Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials, Inc. v. Gwinnett County Board of Registration and Elections

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-14540

____________________

GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF LATINO

ELECTED OFFICIALS, INC.,

as an organization,

GEORGIA COALITION FOR THE

PEOPLE'S AGENDA, INC.,

as an organization,

ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING

JUSTICE - ATLANTA, INC.,

as an organization,

NEW GEORGIA PROJECT,

as an organization,

COMMON CAUSE,

as an organization,

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

ALBERT MENDEZ,

LIMARY RUIZ TORRES,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

GWINNETT COUNTY BOARD OF

REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS,

JOHN MANGANO,

STEPHEN DAY,

BEN SATTERFIELD,

BEAUTY BALDWIN,

ALICE O'LENICK,

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER,

in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Georgia,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01587-WMR

____________________

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 3

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LAGOA, Circuit Judge, and

SCHLESINGER,* District Judge.

LAGOA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs—five organizations and two individual voters

from Gwinnett County, Georgia—allege that absentee ballot appli-

cations and voting-related information should have been, but were

not, provided in both English and Spanish to voters in Gwinnett

County during the 2020 election cycle. This appeal asks us to de-

termine whether Defendants—the Gwinnett County Board of Reg-

istrations and Elections, the Board’s individual members, and

Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger—violated § 203 and

§ 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10503, re-

quires certain States and their political subdivisions to provide vot-

ing materials in languages in addition to English. Gwinnett County

is subject to the requirements of § 203, and Plaintiffs seek relief un-

der that section for all limited-English proficient, Spanish-speaking

voters in Gwinnett County. Section 4(e), 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e), pro-

hibits States from denying individuals who were educated in

“American-flag schools” in a language other than English the right

to vote because of an inability to understand English. Plaintiffs

seek relief under § 4(e) for all limited-English proficient, Spanish-

*Honorable Harvey Schlesinger, United States Senior District Judge for the

Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

speaking voters in Gwinnett County who were educated in Puerto

Rico.

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of ju-

risdiction and for failure to state a claim, and this appeal ensued.

After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we va-

cate the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and we af-

firm its dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The individual Plaintiffs are United States citizens registered

to vote in Gwinnett County. Plaintiff Albert Mendez is a profes-

sional bass fisherman. He was born in New York City and raised

in Puerto Rico, where he attended Spanish-language schools.

Plaintiff Limary Ruiz Torres is a part-time accountant. She was

born and raised in Puerto Rico, where she attended Spanish-lan-

guage schools. Neither Mendez nor Ruiz Torres can read English.

The organizational Plaintiffs are the Georgia Association of

Latino Elected Officials, Inc. (“GALEO”), the Georgia Coalition for

the People’s Agenda, Inc., Asian Americans Advancing Justice–At-

lanta, Inc., the New Georgia Project, Inc., and Common Cause.

These organizations are engaged in “get-out-the-vote” activities

and other voter registration efforts in Gwinnett County. The indi-

vidual and organizational Plaintiffs (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 5

that Defendants violated § 203, 52 U.S.C. § 10503, and § 4(e), 52

U.S.C. § 10303(e), of the Voting Rights Act during the 2020 elec-

tion.

Defendants are the Gwinnett County Board of Registrations

and Elections and its individual members (collectively, the “Gwin-

nett County Board of Elections”), and Georgia Secretary of State

Brad Raffensperger (“Secretary Raffensperger” or the “Secretary”).

The Gwinnett County Board of Elections administers elections in

Gwinnett County, Georgia; its individual members are essentially

election superintendents and responsible for conducting such elec-

tions. Secretary Raffensperger is Georgia’s chief election official.

In this capacity, Secretary Raffensperger is charged with overseeing

and administering elections in Georgia. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.

437, prohibits various kinds of discrimination in voting. Section

4(e), which was enacted in 1965 as part of the original Voting Rights

Act, provides, in relevant part:

No person who demonstrates that he has successfully

completed the sixth primary grade in a public school

in, or a private school accredited by, . . . the Common-

wealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant

classroom language was other than English, shall be

denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local

election because of his inability to read, write, under-

stand, or interpret any matter in the English lan-

guage . . . .

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

52 U.S.C. § 10303(e)(2). Plaintiffs allege that Gwinnett County has

a substantial population of Spanish-speaking voters who were edu-

cated in Puerto Rico and who are entitled to the protections of

§ 4(e).

In 1975, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to include

§ 203. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 301, 89 Stat. 400,

402–03 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10503). Section 203(b)

provides that “no covered State or political subdivision shall pro-

vide voting materials only in the English language.” 52 U.S.C.

§ 10503(b)(1). A State or political subdivision is a “covered State or

political subdivision” if the Director of the Census determines that

certain language minority population thresholds are met and that

“the illiteracy rate of the citizens in the language minority as a

group is higher than the national illiteracy rate.” Id.

§ 10503(b)(2)(A). Finally, § 203(c) provides:

Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to

the prohibition of subsection (b) of this section pro-

vides any registration or voting notices, forms, in-

structions, assistance, or other materials or infor-

mation relating to the electoral process, including bal-

lots, it shall provide them in the language of the ap-

plicable minority group as well as in the English lan-

guage.

Id. § 10503(c).

It is undisputed that Gwinnett County is a covered political

subdivision pursuant to Section 203(b), and that whenever

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 7

Gwinnett County provides the materials or information described

in § 203, they must be in both English and Spanish. It is also undis-

puted that the State of Georgia is not a “covered State” under

§ 203(b). See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, Determina-

tions Under Section 203, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,532 (Dec. 5, 2016).

In response to the public health crisis surrounding the spread

of COVID-19 in early 2020, Secretary Raffensperger postponed

Georgia’s 2020 presidential primary election from March to May

2020. After Georgia Governor Brian Kemp issued a statewide shel-

ter-in-place order in April 2020, Secretary Raffensperger postponed

the 2020 primary election again to June 9, 2020, in order to allow

his office and the counties time to “shore up contingency plans, find

and train additional poll workers, and make other preparations.”

With the election moved to June 9 and uncertainty regarding the

spread of COVID-19, Secretary Raffensperger issued a press release

encouraging Georgia voters to cast absentee ballots instead of vot-

ing in person on election day:

Considering the health risks posed by COVID-19,

Georgians should seriously consider submitting an

absentee ballot by mail . . . . [T]he extra precautions

necessary to preserve voter and poll worker health

during the pandemic will result in long wait times and

an increased health risk that could be avoided

through absentee ballots . . . .

Under normal circumstances, absentee ballot applications

are handled by county elections officials. Due to concerns about

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

the effect of COVID-19, Secretary Raffensperger sought to facili-

tate the use of absentee ballots by using CARES Act 1 funds to mail

two rounds of absentee ballot applications to active Georgia vot-

ers—the first round of approximately 6.9 million applications was

mailed during the last week of March and a second round of ap-

proximately 323,000 applications was mailed on or about April 21.

These applications were provided only in English.

