reconsider

and, if necessary, overrule constitutional decisions.

Some of our most important constitutional decisions have

overruled prior precedents. We mention three. In Brown

v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the Court re-

pudiated the “separate but equal” doctrine, which had al-

lowed States to maintain racially segregated schools and

other facilities. Id., at 488 (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). In so doing, the Court overruled the infamous decision

in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), along with six

other Supreme Court precedents that had applied the

separate-but-equal rule. See Brown, 347 U. S., at 491.

In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937),

the Court overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D. C.,

261 U. S. 525 (1923), which had held that a law setting min-

imum wages for women violated the “liberty” protected by

the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id., at 545.

West Coast Hotel signaled the demise of an entire line of

important precedents that had protected an individual lib-

erty right against state and federal health and welfare leg-

islation. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905)

(holding invalid a law setting maximum working hours);

Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915) (holding invalid a law

banning contracts forbidding employees to join a union);

Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 (1924) (hold-

ing invalid laws fixing the weight of loaves of bread).

Finally, in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S.

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 41

Opinion of the Court

624 (1943), after the lapse of only three years, the Court

overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586

(1940), and held that public school students could not be

compelled to salute the flag in violation of their sincere be-

liefs. Barnette stands out because nothing had changed

during the intervening period other than the Court’s be-

lated recognition that its earlier decision had been seriously

wrong.

On many other occasions, this Court has overruled im-

portant constitutional decisions. (We include a partial list

in the footnote that follows.48) Without these decisions,

——————

48 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-

sex marriage), overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 (1972); Citizens

United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010) (right to engage

in campaign-related speech), overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of

Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990), and partially overruling McConnell v.

Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93 (2003); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556

U. S. 778 (2009) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel), overruling Michi-

gan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S.

36 (2004) (Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses), overruling

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558

(2003) (right to engage in consensual, same-sex intimacy in one’s home),

overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986); Ring v. Arizona,

536 U. S. 584 (2002) (Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital

prosecutions), overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990); Agos-

tini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203 (1997) (evaluating whether government aid

violates the Establishment Clause), overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473

U. S. 402 (1985), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373

(1985); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996) (lack of con-

gressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate States’

Eleventh Amendment immunity), overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas

Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991) (the

Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar to the admission of victim

impact evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial), overruling

Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers,

490 U. S. 805 (1989); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986) (the Equal

Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not ex-

clude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race), over-

ruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965); Garcia v. San Antonio

42 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

——————

Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 530 (1985) (rejecting the

principle that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to en-

force requirements, such as minimum wage laws, against the States “ ‘in

areas of traditional governmental functions’ ”), overruling National

League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S.

213 (1983) (the Fourth Amendment requires a totality of the circum-

stances approach for determining whether an informant’s tip establishes

probable cause), overruling Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969); United States v. Scott, 437

U. S. 82 (1978) (the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to Govern-

ment appeals from orders granting defense motions to terminate a trial

before verdict), overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975);

Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976) (gender-based classifications are

subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause),

overruling Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948); Taylor v. Louisiana,

419 U. S. 522 (1975) (jury system which operates to exclude women from

jury service violates the defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

right to an impartial jury), overruling Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57

(1961); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (the mere

advocacy of violence is protected under the First Amendment unless it is

directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action), overruling Whit-

ney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.

347, 351 (1967) (Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” and

extends to what a person “seeks to preserve as private”), overruling

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United

States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)

(procedural safeguards to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against

self-incrimination), overruling Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433

(1958), and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504 (1958); Malloy v. Hogan, 378

U. S. 1 (1964) (the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination

is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by

the States), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), and

Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376

U. S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (congressional districts should be apportioned so that

“as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is

to be worth as much as another’s”), overruling in effect Colegrove v.

Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963)

(right to counsel for indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution in state

court under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments), overruling Betts v.

Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962) (federal

courts have jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to state re-

districting plans), effectively overruling in part Colegrove, 328 U. S. 549;

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 43

Opinion of the Court

American constitutional law as we know it would be unrec-

ognizable, and this would be a different country.

No Justice of this Court has ever argued that the Court

should never overrule a constitutional decision, but overrul-

ing a precedent is a serious matter. It is not a step that

should be taken lightly. Our cases have attempted to pro-

vide a framework for deciding when a precedent should be

overruled, and they have identified factors that should be

considered in making such a decision. Janus v. State,

County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. ___, ___–___

(2018) (slip op., at 34–35); Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S.

___, ___–___ (2020) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part)

(slip op., at 7–9).

In this case, five factors weigh strongly in favor of over-

ruling Roe and Casey: the nature of their error, the quality

of their reasoning, the “workability” of the rules they im-

posed on the country, their disruptive effect on other areas

of the law, and the absence of concrete reliance.

