explaining the distinction between personal- and official-capacity claims and that qualified immunity applies to the former
How later courts described this case
- explaining the distinction between personal- and official-capacity claims and that qualified immunity applies to the former
- Plaintiffs “must claim that the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the law that was clearly established at the time of the actions complained of.” (quotation omitted)
- elaborating on the limits of this review
- “[W]e have repeatedly held that a district court’s order that declines or refuses to rule on a motion to dismiss based on a government officer’s defense of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable order.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 20-30738 Document: 00516353119 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/10/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 10, 2022
No. 20-30738
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Christopher Marlowe,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and
Corrections; Raman Singh, Doctor; Pam Hearn, Doctor; Timothy
Hooper, Warden; Stephanie Michel, Deputy Warden; Morgan
Leblanc, Assistant Warden; Darryl Campbell, Assistant Warden;
Preety Singh, Doctor; Gail Levy; Fallon Stewart;
Jonathan Travis; Angel Horn, Master Sergeant; Rolanda
Palmer, Master Sergeant; Chermaine Brown, Sergeant;
Chameka Johnson, Sergeant; State of Louisiana,
Department of Public Safety and Corrections; John
Morrison,
Defendants—Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:18-cv-63
Case: 20-30738 Document: 00516353119 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/10/2022
No. 20-30738
Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Christopher Marlowe sued prison officials for violating his rights. The
district court denied some of those officials qualified immunity. We vacate
the denials and remand for further consideration.
I.
Marlowe developed significant health problems while imprisoned in
Louisiana, and he was eventually diagnosed with diabetes. He filed this
lawsuit in 2018, alleging (among other things) that prison officials had
misdiagnosed, neglected to treat, and incorrectly treated his diabetes. His
complaint asserted various causes of action against many defendants,
including both governmental entities and natural persons—some in their
personal capacities and some in their official capacities. Marlowe sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, along with damages.
The defendants filed a collective motion to dismiss. Relevant here,
some of the defendants asserted qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.
In the course of ruling on the motion to dismiss as a whole, the district court
denied qualified immunity to some of those defendants. The defendants
immediately appealed those denials of qualified immunity.
II.
A district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds is a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It is therefore immediately
appealable. See Lincoln v. Barnes, 855 F.3d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 2017); see
also id. at 300 (elaborating on the limits of this review). That is true even in
cases, like this one, where the district court’s denial of qualified immunity
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
2
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No. 20-30738
was either inadequately reasoned or implicit. See Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d
481, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that a district court’s
order that declines or refuses to rule on a motion to dismiss based on a
government officer’s defense of qualified immunity is an immediately
appealable order.”). Our review is de novo. Lincoln, 855 F.3d at 300–01.
When a district court’s analysis of an issue is not sufficiently reasoned
for this court to review, we may remand for further consideration. Cf. Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not
of first view.”). Accordingly, in Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494 (5th Cir.
2021), we remanded after the district court “never ruled on [the]
[d]efendants’ qualified immunity defense” at all. Id. at 500; see also Peña v.
City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018) (“But the district
court found the complaint deficient on its face and never reached QI.
Because, as a general rule, we do not consider an issue not passed upon below,
we remand for the district court to decide in the first instance whether QI
defeats Peña’s proposed amended complaint.” (quotation omitted)). We
have also remanded in cases where district courts deny qualified immunity
without following the procedures set forth in binding precedents. See, e.g.,
Zapata, 750 F.3d at 484–86 (vacating and remanding because, though it had
identified and ruled on the issue, “the district court did not follow the careful
procedure [for deciding whether to defer a qualified immunity ruling in cases
where further factual development might be necessary] set forth in”
controlling precedents).
Those precedents squarely cover this case. We will therefore vacate
and remand for further consideration. See id. To facilitate the proceedings on
remand, we briefly explain the relevant qualified immunity questions for each
defendant or group of defendants.
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No. 20-30738
We begin with EMT Fallon Stewart. The first question is (a) whether
Stewart violated a clearly established right. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (explaining qualified immunity applies “unless,” among
other things, the defendant violated a “right [that] was clearly established at
the time of the challenged conduct” (quotation omitted)); see also Crostley v.
Lamar Cnty., 717 F.3d 410, 422 (5th Cir. 2013) (Plaintiffs “must claim that
the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of the law that
was clearly established at the time of the actions complained of.” (quotation
omitted)). In considering that question, the court must (b) “frame the
constitutional question with specificity and granularity.” Morrow v.
Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874–75 (5th Cir. 2019); see also id. (explaining that
the right to be free from unreasonable seizures is too general); al-Kidd, 563
U.S. at 742 (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.” (citation omitted)). With the
question thus framed, the court should (c) inquire whether “existing
precedent . . . place[s] the statutory or constitutional question”—here,
whether Stewart violated Marlowe’s rights—“beyond debate.” Id. at 741.
And finally, the court should (d) be sure to apply the modified motion-to-
dismiss standard that governs in the context of qualified immunity. See
Jackson v. City of Hearne, 959 F.3d 194, 201 (5th Cir. 2020) (A “plaintiff must
plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a
[qualified immunity] defense with equal specificity.” (quotation omitted)).
Second is a group of defendants: Master Sergeant Angel Horn, Master
Sergeant Rolanda Palmer, Sergeant Chermaine Brown, and Sergeant
Chameka Johnson. As an initial matter, the qualified immunity analysis for
these defendants follows the same four guidelines described above as (a)–(d).
Further, (e), the inquiry should be conducted for each defendant
individually, not on a group-wide basis. See Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880
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No. 20-30738
F.3d 722, 731 (5th Cir. 2018) (“In cases where the defendants have not acted
in unison, qualified immunity claims should be addressed separately for each
individual defendant.” (quotation omitted)); Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319,
325 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2020) (“To the extent [Darden] could be read as
suggesting that collective analysis is appropriate for defendants acting in
unison, we don’t read it that way.”).
Third and finally is the group the district court termed “Supervisor
Defendants.” This group includes seven defendants. The operative
complaint names Dr. Raman Singh, Dr. Pam Hearn, and Dr. John Morrison
in their official capacities only. It names the other four Supervisor
Defendants (Dr. Preety Singh, Warden Timothy Hooper, Deputy Warden
Stephanie Michel, and Assistant Warden Morgan LeBlanc) in both their
official and personal capacities. The same guidelines (a)–(e) apply to these
defendants. In addition, (f), the court should carefully disaggregate all
personal-capacity claims from official-capacity claims, analyzing them
accordingly. See Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 394–95 (5th Cir.
2009) (explaining the distinction between personal- and official-capacity
claims and that qualified immunity applies to the former).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
VACATED. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
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