Plaintiffs’ allegations against Secretary Raffensperger are not

limited to the two mailings of English-only absentee ballot applica-

tions. Plaintiffs also allege that “[a]ll election materials provided by

the Georgia Secretary of State to Gwinnett County voters are Eng-

lish-only.” Secretary Raffensperger “issues press releases that pro-

vide critical and substantive election-related information,” and his

official website “contains other critical information for Gwinnett

County voters,” which are provided only in English. While pre-

cinct cards, which “contain critical information” like a voter’s poll-

ing place, voting districts, and change of address processes, are

mailed to each voter upon registration by the relevant county

board of registration and elections, they are also available—but

only in English—on the Secretary’s website. Further, Secretary

Raffensperger is “responsible for providing election-related

1 Inresponse to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed legislation provid-

ing emergency relief to workers, small businesses, and states. See Coronavirus

Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), Pub. L. No. 116-136,

134 Stat. 281 (2020).

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 9

training for nursing homes,” as well as “supplying election-related

instructions—including those related to absentee voting—and sup-

plies at nursing homes.” All of the instructions and supplies pro-

vided to nursing homes by the Secretary are only in English.

Unable to read English, Mendez and Ruiz Torres allege that

they mistook the Secretary’s absentee ballot applications for “junk

mail” and could not complete them.2 They also allege that they

cannot “read the English-only voter precinct card accessible via the

Georgia My Voter Page, the English-only election notices and in-

formation posted on the Georgia Secretary of State’s website, and

other English-only election materials furnished to [them] by De-

fendants.”

Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to the Gwinnett County Board

of Elections fall into two categories: (1) failure to translate into

Spanish the Secretary’s English-only materials and information,

and (2) deficiencies in the English-to-Spanish translation function

of the Board’s own website. Regarding the first category, Plaintiffs

allege that the Gwinnett County Board of Elections does not trans-

late into Spanish any of the voting materials and voting-related in-

formation provided by the Secretary to voters in Gwinnett County,

including the absentee ballot applications the Secretary mailed in

March and April 2020, the absentee ballot application forms

2 Afterthe complaint was amended to add the individual Plaintiffs, the Gwin-

nett County Board of Elections mailed them bilingual absentee ballot applica-

tions, which they were able to complete.

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

available on the Secretary’s website, the press releases issued by the

Secretary, and other “critical information” posted on the Secre-

tary’s website. Plaintiffs also allege that the Gwinnett Board of

Elections does not post in Spanish on its own website the election

information posted by the Secretary on his website.

Regarding the second category, Plaintiffs allege that, while

the Gwinnett County Board of Elections placed a bilingual absen-

tee ballot application on its own website after this case was filed on

April 13, 2020, “[t]o access that application, voters have to navi-

gate” what Plaintiffs allege is “the [Board’s] English-only website.”

Plaintiffs, however, concede that the website is not, in fact, English-

only, as they allege that a Spanish-language computer-translated

version of the website is accessible by clicking a box marked “Eng-

lish >” at the bottom right-hand corner of the webpage. Plaintiffs

allege that the website also provides a computer-generated Span-

ish-language absentee ballot application if users click a button la-

beled “In English.” But, Plaintiffs allege, that for limited-English

proficiency, Spanish-speaking voters, it “would be difficult, if not

impossible, . . . to navigate” the website, and that the English-to-

Spanish translations themselves are “riddled with errors that could

prevent Spanish-speaking voters from navigating the mail voting

process.”

Plaintiffs’ two counts seek relief against both the Secretary

and the Gwinnett Board of Elections. Count I asserts that the Sec-

retary and the Gwinnett Board of Elections violated § 203 because

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 11

the Secretary mailed two rounds of English-only absentee ballot

applications to Gwinnett County’s voters, and “neither of the De-

fendants mailed a bilingual or Spanish translated version of the ab-

sentee ballot application” to any limited-English proficient, Span-

ish-speaking voter in Gwinnett County. Count I also asserts that

Defendants violate § 203 “on an ongoing basis by disseminating

English-only press releases and all other election-related infor-

mation published on the Secretary of State’s website, English-only

voter precinct cards accessible to individuals logging on to the

Georgia My Voter Page, and English-only election-related notices,

instructions, and supplies to nursing homes, among other items.”

The asserted effect of the alleged ongoing violations of § 203 is to

“deny equal access to voting by mail” to Gwinnett County’s lim-

ited-English proficient, Spanish-speaking voters in the 2020 pri-

mary election and future elections. Count II asserts violations of

§ 4(e) based on the same conduct, although this claim is limited to

Gwinnett County voters who attended school in Puerto Rico and

are protected by § 4(e).

In addition to attorneys’ fees and costs, Plaintiffs seek declar-

atory and injunctive relief. First, Plaintiffs seek declarations that

Defendants are violating §§ 203 and 4(e) on an ongoing basis be-

cause they are providing “absentee ballot applications, press re-

leases and all other election-related information published on the

Secretary of State’s website, voter precinct cards accessible to indi-

viduals logging on to the Georgia My Voter Page, and election-re-

lated notices, instructions, and supplies to nursing homes” only in

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12 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

English to Gwinnett County voters (or those Gwinnett County

voters protected by § 4(e)). Second, Plaintiffs seek an injunction

ordering Defendants to stop “all continuing violations” of §§ 203

and 4(e), to mail bilingual absentee ballot applications to certain

Gwinnett County voters, and to provide “bilingual versions of

press releases and all other election-related information published

on the Secretary of State’s website, bilingual voter precinct cards

accessible to Gwinnett County voters logging on to the Georgia

My Voter Page, and bilingual election-related notices, instructions,

and supplies to nursing homes in Gwinnett County.”

B. Procedural Background

In response to Secretary Raffensperger’s mailing of the ini-

tial English-only absentee ballot applications, the organizational

Plaintiffs sued under §§ 203 and 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act.

They subsequently filed an amended complaint adding the individ-

ual Plaintiffs.

With the 2020 presidential primary election approaching,

Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion seeking preliminary injunctive

relief on April 20, 2020. The motion requested that the district

court “[e]njoin all continuing violations” of the Voting Rights Act

and require the mailing of “accurately translated bilingual absentee

ballot application[s] to Gwinnett County voters who were sent

English-only applications or, alternatively, to all Gwinnett County

voters who self-identified as ‘Hispanic/Latino’ when they regis-

tered to vote and all voters residing in all Gwinett County precincts

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 13

for which at least five percent of voters identified as Hispanic on

their voter registration cards.” Defendants responded that Secre-

tary Raffensperger is not subject to § 203 of the Voting Rights Act

and that the Gwinnett Board of Elections had no duty to translate

the materials sent by the Secretary’s office. Secretary Raffensper-

ger further argued that § 4(e) did not require him to provide bilin-

gual absentee ballot applications to Gwinnet County voters. The

district court denied the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs were

not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.

Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint that ex-

panded the list of challenged English-only practices and included

new factual allegations, such as Secretary Raffensperger’s sending

of additional English-only absentee ballot applications and alleging

that his office “may consider providing similar services for the pri-

mary runoff and November General Election.” In response, De-

fendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

After the district court held a hearing on the motions to dis-

miss but before it had ruled on them, Plaintiffs sought leave to file

a supplemental complaint to address two new developments.

First, Plaintiffs alleged that Secretary Raffensperger had “launched

an English-only online absentee ballot application portal—which

Gwinnett County election officials [were] encouraging voters to

use through a link on the county’s website.” Second, Plaintiffs

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14 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

alleged that the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners had

voted to reject requests to mail absentee ballot applications to all

of the county’s active registered voters for the November 2020 gen-

eral election and, instead, “encourage[d] Gwinnett County voters

to use the Georgia Secretary of State’s new English-only online ab-

sentee ballot application portal.”

