CANarchy Craft Brewery v. Texas Alcoholic

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 20, 2022

No. 21-50195 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

CANarchy Craft Brewery Collective, L.L.C.,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission; Kevin J. Lilly;

Hasan K. Mack; Jason E. Boatright; Michael S. Adkins;

Deborah Gray Marino,

Defendants—Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:20-CV-55

Before Dennis, Southwick, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:

This is a case about beer. It turns on the meaning of the word

“owned,” a pint-sized word with stout implications for craft brewers in

Texas.

In 2019, the Texas Legislature amended the Alcoholic Beverage Code

to allow brewers and manufacturers to sell malt beverages to consumers for

off-premises consumption—a previously untapped market for craft beer-to-

go. But in a bit of a buzzkill, the Legislature also limited beer-to-go sales to

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

brewers and manufacturers that produced no more than 225,000 barrels

annually “at all premises [they] wholly or partly owned.” Tex. Alco. Bev.

Code Ann. §§ 62.122(a) (2019), 12.052(a) (2019) (emphasis added).

Frothy at the prospects, CANarchy Craft Brewery Collective, LLC

began selling beer-to-go from its two Texas-based breweries. But the Texas

Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) ordered CANarchy to cease and

desist after TABC determined that CANarchy’s facilities collectively

exceeded the 225,000-barrel limit. Party over. CANarchy complied with the

order but then filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 225,000-

barrel threshold did not apply to barrels produced at leased premises. The

district court agreed with CANarchy that “premises wholly or partly owned”

do not include leased premises and granted it summary judgment. Party on.

We agree with the district court’s reading of the statutes and affirm.

I.

A.

One of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code’s primary aims is “to

prevent certain overlapping relationships between those engaged in the

alcoholic beverage industry at different levels, or tiers.” Cadena Comercial

USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex.

2017); see also Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. §§ 6.03(i), 102.01(a)–(j).

“The Code contains numerous provisions designed to achieve this

overarching goal by separating the industry into three independent tiers:

manufacturing (brewing), distribution, and retail.” Cadena Comercial, 518

S.W.3d at 322. Under this system, brewers are generally prohibited from

selling their products directly to retailers or consumers and instead must sell

their products to wholesalers. See Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. § 62.01.

Over time, the Texas Legislature has carved out exceptions to the

three-tier system. The evolution of two such exceptions, codified in sections

2

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

12.052(a) and 62.122(a) of the Code, is relevant here. Section 12.052(a)

initially authorized the holder of a brewer’s permit to sell ale “to ultimate

consumers on the brewer’s premises” for on-site consumption so long as the

brewer’s “annual production of ale together with the annual production of

beer by the holder of a manufacturer’s license at the same premises [did] not

exceed a total of 225,000 barrels.” Id. § 12.052(a) (2013). Section 62.122(a)

was identical except that it applied to the holder of a manufacturer’s license

who principally produced beer. Id. § 62.122(a) (2013).

The Legislature amended sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a) in 2017 to

clarify that the 225,000-barrel cap encompassed barrels produced “at all

premises wholly or partly owned, directly or indirectly, by the permit [or

license] holder or an affiliate or subsidiary of the permit [or license] holder.”

Id. § 12.052(a) (2017); see id. § 62.122(a) (2017). The statutes were again

amended in 2019, this time to allow the holder of a brewer’s permit or

manufacturer’s license to sell ale or beer “for off-premises consumption” if

the holder’s annual production “at all premises wholly or partly owned,

directly or indirectly, . . . does not exceed a total of 225,000 barrels.” Id.

§§ 12.052 (2019), 62.122 (2019). 1

1

A note on nomenclature: In 2021, while this appeal was pending, the Legislature

repealed section 12.052(a) and replaced brewer’s permits and manufacturer’s licenses with

a single brewer’s license under section 62.122(a). See Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann.

§ 62.122(a). The Legislature also consolidated “beer” and “ale” with the term “malt

beverages.” See id. §§ 1.09(a), 62.122(a). Streamlined language that tastes great, and is

less filling. Though CANarchy brought its challenge under former sections 12.052(a) and

62.122(a), the operative language at the core of this case—the aggregation of beer produced

at “all premises wholly or partly owned” for the purposes of the production cap—has

remained consistent. See id. § 62.122(a).

3

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

B.