A

The nature of the Court’s error. An erroneous interpreta-

tion of the Constitution is always important, but some are

more damaging than others.

The infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, was one

——————

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) (the exclusionary rule regarding the

inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-

ment applies to the States), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25

(1949); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944) (racial restrictions on

the right to vote in primary elections violates the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), overruling Grovey v. Townsend,

295 U. S. 45 (1935); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) (con-

gressional power to regulate employment conditions under the Com-

merce Clause), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918);

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938) (Congress does not have the

power to declare substantive rules of common law; a federal court sitting

in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive state law), overrul-

ing Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842).

44 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

such decision. It betrayed our commitment to “equality be-

fore the law.” 163 U. S., at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It

was “egregiously wrong” on the day it was decided, see Ra-

mos, 590 U. S., at ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op.,

at 7), and as the Solicitor General agreed at oral argument,

it should have been overruled at the earliest opportunity,

see Tr. of Oral Arg. 92–93.

Roe was also egregiously wrong and deeply damaging.

For reasons already explained, Roe’s constitutional analysis

was far outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretation

of the various constitutional provisions to which it vaguely

pointed.

Roe was on a collision course with the Constitution from

the day it was decided, Casey perpetuated its errors, and

those errors do not concern some arcane corner of the law

of little importance to the American people. Rather, wield-

ing nothing but “raw judicial power,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222

(White, J., dissenting), the Court usurped the power to ad-

dress a question of profound moral and social importance

that the Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people.

Casey described itself as calling both sides of the national

controversy to resolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey

necessarily declared a winning side. Those on the losing

side—those who sought to advance the State’s interest in

fetal life—could no longer seek to persuade their elected

representatives to adopt policies consistent with their

views. The Court short-circuited the democratic process by

closing it to the large number of Americans who dissented

in any respect from Roe. “Roe fanned into life an issue that

has inflamed our national politics in general, and has ob-

scured with its smoke the selection of Justices to this Court

in particular, ever since.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 995–996

(opinion of Scalia, J.). Together, Roe and Casey represent

an error that cannot be allowed to stand.

As the Court’s landmark decision in West Coast Hotel il-

lustrates, the Court has previously overruled decisions that

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 45

Opinion of the Court

wrongly removed an issue from the people and the demo-

cratic process. As Justice White later explained, “decisions

that find in the Constitution principles or values that can-

not fairly be read into that document usurp the people’s au-

thority, for such decisions represent choices that the people

have never made and that they cannot disavow through cor-

rective legislation. For this reason, it is essential that this

Court maintain the power to restore authority to its proper

possessors by correcting constitutional decisions that, on re-

consideration, are found to be mistaken.” Thornburgh, 476

U. S., at 787 (dissenting opinion).

B

The quality of the reasoning. Under our precedents, the

quality of the reasoning in a prior case has an important

bearing on whether it should be reconsidered. See Janus,

585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 38); Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___–

___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 7–8). In Part II,

supra, we explained why Roe was incorrectly decided, but

that decision was more than just wrong. It stood on excep-

tionally weak grounds.

Roe found that the Constitution implicitly conferred a

right to obtain an abortion, but it failed to ground its deci-

sion in text, history, or precedent. It relied on an erroneous

historical narrative; it devoted great attention to and pre-

sumably relied on matters that have no bearing on the

meaning of the Constitution; it disregarded the fundamen-

tal difference between the precedents on which it relied and

the question before the Court; it concocted an elaborate set

of rules, with different restrictions for each trimester of

pregnancy, but it did not explain how this veritable code

could be teased out of anything in the Constitution, the his-

tory of abortion laws, prior precedent, or any other cited

source; and its most important rule (that States cannot pro-

tect fetal life prior to “viability”) was never raised by any

46 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

party and has never been plausibly explained. Roe’s rea-

soning quickly drew scathing scholarly criticism, even from

supporters of broad access to abortion.

The Casey plurality, while reaffirming Roe’s central hold-

ing, pointedly refrained from endorsing most of its reason-

ing. It revised the textual basis for the abortion right, si-

lently abandoned Roe’s erroneous historical narrative, and

jettisoned the trimester framework. But it replaced that

scheme with an arbitrary “undue burden” test and relied on

an exceptional version of stare decisis that, as explained be-

low, this Court had never before applied and has never in-

voked since.

1

a

The weaknesses in Roe’s reasoning are well-known.

Without any grounding in the constitutional text, history,

or precedent, it imposed on the entire country a detailed set

of rules much like those that one might expect to find in a

statute or regulation. See 410 U. S., at 163–164. Dividing

pregnancy into three trimesters, the Court imposed special

rules for each. During the first trimester, the Court an-

nounced, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be

left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s at-

tending physician.” Id., at 164. After that point, a State’s

interest in regulating abortion for the sake of a woman’s

health became compelling, and accordingly, a State could

“regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasona-

bly related to maternal health.” Ibid. Finally, in “the stage

subsequent to viability,” which in 1973 roughly coincided

with the beginning of the third trimester, the State’s inter-

est in “the potentiality of human life” became compelling,

and therefore a State could “regulate, and even proscribe,

abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medi-

cal judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the

mother.” Id., at 164–165.

