In Re Miranda T.

05/05/2022

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs April 1, 2022

IN RE MIRANDA T., ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Crockett County

No. 2019-DN-3 Paul B. Conley, III, Judge

No. W2021-00628-COA-R3-PT

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile

Court for Crockett County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights

of Tiffany T. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Miranda and Baylee (“the Children”).

After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights

on four grounds and finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s

best interest. Mother appeals, arguing solely that the Juvenile Court erred in its best interest

determination. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that DCS proved four grounds for

termination of parental rights against Mother by clear and convincing evidence. We find

further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of

Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the

Juvenile Court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed;

Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT

and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Bob C. Hooper, Brownsville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tiffany T.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Kathryn A. Baker, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, the Tennessee Department of Children’s

Services.

OPINION

Background

Miranda was born to Mother and Mother’s husband, Robert T. (“Father”), in April

of 2009.1 Baylee was born to Mother and Father in March of 2012. DCS has a history

with Mother and Father going back to 2012. Specifically, DCS was concerned among

other things about the family’s lack of a stable home, lack of financial resources, and lack

of proper hygiene and medical care. In November 2018, DCS received a referral alleging

environmental neglect concerning the Children. After a meeting held that month, Father

agreed to send the Children to Baptist Children’s Home while he was getting established.

That, however, did not happen. Father instead took the Children to Baton Rouge,

Louisiana. In January 2019, Mother went to Louisiana and retrieved the Children. Upon

returning to Tennessee, Mother granted power of attorney to Jillian and Justin M. (“the

Foster Parents”). Jillian M. was a special education teacher at the Children’s school.

In February 2019, DCS filed a dependency and neglect petition asking that

temporary custody of the Children be granted to the Foster Parents. Consequently, the

Juvenile Court entered an ex parte protective custody order toward that end. The Juvenile

Court found probable cause that the Children were dependent and neglected; that there was

no less drastic alternative to removal; and that it was reasonable to make no effort to keep

the Children in their home. The Foster Parents assumed temporary legal custody of the

Children. In June 2019, DCS moved to assume custody of the Children. Following a July

2019 hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding by clear and convincing evidence

that the Children were dependent and neglected and granting custody of the Children to

DCS. In relevant part, the Juvenile Court based its finding on Mother’s involvement in a

relationship marked by domestic violence and her inability to financially support the

Children.

In July 2019, a permanency plan was developed for Mother with the goals of exit

custody with relative and return to parent. Mother participated in the plan’s development,

and she signed the plan. Mother also signed the Criteria and Procedures for Termination

of Parental Rights. This first permanency plan included the following responsibilities for

Mother: (1) follow recommendations of parenting and psychological assessments; (2) show

residential stability for at least six consecutive months by rent and/or utilities receipts; (3)

allow DCS home visits and consistently be able to show a clean home; (4) ensure the

Children are not around sex offenders; (5) visit each week with Baylee and show an ability

to properly supervise, care for, and parent the Children; and (6) follow recommendations

1

In this case, the Juvenile Court terminated both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children.

However, Father did not appeal. This appeal concerns only Mother’s parental rights. Facts regarding Father

are set out only to the extent they relate to Mother’s case.

-2-

from Camelot, a service provider, regarding supervised visits. Mother and her boyfriend,

Chad, were both required to: (1) participate in domestic violence services and (2) work in-

home services to address parenting.

In January 2020, a revised permanency plan was developed. The goals of this

second plan were adoption and exit custody with relative. Mother’s responsibilities

remained largely the same. However, there were more details added regarding

recommendations from Mother’s parenting and psychological assessments, as well as

keeping her home appropriate, clean, and safe with functioning utilities. The revised plan

also required Mother to keep in monthly contact with DCS. Mother’s and Chad’s joint

responsibilities remained largely the same, although the responsibility concerning in-home

services specified that they needed to address environmental concerns. Mother did not

participate in the development of this revised plan. However, DCS reviewed the revised

plan with Mother. Mother refused this time to sign the parental rights termination criteria

document; the criteria were explained to her nevertheless. On April 17, 2020, DCS filed a

petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children. DCS alleged against

Mother the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial

noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and mental incompetence.

In April 2021, this matter was tried. We review the pertinent testimony from trial.

The first witness to testify at trial was Taylor Allmon (“Allmon”), the Children’s

DCS case manager. The Children had continuously been in DCS custody since July 2,

2019. The Children were removed from the parents’ custody in February 2019, at which

time they were placed with the Foster Parents. As of trial, Baylee was placed with the

Foster Parents, while Miranda was placed at a facility to address her special needs. DCS

was found to have exercised reasonable efforts to prevent the Children’s removal. Allmon

testified to DCS’s efforts to assist Mother in establishing a suitable home in the four months

following the Children’s removal:

During the initial 4 months, the Department offered several services to

include parenting, to help address the environmental and parenting concerns.

We offered parenting assessments and psychologicals to see if further

assessments were needed. We offered to set up counseling for the children

as well as providing gas cards to her so she could see Miranda to maintain

that bond and provide a supervised visitation between her and Baylee.

Allmon stated that during the same four-month period, from February 5, 2019 until

June 5, 2019, Mother worked with parenting services but did not complete them. Mother

did, however, complete a parenting assessment. During this time period, Mother did not

have a suitable home for the Children. Since Allmon had been on the case, Mother had

-3-

nine different addresses, none of which were suitable for the Children. Allmon testified at

length to the issues with Mother’s homes:

The first time when the case opened was in Maury City. There were

several environmental and safety concerns. She did start out strong keeping

the home clean but it very quickly deteriorated. The environmental concerns,

there were visible leaks in the roof coming into the floor of one bedroom.