CANarchy is a collective of seven affiliated brewers that, in turn,

operate ten breweries across seven states. Aside from one brewery in

Michigan, CANarchy leases all the premises on which its breweries produce

their beer. Two CANarchy brewers operate breweries in Texas: Oskar Blues

Brewery in Austin and Deep Ellum Brewing Company in Dallas. CANarchy

holds a brewer’s permit and manufacturer’s license from TABC for both

premises.

After sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a) were amended in 2019 to allow

beer-to-go sales directly to consumers, Oskar Blues and Deep Ellum began

selling beer-to-go from their premises. TABC subsequently determined that

CANarchy’s “facilities both inside and outside of Texas collectively

produce[d] over 225,000 barrels of malt beverages annually.” TABC sent

cease and desist letters to CANarchy’s Texas brewers, informing them that

they did “not qualify to sell malt beverages to consumers for off-premise[s]

consumption.”

Sobered by TABC’s cease and desist letters, CANarchy stopped

selling beer-to-go. But CANarchy also brought the matter to a head by

draughting a Texas state court complaint against TABC and its Chairman

and Commissioners in their official capacities, seeking two forms of

declaratory relief. First, CANarchy sought a declaratory judgment that

TABC’s application of sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a)—i.e., extending the

225,000-barrel production threshold to include barrels produced at premises

outside of Texas—violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Second, and

relevant here, it sought a declaratory judgment that the 225,000-barrel

production threshold in sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a) only includes

barrels produced at premises owned, and not merely leased, by a brewer.

Because all but 17,281 of the 475,543 barrels CANarchy produced in 2019

4

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

were produced at leased premises, CANarchy argued that it fell far below the

225,000-barrel production threshold set by the statutes.

TABC removed the case to federal court based on federal question

jurisdiction, and the district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over

CANarchy’s Texas statutory construction claim. Following discovery, both

parties moved for summary judgment. CANarchy sought partial summary

judgment on its statutory construction claim based on three primary

arguments: first, that the ordinary meaning of the word “own” makes clear

“that a leaseholder does not ‘own’ the property it leases”; second, that the

Legislature’s distinction between “owned” and “leased” in other parts of

the Code establishes that the two terms are mutually exclusive; and third,

that “partly owned” means owning “less than 100%” of the premises, not

having a leasehold interest therein.

In its motion, TABC argued that CANarchy’s interpretation of the

statutes would stand at odds with the legislative intent behind the beer-to-go

provisions and their subsequent amendments, namely, “to encourage

entrepreneurial and small business development opportunities.” Further,

TABC argued that “owned” refers to “a ‘bundle of sticks’ or collection of

rights with regard to [the] property, including the rights to possess, use,

transfer, and exclude others.” Thus, a lessee who possesses some of the

sticks from that bundle “partly owns” the leased premises. TABC also

moved for summary judgment on CANarchy’s dormant Commerce Clause

claim.

The district court granted partial summary judgment for TABC as to

the dormant Commerce Clause claim. 2 As for CANarchy’s statutory

2

The district court denied TABC’s motion for summary judgment with respect

to CANarchy’s discriminatory purpose argument, but granted it as to CANarchy’s other

5

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

construction claim, the court denied TABC’s motion and instead granted

summary judgment for CANarchy. In doing so, the court looked to the

ordinary meaning of “wholly or partly owned,” as used in sections 12.052(a)

and 62.122(a), and concluded that the language “unambiguously [did] not

apply to CANarchy’s breweries on leased land.” The court reasoned that

while “leaseholders certainly have some interest and rights associated with

the leased premises, such an understanding does not equate to the

leaseholder being an owner or part owner of the premises.”

In the wake of the district court’s ruling, CANarchy asked the court

to enter final judgment as to its statutory construction claim and to grant a

voluntary dismissal of its surviving dormant Commerce Clause claim. The

court obliged and entered a final judgment declaring that “the 225,000-barrel

production threshold in Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code §§ 12.052(a) and

62.122(a) includes only barrels of malt beverages produced by the brewer at

all premises owned by the brewer and does not include barrels of malt

beverages produced by the brewer at premises leased by the brewer.” Rather

than just cry in its beer, TABC timely appealed.

II.