On October 5, 2020, the district court granted Defendants’

motions to dismiss. In its order, the district court found that Plain-

tiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims because they did not suf-

fer an injury in fact. The district court also determined that, even

if they had suffered an injury, that injury was neither traceable to,

nor redressable by, Defendants. Additionally, the district court

found that Plaintiffs’ claims were moot because Secretary Raffen-

sperger was “not likely to take the same challenged action again,

such that it would subject Plaintiffs to the same alleged harm in the

future.”

In the alternative, the district court concluded that, even if

Plaintiffs had standing, they failed to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). In support of its conclusion, the district court explained

that: (1) the State of Georgia is not subject to § 203 of the Voting

Rights Act; (2) consequently, the Gwinnett Board of Elections had

no duty to provide bilingual translations of the voting materials

sent out by Secretary Raffensperger’s office; and (3) the Secretary’s

actions did not violate § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act by condition-

ing the right to vote on the ability to read or understand English.

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 15

Although the district court did not rule on the pending mo-

tion to supplement before issuing its order on the motions to dis-

miss, it discussed the substance of the new allegations in its order

of dismissal. And the district court found that “[n]othing in Plain-

tiffs’ Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint alter[ed] [its] con-

clusion.” The district court explained that § 203 applied based on

the covered entity providing materials, “not the possibility that vot-

ers within a covered jurisdiction may see or come across materials

coming from outside it.”

Plaintiffs timely appealed. Months later, after the parties

filed their initial briefs to this Court, Governor Kemp signed Senate

Bill 202 (Act 9) (2021) into law. The bill prohibits the Secretary of

State from sending absentee ballot applications unless requested by

the voter and, according to Plaintiffs, requires the Secretary’s office

to provide a statewide online absentee ballot application portal.

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (effective July 1, 2021).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

Parise v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 141 F.3d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1998),

and we review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, Hill v.

White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). In our de novo review,

we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe the

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16 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Parise, 141 F.3d at

1465; Hill, 321 F.3d at 1335.

In the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to standing, “we

typically confine our standing analysis to the four corners of the

complaint” but “we may look beyond it when we have before us

facts in the record.” Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 930 F.3d 1225,

1235 (11th Cir. 2019).

Finally, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Establishing plausibility re-

quires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted un-

lawfully.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in

dismissing their second amended complaint both for lack of stand-

ing under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). We address these issues in turn.

A. Jurisdiction

Article III of the Constitution limits the subject-matter juris-

diction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S.

Const. art. III, § 2. “To have a case or controversy, a litigant must

establish that he has standing.” United States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d

967, 971 (11th Cir. 2019). The “irreducible constitutional

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 17

minimum” of standing consists of (1) an injury in fact that (2) is

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is

likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). These three elements “are

not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of

the plaintiff’s case.” Id. at 561.

“Standing is determined at the time the plaintiff’s complaint

is filed,” Arcia v. Fla. Sec’ y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir.

2014), but it must persist throughout a lawsuit. If a case “no longer

presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give

meaningful relief,” the case is moot and must be dismissed. Friends

of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1216

(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla.

Dep’t of Health & Rehab Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir.

2000)).

A district court has “substantial authority. . . to weigh the

evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear [a]

case” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Morrison v. Amway

Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lawrence v.

Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). However, if a juris-

dictional challenge implicates the merits of the underlying claim,

such as here where interpretation of the Voting Rights Act will de-

termine the merits as well as whether Plaintiffs have standing,

“[t]he proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that

jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on

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18 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

the merits of the plaintiff’s case.” Id. at 925 (omission in original)

(quoting Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s, P.A., 104

F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Plaintiffs contend that each of them has standing; Defend-

ants counter that none do. We need not parse each Plaintiff’s

standing, however, because one—GALEO—has standing, under a

diversion of resources theory, to assert all of the claims in the sec-

ond amended complaint. “Because of the presence of this plaintiff,

we need not consider whether the other individual and [organiza-

tional] plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit.” See Village of

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264

n.9 (1977).

1. Injury In Fact

To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he

“suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘con-

crete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural

or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016)

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). A “concrete” injury is one that

actually exists—it is “real,” as opposed to “abstract.” Id. at 340

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009); Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 472 (1971); and Random

House Dictionary of the English Language 305 (1967)). Intangible

harms, such as those created by statute, can nevertheless be

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 19

concrete. 3 Id. at 340. The Supreme Court has “long recognized

that a person’s right to vote is ‘individual and personal in nature’”

and “‘voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves

as individuals have standing to sue’” as they have alleged a concrete

and particularized injury. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929

(2018) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) and

quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962)).

Future injuries can also be concrete. A plaintiff seeking pro-

spective relief to prevent future injuries must prove that their

threatened injuries are “certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013). In other words, “the mere risk

of future harm, standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm—

at least unless the exposure to the risk of future harm itself causes

a separate concrete harm.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct.

2190, 2210–11 (2021).

An organization can establish standing in two ways: (1)

through its members (i.e., associational standing) and (2) through

its own injury in fact that satisfies the traceability and redressability

elements. As relevant to this appeal, an organization can establish

its own injury in fact under a diversion of resources theory. See

Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1249–50 (11th Cir.

3 However, “Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does

not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement

whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize

that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341.

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20 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

2020) (analyzing both methods of establishing an injury). Under

this theory, an organization has standing “if the defendant’s illegal

acts impair its ability to engage in its projects by forcing the organ-

ization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.” Id. at

1250 (quoting Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d

1153, 1165 (11th Cir. 2008)). To establish standing under a diver-

sion of resources theory, an organizational plaintiff must explain

where it would have to “divert resources away from in order to

spend additional resources on combating” the effects of the defend-

ant’s alleged conduct. Id.; cf. Browning, 522 F.3d at 1166 (“These

resources would otherwise be spent on registration drives and elec-

tion-day education and monitoring.”); See Common Cause/Ga. v.

Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that re-

sources would be diverted “from ‘getting voters to the polls’ to

helping them obtain acceptable photo identification” (alteration

adopted)); Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691

F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir. 2012) (observing that an immigration or-

ganization “cancelled citizenship classes to focus on” increased in-

quiries about a new law).

As alleged in the second amended complaint, GALEO was

founded in 2003, is headquartered in Georgia, and is “one of the

oldest, largest, and most significant organizations promoting and

protecting the civil rights” of Georgia’s Latino community. Plain-

tiffs also allege that a “substantial amount of GALEO’s civic en-

gagement, voter registration and get out the vote work takes place

in Gwinnett County.” GALEO generally alleges that it has diverted

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 21

resources on an ongoing basis from these activities because Secre-

tary Raffensperger and the Gwinnet County Board of Elections

provide English-only election materials to limited-English profi-

cient, Spanish-speaking voters in Gwinnett County. GALEO also

specifically alleges that it “is reaching out to and educating [limited-

English proficient,] Spanish-speaking voters about how to navigate

the mail voting process and how to complete the application, as

well as other aspects of the electoral process” and that “GALEO

staff members such as Darrick Alvarez are assisting [limited-English

proficient] voters who received English-only applications such as

his parents and Nelson Romero with navigating the absentee vot-

ing process.”

