City of Fort Worth, Texas v. Abdul Pridgen and Vance Keyes

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 20-0700

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City of Fort Worth, Texas,

Petitioner,

v.

Abdul Pridgen and Vance Keyes,

Respondents

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On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas

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Argued February 1, 2022

JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Devine, Justice Busby, Justice Bland,

Justice Huddle, and Justice Young joined, and in which Justice

Blacklock joined except as to Part III(A).

JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion.

JUSTICE BOYD filed a dissenting opinion.

This case concerns the proper interpretation of a “good faith

report[] [of] a violation of law” under the Texas Whistleblower Act. The

plaintiffs, two veteran law enforcement officers with the Fort Worth

Police Department, contend that they were unlawfully disciplined for

making such a report regarding another officer’s conduct. They sued the

City pursuant to the Act, which provides for a limited waiver of

sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the City’s motion for

summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the

Act waived the City’s immunity. We hold that, as a matter of law, the

officers did not make a qualifying “report” under the Act. We therefore

reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment for the City.

I. Background

Abdul Pridgen and Vance Keyes were veteran law enforcement

officers employed by the Fort Worth Police Department. Pridgen served

as Assistant Chief, Keyes as Deputy Chief. Both supervised the

Department’s Internal Affairs and Special Investigations Units. The

Internal Affairs Unit is responsible for investigating allegations that

police officers have violated general orders or other internal Department

rules or policies. The Special Investigations Unit investigates

allegations of criminal misconduct involving City employees, including

police officers. Keyes reported directly to Pridgen, who in turn reported

to Chief of Police Joel Fitzgerald.

On December 21, 2016, Jacqueline Craig called the police to

report that her neighbor choked her seven-year-old son because he left

trash in the neighbor’s yard. Officer William Martin responded to the

call. When he arrived at the scene, Martin questioned the neighbor and

then approached Craig. After Craig explained the incident, Martin

asked, “Why don’t you teach your son not to litter?” Craig stated that

even if her son had littered, her neighbor did not have a right to touch

him. Martin responded, “Why not?” Craig exclaimed that Martin should

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not tell her how to parent her children. Martin stated, “If you keep

yelling at me, you’re going to piss me off [and] I’m going to take you to

jail.” As Craig yelled back, her teenage daughter stepped between Craig

and Martin. Martin shoved Craig’s daughter away, drew a taser, and

pressed it against Craig’s back, forcing her to the ground. While

handcuffing Craig, he pointed the taser at her daughter and told her to

get on the ground. When Craig’s daughter proceeded to sit, Martin

grabbed the back of her neck and pushed her down. He drew her arms

behind her back, handcuffed her, and then forcefully lifted her to her

feet. As Martin walked Craig and her daughter to his patrol car, Craig’s

older daughter, Brea Hymond, who had been filming the incident,

followed behind him. Once Craig and her younger daughter were inside

the vehicle, Martin turned around and grabbed Hymond’s arm. He

shoved her against the patrol car and, after a struggle, wrested the

phone from her grasp. He went on to handcuff her, arrest her, and place

her in a second patrol car.

The video was streamed to Facebook Live and went viral. It

received substantial negative media attention. Shortly thereafter, the

matter was referred to the Internal Affairs Unit, prompting Pridgen and

Keyes to begin their investigation. On December 25, 2016, Martin was

served with an initial personnel complaint notifying him that he was

under investigation for charges including excessive force, unlawful

arrest, and discourtesy. On December 28, Pridgen instructed Captain

Deven Pitt and Lieutenant Neil Noakes to serve Martin with an

additional personnel complaint for violation of the Bias-Free Policing

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General Order. 1 Internal Affairs conducted pre-disciplinary hearings on

January 7 and 9, 2017.