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 47

Opinion of the Court

This elaborate scheme was the Court’s own brainchild.

Neither party advocated the trimester framework; nor did

either party or any amicus argue that “viability” should

mark the point at which the scope of the abortion right and

a State’s regulatory authority should be substantially

transformed. See Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee

in Roe v. Wade, O. T. 1972, No. 70–18; see also C. Forsythe,

Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade 127,

141 (2012).

b

Not only did this scheme resemble the work of a legisla-

ture, but the Court made little effort to explain how these

rules could be deduced from any of the sources on which

constitutional decisions are usually based. We have al-

ready discussed Roe’s treatment of constitutional text, and

the opinion failed to show that history, precedent, or any

other cited source supported its scheme.

Roe featured a lengthy survey of history, but much of its

discussion was irrelevant, and the Court made no effort to

explain why it was included. For example, multiple para-

graphs were devoted to an account of the views and prac-

tices of ancient civilizations where infanticide was widely

accepted. See 410 U. S., at 130–132 (discussing ancient

Greek and Roman practices).49 When it came to the most

important historical fact—how the States regulated abor-

tion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted—the

Court said almost nothing. It allowed that States had tight-

ened their abortion laws “in the middle and late 19th cen-

tury,” id., at 139, but it implied that these laws might have

——————

49 See, e.g., C. Patterson, “Not Worth the Rearing”: The Causes of In-

fant Exposure in Ancient Greece, 115 Transactions Am. Philosophical

Assn. 103, 111–123 (1985); A. Cameron, The Exposure of Children and

Greek Ethics, 46 Classical Rev. 105–108 (1932); H. Bennett, The Expo-

sure of Infants in Ancient Rome, 18 Classical J. 341–351 (1923); W. Har-

ris, Child-Exposure in the Roman Empire, 84 J. Roman Studies 1 (1994).

48 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

been enacted not to protect fetal life but to further “a Victo-

rian social concern” about “illicit sexual conduct,” id., at

148.

Roe’s failure even to note the overwhelming consensus of

state laws in effect in 1868 is striking, and what it said

about the common law was simply wrong. Relying on two

discredited articles by an abortion advocate, the Court er-

roneously suggested—contrary to Bracton, Coke, Hale,

Blackstone, and a wealth of other authority—that the com-

mon law had probably never really treated post-quickening

abortion as a crime. See id., at 136 (“[I]t now appear[s]

doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a com-

mon-law crime even with respect to the destruction of a

quick fetus”). This erroneous understanding appears to

have played an important part in the Court’s thinking be-

cause the opinion cited “the lenity of the common law” as

one of the four factors that informed its decision. Id., at

165.

After surveying history, the opinion spent many para-

graphs conducting the sort of fact-finding that might be un-

dertaken by a legislative committee. This included a

lengthy account of the “position of the American Medical

Association” and “[t]he position of the American Public

Health Association,” as well as the vote by the American

Bar Association’s House of Delegates in February 1972 on

proposed abortion legislation. Id., at 141, 144, 146 (empha-

sis deleted). Also noted were a British judicial decision

handed down in 1939 and a new British abortion law en-

acted in 1967. Id., at 137–138. The Court did not explain

why these sources shed light on the meaning of the Consti-

tution, and not one of them adopted or advocated anything

like the scheme that Roe imposed on the country.

Finally, after all this, the Court turned to precedent. Cit-

ing a broad array of cases, the Court found support for a

constitutional “right of personal privacy,” id., at 152, but it

conflated two very different meanings of the term: the right

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 49

Opinion of the Court

to shield information from disclosure and the right to make

and implement important personal decisions without gov-

ernmental interference. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589,

599–600 (1977). Only the cases involving this second sense

of the term could have any possible relevance to the abor-

tion issue, and some of the cases in that category involved

personal decisions that were obviously very, very far afield.

See Pierce, 268 U. S. 510 (right to send children to religious

school); Meyer, 262 U. S. 390 (right to have children receive

German language instruction).

What remained was a handful of cases having something

to do with marriage, Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (right to marry a

person of a different race), or procreation, Skinner, 316

U. S. 535 (right not to be sterilized); Griswold, 381 U. S. 479

(right of married persons to obtain contraceptives); Eisen-

stadt, 405 U. S. 438 (same, for unmarried persons). But

none of these decisions involved what is distinctive about

abortion: its effect on what Roe termed “potential life.”

