Google LLC v. Ipa Technologies Inc.

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 1 Filed: 05/19/2022

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

GOOGLE LLC,

Appellant

v.

IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC.,

Appellee

______________________

2021-1179, 2021-1180, 2021-1185

______________________

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2019-

00728, IPR2019-00730, IPR2019-00731.

______________________

Decided: May 19, 2022

______________________

NAVEEN MODI, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, DC,

argued for appellant. Also represented by ARVIND JAIRAM,

STEPHEN BLAKE KINNAIRD, JOSEPH PALYS, DANIEL

ZEILBERGER; MICHAEL C. HENDERSHOT, Jones Day, Palo

Alto, CA.

STEVEN WAYNE HARTSELL, Skiermont Derby LLP, Dal-

las, TX, argued for appellee. Also represented by JAIME

OLIN, PAUL SKIERMONT, SARAH ELIZABETH SPIRES; MIEKE

K. MALMBERG, Los Angeles, CA.

______________________

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 2 Filed: 05/19/2022

2 GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC.

Before DYK, SCHALL, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

Dyk, Circuit Judge.

Google LLC (“Google”) appeals three inter partes re-

view (“IPR”) decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

(“Board”) concluding that Google had not shown the chal-

lenged claims in U.S. Patent Nos. 6,851,115 (“the ’115 pa-

tent”) and 7,069,560 (“the ’560 patent”) to be unpatentable.

Because the Board failed to resolve fundamental testimo-

nial conflicts in concluding that the relied-upon reference

was not prior art, we vacate the decisions and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

The ’115 and ’560 patents relate to a “software-based

architecture . . . for supporting cooperative task completion

by flexible, dynamic configurations of autonomous elec-

tronic agents.” J.A. 95; see also J.A. 131. In particular, the

patents disclose that “[c]ommunications and cooperation

between agents are brokered by one or more facilitators”

and that “[t]he facilitators employ strategic reasoning for

generating a goal satisfaction plan to fulfill arbitrarily com-

plex goals by users and service requesting agents.” J.A. 95.

Both patents list David L. Martin and Adam J. Cheyer as

inventors. Claim 22 of the ’560 patent, which is representa-

tive for purposes of the discussion in this opinion, requires,

among other things, a “facilitator agent” that performs var-

ious functions. ’560 patent, col. 31, l. 61–col. 32, l. 16.

The patent applications resulting in the ’115 and

’560 patents were filed on January 5, 1999, and March 17,

1999 respectively. The underlying technology, known as

the Open Agent Architecture (“OAA”), was conceived at

SRI International (“SRI”) in the 1990s. Martin, Cheyer,

(both SRI employees) and a third SRI employee, Dr. Doug-

las B. Moran, had earlier co-authored an academic paper

entitled “Building Distributed Software Systems with the

Open Agent Architecture” (“the Martin reference”) that

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 3 Filed: 05/19/2022

GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC. 3

was published in the Proceedings of the Third Interna-

tional Conference on the Practical Application of Intelli-

gent Agents and Multi-Agent Technology, which took place

March 23–25, 1998. The Martin reference describes the

OAA project developed at SRI and, significantly for present

purposes, at least some of the technology embodied in the

claims of the ’115 and ’560 patents.

During the prosecution of the ’115 patent, various

claims were rejected based on the Martin reference, which

the examiner identified as being prior art. In response, SRI

contested the prior art status of the reference by submit-

ting inventor declarations by Martin and Cheyer under 37

C.F.R. § 1.132, asserting that Dr. Moran was “not a co-in-

ventor of the subject matter described in the subject matter

disclosed and claimed in the instant application[s].”

J.A. 11172–75. If Dr. Moran was not a co-inventor of the

Martin reference, the Martin reference was not prior art

because it was made by the same inventive entity as the

’115 and ’560 patents and not “by others.” 35 U.S.C.

§ 102(a) (pre-AIA). 1 After receiving the declarations, the

examiner withdrew the rejections based on the Martin ref-

erence and continued examining the applications. The pa-

tents were granted and ultimately assigned to appellee IPA

Technologies, Inc. (“IPA”).

In February 2019, Google petitioned the Board for inter

partes review of various claims of the ’115 and ’560 patents,

relying primarily on the Martin reference to argue that the

claims would have been obvious. Google contended that

the Martin reference was prior art as work “by others” be-

cause it described the work of an inventive entity (Martin,

Cheyer and Dr. Moran) different from the inventive entity

of the challenged patents (Martin and Cheyer). The Board

1 Because the patents at issue were filed before

March 16, 2013, pre-AIA provisions apply. 35 U.S.C. § 100

(note).