Pridgen and Keyes reviewed Martin’s body camera video, the

Facebook Live video, and Martin’s arrest affidavit and determined that

Martin violated the law and should be terminated. They concluded that

Martin used excessive force when he torqued Brea Hymond’s arms while

she was handcuffed, lied in his arrest affidavit when he asserted that

Hymond pushed him from behind, and illegally arrested Craig and her

daughters. Both Pridgen and Keyes assert that they conveyed these

conclusions to Chief Fitzgerald on multiple occasions prior to Martin’s

receiving discipline. Keyes claims that he communicated these

conclusions once over the phone, once while he was in the Chief’s office,

and once when Pridgen, Keyes, and the Chief were all in Pridgen’s office.

Pridgen avers he told Chief Fitzgerald about their conclusions over the

phone and during an Internal Affairs meeting that took place the first

week of January. Specifically, Pridgen states that at the meeting, Chief

Fitzgerald went around the table asking the team what they thought

Martin’s discipline should be. When the Chief got to Pridgen, Pridgen

said, “you don’t want to know my opinion.” Chief Fitzgerald responded,

“no, I do want to know your opinion.” Pridgen then stated that Martin

should be terminated because he “made a false arrest, he lied in his

1 General Order 347.03, Bias-Free Policing, requires all Fort Worth

Police Department officers to “provide[] police services to the community in a

nonpartisan, fair, equitable, and objective manner without consideration of

race, color . . . or other individual characteristics or distinctions.”

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affidavit and used excessive force.” Chief Fitzgerald replied, “you’re

right, I don’t want to know what you’re thinking.”

Though Chief Fitzgerald agreed that Martin used excessive force,

he and several other members of the Internal Affairs Unit disagreed

with Pridgen and Keyes about their other conclusions and did not think

Martin should be terminated. On January 9, 2017, Chief Fitzgerald

suspended Martin for ten days.

On January 26, Martin’s previously undisclosed body camera

video and other confidential files were released and posted on

“theroot.com” and on the Facebook page of Jacqueline Craig’s attorney,

Lee Merritt. Chief Fitzgerald immediately initiated an investigation

into the source of the leak. He later testified that from the beginning,

he suspected Pridgen was involved. And though the Chief initially

directed Keyes to help identify the leak’s source, within a day he notified

Keyes that Valerie Washington, the assistant city manager, wanted

Keyes and Pridgen removed from the leak investigation. 2 Keyes emailed

Chief Fitzgerald and Washington asking why he was removed but

received no response.

The remaining Internal Affairs officers concluded that five

individuals, including Pridgen, had special authorization to access the

body camera video and other leaked materials. Upon further

investigation, they discovered that Pridgen had downloaded the files to

a thumb drive on January 18. Video footage showed that Keyes was in

2 Washington denies this. In her deposition testimony, she stated that

Chief Fitzgerald was the one who wanted Pridgen and Keyes removed from the

leak investigation.

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Pridgen’s office at the time of the download. In early February, a

forensic examiner with the Department concluded that the files Pridgen

downloaded were identical to those posted online.

Pridgen acknowledges downloading the files, claiming that he

intended to share the information with Chief Fitzgerald. He also

concedes that he cannot produce the thumb drive. Keyes likewise

admits that he was in Pridgen’s office on January 18. However, both

deny that they leaked the files to Merritt, and in his deposition, Merritt

denied receiving the files from anyone in the Department.

Keyes and Pridgen were served with personnel complaints on

February 14 and February 20, respectively, notifying them that they

were under investigation for participating in the leak. In March, they

were placed on detached duty, which required them to remain at their

residences for eight hours a day. On May 19, Pridgen and Keyes were

demoted to Captain. And on May 22, Keyes was suspended for three

days without pay.

In November 2017, Pridgen and Keyes each sued the City

pursuant to the Whistleblower Act, alleging that the City took adverse

action against them in response to their “good faith reports” of

“violation[s] of law.” TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 554.001–.002. Specifically,

they alleged that Chief Fitzgerald unlawfully removed them from their

positions due to their “reports of Officer Martin’s violations of law.”