When the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it

imposed on the country, it asserted that its rules were “con-

sistent with” the following: (1) “the relative weights of the

respective interests involved,” (2) “the lessons and exam-

ples of medical and legal history,” (3) “the lenity of the com-

mon law,” and (4) “the demands of the profound problems

of the present day.” Roe, 410 U. S., at 165. Put aside the

second and third factors, which were based on the Court’s

flawed account of history, and what remains are precisely

the sort of considerations that legislative bodies often take

into account when they draw lines that accommodate com-

peting interests. The scheme Roe produced looked like leg-

islation, and the Court provided the sort of explanation that

might be expected from a legislative body.

c

What Roe did not provide was any cogent justification for

the lines it drew. Why, for example, does a State have no

50 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

authority to regulate first trimester abortions for the pur-

pose of protecting a woman’s health? The Court’s only ex-

planation was that mortality rates for abortion at that stage

were lower than the mortality rates for childbirth. Id., at

163. But the Court did not explain why mortality rates

were the only factor that a State could legitimately con-

sider. Many health and safety regulations aim to avoid ad-

verse health consequences short of death. And the Court

did not explain why it departed from the normal rule that

courts defer to the judgments of legislatures “in areas

fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties.” Mar-

shall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974).

An even more glaring deficiency was Roe’s failure to jus-

tify the critical distinction it drew between pre- and post-

viability abortions. Here is the Court’s entire explanation:

“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate

interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at vi-

ability. This is so because the fetus then presumably

has the capability of meaningful life outside the womb.”

410 U. S., at 163.

As Professor Laurence Tribe has written, “[c]learly, this

mistakes ‘a definition for a syllogism.’ ” Tribe 4 (quoting Ely

924). The definition of a “viable” fetus is one that is capable

of surviving outside the womb, but why is this the point at

which the State’s interest becomes compelling? If, as Roe

held, a State’s interest in protecting prenatal life is compel-

ling “after viability,” 410 U. S., at 163, why isn’t that inter-

est “equally compelling before viability”? Webster v. Repro-

ductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 519 (1989) (plurality

opinion) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 795 (White, J.,

dissenting)). Roe did not say, and no explanation is appar-

ent.

This arbitrary line has not found much support among

philosophers and ethicists who have attempted to justify a

right to abortion. Some have argued that a fetus should not

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 51

Opinion of the Court

be entitled to legal protection until it acquires the charac-

teristics that they regard as defining what it means to be a

“person.” Among the characteristics that have been offered

as essential attributes of “personhood” are sentience, self-

awareness, the ability to reason, or some combination

thereof.50 By this logic, it would be an open question

whether even born individuals, including young children or

those afflicted with certain developmental or medical con-

ditions, merit protection as “persons.” But even if one takes

the view that “personhood” begins when a certain attribute

or combination of attributes is acquired, it is very hard to

see why viability should mark the point where “personhood”

begins.

The most obvious problem with any such argument is

that viability is heavily dependent on factors that have

nothing to do with the characteristics of a fetus. One is the

——————

50 See, e.g., P. Singer, Rethinking Life & Death 218 (1994) (defining a

person as “a being with awareness of her or his own existence over time,

and the capacity to have wants and plans for the future”); B. Steinbock,

Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses

9–13 (1992) (arguing that “the possession of interests is both necessary

and sufficient for moral status” and that the “capacity for conscious

awareness is a necessary condition for the possession of interests” (em-

phasis deleted)); M. Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,

57 The Monist 1, 5 (1973) (arguing that, to qualify as a person, a being

must have at least one of five traits that are “central to the concept of

personhood”: (1) “consciousness (of objects and events external and/or in-

ternal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain”; (2) “rea-

soning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex prob-

lems)”; (3) “self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively

independent of either genetic or direct external control)”; (4) “the capac-

ity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite vari-

ety of types”; and (5) “the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness,

either individual or racial, or both” (emphasis deleted)); M. Tooley, Abor-

tion & Infanticide, 2 Philosophy & Pub. Affairs 37, 49 (Autumn 1972)

(arguing that “having a right to life presupposes that one is capable of

desiring to continue existing as a subject of experiences and other mental

states”).

52 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

state of neonatal care at a particular point in time. Due to

the development of new equipment and improved practices,

the viability line has changed over the years. In the 19th

century, a fetus may not have been viable until the 32d or

33d week of pregnancy or even later.51 When Roe was de-

cided, viability was gauged at roughly 28 weeks. See 410

U. S., at 160. Today, respondents draw the line at 23 or 24

weeks. Brief for Respondents 8. So, according to Roe’s logic,

States now have a compelling interest in protecting a fetus

with a gestational age of, say, 26 weeks, but in 1973 States

did not have an interest in protecting an identical fetus.

How can that be?

