Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 20–1573. Argued March 30, 2022—Decided June 15, 2022

The question for decision is whether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9

U. S. C. §1 et seq., preempts a rule of California law that invalidates

contractual waivers of the right to assert representative claims under

California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Cal.

Lab. Code §2698 et seq. PAGA enlists employees as private attorneys

general to enforce California labor law. By its terms, PAGA authorizes

any “aggrieved employee” to initiate an action against a former em-

ployer “on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former em-

ployees” to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been re-

covered only by the State in an enforcement action brought by

California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). Cal-

ifornia precedent holds that a PAGA suit is a “ ‘representative action’ ”

in which the employee plaintiff sues as an “ ‘agent or proxy’ ” of the

State. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348,

380. California precedent also interprets the statute to contain what

is effectively a rule of claim joinder—allowing a party to unite multiple

claims against an opposing party in a single action. An employee with

PAGA standing may “seek any civil penalties the state can, including

penalties for violations involving employees other than the PAGA liti-

gant herself.” ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175, 185.

Respondent Angie Moriana filed a PAGA action against her former

employer Viking River Cruises, alleging a California Labor Code vio-

lation. She also asserted a wide array of other violations allegedly sus-

tained by other Viking employees. Moriana’s employment contract

with Viking contained a mandatory arbitration agreement. Important

here, that agreement contained both a “Class Action Waiver”—provid-

ing that the parties could not bring any dispute as a class, collective,

or representative action under PAGA—and a severability clause—

2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Syllabus

specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, such a dispute would

presumptively be litigated in court. Under the severability clause, any

“portion” of the waiver that remained valid would be “enforced in arbi-

tration.” Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual

PAGA claim and to dismiss her other PAGA claims. Applying Califor-

nia’s Iskanian precedent, the California courts denied that motion,

holding that categorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to Cal-

ifornia policy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable “in-

dividual” claims and nonarbitrable “representative” claims. This

Court granted certiorari to decide whether the FAA preempts the Cal-

ifornia rule.

Held: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes di-

vision of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims

through an agreement to arbitrate. Pp. 7–21.

(a) Based on the principle that “[a]rbitration is strictly ‘a matter of

consent,’ ” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 299, this Court

has held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit

to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding

that the party agreed to do so,” Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l

Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 684. Because class-action arbitration mandates

procedural changes that are inconsistent with the individualized and

informal mode of bilateral arbitration contemplated by the FAA, see

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 347, class proce-

dures cannot be imposed by state law without presenting unwilling

parties with an unacceptable choice between being compelled to arbi-

trate using such procedures and forgoing arbitration all together.

Viking contends that the Court’s FAA precedents require enforcement

of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA actions be-

cause PAGA creates a form of class or collective proceeding. If this is

correct, Iskanian’s prohibition on PAGA waivers presents parties with

an impermissible choice: Either arbitrate disputes using a form of class

procedures, or do not arbitrate at all. Moriana maintains that any

conflict between Iskanian and the FAA is illusory because PAGA cre-

ates nothing more than a substantive cause of action.

This Court disagrees with both characterizations of the statute. Mo-

riana’s premise that PAGA creates a unitary private cause of action is

irreconcilable with the structure of the statute and the ordinary legal

meaning of the word “claim.” A PAGA action asserting multiple viola-

tions under California’s Labor Code affecting a range of different em-

ployees does not constitute “a single claim” in even the broadest possi-

ble sense. Viking’s position, on the other hand, elides important

structural differences between PAGA actions and class actions. A

class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims because he or she

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3

Syllabus

represents a multitude of absent individuals; a PAGA plaintiff, by con-

trast, represents a single principal, the LWDA, that has a multitude

of claims. As a result, PAGA suits exhibit virtually none of the proce-

dural characteristics of class actions.

This Court’s FAA precedents treat bilateral arbitration as the pro-

totype of the individualized and informal form of arbitration protected

from undue state interference by the FAA. See, e.g., Epic Systems

Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___. Viking posits that a proceeding is

“bilateral” only if it involves two and only two parties and “is conducted

by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 348. Thus, Iskanian’s prohibition

on PAGA waivers is inconsistent with the FAA because PAGA creates

an intrinsically representational form of action and Iskanian requires

parties either to arbitrate in that format or forgo arbitration alto-

gether.

This Court disagrees. Nothing in the FAA establishes a categorical

rule mandating enforcement of waivers of standing to assert claims on

behalf of absent principals. Non-class representative actions in which

a single agent litigates on behalf of a single principal necessarily devi-

ate from the strict ideal of bilateral dispute resolution posited by Vi-

king, but this Court has never held that the FAA imposes a duty on

States to render all forms of representative standing waivable by con-

tract or that such suits deviate from the norm of bilateral arbitration.

Unlike procedures distinctive to multiparty litigation, single-principal,

single-agent representative actions are “bilateral” in two registers:

They involve the rights of only the absent real party in interest and

the defendant, and litigation need only be conducted by the agent-

plaintiff and the defendant. Nothing in this Court’s precedent sug-

gests that in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to require States to

reshape their agency law governing who can assert claims on behalf of

whom to ensure that parties will never have to arbitrate disputes in a

proceeding that deviates from bilateral arbitration in the strictest

sense. Pp. 7–17.

(b) PAGA’s built-in mechanism of claim joinder is in conflict with the

FAA. Iskanian’s prohibition on contractual division of PAGA actions

into constituent claims unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to

determine “the issues subject to arbitration” and “the rules by which

they will arbitrate,” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ____, ____,

and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that “ar-

bitration is a matter of consent,” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684. For

that reason, state law cannot condition the enforceability of an agree-

ment to arbitrate on the availability of a procedural mechanism that

would permit a party to expand the scope of the anticipated arbitration

by introducing claims that the parties did not jointly agree to arbitrate.