They sought past and future damages, reinstatement of their previously

held positions, restoration of seniority rights and fringe benefits, and

attorney’s fees. The City filed an answer and general denial in both

suits. It also raised several affirmative defenses, including that it

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“would have taken the action against [the plaintiffs] . . . based solely on

information, observation, or evidence that is not related to the fact that

Plaintiff[s] allegedly made” the protected report, and that Pridgen and

Keyes lacked a good-faith belief that they were reporting a violation of

law.

Pridgen and Keyes (hereinafter collectively referred to as

Respondents) filed a motion to consolidate their suits, which the trial

court granted. The City filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for

summary judgment, arguing that Respondents failed to allege

jurisdictional facts necessary to show a waiver of sovereign immunity

and asking the trial court to render judgment as a matter of law in the

City’s favor. The City argued that Respondents did not “in good faith

report[] a violation of law,” as the Whistleblower Act requires, because

(1) they merely conveyed “their opinions” regarding the Department’s

internal policies and the consequences they believed Martin should have

faced, and (2) they lacked a subjectively and objectively reasonable belief

that Martin violated the law. The City also opined that Respondents

failed to produce evidence showing they were fired because of their

“report[s],” as opposed to the leak of confidential documents.

In their response to the City’s motion, Respondents argued that

(1) a question of fact exists regarding whether they reported violations

of law in good faith, (2) evidence demonstrates that the City’s

disciplinary actions were linked to their reports, and (3) a question of

fact exists regarding the City’s affirmative defense that it had

independent grounds to discipline them.

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The trial court denied the City’s motion, and the court of appeals

affirmed. ___ S.W.3d ___, 2020 WL 3286753, at *4–9 (Tex. App.—Dallas

June 18, 2020). The court of appeals held that Respondents “report[ed]”

a violation of law to Chief Fitzgerald, as required by the Act. Id. at *4–

5. In doing so, the court rejected the City’s arguments that Respondents

failed to make a protected “report” because Chief Fitzgerald (1) already

knew about Martin’s conduct from another source, (2) had already

viewed the Facebook Live video, which was public knowledge, and

(3) had already ordered an investigation of the incident. Id. The court

likewise rejected the City’s argument that Respondents offered only

“opinions about discipline and the consequences of Martin’s conduct,”

which “are simply not the types of ‘reports’ the [Act] protects.” Id.

The court of appeals also held that Respondents satisfied the Act’s

“good faith” requirement because they provided evidence that they

possessed an objectively reasonable belief that Martin’s conduct violated

the law. Id. at *5–6. Finally, relying on the causation factors we

articulated in City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Tex.

2000), the court held that Respondents “offered evidence from which a

jury could conclude that their protected activity . . . at least partially

motivated [Chief] Fitzgerald to demote them, and that Fitzgerald would

have reached a different decision in the absence of their protected

activity.” 2020 WL 3286753, at *8.

The City petitioned this Court for review, arguing that it is

entitled to judgment on multiple independent grounds, including:

(1) Respondents did not “report” under the Act because they did not

“disclos[e] . . . information”; (2) the court of appeals erred in relying only

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on evidence of Respondents’ subjective beliefs about the criminal nature

of Martin’s conduct in determining whether their beliefs were

objectively reasonable; and (3) Respondents’ evidence was legally

insufficient to establish that their discipline resulted from Chief

Fitzgerald’s unlawful motivation. We granted the City’s petition.

II. Standard of Review

Governmental entities are typically immune from suit unless the

state consents through an express legislative enactment. Rosenberg

Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Tex.

2019). The Texas Whistleblower Act provides a limited waiver of that

immunity. Specifically, Section 554.0035 provides that “[a] public

employee who alleges a violation of [the Act] may sue the employing

state or local governmental entity,” and “[s]overeign immunity is waived

and abolished to the extent of liability for the relief allowed under [the

Act] for a violation of [the Act].” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.0035.

Accordingly, the elements of a whistleblower claim are jurisdictional

facts necessary for “determining whether the [plaintiff’s] claim falls

within the jurisdictional confines of section 554.0035.” State v. Lueck,

290 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Tex. 2009).