Viability also depends on the “quality of the available

medical facilities.” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 396

(1979). Thus, a 24-week-old fetus may be viable if a woman

gives birth in a city with hospitals that provide advanced

care for very premature babies, but if the woman travels to

a remote area far from any such hospital, the fetus may no

longer be viable. On what ground could the constitutional

status of a fetus depend on the pregnant woman’s location?

And if viability is meant to mark a line having universal

moral significance, can it be that a fetus that is viable in a

big city in the United States has a privileged moral status

——————

51 See W. Lusk, Science and the Art of Midwifery 74–75 (1882) (explain-

ing that “[w]ith care, the life of a child born within [the eighth month of

pregnancy] may be preserved”); id., at 326 (“Where the choice lies with

the physician, the provocation of labor is usually deferred until the

thirty-third or thirty-fourth week”); J. Beck, Researches in Medicine and

Medical Jurisprudence 68 (2d ed. 1835) (“Although children born before

the completion of the seventh month have occasionally survived, and

been reared, yet in a medico-legal point of view, no child ought to be con-

sidered as capable of sustaining an independent existence until the sev-

enth month has been fully completed”); see also J. Baker, The Incubator

and the Medical Discovery of the Premature Infant, J. Perinatology 322

(2000) (explaining that, in the 19th century, infants born at seven to

eight months’ gestation were unlikely to survive beyond “the first days

of life”).

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 53

Opinion of the Court

not enjoyed by an identical fetus in a remote area of a poor

country?

In addition, as the Court once explained, viability is not

really a hard-and-fast line. Ibid. A physician determining

a particular fetus’s odds of surviving outside the womb

must consider “a number of variables,” including “gesta-

tional age,” “fetal weight,” a woman’s “general health and

nutrition,” the “quality of the available medical facilities,”

and other factors. Id., at 395–396. It is thus “only with

difficulty” that a physician can estimate the “probability” of

a particular fetus’s survival. Id., at 396. And even if each

fetus’s probability of survival could be ascertained with cer-

tainty, settling on a “probabilit[y] of survival” that should

count as “viability” is another matter. Ibid. Is a fetus via-

ble with a 10 percent chance of survival? 25 percent? 50

percent? Can such a judgment be made by a State? And

can a State specify a gestational age limit that applies in all

cases? Or must these difficult questions be left entirely to

the individual “attending physician on the particular facts

of the case before him”? Id., at 388.

The viability line, which Casey termed Roe’s central rule,

makes no sense, and it is telling that other countries almost

uniformly eschew such a line.52 The Court thus asserted

raw judicial power to impose, as a matter of constitutional

law, a uniform viability rule that allowed the States less

freedom to regulate abortion than the majority of western

democracies enjoy.

d

All in all, Roe’s reasoning was exceedingly weak, and ac-

ademic commentators, including those who agreed with the

——————

52 According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, only the United

States and the Netherlands use viability as a gestational limit on the

availability of abortion on-request. See Center for Reproductive Rights,

The World’s Abortion Laws (Feb. 23, 2021), https://reproductiverights

.org/maps/worlds-abortion-laws.

54 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

decision as a matter of policy, were unsparing in their crit-

icism. John Hart Ely famously wrote that Roe was “not con-

stitutional law and g[ave] almost no sense of an obligation

to try to be.” Ely 947 (emphasis deleted). Archibald Cox,

who served as Solicitor General under President Kennedy,

commented that Roe “read[s] like a set of hospital rules and

regulations” that “[n]either historian, layman, nor lawyer

will be persuaded . . . are part of . . . the Constitution.” The

Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 113–

114 (1976). Laurence Tribe wrote that “even if there is a

need to divide pregnancy into several segments with lines

that clearly identify the limits of governmental power,

‘interest-balancing’ of the form the Court pursues fails to

justify any of the lines actually drawn.” Tribe 4–5. Mark

Tushnet termed Roe a “totally unreasoned judicial opinion.”

Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional

Law 54 (1988). See also P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 157

(1982); A. Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doc-

trine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 110 (2000).

Despite Roe’s weaknesses, its reach was steadily ex-

tended in the years that followed. The Court struck down

laws requiring that second-trimester abortions be per-

formed only in hospitals, Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-

ductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 433–439 (1983); that mi-

nors obtain parental consent, Planned Parenthood of

Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976); that

women give written consent after being informed of the sta-

tus of the developing prenatal life and the risks of abortion,

Akron, 462 U. S., at 442–445; that women wait 24 hours for

an abortion, id., at 449–451; that a physician determine vi-

ability in a particular manner, Colautti, 439 U. S., at 390–

397; that a physician performing a post-viability abortion

use the technique most likely to preserve the life of the fe-

tus, id., at 397–401; and that fetal remains be treated in a

humane and sanitary manner, Akron, 462 U. S., at 451–

452.