4 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Syllabus

A state rule imposing an expansive rule of joinder in the arbitral con-

text would defeat the ability of parties to control which claims are sub-

ject to arbitration by permitting parties to superadd new claims to the

proceeding, regardless of whether the agreement committed those

claims to arbitration. When made compulsory by way of Iskanian,

PAGA’s joinder rule functions in exactly this way. The effect is to co-

erce parties into withholding PAGA claims from arbitration. Is-

kanian’s indivisibility rule effectively coerces parties to opt for a judi-

cial forum rather than “forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate

review of the courts to realize the benefits of private dispute resolu-

tion.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 685. Pp. 17–19.

(c) Under this Courts holding, Iskanian’s prohibition on wholesale

waivers of PAGA claims is not preempted by the FAA. But Iskanian’s

rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided into individual and non-in-

dividual claims is preempted, so Viking was entitled to compel arbi-

tration of Moriana’s individual claim. PAGA provides no mechanism

to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an

individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding. And

under PAGA’s standing requirement, a plaintiff has standing to main-

tain non-individual PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also

maintaining an individual claim in that action. As a result, Moriana

would lack statutory standing to maintain her non-individual claims

in court, and the correct course was to dismiss her remaining claims.

Pp. 20–21.

Reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, SO-

TOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

joined as to Parts I and III, and in which KAVANAUGH and BARRETT, JJ.,

joined as to Part III. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT,

J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in

which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C. J, joined as to

all but the footnote. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1573

_________________

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v.

ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF

CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.*

We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq.,

preempts a rule of California law that invalidates contrac-

tual waivers of the right to assert representative claims un-

der California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act

of 2004. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2698 et seq. (West 2022).

I

A

The California Legislature enacted the Labor Code Pri-

vate Attorneys General Act (PAGA) to address a perceived

deficit in the enforcement of the State’s Labor Code. Cali-

fornia’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA)

had the authority to bring enforcement actions to impose

civil penalties on employers for violations of many of the

code’s provisions. But the legislature believed the LWDA

did not have sufficient resources to reach the appropriate

level of compliance, and budgetary constraints made it im-

——————

*THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins Parts I and III of this opinion.

2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

possible to achieve an adequate level of financing. The leg-

islature thus decided to enlist employees as private attor-

neys general to enforce California labor law, with the un-

derstanding that labor-law enforcement agencies were to

retain primacy over private enforcement efforts.

By its terms, PAGA authorizes any “aggrieved employee”

to initiate an action against a former employer “on behalf of

himself or herself and other current or former employees”

to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been re-

covered only by the State in an LWDA enforcement action.

Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(a). As the text of the statute

indicates, PAGA limits statutory standing to “aggrieved

employees”—a term defined to include “any person who was

employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or

more of the alleged violations was committed.” §2699(c). To

bring suit, however, an employee must also exhaust admin-

istrative remedies. That entails providing notice to the em-

ployer and the LWDA of the violations alleged and the sup-

porting facts and theories. §2699.3(a)(1)(A). If the LWDA

fails to respond or initiate an investigation within a speci-

fied timeframe, the employee may bring suit. §2699.3(a)(2).

In any successful PAGA action, the LWDA is entitled to 75

percent of the award. §2699(i). The remaining 25 percent

is distributed among the employees affected by the viola-

tions at issue. Ibid.

California law characterizes PAGA as creating a “type of

qui tam action,”1 Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles,

——————

1 As we have explained, “qui tam” is the short form of the Latin phrase

“qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur”—mean-

ing “ ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his

own.’ ” Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Ste-

vens, 529 U. S. 765, 768, n. 1(2000). Qui tam actions “appear to have

originated around the end of the 13th century, when private individuals

who had suffered injury began bringing actions in the royal courts on

both their own and the Crown’s behalf ” and became more of a rarity as

“royal courts began to extend jurisdiction to suits involving wholly pri-

vate wrongs.” Id., at 774–775.

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3

Opinion of the Court

LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 382, 327 P. 3d 129, 148 (2014). Alt-

hough the statute’s language suggests that an “aggrieved

employee” sues “on behalf of himself or herself and other

current or former employees,” §2699(a), California prece-

dent holds that a PAGA suit is a “ ‘representative action’ ”

in which the employee plaintiff sues as an “ ‘agent or proxy’ ”

of the State. Id., at 380, 327 P. 3d, at 147 (quoting Arias v.

Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986, 209 P. 3d 923, 933

(2009)).

As the California courts conceive of it, the State “is al-

ways the real party in interest in the suit.” Iskanian, 59

Cal. 4th, at 382, 327 P. 3d, at 148.2 The primary function

of PAGA is to delegate a power to employees to assert “the

same legal right and interest as state law enforcement

agencies,” Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933. In

other words, the statute gives employees a right to assert

——————

2 The extent to which PAGA plaintiffs truly act as agents of the State

rather than complete assignees is disputed. See Magadia v. Wal-Mart

Assocs., Inc., 999 F. 3d 668, 677 (CA9 2021) (holding that PAGA “lacks

the procedural controls necessary to ensure that California” retains “sub-

stantial authority over the case” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Agency requires control. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 713

(2013). But apart from the exhaustion process, the statute does not fea-

ture any explicit control mechanisms, such as provisions authorizing the

State to intervene or requiring its approval of settlements.