There was an area of the floor in the living room that appeared bowed as if

something was trying to come up through the living room floor. It was very

common for rodents and insects to be seen in the home, including on the

kitchen table or in the refrigerator. [Mother] had at least one incident in that

home where she did not have running lights or working water - you know -

and she also would consistently have issues where she would not have sinks

or toilets working properly due to being clogged and would go for time

periods without having anywhere to clean the dishes and things like that.

There would be stagnant water in there. There was also consistent issues

with ash trays and cigarette butts throughout the home, on the ground, and in

the bed. The home she lived in next, she then moved to her mother’s home

in Alamo for a short time period. The concern at her mother’s home is that

her paramour who lives there is a registered sex offender, which has been a

concern of [Mother] allowing the children to be around him previously. She

then moved to … Alamo, Tennessee for a time period. Once again, the home

was clean for a short time frame and then it very quickly deteriorated. There

was at least one incident there where she did not have working lights and

water. She told me she had to stay in the bedroom because there was not

adequate - she had to stay in the living room as her bedroom because there

was not adequate heat or air in the rest of the home, including what would

have been the children’s bedroom. On one visit, there was once again many

cigarette butts laying throughout the home, in the floor, on counters, in the

bed. There were open pocket knives laying throughout the house. The home

was extremely cluttered to the point where you could not walk through

certain rooms without stepping on various clothes and furniture, household

items. And there was very vulgar writing on one of the walls calling

[Mother] rather vulgar names. I, myself, witnessed a mouse in that home on

a visit and saw the mouse feces in the kitchen on the counter. And she also

had some exposed piping and venting from where her washer and heater

should have been. After that, she then moved back to her mother’s home for

a time period, which once again, there is a registered sex offender living

there. Once I told her that was not a suitable home, she moved to her

grandmother’s home … in Alamo, which I was never able to go in and see,

but the grandmother did notify me it is only a one-bedroom home. So there

-4-

was concerns there was not appropriate room for [Mother] to be living there

let alone the children. Then [Mother] went back to her mother[’]s home, in

which she would not allow me to come in at any point telling me that the

home was dirty, her mother was not a good housekeeper and that the house

smelled of cat urine. She then moved once again back to her grandmother’s

home. At this point, she did pay rent on a trailer in Humboldt but never

moved into that home. She stated to me that it was not up to code and that

she was waiting for it to be fixed so she could move in there. She never did

physically move there to my knowledge. Most recently she has moved …

[to] Bells, Tennessee. Upon my last visit, the home was clean but there were

some safety concerns due to, once again, a lack of appropriate heating and

air only in one room, exposed light sockets hanging from the ceiling.

[Mother] also pointed out to me a spot in the kitchen in between the kitchen

stove and the kitchen sink where the floor was very soft and she said she had

fears of it falling through herself.

Mother had lived in her most recent residence since February of 2021. Six months

was the longest Mother had remained at one residence. From October 2019 through

February 2020, Mother would not allow Allmon into her home. In June 2020, Allmon

attempted to make a scheduled visit to Mother’s residence, but Mother left and Allmon

could not go in. From September 2020 until March 2021, Mother again barred Allmon

from entering Mother’s residence. Mother was “upset” with Allmon. Mother also barred

homemaker services from entering, even though they would have helped Mother with

cleaning. Allmon stated further that Mother’s boyfriend never participated in any DCS

services.

With respect to Mother’s compliance with the initial permanency plan, Allmon

testified: “She did complete the parenting and psychologicals on those plans and she did

remain in that current home for the 6 months; however, she moved right at that 6 month

mark when she was in that home.” When the permanency plan was modified, Mother did

not substantially complete any of the requirements. Both plans were ratified by the

Juvenile Court and found to be in the Children’s best interest and reasonably related to

remedying the reasons for foster care. Allmon said that the conditions in Mother’s home

had not changed in the two years the Children had been in custody. Allmon testified further

that the Children reported being fearful of Mother’s boyfriend, Chad. According to

Allmon, changing caregivers would be detrimental to the Children at this stage in their

lives. Miranda was then in a facility placement. Allmon stated: “Due to [Miranda’s]

cognitive abilities, we will sometimes see a regression. However, here recently she has

maintained fairly well, especially in the educational setting at that facility.” Allmon

testified that Mother had not made any lasting change to her behavior that would make it

possible to return the Children to her home.

-5-

On cross-examination, Allmon clarified that she had not worked on the Children’s

entire case; she came on board in July 2019. Allmon explained that Miranda was placed

in a facility because of her behavior with the Foster Parents. Miranda had maintained the

same sort of behaviors throughout, including disrobing and urinating on herself. Miranda

was “not close to discharge” from the facility, and she required 24-hour supervision. On

the matter of visitation, Allmon stated that Mother’s visits with the Children had gone

“fine.” Miranda had even stated that she wanted to go live with Mother. Baylee had

behavioral issues, as well, although not to the degree of her sister. Baylee, too, urinated on

herself. When Baylee does this, the Foster Parents remove privileges such as television.