Here, the City challenges the existence of these jurisdictional

facts through a motion for summary judgment. We review such

challenges de novo, considering “the facts alleged by the plaintiff and to

the extent relevant, evidence submitted by the parties.” Tex. Dep’t of

Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 223 (Tex. 2004) (citing

Tex. Nat. Res. & Conservation Comm’n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868

(Tex. 2001)). Where the facts underlying the merits and jurisdiction are

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intertwined, the plaintiff must produce evidence “creat[ing] a fact

question regarding the jurisdictional issue.” Id. at 227–28. At this stage

of litigation, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant

and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the

nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 225. Accordingly, here, we must evaluate

whether Respondents raised a genuine issue of material fact as to each

element of their whistleblower claims under Section 554.002(a) of the

Act. See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 882; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34

S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).

III. Analysis

Section 554.002(a) of the Texas Whistleblower Act provides:

A state or local governmental entity may not suspend or

terminate the employment of, or take other adverse

personnel action against, a public employee who in good

faith reports a violation of law by the employing

governmental entity or another public employee to an

appropriate law enforcement authority.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002(a). The employee bears the burden of

proving this claim. Id. § 554.004(a). 3 Thus, in a Whistleblower Act suit

by a public employee against his governmental-entity employer, the

employee must show that he (1) reported (2) a violation of law by the

employer or another public employee (3) to an appropriate law

3 If a governmental employer takes adverse action “not later than the

90th day after the date on which the employee reports a violation of law,” there

is a rebuttable presumption that the action was taken in response to the

employee’s report. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.004(a). Because the relevant

adverse actions here occurred approximately five months after Respondents

allegedly made their reports, the presumption does not apply.

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enforcement authority, (4) the report was made in good faith, and (5) the

adverse action would not have occurred when it did if the employee had

not reported the illegal conduct. Id. § 554.002(a); Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at

67 (discussing the required causal link between the report and the

adverse employment action).

A. Qualifying “Report” under the Whistleblower Act

The City primarily argues that Respondents did not make a

qualifying “report” under the Act. First, it asserts that “report[ing]”

entails “provid[ing] information” as opposed to mere opinions or

conclusions. Second, it claims that to “report,” one must “disclose” facts

previously unknown to the report’s recipient. It argues that because

Respondents conveyed conclusions to Chief Fitzgerald based on facts he

already knew, they were merely repeating, not “reporting.” Finally, the

City argues that to make a protected report, whistleblowers must be

“illuminat[ing] some governmental misdeeds” and not “simply doing

their jobs.” In the City’s view, Respondents were executing their

assigned task of investigating Martin’s conduct, not blowing the whistle.

Respondents urge us to reject these restrictions, which they

believe are nowhere to be found in the Act’s text. Additionally, they

claim that even if we adopt the City’s “disclosure” rule, their “report”

that Officer Martin committed perjury would comply. In their view, this

conclusion was “new” because they were the only ones to convey it to

Chief Fitzgerald. Similarly, they contend that they were the only

officers who insisted that the Department pursue criminal charges

against Officer Martin.

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As discussed below, we agree with the City that to “report[]”

under the Act, an employee must convey information, not just

conclusions, and we agree that Respondents largely failed to satisfy this

requirement. We disagree, however, that the Act contains an atextual

“disclosure” requirement. We also disagree that public employees forfeit

the Act’s protection if they report as part of their job duties.

We begin by examining the statute’s language. When construing

statutes, we endeavor to “determine and give effect to the Legislature’s

intent.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex.

2002) (citations omitted). We must enforce the Act “as written” and

“refrain from rewriting the text that lawmakers chose.” Jaster v. Comet

II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Entergy Gulf

States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009)). Additionally,

while we must necessarily construe key terms, we do so in the context

of the statute as a whole, not in isolation. Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d

675, 680 (Tex. 2018).

We first consider the word “report.” Because the Act does not

define the term, we interpret it according to its common, ordinary

meaning unless the statute’s language indicates otherwise. Tex. State

Bd. of Examiners of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n,

511 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017) (citation omitted). When determining a

statutory term’s common, ordinary meaning, we typically consult

dictionaries. Epps. v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 866 (Tex. 2011). Common

dictionary definitions of “report” slightly vary, and, unsurprisingly, the

parties each argue that the definition most favorable to their position

controls.