That said, California precedent strongly suggests that the State re-

tains inherent authority to manage PAGA actions. There is no other ob-

vious way to understand California precedent’s description of the State

as the “real party in interest.” See generally 1A Cal. Jur. 3d Actions §31

(real-party-in-interest status is based on ownership and control over the

cause of action). And a theory of total assignment appears inconsistent

with the fact that employees have no assignable interest in a PAGA

claim. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Supe-

rior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002, 209 P. 3d 937, 943

(2009) (Amalgamated Transit); see also Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., 69 Cal.

App. 5th 955, 972, 284 Cal. Rptr. 3d 767, 780 (2021) (The employee’s

“ability to file PAGA claims on behalf of the state does not convert the

state’s interest into their own or render them real parties in interest”).

For purposes of this opinion, we assume that PAGA plaintiffs are agents.

4 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

the State’s claims for civil penalties on a representative ba-

sis, but it does not create any private rights or private

claims for relief. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 381, 327 P. 3d, at

148; see also Amalgamated Transit, 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002,

209 P. 3d 937, 943 (2009). The code provisions enforced

through the statute establish public duties that are owed to

the State, not private rights belonging to employees in their

“individual capacities.” Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 381, 327

P. 3d, at 147. Other, distinct provisions of the code create

individual rights, and claims arising from violations of

those rights are actionable through separate private causes

of action for compensatory or statutory damages. Id., at

381–382, 327 P. 3d, at 147–148; see also Kim v. Reins Int’l

California, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 73, 86, 459 P. 3d 1123, 1130

(2020) (“[C]ivil penalties recovered on the state’s behalf are

intended to remediate present violations and deter future

ones, not to redress employees’ injuries” (internal quotation

marks omitted; emphasis deleted)). And because PAGA ac-

tions are understood to involve the assertion of the govern-

ment’s claims on a derivative basis, the judgment issued in

a PAGA action is binding on anyone “who would be bound

by a judgment in an action brought by the government.”

Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933.

California precedent also interprets the statute to con-

tain what is effectively a rule of claim joinder. Rules of

claim joinder allow a party to unite multiple claims against

an opposing party in a single action. See 6A C. Wright, H.

Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §1582

(3d ed. 2016) (Wright & Miller). PAGA standing has the

same function. An employee with statutory standing may

“seek any civil penalties the state can, including penalties

for violations involving employees other than the PAGA lit-

igant herself.” ZB, N. A. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 5th 175,

185, 448 P. 3d 239, 243–244 (2019). An employee who al-

leges he or she suffered a single violation is entitled to use

that violation as a gateway to assert a potentially limitless

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5

Opinion of the Court

number of other violations as predicates for liability. This

mechanism radically expands the scope of PAGA actions.

The default penalties set by PAGA are $100 for each ag-

grieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and

$200 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each

subsequent violation. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §2699(f )(2). In-

dividually, these penalties are modest; but given PAGA’s

additive dimension, low-value claims may easily be welded

together into high-value suits.

B

Petitioner Viking River Cruises, Inc. (Viking), is a com-

pany that offers ocean and river cruises around the world.

When respondent Angie Moriana was hired by Viking as a

sales representative, she executed an agreement to arbi-

trate any dispute arising out of her employment. The

agreement contained a “Class Action Waiver” providing

that in any arbitral proceeding, the parties could not bring

any dispute as a class, collective, or representative PAGA

action. It also contained a severability clause specifying

that if the waiver was found invalid, any class, collective,

representative, or PAGA action would presumptively be lit-

igated in court. But under that severability clause, if any

“portion” of the waiver remained valid, it would be “en-

forced in arbitration.”

After leaving her position with Viking, Moriana filed a

PAGA action against Viking in California court. Her com-

plaint contained a claim that Viking had failed to provide

her with her final wages within 72 hours, as required by

§§101–102 of the California Labor Code. But the complaint

also asserted a wide array of other code violations allegedly

sustained by other Viking employees, including violations

of provisions concerning the minimum wage, overtime,

meal periods, rest periods, timing of pay, and pay state-

ments. Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana’s

“individual” PAGA claim—here meaning the claim that

6 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

arose from the violation she suffered—and to dismiss her

other PAGA claims. The trial court denied that motion, and

the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that cate-

gorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to state pol-

icy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable

individual claims and nonarbitrable “representative”

claims.

This ruling was dictated by the California Supreme

Court’s decision in Iskanian. In that case, the court held

that pre-dispute agreements to waive the right to bring

“representative” PAGA claims are invalid as a matter of

public policy. What, precisely, this holding means requires

some explanation. PAGA’s unique features have prompted

the development of an entire vocabulary unique to the stat-

ute, but the details, it seems, are still being worked out. An

unfortunate feature of this lexicon is that it tends to use the

word “representative” in two distinct ways, and each of

those uses of the term “representative” is connected with

one of Iskanian’s rules governing contractual waiver of

PAGA claims.

In the first sense, PAGA actions are “representative” in

that they are brought by employees acting as representa-

tives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State. But

PAGA claims are also called “representative” when they are

predicated on code violations sustained by other employees.

In the first sense, “ ‘every PAGA action is . . . representa-

tive’ ” and “[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA

action,” Kim, 9 Cal. 5th, at 87, 459 P. 3d, at 1131 (quoting

Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th, at 387, 327 P. 3d, at 151), because

every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity.

But when the word “representative” is used in the second

way, it makes sense to distinguish “individual” PAGA

claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actu-

ally sustained by the plaintiff, from “representative” (or

perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of

events involving other employees. For purposes of this

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7

Opinion of the Court

opinion, we will use “individual PAGA claim” to refer to

claims based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff.