At this procedural stage, we must accept GALEO’s allega-

tions as true, Tsao v. Captiva MVP Rest. Partners, LLC, 986 F.3d

1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2021), and we are satisfied that those allega-

tions sufficiently plead the injury in fact element of standing. First,

GALEO’s broad allegation of diversion of resources is enough at

the pleading stage. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,

379 (1982) (holding that an allegation in the complaint that the

plaintiff organization “has had to devote significant resources to

identify and counteract the defendant’s” illegal practices was suffi-

cient to confer standing to the organization in its own right at the

pleading stage). Second, even if those allegations were not enough,

GALEO’s more specific allegations identifying the steps it is taking

in response to Defendants’ alleged illegal activities and the person-

nel it has assigned to help limited-English proficient, Spanish-

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22 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

speaking voters who received English-only materials satisfy this el-

ement of standing. See Browning, 522 F.3d at 1165–66 (holding

that organizations “made a sufficient showing that they will suffer

a concrete injury” because they “reasonably anticipate[d] that they

will have to divert personnel and time to educating volunteers and

voters on compliance” with the challenged law). We therefore

conclude that Plaintiffs have established a concrete injury sufficient

to confer standing to challenge the Defendants’ conduct.

However, even if a plaintiff suffers an injury in fact, that does

not end the standing inquiry. We now must address whether Plain-

tiffs satisfy the traceability and redressability elements necessary for

standing to pursue their claims.

2. Traceability and Redressability

The injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action

of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of

some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61

(alterations adopted) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,

426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). Moreover, “it must be ‘likely,’ as op-

posed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by

a favorable decision’” of the court. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426

U.S. at 38, 43).

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to provide bilingual

voting materials and information to voters in Gwinnett County in

violation of §§ 203 and 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act. As discussed

above, at this stage of the case, GALEO sufficiently pleaded an

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 23

injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing—it had to divert

resources to educate limited-English proficient voters in Gwinnett

County about the English-only materials and information provided

by Defendants. That injury is sufficiently traceable to Defendants’

alleged violations of the Voting Rights Act and redressable by a fa-

vorable decision that Defendants must provide bilingual voting

materials in future elections.

The district court, however, concluded that Plaintiffs’ inju-

ries, if they existed, could not be redressed by a favorable ruling

because there “was . . . no legal obligation to provide the materials

Plaintiffs request[ed].” In reaching that conclusion, the district

court committed two errors.

First, whether Defendants have an obligation to provide cer-

tain bilingual materials to voters in Gwinnett County is the legal

question at the center of this case. And in determining that Plain-

tiffs lacked standing on that basis, the district court improperly

equated “weakness on the merits with the absence of Article III

standing.” Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting

Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 800 (2015) (quoting Davis v. United States,

564 U.S. 229, 249 n.10 (2011)). “To establish causation [for purposes

of standing], a plaintiff need only demonstrate, as a matter of fact,

‘a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the

complained of conduct of the defendant,’” Charles H. Wesley

Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005) (em-

phasis in original) (quoting Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc.,

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24 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

386 F.3d 993, 1003 (11th Cir. 2004)), and an organizational plaintiff

need only allege “a drain on an organization’s resources” that

“arises from ‘the organization’s need to “counteract” the defend-

ants’ assertedly illegal practices,’” Browning, 522 F.3d at 1166

(quoting Fair Emp. Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg.

Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Here, GALEO alleged

that the Secretary and the Gwinnett Board of Elections engaged in

illegal conduct and that their conduct—failing to provide bilingual

voting materials and information—caused GALEO to divert re-

sources. Those allegations satisfy the traceability requirement of

standing.

Second, the district court held that GALEO failed to estab-

lish standing under a diversion of resources theory based on our

decision in Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State, 974 F.3d at 1250.

In Jacobson, this Court said that the plaintiffs did not “explain[]

what activities [they] divert[ed] resources away from in order to

spend additional resources on combatting” the alleged illegal con-

duct, “as precedent requires.” Id. (emphasis omitted). The district

court here reasoned that “there is no indication that GALEO would

in fact be diverting any resources away from the core activities it

already engages in by continuing to educate and inform Latino vot-

ers.”

But the district court did not take into account the signifi-

cance of Jacobson’s procedural posture. In Jacobson, the district

court concluded that the organizational plaintiffs failed to establish

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 25

injuries based on a diversion of resources theory after holding a

bench trial during which the witnesses’ testimony did not provide

evidence about which organizational activities were impaired by

the allegedly illegal conduct. See id. at 1243, 1250. In contrast, this

case comes before us at the pleading stage, and “[a]t the pleading

stage, ‘general factual allegations of injury’ are enough.” Tsao, 986

F.3d at 1337 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). As already discussed,

GALEO’s allegations exceed the allegations considered in Havens

and, as this Court noted in Jacobson, Havens “concluded that these

allegations were sufficient to establish standing at the pleading

stage, but . . . [the Supreme Court] warned that at trial the organi-

zation would have to prove ‘that it has indeed suffered impair-

ment.’” Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1249 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at

379 & n.21). Jacobson’s affirmance that the allegations were not

proved at trial does not mean that GALEO’s allegations were in-

sufficient at the pleading stage.

We conclude therefore that GALEO had standing under a

diversion of resources theory. Although we find the Plaintiffs had

standing when the operative complaint was filed to pursue their

Voting Rights Act claims, we must now determine whether their

claims have been mooted.

3. Mootness

Mootness, like standing, is jurisdictional, as Article III’s case

and controversy requirement does not expire upon the filing of a

pleading. If a case “no longer presents a live controversy with

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26 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

respect to which the court can give meaningful relief,” the case is

moot and must be dismissed. 4 Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at

1216 (quoting Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, 225 F.3d at 1217).

Plaintiffs concede that their challenges to the Secretary’s

mailing of English-only absentee ballot applications and the Gwin-

nett County Board of Elections’ failure to translate those applica-

tions were mooted by the passage of Georgia Senate Bill 202. But

other aspects of this case remain live. “Where one of the several

issues presented becomes moot, the remaining live issues supply

the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” Powell

v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 497 (1969).

At this stage of the litigation, in which we must accept Plain-

tiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true, Plaintiffs allege that

Defendants continue to violate §§ 203 and 4(e) by “disseminating

English-only press releases and all other election-related infor-

mation published on the Secretary of State’s website, English-only

voter precinct cards accessible to individuals logging on to the

Georgia My Voter Page, and English-only election-related notices,

instructions, and supplies to nursing homes, among other items.”

4 There is an exception to the mootness doctrine, not applicable here, for cases

that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.

478, 482 (1982). The exception is limited to situations where “(1) the chal-

lenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its ces-

sation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same

complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Id. (quoting

Ill. Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187 (1979)).

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 27

And Plaintiffs’ requested relief regarding these alleged ongoing

statutory violations include an order requiring Defendants to

“[p]rovide bilingual versions of press releases and all other election-

related information published on the Secretary of State’s website,

bilingual voter precinct cards accessible to Gwinnett County voters

logging on to the Georgia My Voter Page, and bilingual election-

related notices, instructions, and supplies to nursing homes in

Gwinnett County.” These remaining claims present “a live contro-

versy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief, ”

and therefore are not moot. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330,

1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fla. Ass’n of Rehab Facilities, 225

F.3d at 1217)). Because we hold that Plaintiffs have standing to

pursue their claims and the claims are not moot, we turn to address

the merits.