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Justice White complained that the Court was engaging in

“unrestrained imposition of its own extraconstitutional

value preferences.” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 794 (dissent-

ing opinion). And the United States as amicus curiae asked

the Court to overrule Roe five times in the decade before

Casey, see 505 U. S., at 844 (joint opinion), and then asked

the Court to overrule it once more in Casey itself.

2

When Casey revisited Roe almost 20 years later, very lit-

tle of Roe’s reasoning was defended or preserved. The Court

abandoned any reliance on a privacy right and instead

grounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 505 U. S., at 846. The

Court did not reaffirm Roe’s erroneous account of abortion

history. In fact, none of the Justices in the majority said

anything about the history of the abortion right. And as for

precedent, the Court relied on essentially the same body of

cases that Roe had cited. Thus, with respect to the standard

grounds for constitutional decisionmaking—text, history,

and precedent—Casey did not attempt to bolster Roe’s rea-

soning.

The Court also made no real effort to remedy one of the

greatest weaknesses in Roe’s analysis: its much-criticized

discussion of viability. The Court retained what it called

Roe’s “central holding”—that a State may not regulate pre-

viability abortions for the purpose of protecting fetal life—

but it provided no principled defense of the viability line.

505 U. S., at 860, 870–871. Instead, it merely rephrased

what Roe had said, stating that viability marked the point

at which “the independent existence of a second life can in

reason and fairness be the object of state protection that

now overrides the rights of the woman.” 505 U. S., at 870.

Why “reason and fairness” demanded that the line be

drawn at viability the Court did not explain. And the Jus-

tices who authored the controlling opinion conspicuously

56 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

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failed to say that they agreed with the viability rule; in-

stead, they candidly acknowledged “the reservations [some]

of us may have in reaffirming [that] holding of Roe.” Id., at

853.

The controlling opinion criticized and rejected Roe’s tri-

mester scheme, 505 U. S., at 872, and substituted a new

“undue burden” test, but the basis for this test was obscure.

And as we will explain, the test is full of ambiguities and is

difficult to apply.

Casey, in short, either refused to reaffirm or rejected im-

portant aspects of Roe’s analysis, failed to remedy glaring

deficiencies in Roe’s reasoning, endorsed what it termed

Roe’s central holding while suggesting that a majority

might not have thought it was correct, provided no new sup-

port for the abortion right other than Roe’s status as prece-

dent, and imposed a new and problematic test with no firm

grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent.

As discussed below, Casey also deployed a novel version

of the doctrine of stare decisis. See infra, at 64–69. This

new doctrine did not account for the profound wrongness of

the decision in Roe, and placed great weight on an intangi-

ble form of reliance with little if any basis in prior case law.

Stare decisis does not command the preservation of such a

decision.

C

Workability. Our precedents counsel that another im-

portant consideration in deciding whether a precedent

should be overruled is whether the rule it imposes is work-

able—that is, whether it can be understood and applied in

a consistent and predictable manner. Montejo v. Louisiana,

556 U. S. 778, 792 (2009); Patterson v. McLean Credit Un-

ion, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.

v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 283–284 (1988). Ca-

sey’s “undue burden” test has scored poorly on the worka-

bility scale.

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Opinion of the Court

1

Problems begin with the very concept of an “undue bur-

den.” As Justice Scalia noted in his Casey partial dissent,

determining whether a burden is “due” or “undue” is “inher-

ently standardless.” 505 U. S., at 992; see also June Medi-

cal Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020)

(GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 17) (“[W]hether a bur-

den is deemed undue depends heavily on which factors the

judge considers and how much weight he accords each of

them” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

The Casey plurality tried to put meaning into the “undue

burden” test by setting out three subsidiary rules, but these

rules created their own problems. The first rule is that “a

provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place

a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an

abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 505 U. S., at 878

(emphasis added); see also id., at 877. But whether a par-

ticular obstacle qualifies as “substantial” is often open to

reasonable debate. In the sense relevant here, “substan-

tial” means “of ample or considerable amount, quantity, or

size.” Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary

1897 (2d ed. 2001). Huge burdens are plainly “substantial,”

and trivial ones are not, but in between these extremes,

there is a wide gray area.

This ambiguity is a problem, and the second rule, which

applies at all stages of a pregnancy, muddies things further.

It states that measures designed “to ensure that the

woman’s choice is informed” are constitutional so long as

they do not impose “an undue burden on the right.” Casey,

505 U. S., at 878. To the extent that this rule applies to pre-

viability abortions, it overlaps with the first rule and ap-

pears to impose a different standard. Consider a law that

imposes an insubstantial obstacle but serves little purpose.