And we will endeavor to be clear about how we are using

the term “representative.”

Iskanian’s principal rule prohibits waivers of “repre-

sentative” PAGA claims in the first sense. That is, it pre-

vents parties from waiving representative standing to bring

PAGA claims in a judicial or arbitral forum. But Iskanian

also adopted a secondary rule that invalidates agreements

to separately arbitrate or litigate “individual PAGA claims

for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered,” on the

theory that resolving victim-specific claims in separate ar-

bitrations does not serve the deterrent purpose of PAGA.

59 Cal. 4th, at 383, 327 P. 3d, at 149; see also Kim, 9 Cal.

5th, at 88, 459 P. 3d, at 1132 (noting that based on Is-

kanian, California courts have uniformly “rejected efforts to

split PAGA claims into individual and representative com-

ponents”).

In this case, Iskanian’s principal prohibition required the

lower courts to treat the representative-action waiver in the

agreement between Moriana and Viking as invalid insofar

as it was construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA stand-

ing. The agreement’s severability clause, however, allowed

enforcement of any “portion” of the waiver that remained

valid, so the agreement still would have permitted arbitra-

tion of Moriana’s individual PAGA claim even if wholesale

enforcement was impossible. But because California law

prohibits division of a PAGA action into constituent claims,

the state courts refused to compel arbitration of that claim

as well. We granted certiorari, 595 U. S. ___ (2021), and

now reverse.

II

The FAA was enacted in response to judicial hostility to

arbitration. Section 2 of the statute makes arbitration

agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon

8 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation

of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2.3 As we have interpreted it,

this provision contains two clauses: An enforcement man-

date, which renders agreements to arbitrate enforceable as

a matter of federal law, and a saving clause, which permits

invalidation of arbitration clauses on grounds applicable to

“any contract.” See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563

U. S. 333, 339–340 (2011); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584

U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 5–6). These clauses

jointly establish “an equal-treatment principle: A court may

invalidate an arbitration agreement based on ‘generally ap-

plicable contract defenses’ like fraud or unconscionability,

but not on legal rules that ‘apply only to arbitration or that

derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to ar-

bitrate is at issue.’ ” Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark,

581 U. S. 246, 251 (2017) (quoting Concepcion, 563 U. S., at

339). Under that principle, the FAA “preempts any state

rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—for ex-

ample, a law ‘prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a par-

ticular type of claim.’ ” Kindred Nursing, 581 U. S., at 251

(quoting Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 341).

But under our decisions, even rules that are generally ap-

plicable as a formal matter are not immune to preemption

——————

3 As we have noted, common-law hostility to arbitration “manifested

itself in a great variety of devices and formulas.” AT&T Mobility LLC v.

Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 342 (2011) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). Two important devices were the doctrines of ouster and revocabil-

ity, which, respectively, invalidated arbitration clauses as impermissible

attempts to “oust” courts of their jurisdiction and permitted parties to

revoke consent to arbitrate until the moment the arbitrator entered an

award. See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. K. B. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532

(K. B. 1746); Vynior’s Case, 77 Co. Rep. 80a, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K. B.

1609). Another was the rule barring specific performance as a remedy

for breach of an arbitration clause. See 21 R. Lord, Williston on Con-

tracts §57:2 (4th ed. 2017). Section 2 abrogated these doctrines by mak-

ing arbitration agreements presumptively “valid,” “irrevocable,” and “en-

forceable.”

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9

Opinion of the Court

by the FAA. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ___,

___ (2019) (slip op., at 6); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 343. Sec-

tion 2’s mandate protects a right to enforce arbitration

agreements. That right would not be a right to arbitrate in

any meaningful sense if generally applicable principles of

state law could be used to transform “traditiona[l] individ-

ualized . . . arbitration” into the “litigation it was meant to

displace” through the imposition of procedures at odds with

arbitration’s informal nature. Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at

___ (slip op., at 8). See also Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 351.

And that right would not be a right to arbitrate based on an

agreement if generally applicable law could be used to coer-

cively impose arbitration in contravention of the “first prin-

ciple” of our FAA jurisprudence: that “[a]rbitration is

strictly ‘a matter of consent.’ ” Granite Rock Co. v. Team-

sters, 561 U. S. 287, 299 (2010) (quoting Volt Information

Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jun-

ior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989)); see also Lamps Plus,

587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7); Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. Ani-

malFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 685 (2010).

Based on these principles, we have held that “a party may

not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitra-

tion unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that

the party agreed to do so.” Id., at 684. See also Lamps Plus,

587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1); Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at

___–___ (slip op., at 6–8); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–348.

The “ ‘shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitra-

tion’ ” mandates procedural changes that are inconsistent

with the individualized and informal mode of arbitration

contemplated by the FAA. Id., at 347 (quoting Stolt-

Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 686). As a result, class procedures

cannot be imposed by state law without presenting unwill-

ing parties with an unacceptable choice between being com-

pelled to arbitrate using procedures at odds with arbitra-

tion’s traditional form and forgoing arbitration altogether.

Putting parties to that choice is inconsistent with the FAA.

10 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

Viking contends that these decisions require enforcement

of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA

actions because PAGA creates a form of class or collective

proceeding. If this is correct, Iskanian’s prohibition on

PAGA waivers presents parties with the same impermissi-

ble choice as the rules we have invalidated in our decisions

concerning class- and collective-action waivers: Either arbi-

trate disputes using a form of class procedure, or do not ar-

bitrate at all.