B. Merits

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a com-

plaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plau-

sible when the alleged factual content “allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon-

duct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[] do not suf-

fice” to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden to support the elements of his

claim. Id.

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28 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

While the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for lack

of jurisdiction, it alternatively concluded that they failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, finding that “[e]ven if Plain-

tiffs have standing, Plaintiffs still lose on the merits.” For the rea-

sons set forth below, we agree.

1. Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act

Pursuant to § 203(b), “no covered State or political subdivi-

sion shall provide voting materials only in the English language.”

52 U.S.C. § 10503(b)(1). “A State or political subdivision is a cov-

ered State or political subdivision for the purposes of [subsection

(b)] if the Director of the Census determines” that certain language

minority population thresholds are met and “the illiteracy rate of

the citizens in the language minority as a group is higher than the

national illiteracy rate.” Id. § 10503(b)(2)(A)–(B). Section 203(b)

defines “voting materials” as “registration or voting notices, forms,

instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating

to the electoral process, including ballots.” Id. § 10503(b)(3)(A).

Section 203(b) establishes what a “covered State or political

subdivision” cannot do. It does not, however, mandate any action.

That is left to § 203(c), which provides:

Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to

the prohibition of subsection (b) of this section pro-

vides any registration or voting notices, forms, in-

structions, assistance, or other materials or infor-

mation relating to the electoral process, including

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 29

ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the

applicable minority group as well as in the English

language . . . .

52 U.S.C. § 10503(c) (emphasis added).

Sections 203(b) and 203(c) use slightly different language to

identify the entities subject to their requirements—“covered State

or political subdivision” and “any State or political subdivision sub-

ject to the prohibition of subsection (b),” respectively. Whether

Plaintiffs have a cause of action under § 203 depends on whether

those terms refer to different entities.

It is undisputed that Gwinnett County is a “covered . . . po-

litical subdivision” under § 203(b), and that the applicable “lan-

guage minority” is Spanish. 52 U.S.C. § 10503(b)(1). Thus, Gwin-

nett County cannot “provide voting materials only in the English

language.” It is also undisputed that Gwinnett County is governed

by § 203(c)’s mandate such that whenever Gwinnett County pro-

vides the materials identified in that subsection, those materials

must be in English and Spanish. Finally, it is undisputed that the

State of Georgia is not a “covered State” under § 203(b), for Spanish

or any other language minority. See 81 Fed. Reg. 87,532. Thus,

§ 203(b) does not prohibit Georgia from providing “voting materi-

als only in the English language.”

Plaintiffs assert, however, that § 203(c)’s mandate nonethe-

less applies to Georgia. Under Plaintiffs’ reading, a State is “subject

to the prohibition of subsection (b)” if it has within its borders a

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30 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

“covered . . . political subdivision” even though the State itself is

not a covered jurisdiction under § 203(b). In that circumstance,

Plaintiffs contend that a State must provide bilingual voting mate-

rials to voters in any covered political subdivision within its bor-

ders, in this case Gwinnett County. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that

the State of Georgia must provide bilingual voting materials to vot-

ers in Gwinnett County.

In support of their reading of § 203(c), Plaintiffs argue that

Congress could have used the “covered State or political subdivi-

sions” language from subsection (b) if it had intended for subsec-

tion (c) to cover the same entities. Plaintiffs also note that “subject

to” is defined as “affected by or possibly affected by (something).”

Subject to, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-web-

ster.com/dictionary/subject%20to. Plaintiffs claim that the phrase

“subject to,” combined with the drafters’ failure to use the identical

language found in § 203(b), makes it clear that the statute requires

noncovered States to provide bilingual election materials to voters

in a covered political subdivision. According to Plaintiffs, the

meaning is “so plain that this Court has already assumed” in Del-

gado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1988) “that the statute ap-

plies in these particular circumstances.”

In Delgado, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of

an injunction seeking to enjoin Florida state officials from conduct-

ing an election of a citizen initiative to amend the Florida state con-

stitution. Opponents of the petition contended that the proposed

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 31

amendment was improperly on the ballot because the English-only

petition circulated by its proponents failed to include a bilingual

translation in § 203-covered political subdivisions. Id. at 1491. Be-

cause we held that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to citizen

initiative petitions and that the involvement of state officials in the

initiative process did not constitute state action, id. at 1490–91, we

did not address whether § 203 requires a noncovered State to pro-

vide bilingual election materials to voters in a covered political sub-

division.

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the following language in

the introductory paragraph of Delgado supports their position:

“[t]he controlling provision of the Voting Rights Act requires a

state which distributes ‘materials or information relating to the

electoral process’ to certain bilingual political subdivisions to pro-

vide them ‘in the language of the applicable language minority

group as well as in the English language.’” Id. at 1490 (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1981)). We disagree. This language in Del-

gado regarding the scope of § 203’s mandate is dicta. Dicta are de-

fined as “those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to de-

ciding the case then before us.” See Fresh Results, LLC v. ASF Hol-

land, B.V., 921 F.3d 1043, 1049 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting United

States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017)).

“Although our holdings are precedential, our dicta are not.” Id.

“The holding of a case comprises both ‘the result of the case and

those portions of the opinion necessary to that result.’ But the

‘holding’ of a prior decision can reach only as far as the facts and

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32 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

circumstances presented to the Court in the case which produced

that decision.” Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d at 1244 (citations

omitted). The prefatory statement in Delgado that Plaintiffs rely

on was not necessary to our holding that the Voting Rights Act did

not apply to the facts and circumstances presented in that case. It

is dicta, and we are not bound by it. See id.; see also McNely v.

Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e

are not required to follow dicta contained in our own precedents”).

We thus turn to the issue before us—an issue which this

Court has not previously addressed—whether Sections 203(b) and

203(c) of the Voting Rights Act apply to different entities. Our role

in this endeavor is to give the statute a “fair reading.” See Antonin

Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 3 (2012) (“In an age when

democratically prescribed texts (such as statutes. . . ) are the rule,

the judge’s principal function is to give those texts their fair mean-

ing.”); see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134,

1143 (2018) (“Even if Congress did not foresee all of the applica-

tions of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text

a fair reading.”).

We start, as always, with the language of the statute itself.

United States v. Forey-Quintero, 626 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir.

2010) (“Because this is solely a matter of statutory interpretation,

we must start with the language of the statute itself.”). “If the stat-

ute’s meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for fur-

ther inquiry.” United States v. One 1990 Beechcraft, 1900 C Twin

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 33

Engine Turbo-Prop Aircraft, 619 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 797–98 (11th

Cir.2006)).

“When examining the plain and ordinary meaning of a stat-

ute, ‘one of the ways to figure out that meaning is by looking at

dictionaries in existence around the time of enactment.’” United

States v. Chinchilla, 987 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting

EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1026 (11th Cir.

2016)). Moreover, “[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the stat-

ute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at is-

sue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”

K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); see also

Scalia & Garner, supra at 167 (“Perhaps no interpretive fault is

more common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon

which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in

view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its

many parts.”). “Under the whole-text canon, courts should ‘con-

sider the entire text [of a statute], in view of its structure and of the

physical and logical relation of its many parts,’ when interpreting

any particular part of the text.” In re Cumbess, 960 F.3d 1325,

1333–34 (11th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Regions

Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019)).