Allmon testified that the Foster Parents have some reservations about adopting Baylee

because of the “seeming increase in some of Baylee’s behaviors….” Meanwhile, Miranda

undergoes weekly therapy at the facility. Mother participates in those sessions. Allmon

acknowledged that the Foster Parents could, if they decide not to adopt Baylee, turn in their

14-day notice at any time which would result in Baylee going to another placement. The

situation with Miranda was even more uncertain, as it was unknown when she would leave

the facility. Allmon elaborated upon Miranda’s statements that she wanted to live with

Mother, stating “she has, on the other hand, made the same comments that she does not

want to do that. It kind of depends on the day and her disposition that day.” Allmon stated

that most of Baylee’s “regressive behaviors,” such as urinating on herself, occurred when

in-person parental visits were scheduled. Baylee had been undergoing trauma therapy and

adoption counseling. Allmon testified: “For [Baylee’s] current behaviors, I would say [the

parents] are not directly influencing her as in they are not directly making her have them.

However, she is working through trauma that happened in the home through adoption

counseling while this has come up.”

When the Children first entered the Foster Parents’ custody, the Children were

significantly behind in their education, were very dirty, and had lice. The Foster Parents

remedied those conditions. Baylee made significant gains in education, including reading

at her grade level. With respect to Miranda, Allmon testified that Miranda’s intellectual

capacity is extremely low. The facility Miranda lives at sometimes notifies Allmon that

Miranda has had an aggressive outburst. Even still, Miranda’s behavior had improved

“some.” Allmon testified that there had been an internal investigation at Miranda’s facility

into an incident whereby Miranda was assaulted; someone at the facility was fired in

connection with this incident. Asked if stopping Mother’s visitation would have a

detrimental effect on the Children, Allmon stated she was confident that adoption

counseling would minimize any detrimental effect. Allmon acknowledged, however, that

Miranda had been in a residential placement for two years and was no closer to leaving it.

The next witness to testify was Dr. Douglas Mays (“Dr. Mays”), Director of Clinical

Assessments at Wayne Provision. Dr. Mays has an undergraduate degree in psychology

-6-

and biology from Bucknell University, as well as a Master’s degree in school psychology.

He earned a doctorate in counseling psychology from Argosy University. He also

performed other graduate work at Vanderbilt and Tennessee State University. Dr. Mays

had been licensed by the State of Tennessee for over thirty years, during which time he

performed psychological evaluations. Approximately ten years into his practice, Dr. Mays

began performing parenting capacity assessments. Dr. Mays was qualified as an expert

without objection.

Dr. Mays completed a psychological evaluation and a parenting capacity assessment

of Mother. The assessment began on June 25, 2019, and was completed on September 25,

2019. Dr. Mays asked Mother to complete a number of different psychology instruments.

Mother complied. Dr. Mays testified that Mother is “low functioning cognitively.” Mother

has difficulty with judgment and turns to other people who “aren’t particularly good

choices.” Dr. Mays stated that he saw no evidence of Mother being emotionally abusive

toward the Children, but that there was more to parenting than just playing. Dr. Mays

stated that, in his experience, people in Mother’s circumstances require concrete, hands-on

assistance with better parenting and family routines. Dr. Mays said that it was difficult,

although not impossible, for people functioning in Mother’s range to adapt to changing

circumstances as parenting requires. Dr. Mays’ report concluded that Mother was unlikely

to follow the advice and instructions of the treating professionals with respect to Miranda’s

condition. Dr. Mays did not recommend returning the Children to Mother’s custody. In

addition, Dr. Mays said that if Mother did not follow through with his recommendations,

such as in-home homemaker services, “we would be right where she was in 2019

obviously.”

On cross-examination, Dr. Mays stated that he met with Mother on two occasions.

He had not done anything to further his assessment of Mother since September 25, 2019.

As to what has happened with Mother since then, Dr. Mays acknowledged: “I have no

idea.” Dr. Mays also acknowledged that, due to Mother’s level of functioning, he had not

been able to administer an inventory like the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory,

which might have been helpful to his assessment. Dr. Mays observed Mother and Baylee

interact and they appeared to be bonded.

Continuing our review of Dr. Mays’ testimony, Dr. Mays’ report reflected that

Miranda’s facility noted her psychiatric history of autism spectrum disorder. Dr. Mays

testified that Mother’s intellectual deficiencies could present a large hurdle to overcome in

raising an autistic daughter. Dr. Mays then was asked about Baylee’s improvement while

in the Foster Parents’ care, and to what extent an improved environment helps a child grow

and be successful. He replied:

-7-

I can answer it this way. The average childhood experience’s research shows

that if you have a lot of things that aren’t going right in the family home, that

can result in physical and psychological problems for children and that can

persist into adulthood. So the research suggests if those markers are for a

negative outcome, you would think not having those markers and being in a

healthy environment would be the opposite.

Allmon was recalled to the stand to testify further. Allmon agreed that, because of

the Children’s separate placements, terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights

would essentially mean terminating the sibling bond.

In May 2021, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental

rights to the Children. The Juvenile Court found the following grounds were proven

against Mother by clear and convincing evidence: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a

suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (3) persistent

conditions; and (4) mental incompetence. The Juvenile Court found further, also by clear

and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s

best interest. The Juvenile Court found, in relevant part:

8. That Ms. Allmon’s testimony, again unrefuted by Mother, was that Mother

completed little of what was required of her. Mother did attend a

psychological assessment with Dr. Mays, but there was no evidence that

Mother followed through with any of his recommendations. Ms. Allmon

testified that Mother moved some nine times during this matter. Ms. Allmon

offered photographs of Mother’s home (included in the State’s Collective

Exhibit 1) that showed the home to be unlivable. Again, Mother did not

challenge these photographs were taken in her home. Ms. Allmon’s

testimony was that Mother later refused to allow her to enter her later homes,

refused homemaker services, and generally stopped cooperating with her.

Mother did not refute this testimony.