The district court had original jurisdiction over CANarchy’s dormant

Commerce Clause claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental

jurisdiction over CANarchy’s state statutory construction claim under 28

U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final

judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

“We review a district court’s judgment on cross motions for summary

judgment de novo, addressing each party’s motion independently, viewing

dormant Commerce Clause theories (discriminatory effect and “clearly excessive”

burden). CANarchy does not challenge that ruling here.

6

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2009)

(citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. When

“interpreting a Texas statute, we use the same methods of statutory

interpretation” used by the Supreme Court of Texas. Camacho v. Ford Motor

Co., 993 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2021).

III.

The parties offer competing interpretations of the phrase “premises

wholly or partly owned” in sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a). Distilling their

arguments, TABC asserts that the word “owned” includes leased premises,

while CANarchy contends that it does not. We hop right to the analysis.

Under Texas law, the court’s “fundamental goal when reading

statutes ‘is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.’” Cadena

Comercial, 518 S.W.3d at 325 (quoting Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381

S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012)). “We seek that intent first and foremost in the

plain meaning of the text.” Greater Hous. P’ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 58

(Tex. 2015). And “[w]here text is clear, text is determinative.” Entergy Gulf

States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009). “When faced with

an undefined statutory term, our job is to apply the ‘common, ordinary

meaning unless a more precise definition is apparent from the statutory

context or the plain meaning yields an absurd result.’” Camacho, 993 F.3d at

312 (quoting Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838

(Tex. 2018)). “To determine a term’s common, ordinary meaning, we

typically look first to dictionary definitions.” Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 838;

see also Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med.

Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017) (“To determine a statutory term’s

7

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

common, ordinary meaning, we typically look first to [its] dictionary

definitions and then consider the term’s usage in other statutes, court

decisions, and similar authorities.”).

Here, “owned” is undefined in the Code. We can glean a somewhat

“more precise definition . . . from the statutory context,” Camacho, 993 F.3d

at 312, because “owned” modifies “premises,” which the Code defines as

“the grounds and all buildings, vehicles, and appurtenances pertaining to the

grounds, including any adjacent premises if they are directly or indirectly

under the control of the same person,” Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann.

§ 11.49(a). In searching out the “common, ordinary meaning” of “owned,”

then, we focus on definitions that relate to real property.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “own” in relevant part as “[t]o

rightfully have or possess as property; to have legal title to.” Own, Black’s

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, Merriam-Webster’s

Dictionary defines “own” as “to have or hold as property; to have power or

mastery over.” Own, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/own (last visited Jun. 3, 2022). These definitions,

while not conclusive, suggest that the ordinary meaning of “owned” involves

an interest in property greater than—and distinct from—that of a leasehold.

Granted, possession is a right enjoyed by most, if not all, lessees. See Lessee,

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Someone who has a

possessory interest in real or personal property under a lease.”). But a

lessee’s right to possession exists only by virtue of a lessor’s “legal title to,”

or “power or mastery over,” the leased property. In other words, a

leaseholder has only such rights as are granted by the lessor, and the

leaseholder’s rights continue to be subject to the superior rights held by the

lessor—i.e., the owner of leased property continues “to have legal title to”

8

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

or “have power or mastery over” the property. The derivative rights held by

a lessee are not synonymous with ownership of the leased property.

The broader statutory context puts to rest any lingering uncertainty.

The Supreme Court of Texas has held that “[w]hen the Legislature uses a

word or phrase in one part of a statute but excludes it from another, the term

should not be implied where it has been excluded.” Cadena Comercial, 518

S.W.3d at 329; see also Coming Attractions Bridal & Formal, Inc. v. Tex. Health

Res., 595 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Tex. 2020) (“We do not imply [a] term where the

[L]egislature did not use it.”); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe

Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 628 (Tex. 2011) (same). That

principle is significant here because, though the term “leased” is absent from

sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a), “leased” is expressly used—paired with

“owned”—in at least nineteen other sections of the Code. See Tex. Alco.

Bev. Code Ann. §§ 2.02, 11.61, 14.071, 14.08, 16.10, 16.11, 19.06, 19.07,

20.04, 20.05, 48.04, 61.71, 62.15, 63.01, 63.03, 64.10, 108.08, 108.73, 108.82. 3

Eleven of those sections specifically apply to premises or buildings that are

“owned or leased.” See id. §§ 2.02, 11.61, 14.08, 16.11, 19.07, 20.05, 48.04,

61.71, 108.08, 108.73, 108.82 (emphasis added).