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Respondents point to Merriam-Webster’s “to give an account of”

and Cambridge Dictionary’s “to give a description of something or

information about it to someone.” See Report, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/report; see also Report,

Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/report.

The City, however, cites another Merriam-Webster definition: “to make

known to the proper authorities.” See Report, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/report. We decline to

arbitrarily choose between these definitions but believe they are helpful

in “establish[ing] outer boundaries of what [report] could (or could not)

mean.” Philip A. Rubin, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use

Dictionaries in Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167,

191 (2010) (“[D]ictionaries . . . should be used only to say what a word

could mean, not what it must mean—they can only establish outer

boundaries.”). The common thread throughout these definitions is

provision of information, as opposed to mere opinions or suppositions.

Therefore, we agree with the City that, to “report” under the Act,

employees must convey facts. Communicating unsupported opinions or

legal conclusions is insufficient.

Respondents urge us to refrain from reading any further

restriction into the Act, pointing to opinions from the courts of appeals

suggesting that “report” should be construed broadly in light of the Act’s

failure to otherwise constrain the term. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Assistive

& Rehabilitative Servs. v. Howard, 182 S.W.3d 393, 400–01 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2005, pet. denied) (holding that no specific phrasing is required

to make a qualifying “report” under the Act); Montie v. Bastrop County,

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No. 03-16-00123-CV, 2016 WL 6156232, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin

Oct. 19, 2016, pet. denied) (holding that “reports” need not be in writing).

Regardless of whether these cases are correct, they pertain only to the

form a report may take, not its substance. And in interpreting statutes,

we look not only to the statutory language, but also to the objective the

Legislature sought to attain and the consequences of a particular

construction. Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tex.

2020); In re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518, 526 n.48 (Tex. 2018) (citing

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.023). Indeed, “we consider the context and

framework of the entire statute and meld its words into a cohesive

reflection of legislative intent.” Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex.

Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 326 (Tex. 2017).

Therefore, we must consider the context in which “report” appears

within Section 554.002 and our own precedent.

In Neighborhood Centers, Inc. v. Walker, we explained that the

Whistleblower Act was adopted “amidst a growing sense throughout the

country that ‘mismanagement in the public sector’” was a mounting

public concern, and that “employees who disclose mismanagement

deserve legal protection.” 544 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. 2018) (citation

omitted). In light of this history, we concluded that the Act is aimed at

“ferreting out government mismanagement to protect the public.” Id. at

748. Accordingly, the Act is not intended to protect all reports; it is

intended to protect those that further this purpose. 4 Therefore, to

4Both the concurrence and the dissent assert that our interpretation

goes beyond the Act’s text. See post at 3 (Blacklock, J., concurring); post at 2

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properly “report” under the Act, a public employee must convey

information that exposes or corroborates a violation of law or otherwise

provide relevant, additional information that will help identify or

investigate illegal conduct. 5

In so construing the Act, we reject the City’s additional proposed

constraints on the Act’s “report” requirement. First, the City urges us

to adopt the Thirteenth Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the Act and

define “report” as “[a] disclosure of information . . . tending to directly or

circumstantially prove the substance of a violation of criminal or civil

law.” Castaneda v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 831 S.W.2d 501, 503–04 (Tex.

(Boyd, J., dissenting). However, by purporting to stick to the Act’s plain

language, they each reach different conclusions. This is because words are

meant to be read in context. See, e.g., In re Academy, Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 25

(Tex. 2021) (“We consider statutes as a whole, reading the chosen words ‘in

their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’”

(citation omitted)). Our interpretation adheres to the Legislature’s intent

precisely because it considers the statute as a contextual whole.