9. The testimony of Dr. Mays was that in his opinion, Mother was very low

functioning mentally, was too dependent on others for advice and guidance

(even when that advice or guidance resulted in negative effects), and was

generally unable to care for a special needs child such as [Miranda]. Dr.

Mays testified that he did not think services would be of significant help to

Mother. As a result, Dr. Mays could not recommend return of the children

to Mother. Again, Mother, did not challenge any of Dr. Mays’ findings.

10. That based on the above, the Court finds that the State has proven by

clear and convincing evidence the grounds of “abandonment” pursuant [to]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(c) in that Mother, even though

initially working with DCS, has not shown any ability to provide a safe,

-8-

clean, suitable home for the children. Mother did in the early stages of this

matter allow Ms. Allmon to enter some of her homes. However, when the

pictures showed the home to be unlivable, Mother refused to allow Ms.

Allmon into her later homes, and refused work with homemaker services.

[Mother] did not offer any reason for not working services. This matter has

gone on for two years, and during that time, Mother has not shown any

willingness or ability to improve her living situation. The Court also finds it

significant that DCS had been working with this family since 2012, with little

or no improvement. For these reasons, the Court finds by clear and

convincing evidence that the State has proven this ground for termination of

Mother’s parental rights.

11. Based on the above, and pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)

the court finds that the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence the

grounds of persistence of conditions as to Mother, in that:

(a) The children have been removed from Mother’s home for at least

six months;

(b) The conditions that led to the removal have not been rectified by

Mother so that return to Mother’s custody at this time, or at any

reasonable time in the future, would result in harm to the children;

(c) That during the D&N hearing, Mother did testify and admit she

could not financially or emotionally care for the children,

(d) That due to Mother’s lack of any progress in meeting the goals of

the [Permanency Plan], based on the testimony of Ms. Allmon, the

Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is little

likelihood that Mother will be able to correct these conditions in the

near future; and

(e) That any continuation of the parent/child relationship between

Mother and [Miranda] and [Baylee] greatly diminishes the chances

that either child can integrate into a safe, stable and permanent home.

12. That based on the above, the Court finds the State has proven by clear

and convincing evidence the ground of substantial non-compliance with the

PP pursuant to TCA § 36-1-113(g)(2) as to Mother, in that:

(a) Mother did not challenge Ms. Allmon’s testimony that Ms. Allmon

explained Mother’s responsibilities under two PP’s or Ms. Allmon’s

testimony that Mother was not in substantial compliance with the

goals of either plan.

(b) Mother also did not challenge that DCS had made reasonable

efforts to assist her in meeting those responsibilities.

(c) Mother offered no plan of her on how she was going to remedy or

correct the conditions that led to the removal.

-9-

(d) Mother offered no evidence that any of these situations would be

remedied in the future.

(e) That because of all of these factors, the Court finds that continuing

the parent/child relationship in this case as to Mother greatly

diminishes the children’s chances of being placed in a safe, stable, and

permanent home.

(f) That the conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist,

preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian,

or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable probability, would

cause the children to be subjected to further abuse or neglect,

preventing the children’s safe return to the care of the parent or

guardian;

(g) The Court finds no evidence that these conditions will be remedied

by Mother at an early date so that the children could be safely returned

to the parent or guardian in the near future.

(h) The Court also finds that the State has proven by clear and

convincing evidence that continuation of the parent/child relationship

greatly diminishes these children’s chances of early integration into a

safe, stable, and permanent home.

13. The Court finds the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence

the ground of mental incompetence pursuant to TCA § 36-1-113(g)(8) as to

Mother, in that:

(a) The testimony of Dr. Mays was that Mother was extremely low

functioning mentally and emotionally. In fact, after observing Mother

and [Baylee] playing, Dr. Mays opined that both Mother and [Baylee]

“had similar levels of maturity.”

(b) That when asked if it would be detrimental to [Miranda] to be

returned to Mother, Dr. Mays stated “absolutely.”

(c) Dr. Mays also stated that due to Mother’s low functioning mental

capacity, it was his opinion that parenting classes or additional

services would be of little help to Mother as he felt she would be

unable to put the recommendations into practice.

(d) While the Court finds this a much closer call than the other above

grounds, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that due to

Mother’s mental limitations, she is not capable of taking care of

children with the special needs that [Miranda] and, to a lesser extent,

[Baylee] have, and therefore [the] Court finds the State has proven

this ground for termination of Mother’s parental rights by clear and

convincing evidence.

-10-

14. That the Court finds it highly significant that Mother did not contest or

challenge DCS’s statements that it had used reasonable efforts to help mother

comply with the permanency plans that were developed.

[Best Interest]

As to Mother, the testimony showed that Mother had not been able to

maintain a suitable home, had not been willing to work with DCS-provided

homemaker services, and eventually, stopped allowing DCS to visit her

home. The testimony was also that Mother’s boyfriend refused to work any

DCS services. The Court finds it is not likely Mother will correct any of

these issues in the near future, making it dangerous to return the children to

her. The Court finds this factor weighs heavily in favor of termination of her

parental rights being in the children’s best interest.

***

As to Mother, Mother did not challenge DCS’s statements that it had used

reasonable efforts to help her correct conditions in her home or to help her

with homemaker services or counseling help. However, Mother has not

made any effort to correct the conditions of her home, or allow DCS to assist

her. The Court finds this factor weighs heavily in favor of termination of her

parental rights being in the children’s best interest.

***

As to Mother, DCS did not allege that Mother failed to participate in

visitation with the girls. In fact, Mother has expressed interest in having the

girls return home, but the testimony of Dr. Mays was that return was not in

the best interests of the children. This factor does weigh in slightly in favor

of Mother.