Moriana offers a very different characterization of the

statute. As she sees it, any conflict between Iskanian and

the FAA is illusory because PAGA creates nothing more

than a substantive cause of action. The only thing that is

distinctive about PAGA, she supposes, is that it allows em-

ployee plaintiffs to increase the available penalties that

may be awarded in an action by proving additional predi-

cate violations of the Labor Code. But that does not make

a PAGA action a class action, because those violations are

not distinct claims belonging to distinct individuals. In-

stead, they are predicates for expanded liability under a

single cause of action. In Moriana’s view, that means Is-

kanian invalidates waivers of substantive rights, and does

not purport to invalidate anything that can meaningfully

be described as an “arbitration agreement.”4

——————

4 Moriana declines to defend one of the Iskanian court’s own bases for

holding that the FAA does not mandate enforcement of PAGA waivers.

The Iskanian court reasoned that a PAGA action lies outside the FAA’s

coverage entirely because §2 is limited to controversies “arising out of ”

the contract between the parties, 9 U. S. C. §2 (emphasis added), and a

PAGA action “is not a dispute between an employer and an employee

arising out of their contractual relationship,” but “a dispute between an

employer and the state.” Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 59

Cal. 4th 348, 387, 327 P. 3d 129, 151 (2014). We reject this argument.

Although the terms of §2 limit the FAA’s enforcement mandate to agree-

ments to arbitrate controversies that “arise out of ” the parties’ contrac-

tual relationship, disputes resolved in PAGA actions satisfy this require-

ment. The contractual relationship between the parties is a but-for cause

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11

Opinion of the Court

We disagree with both characterizations of the statute.

Moriana is correct that the FAA does not require courts to

enforce contractual waivers of substantive rights and rem-

edies. The FAA’s mandate is to enforce “arbitration agree-

ments.” Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 344 (emphasis added).

And as we have described it, an arbitration agreement is “a

specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not

only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in

resolving the dispute.” Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417

U. S. 506, 519 (1974); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler

Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 633 (1985). An ar-

bitration agreement thus does not alter or abridge substan-

tive rights; it merely changes how those rights will be pro-

cessed. And so we have said that “ ‘[b]y agreeing to

arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the sub-

stantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to

their resolution in an arbitral . . . forum.’ ” Preston v. Fer-

rer, 552 U. S. 346, 359 (2008) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors

Corp., 473 U. S., at 628).5

——————

of any justiciable legal controversy between the parties under PAGA, and

“arising out of ” language normally refers to a causal relationship. See,

e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S.

___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8). And regardless of whether a PAGA action

is in some sense also a dispute between an employer and the State, noth-

ing in the FAA categorically exempts claims belonging to sovereigns from

the scope of §2.

5 In briefing before this Court, Viking argued that the principle that

the FAA does not mandate enforcement of provisions waiving substan-

tive rights is limited to federal statutes. This argument is erroneous.

The basis of this principle is not anything unique about federal statutes.

It is that the FAA requires only the enforcement of “provision[s]” to settle

a controversy “by arbitration,” §2, and not any provision that happens to

appear in a contract that features an arbitration clause. That is why we

mentioned this principle in Preston, which concerned claims arising un-

der state law. See 552 U. S., at 360 (noting that under the agreement, a

party “relinquishe[d] no substantive rights . . . California law may accord

him”).

12 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

But Moriana’s premise that PAGA creates a unitary pri-

vate cause of action is irreconcilable with the structure of

the statute and the ordinary legal meaning of the word

“claim.” California courts interpret PAGA to provide em-

ployees with delegated authority to assert the State’s

claims on a representative basis, not an individual cause of

action. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit, 46 Cal. 4th, at

1003, 209 P. 3d, at 943 (PAGA “is simply a procedural stat-

ute” that “does not create property rights or any other sub-

stantive rights”). And a PAGA action asserting multiple

code violations affecting a range of different employees does

not constitute “a single claim” in even the broadest possible

sense, because the violations asserted need not even arise

from a common “transaction” or “nucleus of operative facts.”

Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group,

Inc., 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 6) (internal quo-

tation marks omitted).6

Viking’s position, on the other hand, elides important

structural differences between PAGA actions and class ac-

tions that preclude any straightforward application of our

precedents invalidating prohibitions on class-action waiv-

ers. Class-action procedure allows courts to use a repre-

sentative plaintiff ’s individual claims as a basis to “adjudi-

cate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in

separate suits,” Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A. v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. 393, 408 (2010). This, of course,

requires the certification of a class. And because class judg-

ments bind absentees with respect to their individual

——————

6 California courts sometimes speak as though a PAGA action involves

the assertion of “a single representative PAGA claim,” Williams v. Supe-

rior Court, 237 Cal. App. 4th 642, 649, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 87 (2015).

But we are not required to take the labels affixed by state courts at face

value in determining whether state law creates a scheme at odds with

federal law. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367–368 (1930).

And in our view, this manner of speaking is another reflection of the still-

embryonic character of the language that has grown up around PAGA.

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13

Opinion of the Court

claims for relief and are preclusive as to all claims the class

could have brought, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-

mond, 467 U. S. 867, 874 (1984), “class representatives

must at all times adequately represent absent class mem-

bers, and absent [class] members must be afforded notice,

an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the

class.” Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 349. And to “ensur[e] that

the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the

class whose claims they wish to litigate,” the adjudicator

must decide questions of numerosity, commonality, typical-

ity, and adequacy of representation. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 349 (2011).