As applied to a pre-viability abortion, would such a regula-

tion be constitutional on the ground that it does not impose

a “substantial obstacle”? Or would it be unconstitutional on

58 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

the ground that it creates an “undue burden” because the

burden it imposes, though slight, outweighs its negligible

benefits? Casey does not say, and this ambiguity would lead

to confusion down the line. Compare June Medical, 591

U. S., at ___–___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1–2), with

id., at ___–___ (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring) (slip op., at 5–

6).

The third rule complicates the picture even more. Under

that rule, “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the

purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a

woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the

right.” Casey, 505 U. S., at 878 (emphasis added). This rule

contains no fewer than three vague terms. It includes the

two already discussed—“undue burden” and “substantial

obstacle”—even though they are inconsistent. And it adds

a third ambiguous term when it refers to “unnecessary

health regulations.” The term “necessary” has a range of

meanings—from “essential” to merely “useful.” See Black’s

Law Dictionary 928 (5th ed. 1979); American Heritage Dic-

tionary of the English Language 877 (1971). Casey did not

explain the sense in which the term is used in this rule.

In addition to these problems, one more applies to all

three rules. They all call on courts to examine a law’s effect

on women, but a regulation may have a very different im-

pact on different women for a variety of reasons, including

their places of residence, financial resources, family situa-

tions, work and personal obligations, knowledge about fetal

development and abortion, psychological and emotional dis-

position and condition, and the firmness of their desire to

obtain abortions. In order to determine whether a regula-

tion presents a substantial obstacle to women, a court needs

to know which set of women it should have in mind and how

many of the women in this set must find that an obstacle is

“substantial.”

Casey provided no clear answer to these questions. It

said that a regulation is unconstitutional if it imposes a

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 59

Opinion of the Court

substantial obstacle “in a large fraction of cases in which

[it] is relevant,” 505 U. S., at 895, but there is obviously no

clear line between a fraction that is “large” and one that is

not. Nor is it clear what the Court meant by “cases in

which” a regulation is “relevant.” These ambiguities have

caused confusion and disagreement. Compare Whole

Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 582, 627–628

(2016), with id., at 666–667, and n. 11 (ALITO, J., dissent-

ing).

2

The difficulty of applying Casey’s new rules surfaced in

that very case. The controlling opinion found that Pennsyl-

vania’s 24-hour waiting period requirement and its

informed-consent provision did not impose “undue bur-

den[s],” Casey, 505 U. S., at 881–887, but Justice Stevens,

applying the same test, reached the opposite result, id., at

920–922 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).

That did not bode well, and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist

aptly observed that “the undue burden standard presents

nothing more workable than the trimester framework.” Id.,

at 964–966 (dissenting opinion).

The ambiguity of the “undue burden” test also produced

disagreement in later cases. In Whole Woman’s Health, the

Court adopted the cost-benefit interpretation of the test,

stating that “[t]he rule announced in Casey . . . requires

that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion

access together with the benefits those laws confer.” 579

U. S., at 607 (emphasis added). But five years later, a ma-

jority of the Justices rejected that interpretation. See June

Medical, 591 U. S. ___. Four Justices reaffirmed Whole

Woman’s Health’s instruction to “weigh” a law’s “benefits”

against “the burdens it imposes on abortion access.” 591

U. S., at ___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 2) (internal quo-

tation marks omitted). But THE CHIEF JUSTICE—who cast

60 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

the deciding vote—argued that “[n]othing about Casey sug-

gested that a weighing of costs and benefits of an abortion

regulation was a job for the courts.” Id., at ___ (opinion con-

curring in judgment) (slip op., at 6). And the four Justices

in dissent rejected the plurality’s interpretation of Casey.

See 591 U. S., at ___ (opinion of ALITO, J., joined in relevant

part by THOMAS, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ.) (slip op.,

at 4); id., at ___–___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at

15–18); id., at ___–___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op.,

at 1–2) (“[F]ive Members of the Court reject the Whole

Woman’s Health cost-benefit standard”).

This Court’s experience applying Casey has confirmed

Chief Justice Rehnquist’s prescient diagnosis that the

undue-burden standard was “not built to last.” Casey, 505

U. S., at 965 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and

dissenting in part).

3

The experience of the Courts of Appeals provides further

evidence that Casey’s “line between” permissible and un-

constitutional restrictions “has proved to be impossible to

draw with precision.” Janus, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at

38).

Casey has generated a long list of Circuit conflicts. Most

recently, the Courts of Appeals have disagreed about

whether the balancing test from Whole Woman’s Health

correctly states the undue-burden framework.53 They have

disagreed on the legality of parental notification rules.54

——————

53 Compare Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F. 4th 430, 440 (CA5

2021), EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F. 3d

418, 437 (CA6 2020), and Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F. 3d 912, 915 (CA8

2020) (per curiam), with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box,

991 F. 3d 740, 751–752 (CA7 2021).

54 Compare Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F. 3d

352, 367 (CA4 1998), with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Ad-

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 61

Opinion of the Court

They have disagreed about bans on certain dilation and

evacuation procedures.55 They have disagreed about when

an increase in the time needed to reach a clinic constitutes

an undue burden.56 And they have disagreed on whether a

State may regulate abortions performed because of the fe-

tus’s race, sex, or disability.57

The Courts of Appeals have experienced particular diffi-

culty in applying the large-fraction-of-relevant-cases test.