***

As to Mother, the Court does not doubt that Mother cares for her children.

However, the evidence was clear that due to Mother’s low functioning

cognitive capabilities, as testified to by Dr. Mays and as observed by the

Court when Mother did testify at the D&N hearing, return to Mother would

likely result in the same conditions that led to the removal. The factor does

weigh in favor of termination of Mother’s parental rights being in the best

interests of the children.

-11-

***

The Court finds this factor applies equally to both parents and weighs in favor

of termination of the parental rights of Father and Mother. The only evidence

presented at trial — and neither parent challenged — was that [Baylee] was

doing well in foster care, and was even now reading on grade level. Due to

the diagnosis of [Miranda], it is unlikely she will ever be able to function in

a normal setting, and will likely require, according to Dr. Mays, 24 hour care

and special treatment. The factor does weigh in favor of termination of both

parents[’] parental rights being in the best interests of the children.

***

As to Mother, the testimony was the Mother’s boyfriend was abusive and the

girls did not like living with him. Ms. Allmon stated that Mother had

indicated that her boyfriend was going to leave, but Ms. Allmon was never

able to confirm that fact. This factor does weigh in favor to termination of

Mother’s parental rights being in the best interest of the children.

***

As to Mother, DCS inspections of Mother’s home indicated dangerous

conditions for the children, cigarette ashes and butts in the floor, lack of

consistent utilities, evidence of insects and rodents in the home and on the

kitchen counters, and generally unclean, cluttered conditions. Dr. Mays’

opinion was that Mother would not be able to correct these conditions on her

own. This factor weighs heavily in favor that termination of Mother’s

parental rights to be [ ] in the children’s best interests.

***

As to Mother, Mother’s mental state has been a concern for DCS workers

from the beginning of this case. Based on the Court[’]s observation of

Mother during court proceedings (the Court notes that during one

proceeding, Mother abruptly left the courtroom and did not return), the

opinion of Dr. Mays, the conditions of Mother’s home as shown in the

pictures, it is clear to the Court that Mother continues to struggle

mentally/emotionally so that return of children to her would be detrimental

to them. The Court finds this factor weighs heavily in favor of a finding that

the termination of Mother’s parental rights to be in children’s best interests.

-12-

***

As to Mother, there was no evidence concerning Mother’s child support

presented. The only testimony is that Mother draws SSI as her only source

of income. The factor was not considered by the Court as to Mother.

***

This has been a long running case, with DCS being involved with this family

since 2012. The evidence showed that Mother has made little or no progress

toward correcting the issues that caused the initial removal. The record also

shows that Father did not participate in the case significantly when it was

filed in February of 2019, until January of 2020. The record also showed

[that] on occasion, Father’s attorney would appear in court and have no

knowledge of where Father was. The Court also takes note of the special

needs of [Miranda]. Neither parent showed any capability of being able to

care for a child with the special needs [Miranda] has. [Baylee] also has

developmental issues that require special care. Neither parent presented any

evidence that either had a plan for taking care of the girls, had any family

support, or showed any ability to handle special need children. The Court

finds this is a key factor weighing in favor of a finding that the termination

of parental rights of both Father and Mother to be in the children’s best

interests.

Mother timely appealed to this Court. In June 2021, the Juvenile Court, acting upon DCS’s

motion, entered an order awarding full guardianship of the Children to DCS.

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Mother raises the following issue on appeal:

whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is

in the Children’s best interest. DCS raises a separate issue of whether this Court should

consider post-judgment documents contained in the record on appeal. DCS also addresses

the grounds for termination found against Mother.

As our Supreme Court has instructed regarding the standard of review in parental

rights termination cases:

A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the

oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by

-13-

the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.2 Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Stanley

v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); In re

Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption of Female

Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d

573, 578-79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although fundamental and

constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at

250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty to protect minors .

. . .’ Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority as parens patriae

when interference with parenting is necessary to prevent serious harm to a

child.” Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425,

429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747,

102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250.

“When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks

not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.”

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388. “Few consequences of judicial

action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties.” Id. at 787, 102

S.Ct. 1388; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136

L.Ed.2d 473 (1996). The parental rights at stake are “far more precious than

any property right.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388.

Termination of parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent to

the role of a complete stranger and of “severing forever all legal rights and

obligations of the parent or guardian of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(l)(1); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (recognizing

that a decision terminating parental rights is “final and irrevocable”). In light

of the interests and consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally

entitled to “fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings.

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d

640 (1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair

procedures).

Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair

procedures” is a heightened standard of proof – clear and convincing

evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388. This standard

minimizes the risk of unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference

2

U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law . . . .”). Similarly, article 1, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution states “[t]hat no

man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled,

or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or

the law of the land.”

-14-

with fundamental parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596

(Tenn. 2010). “Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to

form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and

eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these

factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted).

The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are

established as highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than not.

In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R.,

183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Tennessee statutes governing parental termination proceedings

incorporate this constitutionally mandated standard of proof. Tennessee

Code Annotated section 36-1-113(c) provides:

Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based

upon:

(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that

the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights

have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the

best interests of the child.

This statute requires the State to establish by clear and convincing proof that

at least one of the enumerated statutory grounds3 for termination exists and

that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d

at 250; In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006); In re Valentine,

79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). “The best interests analysis is separate

from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear and convincing

evidence of grounds for termination.” In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 254.

Although several factors relevant to the best interests analysis are statutorily

enumerated,4 the list is illustrative, not exclusive. The parties are free to offer

proof of other relevant factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. The trial

court must then determine whether the combined weight of the facts

“amount[s] to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s

best interest.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015). These

requirements ensure that each parent receives the constitutionally required

“individualized determination that a parent is either unfit or will cause

3

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1)-(13).