5 While not directly relevant to the disposition of this case, we note for

clarity that the “good faith” limitation modifies all the Act’s components,

including the report requirement. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002(a). We have

interpreted “good faith” under the Act to have subjective and objective

components. Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996) (holding

that to properly report a “violation of law,” an employee must personally

believe the conduct reported was a violation of law, and the employee’s belief

must have been reasonable in light of his training and experience). Applying

the good-faith restriction to the report requirement as we have construed it,

we hold that an employee “reports” “in good faith” when (1) the employee

believes the reported information will facilitate identifying or investigating a

violation of law by the employing governmental entity or another public

employee, and (2) the employee’s belief is reasonable in light of the employee’s

training and experience. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314,

321 (Tex. 2002) (“[W]hen feasible, we should consistently interpret terms used

throughout a statute.”).

15

App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (emphasis added), superseded

by statute on other grounds, TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002. “Disclosure,”

the City says, entails provision of novel information. Accordingly, in the

City’s view, the Act requires that employees possess a good-faith belief

that they conveyed previously unknown information to the relevant

authority. Redundant reports, even if made by separate employees,

would not count.

As discussed, there is no question that “disclosing” new

information regarding illegal conduct may qualify as “report[ing] a

violation of law.” However, we disagree that this is the only type of

communication the Act protects. First, the word “disclosure” is

conspicuously absent from the Act’s text. It likewise does not appear in

most dictionary definitions of “report.” This is particularly notable in

light of the numerous other whistleblower statutes that explicitly

employ the word “disclosure,” including the federal Act. 6 Our precedent

dictates that just as “every word of a statute must be presumed to have

been used for a purpose[,] . . . every word excluded from a statute must

6See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-531 to 38-534 (2021); ARK. CODE ANN.

§§ 21-1-601 to 21-1-610 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-101 to 24-50.5-107

(2021); CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 4-61dd (2021); D.C. CODE §§ 1-615.51 to 1-615.59

(2021); FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (2021); GA. CODE ANN. 45-1-4 (2021); IDAHO

CODE §§ 6-2101 to 6-2109 (2021); IOWA CODE § 70A.28 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 75-2973 (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102 (2021); MD. CODE ANN., State

Pers. & Pens. §§ 5-301 to 5-314 (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 185 (2021);

MINN. STAT. §§ 181.931–.937 (2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.055 (2021); NEB.

REV. STAT. § 81-2705 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (2021); N.Y. PUB. AUTH.

LAW § 2986 (2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 840-2.5 (2021); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 659A.199–659A.236 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.40.010–42.40.910

(2021); WIS. STAT. §§ 230.80–.89 (2021) Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,

Pub. L. No. 101–12, 103 Stat. 21. (2021).

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also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.” City of

Richardson v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 539 S.W.3d 252, 260 (Tex. 2018)

(citation omitted). Accordingly, we decline to read a limitation into the

statute that the Legislature chose to omit.

Additionally, the City’s interpretation precludes protection for

corroborative reports, which may be equally helpful in “ferreting out

government mismanagement to protect the public.” Walker, 544 S.W.3d

at 748. Indeed, the City’s argument presumes that once officials receive

an initial report of illegal conduct, further, consistent reports add no

benefit. But corroboration is eminently valuable when evaluating the

reliability of an informant’s tip. This is a maxim of federal Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.

257, 271 (1960) (“Corroboration through other sources of information

reduce[s] the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale.”), overruled on

other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). It is also

common sense. Three consistent accounts of misconduct from three

different sources represent far more compelling evidence of wrongdoing

than a single report. However, the City’s “disclosure” requirement

would disincentivize employees from sharing information after an initial

report has been made. In fact, even if employees possessed additional

evidence, threat of adverse action may chill them from sharing it.

Accordingly, the City’s disclosure requirement would obstruct the

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Legislature’s goal of addressing misconduct through incentivizing

verifiable reports. We reject it. 7

Finally, the City argues that employees do not “report[] a

violation of law” under the Act when they convey information “as part of

their jobs.” The City warns that holding otherwise would create “a de

facto class of whistleblowers who are protected simply because they do

their job.” We similarly reject this interpretation.