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 4 Filed: 05/19/2022

4 GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC.

instituted review but concluded after the trial proceedings

that Google “ha[d] not provided sufficient support to ex-

plain how Dr. Moran’s contribution [wa]s sufficient to es-

tablish he [wa]s an inventive entity with respect to the

Martin reference by a preponderance of the evidence” and

that Google thus failed to “establish[] that Martin was

prior art under § 102(a) to the ’560 Patent.” J.A. 26. 2 Be-

cause each of Google’s grounds in its petition relied on the

Martin reference, the Board concluded that Google did not

establish that any of the challenged claims was unpatent-

able. Google appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

I

We review the Board’s legal determination de novo and

any underlying factual findings for substantial evidence.

Duncan Parking Techs., Inc. v. IPS Grp., Inc., 914 F.3d

1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “[W]hether a reference is a

work of others for the purposes of § 102(a) is, like that of

inventorship, a question of law based on underlying facts.”

Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 969 (Fed. Cir.

2014) (citing Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d

1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

Joint inventors need “not physically work together or

at the same time, . . . make the same type or amount of con-

tribution, or . . . make a contribution to the subject matter

of every claim of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 116(a). A joint

inventor must simply:

2 Because Google’s arguments regarding the prior

art status of the Martin reference were the same across the

three IPR proceedings and that is the sole issue on appeal,

unless otherwise noted, we cite only the materials corre-

sponding to IPR2019-728 challenging the ’560 patent.

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 5 Filed: 05/19/2022

GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC. 5

(1) contribute in some significant manner to the

conception or reduction to practice of the invention,

(2) make a contribution to the claimed invention

that is not insignificant in quality, when that con-

tribution is measured against the dimension of the

full invention, and (3) do more than merely explain

to the real inventors well-known concepts and/or

the current state of the art.

In re VerHoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting

Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

Accordingly, “to decide whether a reference patent is ‘by

another’ . . . , the Board must”:

(1) determine what portions of the reference patent

were relied on as prior art to anticipate the claim

limitations at issue, (2) evaluate the degree to

which those portions were conceived ‘by another,’

and (3) decide whether that other person’s contri-

bution is significant enough, when measured

against the full anticipating disclosure, to render

him a joint inventor of the applied portions of the

reference patent.

Duncan Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358 (quoting pre-AIA

35 U.S.C. § 102(e)).

Google argues that the Board improperly imposed a

burden on Google to prove that the Martin reference has a

different inventive entity than the challenged patents. In

response, IPA argues that the Board correctly placed the

burden on Google to show what Dr. Moran contributed to

the Martin reference.

The term “burden of proof” has been used to describe

two distinct concepts: the burden of persuasion and the

burden of production. The burden of persuasion is “the ul-

timate burden assigned to a party who must prove some-

thing to a specified degree of certainty.” Tech. Licensing

Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir.

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 6 Filed: 05/19/2022

6 GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC.

2008). In an IPR, “the burden of persuasion is on the peti-

tioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the

evidence,’ and that burden never shifts to the patentee.”

Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d

1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)). In

contrast, the burden of production, or “going forward with

evidence,” is a shifting one, “the allocation of which de-

pends on where in the process of trial the issue arises.” Id.

at 1379 (quoting Tech. Licensing, 545 F.3d at 1327). The

burden of production may be met either by “producing ad-

ditional evidence” or by “presenting persuasive argument

based on new evidence or evidence already of record.” Tech.

Licensing, 545 F.3d at 1327.

With respect to the burden of production, the record

contains evidence and arguments from Google and IPA in

support of their respective positions on the prior art status

of the Martin reference. Google, as the petitioner, had the

ultimate burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability by

a preponderance of the evidence and this burden never

shifted. We see no error with the Board’s requiring that

Google establish the Martin reference was prior art “by an-

other” by showing that Dr. Moran made a significant

enough contribution to the portions relied on to invalidate

the challenged patents to qualify as a joint inventor of

those portions. We next address whether Google satisfied

its burden.

II

Dr. Moran was the most senior computer scientist on

the OAA team, worked on the OAA team for five years, au-

thored five papers relating to OAA, and was named as a

joint inventor on U.S. Patent No. 6,859,931 (“the ’931 pa-

tent”), which is a continuation-in-part of the application

that resulted in the ’115 patent. The ’931 patent claims

appear to be directed at the same computer architecture as

the ’115 and ’560 patents with an additional “bridge agent”