4

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i).

-15-

substantial harm to his or her child before the fundamental right to the care

and custody of the child can be taken away.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180,

188 (Tenn. 1999).

Furthermore, other statutes impose certain requirements upon trial

courts hearing termination petitions. A trial court must “ensure that the

hearing on the petition takes place within six (6) months of the date that the

petition is filed, unless the court determines an extension is in the best

interests of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). A trial court must

“enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law

within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing.” Id. This portion of

the statute requires a trial court to make “findings of fact and conclusions of

law as to whether clear and convincing evidence establishes the existence of

each of the grounds asserted for terminating [parental] rights.” In re Angela

E., 303 S.W.3d at 255. “Should the trial court conclude that clear and

convincing evidence of ground(s) for termination does exist, then the trial

court must also make a written finding whether clear and convincing

evidence establishes that termination of [parental] rights is in the [child’s]

best interests.” Id. If the trial court’s best interests analysis “is based on

additional factual findings besides the ones made in conjunction with the

grounds for termination, the trial court must also include these findings in the

written order.” Id. Appellate courts “may not conduct de novo review of the

termination decision in the absence of such findings.” Id. (citing Adoption

Place, Inc. v. Doe, 273 S.W.3d 142, 151 & n. 15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

B. Standards of Appellate Review

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in

termination proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P.

13(d). In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at

246. Under Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on

the record and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the

evidence preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In

re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215

S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened burden of proof in

termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own

determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as

supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and

convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.

In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. The trial court’s ruling that the

evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion

-16-

of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no presumption of

correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re Adoption of

A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions of law in

parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de novo with

no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 521-24 (Tenn. 2016) (footnotes in original but

renumbered). Clear and convincing evidence supporting any single ground will justify a

termination order. E.g., In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). Mother does

not challenge any of the grounds found against her. However, the Tennessee Supreme

Court has instructed “that in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights the Court

of Appeals must review the trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as

to whether termination is in the child’s best interests, regardless of whether the parent

challenges these findings on appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525-26 (footnote

and citation omitted). We will, therefore, review each of the grounds found against Mother.

Four grounds for termination of parental rights are at issue on appeal. On April 17,

2020, when DCS filed its petition in this case, these grounds were set out in statute as

follows:

(g) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based

upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The following grounds

are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing conditions, acts or omissions

in one ground does not prevent them from coming within another ground:

(1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-102, has

occurred;

(2) There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with

the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan pursuant to title 37,

chapter 2, part 4;

(3)(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal

custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order

entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the

juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist,

preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian,

or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable probability, would

cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, preventing

the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at

an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or

guardian in the near future; and

-17-

(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship

greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe,

stable, and permanent home;

(B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the termination

of parental rights petition is set to be heard;

***

(8)(A) The chancery and circuit courts shall have jurisdiction in an adoption

proceeding, and the chancery, circuit, and juvenile courts shall have

jurisdiction in a separate, independent proceeding conducted prior to an

adoption proceeding to determine if the parent or guardian is mentally

incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the child, and

to terminate that parent’s or guardian’s rights to the child;

(B) The court may terminate the parental or guardianship rights of that person

if it determines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that:

(i) The parent or guardian of the child is incompetent to adequately

provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the

parent’s or guardian’s mental condition is presently so impaired and

is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent or guardian

will be able to assume or resume the care of and responsibility for the

child in the near future; and

(ii) That termination of parental or guardian rights is in the best

interest of the child;

(C) In the circumstances described under subdivisions (8)(A) and (B), no

willfulness in the failure of the parent or guardian to establish the parent’s or

guardian’s ability to care for the child need be shown to establish that the

parental or guardianship rights should be terminated[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g) (West March 6, 2020 to April 21, 2021).

The type of abandonment at issue on appeal is abandonment by failure to provide a

suitable home, which was defined as follows:

(1)(A) For purposes of terminating the parental or guardian rights of a parent

or parents or a guardian or guardians of a child to that child in order to make

that child available for adoption, “abandonment” means that:

***

-18-

(ii)(a) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or

legal custody of a parent or parents or guardian or guardians by a court

order at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in

the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected

child, and the child was placed in the custody of the department or a

licensed child-placing agency;

(b) The juvenile court found, or the court where the termination of

parental rights petition is filed finds, that the department or a licensed

child-placing agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of

the child or that the circumstances of the child’s situation prevented

reasonable efforts from being made prior to the child’s removal; and

(c) For a period of four (4) months following the physical removal,

the department or agency made reasonable efforts to assist the parent

or parents or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home

for the child, but that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians

have not made reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable

home and have demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such a

degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a

suitable home for the child at an early date. The efforts of the

department or agency to assist a parent or guardian in establishing a

suitable home for the child shall be found to be reasonable if such

efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian toward the

same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware that the child is in the

custody of the department[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii) (West March 6, 2020 to June 30, 2021).

We first address DCS’s issue of whether this Court should consider post-judgment

documents contained in the record on appeal. The record does, indeed, contain certain

post-judgment documents. DCS notes that we generally do not consider post-judgment

facts except upon a party’s motion pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 14. In its brief, DCS

asserts that “any documents in the record dated after the trial court’s June 8, 2021 order of

guardianship are inappropriate for consideration, as they appear to have been

improvidently included by the trial court clerk and no Tenn. R. App. P. 14 motion has been

filed.” (Footnote omitted). We agree. We will not consider these post-judgment

documents contained in the record on appeal.