TABC counters that the statutory context actually brews in its favor,

citing sections 12.06, 13.04, 62.14, and 63.05 of the Code. Those sections

reference brewers that “own [their] . . . facilities” and that “own a fee

3

When this case was initially filed, the phrase “owned or leased” appeared in ten

different Code sections. See id. §§ 2.02, 11.61, 45.01, 48.01, 61.71, 63.01, 63.03, 108.08,

108.73, 108.82 (2019). Since then, the Legislature has removed “owned or leased” from

two sections, see id. §§ 45.01 (repealed 2021), 48.01, but added it to eleven more, see id.

§§ 14.071, 14.08, 16.10, 16.11, 19.06, 19.07, 20.04, 20.05, 48.04, 62.15, 64.10. If anything,

the Legislature’s repeated use of “owned or leased” buttresses our conclusion that

“owned” and “leased” are distinct terms, with distinct meanings, in the Code. And the

repeated amendments show that when the Legislature sought to include both owned and

leased premises within a Code section’s scope, it has deliberately done so.

9

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

interest in a . . . facility.” Id. §§ 12.06 (2019), 13.04 (2019), 62.14, 63.05.

TABC reasons that “[u]nless the words ‘a fee interest’ . . . are surplusage,

which a court should not presume, . . . the word ‘own’ as used in the Code

must encompass more than fee ownership.” Perhaps. But that does not

necessarily mean that “owned” premises implicitly include “leased” ones

too. To the contrary, if the Legislature intended for the word “owned” to

encompass leasehold interests, then the word “leased,” as used in the

numerous other Code sections referenced above, would be mere surplusage.

See TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin, 498 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. 2016)

(“[W]e consider the statute as a whole, giving effect to each provision so that

none is rendered meaningless or mere surplusage.”). Given all this, we

conclude that the Legislature intended for “owned” and “leased” to be

distinct (and mutually exclusive) within the Code. See Coming Attractions

Bridal & Formal, 595 S.W.3d at 666; Cadena Comercial, 518 S.W.3d at 329.

And the Legislature’s omission of “leased” from sections 12.052(a) and

62.122(a) indicates that it intended to count as part of the production cap

only barrels produced at premises “owned” either in whole or in part by the

brewer, and not at leased premises.

More generally, TABC urges a different analysis. It contends that

“owned” should simply be given “its ordinary meaning under the common

law,” rather than construed by reference to dictionaries or other Code

sections. According to TABC, the longstanding “common law

understanding of property ownership encompasses possession of any stick

from the property rights bundle” (e.g., possession, use, exclusion,

alienation). Possession, as one of those sticks, would be sufficient to construe

CANarchy’s leased premises as “owned” for purposes of the brewing

production threshold. We disagree.

We have not found, and TABC does not cite, any case in which a

Texas court has conceptualized ownership as just one, or a specific number,

10

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

of “sticks” in a bundle of property rights. Instead, the few Texas cases to

discuss the term “owned” or its variants demonstrate that “own” has no

well-established meaning in common law. See, e.g., Realty Tr. Co. v.

Craddock, 112 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1938) (finding the “term owner . . . has

no definite legal meaning”). Some decisions even directly contradict

TABC’s proposed interpretation. See Odyssey 2020 Acad., Inc. v. Galveston

Cent. Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 546 (Tex. 2021) (“Property leased is

not property owned.”); Holt v. Giles, 240 S.W.2d 991, 993–94 (Tex. 1951)

(“In its ordinary meaning an ‘owner’ is ‘one who owns; a rightful proprietor;

one who has the legal or rightful title, whether he is the possessor or not.’”).

Regardless, judicial constructions are only instructive when determining a

statutory term’s ordinary meaning if that term has “acquired a technical or

particular meaning,” or a well-established definition in common law. See

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011(b) (“Words and phrases that have

acquired a technical or particular meaning . . . shall be construed

accordingly.”); Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex. 2017) (“[W]e

construe statutory language against the backdrop of common law, assuming

the Legislature is familiar with common-law traditions and principles.”). As

the foregoing analysis demonstrates, “owned” has not obtained that status

in Texas, so TABC’s resort to the common law falls a bit flat.