They have criticized the assignment while reaching unpre-

dictable results.58 And they have candidly outlined Casey’s

many other problems.59

——————

ams, 937 F. 3d 973, 985–990 (CA7 2019), cert. granted, judgment va-

cated, 591 U. S. ___ (2020), and Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic

v. Miller, 63 F. 3d 1452, 1460 (CA8 1995).

55 Compare Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F. 4th, at 435–436,

with West Ala. Women’s Center v. Williamson, 900 F. 3d 1310, 1319, 1327

(CA11 2018), and EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander,

960 F. 3d 785, 806–808 (CA6 2020).

56 Compare Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F. 3d 531, 541 (CA9

2004), with Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird, 438 F. 3d 595,

605 (CA6 2006), and Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F. 3d 157,

171–172 (CA4 2000).

57 Compare Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud, 994 F. 3d 512, 520–535

(CA6 2021), with Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Rutledge, 984

F. 3d 682, 688–690 (CA8 2021).

58 See, e.g., Bristol Regional Women’s Center, P.C. v. Slatery, 7 F. 4th

478, 485 (CA6 2021); Reproductive Health Servs. v. Strange, 3 F. 4th

1240, 1269 (CA11 2021) (per curiam); June Medical Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee,

905 F. 3d 787, 814 (CA5 2020), rev’d, 591 U. S. ___; Preterm-Cleveland,

994 F. 3d, at 534; Planned Parenthood of Ark. & Eastern Okla. v. Jegley,

864 F. 3d 953, 958–960 (CA8 2017); McCormack v. Hertzog, 788 F. 3d

1017, 1029–1030 (CA9 2015); compare A Womans Choice–East Side

Womens Clinic v. Newman, 305 F. 3d 684, 699 (CA7 2002) (Coffey, J.,

concurring), with id., at 708 (Wood, J., dissenting).

59 See, e.g., Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery, 14

F. 4th 409, 451 (CA6 2021) (Thapar, J., concurring in judgment in part

and dissenting in part); Preterm-Cleveland, 994 F. 3d, at 524; Planned

Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Commissioner of Ind. State Dept. of

62 DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Opinion of the Court

Casey’s “undue burden” test has proved to be unworkable.

“[P]lucked from nowhere,” 505 U. S., at 965 (opinion of

Rehnquist, C. J.), it “seems calculated to perpetuate give-it-

a-try litigation” before judges assigned an unwieldy and in-

appropriate task. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S.

507, 551 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part

and dissenting in part). Continued adherence to that

standard would undermine, not advance, the “evenhanded,

predictable, and consistent development of legal princi-

ples.” Payne, 501 U. S., at 827.

D

Effect on other areas of law. Roe and Casey have led to

the distortion of many important but unrelated legal doc-

trines, and that effect provides further support for overrul-

ing those decisions. See Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___ (opinion

of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 8); Janus, 585 U. S., at ___

(slip op., at 34).

Members of this Court have repeatedly lamented that “no

legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this

Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case

involving state regulation of abortion.” Thornburgh, 476

U. S., at 814 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Madsen v.

Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 785 (1994)

(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting

——————

Health, 888 F. 3d 300, 313 (CA7 2018) (Manion, J., concurring in judg-

ment in part and dissenting in part); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky.,

Inc. v. Box, 949 F. 3d 997, 999 (CA7 2019) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in

denial of reh’g en banc) (“How much burden is ‘undue’ is a matter of judg-

ment, which depends on what the burden would be . . . and whether that

burden is excessive (a matter of weighing costs against benefits, which

one judge is apt to do differently from another, and which judges as a

group are apt to do differently from state legislators)”); National Abor-

tion Federation v. Gonzales, 437 F. 3d 278, 290–296 (CA2 2006) (Walker,

C. J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Servs. Corp.

v. Owens, 287 F. 3d 910, 931 (CA10 2002) (Baldock, J., dissenting).

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 63

Opinion of the Court

in part); Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at 631–633

(THOMAS, J., dissenting); id., at 645–666, 678–684 (ALITO,

J., dissenting); June Medical, 591 U. S., at ___–___

(GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1–15).

The Court’s abortion cases have diluted the strict stand-

ard for facial constitutional challenges.60 They have ig-

nored the Court’s third-party standing doctrine.61 They

have disregarded standard res judicata principles.62 They

have flouted the ordinary rules on the severability of

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