The plain and ordinary language of the statute, read in light

of this well-accepted canon, leads us to conclude that § 203 cannot

be read in the way suggested by Plaintiffs. Turning first to

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34 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

dictionaries in existence around the time of § 203’s enactment,

“subject to” means: “[i]n a state of subjection or dependence; under

the control, rule, or influence of something; subordinate . . . to the

power, law, command, etc. of another”5; “[u]nder the power or au-

thority of another”6; and “[l]iable, subordinate, subservient, infe-

rior, obedient to; governed or affected by.” 7

With these definitions in mind, a State that is “subject to the

prohibition of” § 203(b) is one that is “subordinate to” the prohibi-

tion, “under the power or authority” of the prohibition, and “gov-

erned or affected” by the prohibition—in other words, a State that

itself must directly comply with § 203(b)’s prohibition. Plaintiffs’

reading that the State of Georgia is “affected by” § 203(b) because

it has within its borders a county that must comply with § 203(b)’s

prohibition fails to take into account this sense: “subject to” means

that the State itself must be under or governed by the statute’s com-

mand because it meets the statutory criteria established by Con-

gress in § 203(b). While the drafters used slightly different language

in subsections (b) and (c), the language refers to the same entities.

That is, the only entities “subject to the prohibition” of § 203(b) are

the “covered” States or political subdivisions themselves, and

therefore only those entities must comply with the mandate of

5 Subject, Oxford English Dictionary (1st ed. 1933) (reprinted in 1978).

6 Subject, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1976).

7 Subject To, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) and (5th ed. 1979).

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 35

§ 203(c). It is undisputed that the State of Georgia is not a “covered

State” for purposes of § 203(b). As a result, Plaintiffs cannot state a

cause of action against the Secretary under § 203.

Although the plain and unambiguous meaning of the lan-

guage used by Congress answers the question, we note that the

statutory structure, when considered as a whole, further militates

against Plaintiffs’ reading. Section 203(c) mandates that voting ma-

terials be provided “in the language of the applicable minority

group as well as in the English language.” But § 203(c) does not

itself indicate what that additional language is. Instead, that is left

to § 203(b), which provides a language-specific formula to deter-

mine whether a jurisdiction is “covered” based on specific popula-

tion and literacy criteria. Section 203(b)’s formula is necessary for

determining the existence of “a single language minority,” which,

in turn, is necessary for determining the “language of the applicable

minority group” under § 203(c). 52 U.S.C. § 10503(b)–(c) (emphasis

added). Indeed, § 203(c) expressly refers back to “subsection (b) of

this section,” providing a further clue to the reader that the States,

political subdivisions, and language of the applicable minority

groups referred to in § 203(c) are the same “covered” jurisdictions

and “single language” minority groups outlined in § 203(b). Simply

put, § 203(c), either expressly or by natural implication, repeatedly

refers the reader back to § 203(b), further confirming our conclu-

sion that Subsections (b) and (c) can only plausibly be read together

to apply to the same entities.

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36 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

If Plaintiffs’ reading were correct, Congress’ express limita-

tion of § 203(b)’s prohibition to “covered” jurisdictions would be

meaningless, or at least something very different from what the

statute’s plain language provides. Under § 203(b), the prohibition

on providing English-only materials applies only to States or polit-

ical subdivisions that meet the statutory formula’s criteria. If a

State or political subdivision does not meet those criteria, Congress

has imposed no limitation under § 203(b) on that entity’s ability to

provide voting materials only in English. But under Plaintiffs’ read-

ing of § 203(c), there is now some in-between status: a State that

does not meet § 203(b)’s statutory criteria but nevertheless is pro-

hibited from providing “voting materials only in the English lan-

guage” in some parts of its territory. That reading cannot be

squared with the statutory text of § 203(b) and provides further

confirmation that Plaintiffs’ reading of § 203(c) as sweeping in ju-

risdictions on a broader basis than § 203(b) is incorrect.

Plaintiffs cite the United States Attorney General’s interpre-

tations of § 203 in support of their reading of the statute, noting

that the Supreme Court has said that the Attorney General’s “in-

terpretation of the Voting Rights Act is entitled to considerable def-

erence.” See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462,

468 (1987). Specifically, Plaintiffs cite 28 C.F.R. § 55.9, which pro-

vides that “[w]here a political subdivision (e.g., a county) is deter-

mined to be subject to . . . section 203(c), all political units that hold

elections within that political subdivision (e.g., cities, school

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 37

districts) are subject to the same requirements.” 8 This regulatory

interpretation cannot, however, be construed as reading the statute

in the way Plaintiffs propose. It merely says that when a covered

political subdivision itself contains smaller political units, such as

cities and school districts, those smaller political units must also

provide bilingual voting materials if they hold elections. That is,

the greater includes the lesser. But Plaintiffs ask us to assume that

because the greater includes the lesser, the lesser—here, Gwinnett

County—includes the greater—the State of Georgia. Neither the

statute nor the Attorney General’s interpretation support this con-

clusion.

Applying the facts of this case to § 203, only Gwinnett

County is prohibited, under § 203(b), from providing materials

“only in the English language,” and only Gwinnett County is re-

quired, under § 203(c), to provide bilingual voting materials in Eng-

lish and Spanish. Section 203(c) does not apply to the State of Geor-

gia unless and until it becomes a “covered” jurisdiction pursuant to

the formula set forth in § 203(b). Further, § 203(c) only applies to

Gwinnett County when it “provides” voting materials, i.e., when

8 Plaintiffs

also cite 28 C.F.R. § 55.19(a), which provides that “[a] jurisdiction

required to provide minority language materials is only required to publish in

the language of the applicable language minority group materials distributed

to or provided for the use of the electorate generally.” That regulation, how-

ever, merely identifies what materials must be distributed in the relevant lan-

guage; it does not address what entity is subject to § 203(c).

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38 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

it furnishes or supplies 9 the materials. Nothing in the statute re-

quires Gwinnett County to translate voting materials provided by

another entity. See 52 U.S.C. § 10503(c). Thus, Secretary Raffen-

sperger does not violate § 203 by maintaining English-only voting

materials and information on his website because the State of Geor-

gia is not a “covered” jurisdiction under § 203(b). And the Gwin-

nett County Board of Elections does not violate § 203 by failing to

translate voting materials and other information provided by the

Secretary of State.

In addition to their allegations regarding voting materials

provided by Secretary Raffensperger, Plaintiffs also allege that the

Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ website provides inadequate

access to a bilingual absentee ballot application. While Plaintiffs

concede that the Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ website al-

lows users to translate the application into Spanish, they allege that

accessing the translation function is not obvious and that the trans-

lations themselves are not accurate enough.

As a preliminary matter, it is unclear from the pleadings

whether these allegations form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claim under

§ 203. The Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ website is not it-

self referenced in Count I. The allegations in Count I that relate to

9Provide, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1976) (“To

furnish; supply.”); Provide, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) (“To sup-

ply.”); Provide, Oxford English Dictionary (1st ed. 1933) (reprinted in 1978)

(“To supply or furnish for use; to yield, afford.”).