Like the “disclosure” limitation, this restriction does not appear

in the Act’s text. Moreover, the Act’s structure and purpose cut against

such a limitation. As mentioned, the Act is intended to help “ferret[] out

government mismanagement to protect the public.” Walker, 544 S.W.3d

at 748. And the Act protects only “[p]ublic employee[s]” who are “paid

to perform services for a state or local governmental entity.” TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 554.001(4). Indeed, the public employees best equipped to

expose, corroborate, or otherwise provide relevant information

regarding government illegality are those tasked with investigating

misconduct allegations. Moreover, these employees often need the Act’s

protections most, since they may be required to make unpopular reports.

7 That is not to say, however, that employees qualify for the Act’s

protection merely by repeating stale information or undisputed facts. An

employee must in good faith believe the information provided will assist in

identifying or investigating a violation of law. Once the governmental

authority has conclusively identified, verified, and addressed a prior report of

illegality, further reports are unlikely to facilitate these objectives unless they

convey new, relevant information. Along the same lines, a report will not fall

within the Act’s ambit when it merely repeats facts derived from a credible or

self-verifying source that is public or broadly available to law enforcement (like

a video or police report).

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Additionally, though we have never explicitly stated that the Act

covers such reports, we have implied as much. In University of Texas

Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas v. Gentilello, we emphasized

that we were not holding that a report “can never be made internally.”

398 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2013). To illustrate this point, we provided

the following example:

A police department employee could retain the protections

of the Whistleblower Act if she reported that her partner is

dealing narcotics to her supervisor in the narcotics or

internal affairs division. In such a situation, the employee

works for an entity with authority to investigate violations

of drug laws committed by the citizenry at large.

Id. Accordingly, we found that the fact that employees might discover a

violation of law in the course of their professional duties presented no

obstacle to seeking the Act’s protection. Id. Our opinion in Texas

Department of Human Services v. Okoli, 440 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. 2014),

further supports this point. Okoli followed job-specific training in

reporting a supervisor’s allegedly fraudulent activity. Id. at 612–13.

Though we held that the agency was immune, we noted that Okoli would

have qualified for the Act’s protection, even though he reported

internally, if he had conveyed information to an official with outward-

looking law enforcement authority. Id. at 616–17.

B. Application

We now turn to whether Respondents raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether they made a qualifying report under the Act.

We hold that they did not.

Respondents each communicated with Chief Fitzgerald

throughout Martin’s investigation. Though they characterize their

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communications in slightly different ways in their testimony, their

briefing provides this summary: “Pridgen and Keyes repeatedly

reported to Fitzgerald that Martin had committed crimes of assault,

perjury and official oppression and that criminal charges should be

pursued.”

First, we conclude that these “reports” were not geared toward

exposing, corroborating, or otherwise providing information pertinent to

identifying or investigating governmental illegality. Respondents did

not supply Chief Fitzgerald with new information about Martin’s

conduct. Rather, Chief Fitzgerald learned about the incident

independently through then-Deputy Chief Ramirez. And the record

shows that Pridgen, Keyes, and Chief Fitzgerald all had access to the

same sources: Martin’s body camera video, the Facebook Live video, and

Martin’s arrest affidavit. Indeed, Chief Fitzgerald, city officials, and

news media discussed the Facebook Live video at a press conference two

days after the incident. Additionally, Respondents did not corroborate

facts that were unverified or subject to dispute. Two videos depict the

Craig arrest from multiple perspectives—the Facebook Live video,

which was public, and the body camera video, which was available to all

members of the Internal Affairs team, including Chief Fitzgerald. And

Martin’s affidavit, an official law-enforcement record, was similarly

available to all parties and reviewed in the course of the investigation.

Nor could Respondents have reasonably believed that they were

exposing, corroborating, or otherwise providing new or corroborative

information about Martin’s conduct. They knew that Chief Fitzgerald

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was aware of the incident and knew he had access to the same sources

of information depicting it.