Turning to the grounds found for termination of Mother’s parental rights, we address

whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding that the ground of abandonment by failure to

provide a suitable home was proven against Mother. On February 4, 2019, the Children

were removed from Mother’s custody by court order pursuant to a dependency and neglect

-19-

petition. As relevant to this issue, the Juvenile Court found that Mother “has not shown

any ability to provide a safe, clean, suitable home for the children.” The Juvenile Court

found further that “[t]his matter has gone on for two years, and during that time, Mother

has not shown any willingness or ability to improve her living situation.” Despite DCS’s

assistance, Mother never established a home suitable for the Children. In fact, for stretches

of the case, Mother refused outright to work with DCS on improving her home situation.

The evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings relative to this

ground. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the ground of abandonment by failure to

provide a suitable home was proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence.

We next address whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding that the ground of

substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan was proven against Mother. Two

permanency plans were developed for Mother before DCS filed its petition. Regarding

areas of compliance with the statement of responsibilities in her permanency plans, Mother

completed parenting services and psychological assessments. She also remained in one

home for at least six months. However, Mother never established a home suitable for the

Children. Mother did not address domestic violence issues; she refused recommended

homemaker services; denied DCS access to her home; and failed to address her mental

health issues. Perhaps the most glaring example of Mother’s noncompliance was Mother’s

outright refusal to accept homemaker services for stretches of the case when the

unsuitability of her home was one of the central recurring issues preventing Mother from

having a chance of reunification with the Children. This defiance, as well as the other

instances of noncompliance found by the Juvenile Court, constituted substantial

noncompliance with the permanency plans on Mother’s part. We note further the Juvenile

Court’s finding that “Mother did not challenge Ms. Allmon’s testimony that Ms. Allmon

explained Mother’s responsibilities under two PP’s or Ms. Allmon’s testimony that Mother

was not in substantial compliance with the goals of either plan.” The evidence does not

preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings relative to this ground. We find, as did

the Juvenile Court, that the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan

was proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence.

We next address whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding that the ground of

persistent conditions was proven against Mother. On February 4, 2019, the Children were

removed from Mother’s custody by court order pursuant to a dependency and neglect

petition. DCS’s petition was filed on April 17, 2020, with trial initially set for October 23,

2020. The Juvenile Court found that “[t]he conditions that led to the removal have not

been rectified by Mother so that return to Mother’s custody at this time, or at any reasonable

time in the future, would result in harm to the children[.]”; that “due to Mother’s lack of

any progress in meeting the goals of the [Permanency Plan], based on the testimony of Ms.

Allmon, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is little likelihood that

Mother will be able to correct these conditions in the near future[.]”; and “[t]hat any

-20-

continuation of the parent/child relationship between Mother and [Miranda] and [Baylee]

greatly diminishes the chances that either child can integrate into a safe, stable and

permanent home.” Each of the elements of this ground have been established.

Unfortunately, the evidence reveals that, despite the passage of time, Mother is no closer

to being able to assume custody of the Children. Mother lacks a suitable home, as she has

persistently throughout the custodial episode. As testified to by Dr. Mays, Mother

functions at a low cognitive level. In order to overcome this issue so as to be able to safely

parent the Children—who have special needs of their own—Mother needed to, at

minimum, cooperate fully with all the recommended services aimed toward rendering her

able to parent. Mother did not cooperate fully with these recommended services, and there

is no evidence that her circumstances have materially improved. The evidence does not

preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings relative to this ground. We find, as did

the Juvenile Court, that the ground of persistent conditions was proven against Mother by

clear and convincing evidence.

The final issue pertaining to grounds is whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding

that the ground of mental incompetence was proven against Mother. The Juvenile Court,

noting Dr. May’s testimony that “parenting classes or additional services would be of little

help to Mother as he felt she would be unable to put the recommendations into practice,”

found that “due to Mother’s mental limitations, she is not capable of taking care of children

with the special needs that [Miranda] and, to a lesser extent, [Baylee] have….” The

uncontroverted evidence reflects that Mother is in the low range of mental functioning, and

she is highly dependent upon others. However, mental disability is not an ipso facto basis

for finding the ground of mental incompetence. The statute allows for the possibility that

an impaired parent or guardian may yet be able to assume care of and responsibility for her

child in the near future. An impaired parent, unable to adequately care for her child on

account of her mental condition, potentially can be rehabilitated or adjust so as to

successfully cope with her condition. However, the record reflects that Mother has never

taken the steps necessary to address her condition so as to assume care for the Children.

Mother’s refusal to accept homemaker services is an example of her failure to accept the

help she needs. Mother has shown no ability to provide for the Children or attend to their

special needs. Indeed, based upon Dr. Mays’ report and testimony, it is unclear whether

Mother will ever be in a position to assume responsibility for the Children. The Juvenile

Court did not err in finding that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(i),

Mother is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the

Children because Mother’s mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to

remain so that it is unlikely that Mother will be able to assume care of and responsibility

for the Children in the near future. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(B)(ii) contains

another element of this ground, namely that termination of parental rights is in the best

interest of the child. As we will discuss in more detail in the next issue, the Juvenile Court

found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest, a

-21-

finding we affirm. The evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s

findings relative to the ground of mental incompetence. We find, as did the Juvenile Court,

that the ground of mental incompetence was proven against Mother by clear and

convincing evidence.