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 39

absentee ballot applications refer only to the two rounds of appli-

cations mailed by Secretary Raffensperger, the alleged ongoing vi-

olations of § 203 refer only to voting materials and information pro-

vided by the Secretary, and Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief does not refer

to the Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ website. 10

Nonetheless, assuming that some part of Plaintiffs’ claim un-

der § 203 relates to the alleged deficiencies in the Gwinnett County

Board of Elections website’s Spanish translation of the absentee

ballot application, Plaintiffs fail to plead facts to support their con-

clusions. That Spanish-speaking voters have to click a button to

translate the webpage from English to Spanish does not render the

website “only in the English language.” See 52 U.S.C.

§ 10503(b)(1). We take judicial notice that the website offers Gwin-

nett County voters fifteen languages other than English in which

to view its website, including Spanish. See Gwinnett Elections,

https://www.gwinnettcounty.com/web/gwinnett/Depart-

ments/Elections (last visited May 10, 2022). The “English >” but-

ton, which is a commonly used indicator of a website translation

option, clearly represents the language in which the webpage ap-

pears upon initially visiting the page and invites the viewer to see

what other languages are available.

10The same is true for Count II, Plaintiffs’ claim asserting a violation of § 4(e),

and Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief as it relates to § 4(e).

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40 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

In summary, because the State of Georgia is not a covered

jurisdiction under § 203(b), Secretary Raffensperger is not required

to provide bilingual voting materials under § 203(c). While § 203(c)

requires Gwinnett County to provide its voting materials in both

English and Spanish, it does not require Gwinnett County to trans-

late voting materials provided by the Secretary. And Plaintiffs

failed to plead facts to support its conclusory allegations that the

Gwinnett County Board of Elections provides English-only voting

materials, specifically absentee ballot applications, on its website.

For these reasons, the district court correctly concluded that Plain-

tiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

2. Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act

Section 4(e) was enacted as part of the Voting Rights Act in

1965. In § 4(e)(1), Congress invoked its enforcement power under

§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion, and declared that in order to secure the rights of “persons

11

educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant class-

room language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit

the States from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on

ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the

English language.” 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e)(1). Section 4(e)(2), in turn,

sets forth that prohibition:

11 “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,

the provisions of this article.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5.

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 41

No person who demonstrates that he has successfully

completed the sixth primary grade in a public school

in, or a private school accredited by . . . the Common-

wealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant

classroom language was other than English, shall be

denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local

election because of his inability to read, write, under-

stand, or interpret any matter in the English lan-

guage . . . .

Id. § 10303(e)(2).

The district court determined that Plaintiffs’ § 4(e) claim

failed on the merits as to Gwinnett County because: (i) Gwinnett

County consistently provided all voting materials in Spanish and

was under no duty to translate the voting materials provided by a

noncovered jurisdiction, here, the State of Georgia, (ii) “Gwinnett

County provided Plaintiffs with absentee-ballot applications in bi-

lingual form after the Secretary's distribution,” and (iii) “Plaintiffs

have been unable to establish that Gwinnett County is otherwise

preventing its voters from voting in person on Spanish ballots in

any future elections.” The district court determined that Plaintiffs’

§ 4(e) claim failed on the merits as to the Secretary because Secre-

tary Raffensperger’s actions “d[id] not amount to ‘conditioning the

right to vote’ on being able to read or understand English.”

Like § 203, § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act has not been con-

strued by this Court or the Supreme Court in a case involving fac-

tual allegations similar to the allegations present here. We start, as

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42 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

we must, with the statutory text. The relevant text at issue in this

case states that no person described in § 4(e)(2) “shall be denied the

right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his

inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the

English language.” 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e)(2) (emphasis added). Un-

like § 203, the text of § 4(e) contains an express causation require-

ment. “The words ‘because of’ mean ‘by reason of: on account

of.’” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (quot-

ing 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966))

(interpreting the words “but for” in 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). “Thus,

the ordinary meaning of” § 4(e)(2)’s prohibition on depriving a per-

son protected by that statute of his right to vote “because of” his

inability to read, write, or understand English “is that [such inabil-

ity] was the ‘reason’” he was denied the right to vote. See id. “It

follows, then” that under § 4(e)(2) “the plaintiff retains the burden

of persuasion to establish that” inability to read, write, understand,

or interpret English “was the ‘but-for’ cause of the” State’s denial

of his right to vote. See id. at 177.

At the outset, and for the reasons discussed in our consider-

ation of standing, see supra, Section III.A., the allegations relating

to the Secretary’s mailings of English-only absentee ballot applica-

tions, and the Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ failure to trans-

late them into Spanish, are moot. We therefore consider whether

the allegations of ongoing violations of § 4(e) sufficiently establish

a cause of action under the statute.

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 43

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violate § 4(e) on an ongoing

basis by disseminating: “English-only press releases and all other

election-related information published on the Secretary of State’s

website, English-only voter precinct cards accessible to individuals

logging on to the Georgia My Voter Page, and the English-only

election-related notices, instructions, and supplies to nursing

homes, among other items” provided by the Secretary of State.

Plaintiffs further allege that these activities violate § 4(e) because

the right to vote under § 4(e) “encompasses the right to an effective

vote” and that this “requires that jurisdictions provide instructions,

ballots, and ‘any other material which forms part of this official

communication to registered voters prior to an election’ in [the]

Spanish language.”

As Plaintiffs point out, courts have described the right to

vote under § 4(e) as encompassing “the right to an effective vote,”

i.e., “the right to cast effective votes for the candidate of [the

voter’s] choice.” See, e.g., Puerto Rican Org. for Pol. Action v.

Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 1973) (quoting United States v.

Post, 297 F. Supp. 46, 51 (W.D. La. 1969)). In Kusper, the Seventh

Circuit affirmed a district court’s preliminary injunction ordering

local elections commissioners “to print Spanish translations of di-

rections for using voting machines to be pasted over English in-

structions on specimen ballots,” to put up Spanish-language posters

advising about the availability of assistance, and to provide Spanish-

language instruction cards for model voting machines in certain

polling places located within precincts in eleven wards. Id. at 576–

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44 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

77, 580. In addition, the elections commissioners were ordered to

“make all reasonable efforts” to recruit and place bilingual elections

judges at those same polling places. Id. at 577. The district court

ordered relief under § 4(e) after finding that protected voters in

those polling places did “not understand enough English to be able

to vote effectively unless they ha[d] written instructions or verbal

assistance in Spanish.” Id. at 576. In affirming the injunction, the

Seventh Circuit looked at district court decisions considering what

the right to vote under § 4(e) entailed. Id. at 579. Analogizing it to

the situation of an illiterate voter, the court noted that it was im-

plausible that such voter has the right to “pull the lever of a voting

machine, but not the right to know for whom he pulls the lever.”

Id. at 579 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 265 F. Supp. 703, 708

(E.D. La. 1966)), aff’d sub nom. Louisiana v. United States, 386 U.S.

270 (1967)). Thus, by analogy, under § 4(e), “a Spanish-speaking

Puerto Rican is entitled to assistance in the language he can read or

understand.” Id. at 580.

This case does not require us to delineate the boundaries of

permissible and impermissible conduct under § 4(e). For while the

right to vote protected by § 4(e) involves not only the mechanics

of casting one’s ballot but also the ability to understand what is on

the ballot, that does not mean that § 4(e) requires all voting-related

materials or information to be provided in both English and Span-

ish, nor does it relieve a party from pleading the causation element

required by § 4(e)’s text.