PAGA actions also permit the adjudication of multiple

claims in a single suit, but their structure is entirely differ-

ent. A class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims

because he or she represents a multitude of absent individ-

uals; a PAGA plaintiff, by contrast, represents a single prin-

cipal, the LWDA, that has a multitude of claims. As a result

of this structural difference, PAGA suits exhibit virtually

none of the procedural characteristics of class actions. The

plaintiff does not represent a class of injured individuals, so

there is no need for certification. PAGA judgments are

binding only with respect to the State’s claims, and are not

binding on nonparty employees as to any individually held

claims. Arias, 46 Cal. 4th, at 986, 209 P. 3d, at 933–934.

This obviates the need to consider adequacy of representa-

tion, numerosity, commonality, or typicality. And although

the statute gives other affected employees a future interest

in the penalties awarded in an action, that interest does not

make those employees “parties” in any of the senses in

which absent class members are, see Devlin v. Scardelletti,

536 U. S. 1 (2002), or give those employees anything more

than an inchoate interest in litigation proceeds. See Ver-

mont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.

Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 773 (2000) (The “ ‘right’ ” to a share

14 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

of the proceeds of a qui tam action “does not even fully ma-

terialize until the litigation is completed and the relator

prevails”).

Because PAGA actions do not adjudicate the individual

claims of multiple absent third parties, they do not present

the problems of notice, due process, and adequacy of repre-

sentation that render class arbitration inconsistent with ar-

bitration’s traditionally individualized form. See Concep-

cion, 563 U. S., at 347–348. Of course, as a practical matter,

PAGA actions do have something important in common

with class actions. Because PAGA plaintiffs represent a

principal with a potentially vast number of claims at its dis-

posal, PAGA suits “greatly increas[e] risks to defendants.”

Id., at 350. But our precedents do not hold that the FAA

allows parties to contract out of anything that might am-

plify defense risks. Instead, our cases hold that States can-

not coerce individuals into forgoing arbitration by taking

the individualized and informal procedures characteristic of

traditional arbitration off the table. Litigation risks are rel-

evant to that inquiry because one way in which state law

may coerce parties into forgoing their right to arbitrate is

by conditioning that right on the use of a procedural format

that makes arbitration artificially unattractive. The ques-

tion, then, is whether PAGA contains any procedural mech-

anism at odds with arbitration’s basic form.

Viking suggests an answer. Our FAA precedents treat

bilateral arbitration as the prototype of the individualized

and informal form of arbitration protected from undue state

interference by the FAA. See Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at

___–___ (slip op., at 8–9); see also American Express Co. v.

Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U. S. 228, 238 (2013); Con-

cepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–349; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at

685–686. Viking posits that a proceeding is “bilateral” in

the relevant sense if—but only if—it involves two and only

two parties and the arbitration “ ‘is conducted by and on be-

half of the individual named parties only.’ ” Wal-Mart, 564

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15

Opinion of the Court

U. S., at 348 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682,

700–701 (1979)). PAGA actions necessarily deviate from

this ideal because they involve litigation or arbitration on

behalf of an absent principal. Viking thus suggests that

Iskanian’s prohibition on PAGA waivers is inconsistent

with the FAA because PAGA creates an intrinsically repre-

sentational form of action and Iskanian requires parties ei-

ther to arbitrate in that format or forgo arbitration alto-

gether.

We disagree. Nothing in the FAA establishes a categori-

cal rule mandating enforcement of waivers of standing to

assert claims on behalf of absent principals. Non-class rep-

resentative actions in which a single agent litigates on be-

half of a single principal are part of the basic architecture

of much of substantive law. Familiar examples include

shareholder-derivative suits, wrongful-death actions, trus-

tee actions, and suits on behalf of infants or incompetent

persons. Single-agent, single-principal suits of this kind

necessarily deviate from the strict ideal of bilateral dispute

resolution posited by Viking. But we have never held that

the FAA imposes a duty on States to render all forms of rep-

resentative standing waivable by contract. Nor have we

suggested that single-agent, single-principal representa-

tive suits are inconsistent the norm of bilateral arbitration

as our precedents conceive of it. Instead, we have held that

“the ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral ar-

bitration to class-action arbitration’ ” are too fundamental

to be imposed on parties without their consent. Concepcion,

563 U. S., at 347–348 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at

686; emphasis added). And we have held that §2’s saving

clause does not preserve defenses that would allow a party

to declare “that a contract is unenforceable just because it

requires bilateral arbitration.” Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at

___ (slip op., at 9).

These principles do not mandate the enforcement of waiv-

16 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

ers of representative capacity as a categorical rule. Requir-

ing parties to decide whether to arbitrate or litigate a

single-agent, single-principal action does not produce a

shift from a situation in which the arbitrator must “re-

solv[e] a single dispute between the parties to a single

agreement” to one in which he or she must “resolv[e] many

disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of

parties.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 686. And a proceeding

in which two and only two parties arbitrate exclusively in

their individual capacities is not the only thing one might

mean by “bilateral arbitration.” As we have said, “[t]he la-

bel ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but

rather a conclusion about the applicability of various proce-

dural rules that may differ based on context.” Devlin, 536

U. S., at 10. Our precedents use the phrase “bilateral arbi-

tration” in opposition to “class or collective” arbitration, and

the problems we have identified in mandatory class arbitra-

tion arise from procedures characteristic of multiparty rep-

resentative actions. Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip

op., at 24); see also Italian Colors, 570 U. S., at 238; Con-

cepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–349; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at

685–686. Unlike these kinds of actions, single-principal,

single-agent representative actions are “bilateral” in two

registers: They involve the rights of only the absent real

party in interest and the defendant, and litigation need only

be conducted by the agent-plaintiff and the defendant. This

degree of deviation from bilateral norms is not alien to tra-

ditional arbitral practice,7 and our precedents have never

suggested otherwise. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Center,

Inc. v. Brown, 565 U. S. 530 (2012) (per curiam) (invalidat-

ing rule categorically barring arbitration of wrongful-death

actions).