Having affirmed grounds for termination, we consider whether the Juvenile Court

erred in finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best

interest. On April 17, 2020, when DCS filed its petition in this case, the statutory best

interest factors read as follows:

(i) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights is

in the best interest of the child pursuant to this part, the court shall consider,

but is not limited to, the following:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best

interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment

after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such

duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or other

contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established

between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to

have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent

or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or

psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child or adult in

the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is

healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the home, or whether

there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance

analogues as may render the parent or guardian consistently unable to care

for the child in a safe and stable manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status would

be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from effectively

providing safe and stable care and supervision for the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with the

child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-

101.

-22-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (West March 6, 2020 to April 21, 2021).

With regard to making a determination concerning a child’s best interest, the

Tennessee Supreme Court has instructed:

When conducting the best interests analysis, courts must consider nine

statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i).

These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the

termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor relevant to

the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (citing In

re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Facts considered

in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a preponderance of the

evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 455

S.W.3d at 555 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861). “After making

the underlying factual findings, the trial court should then consider the

combined weight of those facts to determine whether they amount to clear

and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest[s].”

Id. When considering these statutory factors, courts must remember that

“[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s, rather than the

parent’s, perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Indeed, “[a]

focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme” evident in all of

the statutory factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the child and those of

the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the

rights and the best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d)

(2017).

Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote

examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.

And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of

statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v.

Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts

and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant each

statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d

at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a factually

intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives

individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are

terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon the

circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration

of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” In re

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194).

But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the obligation of considering

-23-

all the factors and all the proof. Even if the circumstances of a particular

case ultimately result in the court ascribing more weight—even outcome

determinative weight—to a particular statutory factor, the court must

consider all of the statutory factors, as well as any other relevant proof any

party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

Mother argues that the Juvenile Court erred in its best interest determination.

Mother’s arguments fit into three overarching categories, to wit: (1) that Mother was not

afforded enough time—roughly nine months—between the July 2, 2019 dependency and

neglect determination and the filing of DCS’s termination petition on April 17, 2020; (2)

that the Children desire to be with Mother and have a relationship with Mother; and (3)

that the Children’s prospects for permanency are uncertain because the Foster Parents have

not committed to adopting Baylee, and Miranda is at a facility with no discharge date in

sight. Mother also states that, given the Children’s separate placements, terminating

Mother’s parental rights effectively would sever the Children’s relationship not only with

Mother but with one another. Mother contends that the Trial Court did not place sufficient

weight on these relationships in conducting its best interest analysis.

Regarding Mother’s first line of argument, Mother fails to articulate exactly what

she would do with additional time or how additional time would lead to her being able to

safely parent the Children. Mother refused to cooperate with DCS or homemaker services

for stretches of the case. Mother nevertheless points out that she completed certain services

through Camelot. That was good of Mother, but insufficient. Among other things, Mother

needed to address the unsuitability of her housing situation, which she never did.

Regarding Dr. Mays’ assessment, Mother argues it is stale because Dr. Mays testified one-

and-a-half years after his last interaction with her. However, Mother has not pointed to

any evidence in the record showing that she has addressed her mental health and housing

issues since Dr. Mays’ assessment. On the contrary, the record reflects that Mother has

made no material gains in addressing her issues. Additionally, there is no basis to assume

that Mother’s being in the low range of mental functioning has changed since Dr. Mays

rendered his assessment.

With respect to the Children’s sometimes-stated desire to be with Mother, that is a

relevant but by no means dispositive fact for consideration in our best interest analysis.

First, the record reflects that it was Miranda who occasionally expressed this desire.

Miranda and, to a lesser extent, Baylee, both have special needs. The record reflects that

Mother is in no position to provide for the Children’s special needs, and will not be in any

position to do so any time soon. Mother’s practical inability to parent the Children

outweighs any occasional preference the Children express about wanting to live with

-24-

Mother. Miranda, in particular, requires 24-hour care. Based on this record, there is no

hint Mother will be able to provide that level of care in the near future, if ever.

Finally, there is the matter of the Children’s uncertain permanency. Mother is

correct in that neither of the Children have a firmly delineated path to permanency going

forward. Miranda is at a facility, where she has no release date. Baylee lives with the

Foster Parents, but the Foster Parents have reservations about adopting Baylee on account

of her behaviors. Mother also cites her participation in Miranda’s counseling, as well as

the fact that termination of Mother’s parental rights effectively means severance of the

sisters’ relationship with one another given their separate placements.

Respectfully, Mother has failed to establish how her participation in Miranda’s

counseling is vital to Miranda’s well-being. In addition, Mother has failed to explain why

separating the Children would be contrary to the Children’s best interest. The Children,

particularly Miranda, require special care. There is no hint whatsoever that Mother, with

her own struggles, can provide this level of care for the Children. Mother, too, has mental

health issues, with no realistic likelihood she will be able to safely parent the Children any

time soon; this is the paramount and weightiest consideration regarding the Children’s best

interest under the facts of this case. Meanwhile, Baylee has shown significant

improvement while in the Foster Parents’ care. While the Foster Parents have expressed

reservations about adopting Baylee, they have not definitively ruled it out, either. The

Children’s lack of certainty in their placements is not optimal, but preserving Mother’s

parental rights offers even fewer good prospects for the Children’s best interest. As the

Juvenile Court stated, there is no dispute that Mother loves the Children. It is Mother’s

persistent inability to safely parent the Children that is at issue.

The Juvenile Court made detailed findings relative to each applicable best interest

factor. The evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings as to the

Children’s best interest. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s

parental rights is in the Children’s best interest.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the

Juvenile Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against

the Appellant, Tiffany T., and her surety, if any.

____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

-25-