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 45

Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Secretary provides press re-

leases and all other voting-related information on his website, as

well as voter precinct cards on the Georgia My Voter Page, only in

English. At the same time, however, Plaintiffs allege that the

Gwinnett County Board of Elections mailed the individual Plain-

tiffs bilingual absentee ballot applications, which they were able to

complete, that the Gwinnett County Board of Elections provides a

bilingual absentee ballot application on its website, that the website

itself has an English-to-Spanish translation function, and that

county boards of registration and elections separately provide vot-

ers with precinct cards when they register to vote. Additionally,

Plaintiffs allege that the “Defendants have provided bilingual ab-

sentee ballots to Gwinnett County voters for the June 9, 2020 pri-

mary election.” Read together, Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to the

Secretary’s website and voter precinct cards are insufficient to

plead that, but for the Secretary’s English-only materials and infor-

mation, a Gwinnett County voter protected by § 4(e) was or will

be denied the ability to vote.

Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding nursing homes located in

Gwinnett County are a closer call. Plaintiffs allege that the Secre-

tary is responsible for providing nursing homes with certain elec-

tion-related training and materials, and that the “election-related

notices, instructions, and supplies . . . among other items” provided

by the Secretary are only in English. There are no allegations re-

garding what, if any, voting materials (e.g., registration materials,

absentee ballot applications) the Gwinnett County Board of

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46 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

Elections provides to residents in those nursing homes. But even

assuming that some of the residents of those nursing homes are

protected by § 4(e), Plaintiffs’ allegations suffer from the same de-

ficiency as their allegations relating to the quality of the English-to-

Spanish translation function of the Gwinnett County Board of Elec-

tions’ website. We have no way of knowing what the “notices,

instructions, and supplies”—much less the “other items”—referred

to in Plaintiffs’ pleading consist of in order to determine whether

they are the kinds of materials that, because they are in English

only, could plausibly be the reason a voter protected by § 4(e) was

or will be unable to cast his vote. In contrast, we do know from

Plaintiffs’ allegations that materials unquestionably necessary to

vote—absentee ballots—were provided in both English and Span-

ish to all of Gwinnett County’s voters. And there is no allegation

that a voter protected by § 4(e) was or will be unable to cast his

absentee ballot because of the English-only materials provided to

his nursing home. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the materials

provided by the Secretary to nursing homes in Gwinnett County

are simply too general and conclusory to allege a violation of § 4(e).

See Gill, 941 F.3d at 515.

In summary, there are no allegations that Gwinnett County

voters protected by § 4(e) were or plausibly will be unable to vote

because of or on account of the Secretary’s English-only infor-

mation posted on his website and the English-only precinct cards

available on the Georgia My Voter Page. Additionally, Plaintiffs

failed to plead facts to support their general allegations regarding

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 47

election-related items provided by the Secretary to nursing homes

in Gwinnett County. For these reasons, the district court correctly

concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under § 4(e).

C. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Com-

plaint.

The decision whether to grant a motion for leave to file sup-

plemental pleadings is generally within the discretion of the district

court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). We review a district court’s denial

of a motion for leave only for abuse of discretion, Schwarz v. City

of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1211 (11th Cir. 2008), but we re-

view de novo whether a supplemental pleading would be futile, see

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007). A supple-

mental pleading is futile “when the claim, as amended, would still

be subject to dismissal.” Boyd v. Warden, Holman Corr. Facility,

856 F.3d 853, 864 (11th Cir. 2017).

Before the district court ruled on Defendants’ motions to

dismiss, Plaintiffs sought leave to file a supplemental complaint

with additional factual allegations relating to two developments:

(1) Secretary Raffensperger had unveiled a new, English-only ab-

sentee ballot application portal, which the Gwinnett County Board

of Elections was encouraging voters to use through a link on its

website, and (2) the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners re-

jected a proposal, which had been supported by the Gwinnett

County Board of Elections, to mail bilingual absentee ballot appli-

cations to active voters in Gwinnett County. Together, Plaintiffs

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48 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

asserted, that these developments constituted further violations of

§§ 203 and 4(e). In its order granting the motions to dismiss, the

district court concluded that “[n]othing in Plaintiffs’ Motion to File

a Supplemental Complaint alter[ed]” its conclusions.

We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discre-

tion in denying the motion for leave to file a supplemental com-

plaint. For the reasons previously discussed, the Secretary is not

subject to the requirements of § 203, and § 203 does not require the

Gwinnett County Board of Elections to translate into Spanish vot-

ing-related materials provided by the Secretary.

Turning to § 4(e), there is no question that using the Secre-

tary’s portal to file an absentee ballot application may be more con-

venient for many voters, and Plaintiffs also allege that the portal

provides a voter with a printed confirmation that his application

was filed. But that is not enough to state a cause of action for vio-

lation of § 4(e). This supplemental allegation does not demonstrate

that the additional resources provided on the Secretary’s website

amount to effectively conditioning the right to vote on the ability

to read and understand English. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ proposed

supplemental complaint does not deny that the Gwinnett County

Board of Elections provides a bilingual absentee ballot application

on its own website and that the website also has an English-to-

Spanish translation function. Because those allegations would re-

main part of Plaintiffs’ pleadings even if the motion for leave had

been granted, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege that certain

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20-14540 Opinion of the Court 49

voters were denied the right to vote based on their inability to read

and understand English. And, as already discussed above, even as-

suming that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the website’s deficien-

cies form part of their claim under § 4(e), those allegations are in-

sufficient to support a cause of action. Thus, Plaintiffs have not

pleaded the causation required by § 4(e) between the Secretary’s

English-only absentee ballot application portal and the denial of the

right to vote.

Finally, neither § 203 nor § 4(e) require the Gwinnett

County Board of Commissioners or the Gwinnett County Board of

Elections to provide absentee ballot applications, or any particular

voting material for that matter, only that those voting materials

that are provided comply with the statutory mandates. Signifi-

cantly, the proposed supplemental complaint does not allege that

the Gwinnett County Board of Elections (or Board of Commission-

ers) mailed English-only absentee ballot applications. Absent any

statutory mandate that the Gwinnett Board of Elections mail bilin-

gual ballot applications, there is no claim under either § 203 or

§ 4(e) for its failure to do so.

Because the additional allegations in Plaintiffs’ proposed

supplemental complaint would not have stated causes of action un-

der either § 203 or § 4(e), the amendment would have been futile.

The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in failing to

grant Plaintiffs leave to file.

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50 Opinion of the Court 20-14540

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the district court erred in

concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing—GALEO sufficiently

pleaded standing under a diversion of resources theory, and while

some of Plaintiffs’ claims were moot, others remained live and

amenable to meaningful relief from the court. We therefore vacate

the district court’s dismissal of the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

The district court was correct, however, in concluding that Plain-

tiffs failed to state causes of action under either § 203 or § 4(e) of

the Voting Rights Act and in not granting Plaintiffs leave to file

their proposed supplemental complaint. We therefore affirm the

district court’s dismissal of the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and

its denial of leave for Plaintiffs to file the supplemental complaint

pursuant to Rule 15(d).

VACATED in part, AFFIRMED in part.