——————

7 For example, close corporations have included arbitration clauses in

negotiated shareholder agreements for many decades. See, e.g., In re

Carl, 263 App. Div. 887, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 410 (1942); Lumsden v. Lumsden

Bros. & Taylor Inc., 242 App. Div. 852, 257 N. Y. S. 221 (1934).

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17

Opinion of the Court

Nor does a rule prohibiting waiver of representative

standing declare “that a contract is unenforceable just be-

cause it requires bilateral arbitration.” Epic Systems, 584

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). Indeed, if the term “bilateral

arbitration” is used to mean “arbitration in an individual

capacity between precisely two parties,” a rule prohibiting

representative-capacity waivers cannot invalidate agree-

ments to arbitrate on a “bilateral” basis. An agreement that

explicitly provided for “arbitration on a strictly bilateral ba-

sis” would, under that definition of the term “bilateral,” cat-

egorically exclude representative-capacity claims from its

coverage. Such claims, after all, necessarily involve the rep-

resentation of an absent principal, and thus cannot be arbi-

trated in a strictly bilateral proceeding. A rule prohibiting

waivers of representative standing would not invalidate

any agreements that contracted for “bilateral arbitration”

in Viking’s sense—it would simply require parties to choose

whether to litigate those claims or arbitrate them in a pro-

ceeding that is not bilateral in every conceivable sense. And

while this consequence only follows because it is impossible

to decide representative claims in an arbitration that is “bi-

lateral” in every dimension, nothing in our precedent sug-

gests that in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to re-

quire States to reshape their agency law to ensure that

parties will never have to arbitrate in a proceeding that de-

viates from “bilateral arbitration” in the strictest sense. If

there is a conflict between California’s prohibition on PAGA

waivers and the FAA, it must derive from a different source.

III

We think that such a conflict between PAGA’s procedural

structure and the FAA does exist, and that it derives from

the statute’s built-in mechanism of claim joinder. As we

noted at the outset, that mechanism permits “aggrieved em-

ployees” to use the Labor Code violations they personally

suffered as a basis to join to the action any claims that could

18 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

have been raised by the State in an enforcement proceed-

ing. Iskanian’s secondary rule prohibits parties from con-

tracting around this joinder device because it invalidates

agreements to arbitrate only “individual PAGA claims for

Labor Code violations that an employee suffered,” 59 Cal.

4th, at 383, 327 P. 3d, at 149.

This prohibition on contractual division of PAGA actions

into constituent claims unduly circumscribes the freedom of

parties to determine “the issues subject to arbitration” and

“the rules by which they will arbitrate,” Lamps Plus, 587

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7), and does so in a way that vio-

lates the fundamental principle that “arbitration is a mat-

ter of consent,” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684. The most

basic corollary of the principle that arbitration is a matter

of consent is that “a party can be forced to arbitrate only

those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitra-

tion,” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S.

938, 945 (1995). This means that parties cannot be coerced

into arbitrating a claim, issue, or dispute “absent an affirm-

ative ‘contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed

to do so.’ ” Lamps Plus, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quot-

ing Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684); see also Concepcion,

563 U. S., at 347–348.

For that reason, state law cannot condition the enforcea-

bility of an arbitration agreement on the availability of a

procedural mechanism that would permit a party to expand

the scope of the arbitration by introducing claims that the

parties did not jointly agree to arbitrate. Rules of claim

joinder can function in precisely that way. Modern civil pro-

cedure dispenses with the formalities of the common-law

approach to claim joinder in favor of almost-unqualified

joinder. Wright & Miller §1581. Federal Rule of Civil Pro-

cedure 18(a), which permits a party to “join, as independent

or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an

opposing party,” is typical of the modern approach. But the

FAA licenses contracting parties to depart from standard

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 19

Opinion of the Court

rules “in favor of individualized arbitration procedures of

their own design,” so parties to an arbitration agreement

are not required to follow the same approach. Epic Systems,

584 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 14). And that is true even if

bifurcated proceedings are an inevitable result. See, e.g.,

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 220–221

(1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-

str. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 103 (1983).

A state rule imposing an expansive rule of joinder in the

arbitral context would defeat the ability of parties to control

which claims are subject to arbitration. Such a rule would

permit parties to superadd new claims to the proceeding,

regardless of whether the agreement between them com-

mitted those claims to arbitration. Requiring arbitration

procedures to include a joinder rule of that kind compels

parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the

range of issues under consideration is determined by coer-

cion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration alto-

gether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a

right they enjoy under the FAA. See Lamps Plus, 587 U. S.,

at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–8); Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at ___–

___ (slip op., at 5–9); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–351;

Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684–687.

When made compulsory by way of Iskanian, the joinder

rule internal to PAGA functions in exactly this way. Under

that rule, parties cannot agree to restrict the scope of an

arbitration to disputes arising out of a particular “ ‘ “trans-

action” ’ ” or “ ‘common nucleus of facts.’ ” Lucky Brand, 590

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). If the parties agree to arbitrate

“individual” PAGA claims based on personally sustained vi-

olations, Iskanian allows the aggrieved employee to abro-

gate that agreement after the fact and demand either judi-

cial proceedings or an arbitral proceeding that exceeds the

scope jointly intended by the parties. The only way for par-

ties to agree to arbitrate one of an employee’s PAGA claims

is to also “agree” to arbitrate all other PAGA claims in the

20 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

same arbitral proceeding.