capable of communicating with and incorporating other

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 7 Filed: 05/19/2022

GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC. 7

distributed component systems. E.g., ’931 patent, col. 33,

l. 4–col. 34, l. 10. Although Dr. Moran did “little program-

ming for OAA after 1995” due to a nerve injury, he claims

that he “conducted code reviews and design sessions” on

top of his primary responsibility for “presentations, demon-

stration scenarios, funding proposals and research publica-

tions.” J.A. 3665. According to Cheyer, Dr. Moran “helped

solve specific problems, mostly at the application level” in

the OAA project. J.A. 8790. The Board found that Dr. Mo-

ran contributed “supporting foundational concepts” to the

OAA project. J.A. 17. It is evident that Dr. Moran made

general technical contributions to the OAA project. But

that is not the relevant inquiry. To be a joint inventor of

the Martin reference, as recognized in Duncan Parking, he

must have made an inventive contribution to the portions

of the reference relied on and relevant to establishing obvi-

ousness. See 914 F.3d at 1358. 3

Here, Google claims that the description in the Martin

reference of using a facilitator is, in part, grounds for find-

ing that the Martin reference rendered the claims obvious,

and that Dr. Moran made an inventive contribution to the

facilitator concept recited in the Martin reference. Specifi-

cally, Dr. Moran claimed to “play[] a significant role regard-

ing the distributed agent-based approach, and in particular

using a facilitator, as described in the [Martin reference] at

3 The portions of the reference being considered

must be relied upon and relevant to establishing obvious-

ness. Otherwise, a party challenging a patent could artifi-

cially alter the inventive entity for comparison by citing

extraneous portions of a multi-inventor prior art reference,

thereby making it “by others” even if the portions of the

reference necessary for establishing obviousness had the

same inventive entity as the challenged patent.

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 8 Filed: 05/19/2022

8 GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC.

Section 4 and 4.1–4.5.” J.A. 3692. 4 Section 4.5 of the Mar-

tin reference states:

Facilitation plays a central role in OAA. At its core,

our notion of facilitation is similar to that proposed

by Genesereth [] and others. In short, a facilitator

maintains a knowledge base that records the capa-

bilities of a collection of agents, and uses that

knowledge to assist requesters and providers of

services in making contact. But our notion of facil-

itation is also considerably stronger in three re-

spects.

J.A. 3954 (internal citation omitted). The reference then

identifies three ways in which its facilitator differs from

the prior art: “transparent delegation,” “handling of com-

pound goals” via delegation, optimization, and interpreta-

tion, and using “strategies and advice given by the

requesting agent.” J.A. 3954–55. These concepts found

4 Dr. Moran also claimed to “play[] a significant role

in the approach of using recursion to decompose base goals

into subgoals that were then dispatched to agents, e.g., as

described in the [Martin reference] at Sections 2.5 and 4.1–

4.2.” J.A. 3692. For our purposes, it is unnecessary to ad-

dress this claim because a joint inventor need not contrib-

ute to every aspect of a prior art reference, but rather need

only make a “contribution [] significant enough, when

measured against the full anticipating disclosure, to render

him a joint inventor of the applied portions of the [prior art]

reference.” Duncan Parking, 914 F.3d at 1358. If, on re-

mand, joint inventorship is not found as to the relied-on

portions of the Martin reference for the facilitator claim

limitation, the Board may have to address the recursion

portions of the reference, including Dr. Moran’s role in

those portions and what bearing those portions have on the

challenged patent claims.

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 9 Filed: 05/19/2022

GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC. 9

their way into the specification of the ’560 patent. See ’560

patent, col. 19, ll. 14–62.

When asked about Dr. Moran’s contributions to OAA,

Cheyer acknowledged Dr. Moran’s assistance with tech-

nical problems “at the application level” but stated that Dr.

Moran did not “influenc[e] core OAA architecture or struc-

ture.” J.A. 8790–91. Cheyer describes Dr. Moran’s state-

ments about “having multiple facilitator architectures and

a recursive structure” as a “mischaracterization of his role”

because those concepts “clearly existed before he ever be-

came involved with the project,” dating back to “the very

first OAA paper.” J.A. 8819–22.

Martin testified that he and Cheyer were responsible

for the technical details in the Martin reference, and that

Dr. Moran’s role on OAA was “administrative.” J.A. 8889.

When presented with other articles relating to technical as-

pects of OAA listing Dr. Moran as an author, Martin

acknowledged that Dr. Moran “may have made contribu-

tions to the technological development of either interfaces

for use with OAA, agents used with OAA, or systems based

on OAA” but with the caveat that these were topics that

were “not necessarily part of OAA per se.” J.A. 8907.