Finally, TABC asserts that construing “premises wholly or partly

owned” to exclude leased premises “would lead to absurd or unreasonable

outcomes.” Cf. Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 630

(Tex. 2013) (noting that “absurdity safety valve is reserved for truly

exceptional cases”). TABC argues that reading “owned” to exclude leased

premises in sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a) will lead to absurd results

because of the logical effect such a reading has on two other Code provisions,

11

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

sections 62.14 and 63.05. 4 Those sections discuss a license holder’s ability

to operate under an “alternating brewery proprietorship,” see Tex. Alco.

Bev. Code Ann. §§ 62.14, 63.05, which is “an arrangement in which two

or more parties take turns using the physical premises of a brewery,” id.

§ 1.04. Subsection (b) of both statutes states that “[a]n entity is not required

to own its brewing facilities if the entity operates under an alternating

brewery proprietorship . . . .” Id. §§ 62.14(b), 63.05(b).

TABC contends that if we exclude leased premises from those

“wholly or partly owned” in sections 12.052(a) and 62.122(a), then sections

62.14(b) and 63.05(b) “would require every brewery in Texas either to own

its premises in fee simple or operate under an alternating brewery

proprietorship.” And “[b]ecause relatively few Texas-based breweries

operate under alternating proprietorship arrangements, [such a] reading

could substantially disrupt the brewery industry in Texas.”

We are unpersuaded. As an initial matter, TABC did not argue

absurdity—or cite to sections 62.14(b) and 63.05(b)—in the district court, so

its argument on this issue is forfeited. See Templeton v. Jarmillo, 28 F.4th 618,

622 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[P]resenting the issue ‘face up and squarely in the trial

court,’ is necessary” to preserve it. (quoting Alston v. Town of Brookline, 997

F.3d 23, 44 (1st Cir. 2021))); Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397

(5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first

instance in the district court—thus raising it for the first time on

appeal . . . .”).

4

In its opening brief, TABC also referred to Code sections 12.06 and 13.04 in

support of its absurdity argument. Those sections have since been repealed. See Tex.

Alco. Bev. Code Ann. §§ 12.06, 13.04, repealed by Acts 2019, ch. 1369, § 410(a)(1),

2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4992. Because an absurd consequence is one that flows from

current law, we will not consider the now-repealed statutes in our analysis.

12

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

That party foul aside, the only way TABC’s allegedly absurd

consequence arises is if TABC’s interpretation of sections 62.14 and 63.05

is correct. Count us skeptical. Here is the text of those statutes: “An entity

is not required to own its brewing facilities if the entity operates under an

alternating brewery proprietorship.” Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann.

§§ 62.14(b), 63.05(b). From that language, TABC extrapolates a broad,

inverse mandate that unless “[an] entity operates under an alternating

brewery proprietorship,” it is required “to own its brewing facilities.” 5 But

sections 62.14 and 63.05 focus on a niche type of brewing arrangement—one

TABC concedes “relatively few” Texas brewers employ—and they set

forth specialized requirements an “alternating” brewer must meet in the

event it does not own its brewing facilities. E.g., id. §§ 62.14(e), 63.05(e)

(requiring a non-owner to post a bond as part of an alternating brewery

proprietorship). No Texas court has construed sections 62.14(b) and

63.05(b), much less in the way that TABC asks us to read them. Given that

the question has not been properly served up and TABC offers no authority

to support its broad reading of these provisions, we decline to evaluate

further the effect these relatively minor Code sections might have on the

broader regulatory scheme at issue in this case.

IV.

“It is the Legislature’s prerogative to enact statutes; it is the

judiciary’s responsibility to interpret those statutes according to the language

the Legislature used, absent a context indicating a different meaning or the

result of the plain meaning of the language yielding absurd or nonsensical

results.” Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414–15 (Tex. 2011). The

5

TABC apparently also equates “brewing facilities” with “premises,” the term

used in the Code sections at issue in our case. That is another assumption that may or may

not bear scrutiny across the relevant Code sections.

13

Case: 21-50195 Document: 00516362485 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/20/2022

No. 21-50195

ordinary definition of “owned,” when applied to sections 12.052(a) and

62.122(a) of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code, establishes that the

225,000-barrel production threshold set in those statutes encompasses only

barrels produced at premises owned by the brewer, either in whole or in part,

and not at premises leased by the brewer. Accordingly, the judgment of the

district court is

AFFIRMED.

14