The effect of Iskanian’s rule mandating this mechanism

is to coerce parties into withholding PAGA claims from ar-

bitration. Liberal rules of claim joinder presuppose a back-

drop in which litigants assert their own claims and those of

a limited class of other parties who are usually connected

with the plaintiff by virtue of a distinctive legal relation-

ship—such as that between shareholders and a corporation

or between a parent and a minor child. PAGA departs from

that norm by granting the power to enforce a subset of Cal-

ifornia public law to every employee in the State. This com-

bination of standing to act on behalf of a sovereign and man-

datory freeform joinder allows plaintiffs to unite a massive

number of claims in a single-package suit. But as we have

said, “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes” of

massive-scale disputes of this kind. Concepcion, 563 U. S.,

at 350. The absence of “multilayered review” in arbitral

proceedings “makes it more likely that errors will go uncor-

rected.” Ibid. And suits featuring a vast number of claims

entail the same “risk of ‘in terrorem’ settlements that class

actions entail.” Ibid. As a result, Iskanian’s indivisibility

rule effectively coerces parties to opt for a judicial forum

rather than “forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate

review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of pri-

vate dispute resolution.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 685;

see also Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 350–351. This result is

incompatible with the FAA.

IV

We hold that the FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian in-

sofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individ-

ual and non-individual claims through an agreement to ar-

bitrate. This holding compels reversal in this case. The

agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive

“representative” PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provi-

sion was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 21

Opinion of the Court

claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is

not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains inva-

lid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the sev-

erability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver

provision is invalid in some respect, any “portion” of the

waiver that remains valid must still be “enforced in arbitra-

tion.” Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce

the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Mori-

ana’s individual PAGA claim. The lower courts refused to

do so based on the rule that PAGA actions cannot be divided

into individual and non-individual claims. Under our hold-

ing, that rule is preempted, so Viking is entitled to compel

arbitration of Moriana’s individual claim.

The remaining question is what the lower courts should

have done with Moriana’s non-individual claims. Under

our holding in this case, those claims may not be dismissed

simply because they are “representative.” Iskanian’s rule

remains valid to that extent. But as we see it, PAGA pro-

vides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-

individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been

committed to a separate proceeding. Under PAGA’s stand-

ing requirement, a plaintiff can maintain non-individual

PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also maintaining

an individual claim in that action. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann.

§§2699(a), (c). When an employee’s own dispute is pared

away from a PAGA action, the employee is no different from

a member of the general public, and PAGA does not allow

such persons to maintain suit. See Kim, 9 Cal. 5th, at 90,

459 P. 3d, at 1133 (“PAGA’s standing requirement was

meant to be a departure from the ‘general public’ . . . stand-

ing originally allowed” under other California statutes). As

a result, Moriana lacks statutory standing to continue to

maintain her non-individual claims in court, and the correct

course is to dismiss her remaining claims.

For these reasons, the judgment of the California Court

of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

22 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

Opinion of the Court

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1573

_________________

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v.

ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF

CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion in full. The Court faithfully ap-

plies precedent to hold that California’s anti-waiver rule for

claims under the State’s Labor Code Private Attorneys Gen-

eral Act of 2004 (PAGA) is pre-empted only “insofar as it

precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-

individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.”

Ante, at 20. In its analysis of the parties’ contentions, the

Court also details several important limitations on the pre-

emptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See

ante, at 11–17. As a whole, the Court’s opinion makes clear

that California is not powerless to address its sovereign con-

cern that it cannot adequately enforce its Labor Code with-

out assistance from private attorneys general.

The Court concludes that the FAA poses no bar to the ad-

judication of respondent Angie Moriana’s “non-individual”

PAGA claims, but that PAGA itself “provides no mechanism

to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims

once an individual claim has been committed to a separate

proceeding.” Ante, at 21. Thus, the Court reasons, based

on available guidance from California courts, that Moriana

lacks “statutory standing” under PAGA to litigate her “non-

individual” claims separately in state court. Ibid. Of

course, if this Court’s understanding of state law is wrong,

California courts, in an appropriate case, will have the last

2 VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

word. Alternatively, if this Court’s understanding is right,

the California Legislature is free to modify the scope of stat-

utory standing under PAGA within state and federal con-

stitutional limits. With this understanding, I join the

Court’s opinion.

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1

BARRETT,of

Opinion J.,Bconcurring

ARRETT, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1573

_________________

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v.

ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF

CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH

joins, and with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins except as to

the footnote, concurring in part and concurring in the judg-

ment.

I join Part III of the Court’s opinion. I agree that reversal

is required under our precedent because PAGA’s procedure

is akin to other aggregation devices that cannot be imposed

on a party to an arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Stolt-Niel-

sen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662 (2010);

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333 (2011);

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___ (2018); Lamps

Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ___ (2019). I would say noth-

ing more than that. The discussion in Parts II and IV of the

Court’s opinion is unnecessary to the result, and much of it

addresses disputed state-law questions as well as argu-

ments not pressed or passed upon in this case.*

——————

*The same is true of Part I.

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1

THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 20–1573

_________________

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC., PETITIONER v.

ANGIE MORIANA

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF

CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

[June 15, 2022]

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.

I continue to adhere to the view that the Federal Arbitra-

tion Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., does not apply to pro-

ceedings in state courts. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.

Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 285–297 (1995) (THOMAS, J., dis-

senting); see also Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark,

581 U. S. 246, 257 (2017) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (collect-

ing cases). Accordingly, the FAA does not require Califor-

nia’s courts to enforce an arbitration agreement that forbids

an employee to invoke the State’s Private Attorneys Gen-

eral Act. On that basis, I would affirm the judgment of the

California Court of Appeal.