The testimony of Dr. Moran, if credited, might well es-

tablish that he was a co-inventor of the particular portions

of the Martin reference relied on by Google in, and relevant

to, the challenge to particular claims. However, the Board

did not complete the full Duncan analysis. Instead, it ap-

pears to have concluded that Dr. Moran’s testimony was

insufficiently corroborated, “agree[ing] with Patent Owner

that Dr. Moran’s [claimed contributions to the Martin ref-

erence were] . . . not supported by additional evidence at

trial,” and that the “record lack[ed] sufficient supporting

evidence to establish the contributions of Dr. Moran and

Messrs. Cheyer and Martin, beyond the Rule 1.132 decla-

rations.” J.A. 22–23.

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 10 Filed: 05/19/2022

10 GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC.

Both parties appear to agree that the Board held Dr.

Moran’s testimony was insufficiently corroborated. Con-

trary to the Board’s decision, the record reveals more than

adequate corroboration of Dr. Moran’s testimony. While

the majority of corroboration cases involve issued patents,

our cases have also required corroboration of testimony

that an individual is an inventor of a potentially invalidat-

ing prior art reference that is not a patent. Allergan, 754

F.3d at 969. While “corroborating an inventor’s testimony

is a well-established principle in our case law” for purposes

of determining inventorship, it is not the case that “an in-

ventor must produce contemporaneous documentary evi-

dence . . . to support his or her declaration” or that a “high

degree of corroboration . . . is required across the board.”

EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am.,

Inc., 859 F.3d 1341, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Although co-

authorship does not presumptively make a co-author a co-

inventor, e.g., In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 455 (CCPA 1982);

Allergan, 754 F.3d at 969, it is significant corroborating ev-

idence that a co-author contributed to the invention. Here,

Dr. Moran’s testimony as to his technical contributions was

sufficiently corroborated by his being named as a co-author

on the Martin reference, his role within the OAA project,

Cheyer’s acknowledgement of Dr. Moran’s technical contri-

butions to the OAA project, and Dr. Moran’s being named

on the related ’931 patent.

The issue in this case was not lack of corroboration for

Dr. Moran’s testimony, but rather whether his testimony

should ultimately be credited over Cheyer and Martin’s

conflicting testimony during the IPR proceedings. 5 Instead

of resolving the conflicts, the Board stated that it found

5 The § 1.132 declarations by Martin and Cheyer,

standing alone, were insufficiently focused on the Duncan

question to raise a fact issue. See EmeraChem, 859 F.3d at

1345–46.

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 11 Filed: 05/19/2022

GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC. 11

“the testimony of Dr. Moran, Mr. Martin, and Mr. Cheyer

credible with respect to the facts cited herein.” J.A. 17

n.10; see also IPA Br. at 37 (“The Board found all the wit-

nesses credible . . . .”); id. at 66 (The Board found that “all

the witnesses, including [Dr.] Moran, were ‘credible.’”).

This was not a tenable position for the Board to take. The

Board was required to resolve this highly relevant eviden-

tiary conflict and make appropriate findings of fact.

III

IPA argues that we can nonetheless affirm because it

is inconsistent for Google to claim “that [Dr.] Moran alleg-

edly contributed invalidating subject matter to the Martin

[reference], yet is correctly excluded as a named inventor

of the Patents-at-Issue” because “[i]f the Martin [reference]

discloses the key limitations of the inventions claimed in

the Patents-at-Issue and [Dr.] Moran, in fact, contributed

to the inventive subject matter in the Martin [reference],

then, by extension, [Dr.] Moran would have also contrib-

uted inventive subject matter to the Patents-at-Issue.” IPA

Br. at 46. Of course, if Dr. Moran were a joint inventor on

both the Martin reference and the patents-at-issue, then

the Martin reference would no longer be prior art “by an-

other.” But the named inventors on the patents, Cheyer

and Martin, are presumptively “the true and only inven-

tors.” Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460. IPA cannot raise this

argument as a defense without actually seeking correction

of inventorship of the patents, which it has not. See Pannu,

155 F.3d at 1350 (“[A] patent with improper inventorship

does not avoid invalidation simply because it might be cor-

rected under section 256. Rather, the patentee must claim

entitlement to relief under the statute and the court must

give the patentee an opportunity to correct the inventor-

ship.”); Horizon Meds. LLC v. Alkem Labs. Ltd., 2021 WL

5315424, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (effort to correct

Case: 21-1179 Document: 48 Page: 12 Filed: 05/19/2022

12 GOOGLE LLC v. IPA TECHNOLOGIES INC.

inventorship of issued patent to avoid pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.

§ 102(a) prior art). 6

CONCLUSION

We vacate the Board’s decisions and remand for fur-

ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

6 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure

(“MPEP”) similarly advises applicants that a pre-AIA

35 U.S.C. § 102(a) rejection can be overcome “by adding the

coauthors as inventors to the application” assuming the

statutory requirements are met. MPEP § 2132.01(I) (9th

ed. Rev. 10, June 2020).