Second, Respondents’ testimony demonstrates an objective not to

unearth or prove unlawful conduct, but to persuade Chief Fitzgerald to

classify Martin’s known actions as criminal conduct and to terminate his

employment. To that end, Respondents’ communications with Chief

Fitzgerald consisted principally of recommendations about the

appropriate legal conclusions to be drawn from Martin’s actions. 8 For

instance, Pridgen claims he told Chief Fitzgerald that “Martin lied in

his Affidavit, he made a false arrest, and [he] used excessive force.”

Similarly, Keyes states he told Chief Fitzgerald that “Brea Hymond had

been falsely arrested,” “excessive force had occurred,” and “Officer

Martin had filed a false affidavit.” Such statements do not provide

relevant information about Martin’s actions. Rather, they amount to

opinions and conclusions, which the Act does not protect. Other

descriptions of Respondents’ communications with Chief Fitzgerald

pertain to Martin’s punishment. But the Act does not protect

recommendations about appropriate internal discipline; it protects

reports of illegal conduct. Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 786

(Tex. 1996). Accordingly, Respondents’ reports did not aim to expose,

corroborate, or otherwise provide information pertinent to identifying or

investigating governmental illegality. They merely voiced opinions and

8To the extent they went beyond recommendations and contained

information, they still do not qualify as “reports” for the reasons explained

above.

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encouraged Chief Fitzgerald to assign Martin’s actions a particular legal

designation. As such, they do not fall within the Act’s purview.

Respondents argue that at the very least, their statements that

Officer Martin perjured himself constitute qualifying reports because

they were the first to bring Officer Martin’s false affidavit to Chief

Fitzgerald’s attention. The City disputes this assertion, and

Respondents did not testify to that effect in their depositions or

declarations. Even if true, however, the record shows that at most

Pridgen and Keyes voiced an opinion to Chief Fitzgerald about broadly

known (indeed, public) and easily verifiable information. Accordingly,

there were no facts for Respondents to expose or corroborate. Chief

Fitzgerald had all the information needed to confirm whether Officer

Martin lied, and he knew about the allegation. Since “reporting” under

the Act requires, at a minimum, provision of information regarding

illegal conduct, this type of communication does not suffice. 9

Indeed, as Respondents appear to concede, the purpose of their

communications with Chief Fitzgerald was not to help identify or

investigate Martin’s allegedly illegal conduct. Rather, they were voicing

opinions about how Chief Fitzgerald should classify and punish such

behavior. And while providing these recommendations may have fallen

within Respondents’ job responsibilities, such opinions and conclusions

do not trigger the Act’s protections. Accordingly, we cannot conclude

9 Additionally, it is irrelevant that Respondents were the only ones to

recommend that the Department pursue criminal charges against Officer

Martin. Suggesting potential punishment does not equate to “report[ing] a

violation of law.”

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that Respondents “in good faith report[ed] a violation of law,” and

therefore the Act does not apply. 10

In sum, we hold that Respondents failed to raise a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether they “report[e]d a violation of law” under

the Whistleblower Act. Therefore, the Act does not waive the City’s

immunity from suit, and we need not address the City’s additional issues

regarding the Act’s good-faith and causation requirements.

IV. Conclusion

Respondents failed to present evidence that they “report[ed] a

violation of law” under the Whistleblower Act. Therefore, the City

retains immunity from suit. We accordingly reverse the court of appeals’

judgment and render judgment for the City.

Debra H. Lehrmann

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 27, 2022

10 We emphasize that we pass no judgment on Respondents’ decisions

to convey their recommendations to Chief Fitzgerald. That they failed to meet

the Act’s narrow requirements for whistleblower protection does not mean they

acted in “bad faith” as that term is commonly understood. As we explained in

Hart, an employee’s subjective motivations for “report[ing]” are irrelevant for

purposes of the Act. 917 S.W.2d at 785–86. An employee motivated by malice

toward another individual could qualify for the Act’s protection if he reasonably

believed the individual violated the law and the report would assist in ferreting

out illegality. Id. At the same time, an employee with the noblest intentions

may forfeit the Act’s protections by failing to make a qualifying report to the

proper authority. We merely conclude that Respondents’ communications are

not the type the Act protects.

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