107oag093

Gen. 93] 93

TRANSPORTATION

VEHICLE LAWS – TOWING FEES – HOW TO DETERMINE THE

PERMISSIBLE FEES FOR TRESPASS TOWING IN LOCAL

JURISDICTIONS UNDER SECTION 21-10A-04 OF THE

TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE

April 13, 2022

The Honorable Brandon M. Scott

Mayor, Baltimore City

You have asked for an opinion of the Attorney General as to

how to interpret certain towing-fee-related provisions in § 21-10A-

04 of the Transportation Article. That statute imposes constraints

on the fees that can be charged for the towing of vehicles from

private parking lots, a practice that is often called “trespass

towing.” Those constraints, in turn, are largely based on the fees

for “impound towing,” i.e., the removal of vehicles from public

streets. More specifically, the statute generally sets the permissible

fee for trespass towing as double the “total fees normally charged

or authorized by the political subdivision for the public safety

impound towing of vehicles,” Md. Code Ann., Transp. (“TR”)

§ 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i), plus “the fee normally charged or authorized

by the political subdivision from which the vehicle was towed for

the daily storage of impounded vehicles,” TR § 21-10A-

04(a)(1)(ii). But the statute provides a different maximum fee for

trespass towing—$250 for towing a vehicle and $30 per day for

storage—“[i]f a political subdivision does not establish a fee limit

for the public safety towing, recovery, or storage of impounded

vehicles.” TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(iii).

Under that scheme, your first question is which towing-

related fees may be doubled under subparagraph (a)(1)(i) of the

statute as the “total fees normally charged or authorized by the

political subdivision for the public safety impound towing of

vehicles.” That is, do the “total fees” that may be doubled include

only fees that are charged for the actual towing of the vehicle, or

can they also include storage fees, fees for notice, or administrative

fees that a local jurisdiction might charge in connection with

impound towing? Your second question is about the meaning of

the term “normally charged or authorized” in TR §§ 21-10A-

04(a)(1)(i) and (ii), and how that term relates to the term “fee limit”

found in § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(iii). In other words, was the term “fee

limit” in (a)(1)(iii) intended as a shorthand to refer back to the fee

“normally charged or authorized” by the jurisdiction for impound

94 [107 Op. Att’y

towing mentioned earlier in that subsection—such that the default

fee in (a)(1)(iii) applies only if the jurisdiction does not have a fee

“normally charged or authorized”—or was the term “fee limit”

intended to mean something else? You explain that, at Baltimore

City Council committee hearings held to consider recent legislation

that would amend local towing laws, testimony from members of

the towing industry revealed that there are conflicting

interpretations of § 21-10A-04.

In our opinion, as to your first question, the “total fees”

referred to in TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i) clearly do not include fees

for storage or notice, or fines owed for traffic or parking violations.

And although less clear, the term “total fees” likely also does not

include administrative fees charged by a political subdivision for

public safety impound towing. Rather, both the text and the

legislative history of the provision indicate that the “total fees”

include those fees directly related to the actual towing of a vehicle,

such as fees for hook-up, mileage, or time. As to your second

question, our conclusion is that the fees “normally charged or

authorized” by a jurisdiction for public safety impound towing

refer to the fees for a normal tow set by the jurisdiction in its local

code or by some other formal fee-setting mechanism and that, so

understood, those fees serve as a type of “fee limit” for purposes of

TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(iii).

I

Background

A. Section 21-10A-04 of the Transportation Article

Title 21, Subtitle 10A of the Transportation Article regulates

the towing or removal of vehicles from parking lots, which are

defined as “privately owned facilit[ies] consisting of 3 or more

spaces for motor vehicle parking” that are “[a]ccessible to the

general public” and “intended by the owner of the facility to be

used primarily by the owner’s customers, clientele, residents,

lessees, or guests.” TR § 21-10A-01(a). The practice of removing

vehicles from these parking lots is sometimes referred to as

“trespass towing.” See, e.g., Baltimore County Code Ordinances

§ 21-16-101(j) (2021) (defining “trespass towing”). The provisions

in Subtitle 10A apply statewide, though local authorities are not

precluded from adopting local laws or regulations that relate to the

registration or licensing of those who engage in “the parking,

towing or removal, or impounding of vehicles,” or from “otherwise

regulating” the practice in a “more stringent manner.” TR § 21-

10A-01(b); see also id. § 26-301(b)(3) (providing that any political

Gen. 93] 95

subdivision of the State may adopt ordinances and regulations that

“[r]egulate the towing of vehicles from publicly owned and

privately owned parking lots”).

Section 21-10A-04 governs the process of towing and storing

a vehicle and, as relevant here, includes limitations on the fees that

may be charged in connection with a trespass tow. Currently, the

statute provides that:

Unless otherwise set by local law, a person who undertakes

the towing or removal of a vehicle from a parking lot:

(1) May not charge the owner of the vehicle,

the owner’s agent, the insurer of record, or any

secured party more than:

(i) Twice the amount of the total fees

normally charged or authorized by the

political subdivision for the public safety

impound towing of vehicles;

(ii) Notwithstanding § 16-207(f)(1) of the

Commercial Law Article,[1] the fee normally

charged or authorized by the political

subdivision from which the vehicle was towed

for the daily storage of impounded vehicles;

(iii) If a political subdivision does not

establish a fee limit for the public safety

towing, recovery, or storage of impounded

vehicles, $250 for towing and recovering a

vehicle and $30 per day for vehicle storage;

and

(iv) Subject to subsection (b) of this

section, the actual cost of providing notice

under this section[.]

TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1).

The statute is relatively new. Prior to 1989, State law did not

regulate private towing practices, 73 Opinions of the Attorney

General 349, 351 n.2 (1988), though there were local laws that did

to some extent, see, e.g., Cade v. Montgomery County, 83 Md. App.

419, 431 (1990) (holding that a Montgomery County ordinance that

1

That provision, which governs statutory liens on personal property,

states that “storage fees of the third party holder may not exceed $5 per

day or a total of $300.”

96 [107 Op. Att’y

regulated trespass towing, including maximum fees, was not

unconstitutional); 73 Opinions of the Attorney General 246, 248

(1988) (concluding that a Montgomery County ordinance

regulating towing of vehicles from private property was valid).

In 1989, a bill was introduced in response to “many well-

publicized abuses by towing companies and parking lot owners in

the Baltimore area.” Floor Report, Senate Jud. Proc. Comm., H.B.

1303, 1989 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2. These abuses included

“exorbitant fees, unauthorized removal, unavailability, and damage

to removed vehicles.” Id. As introduced, the bill provided that

persons towing from private parking lots, in Baltimore City and

County only, were precluded from charging “more for the towing

of the vehicle from the parking lot than the amount normally

charged by the political subdivision for the towing of vehicles” or

“more than $10 per day for storage.” H.B. 1303, 1989 Leg., Reg.

Sess. (First Reader). The bill went through a series of amendments

as the legislative session progressed and, as finally enacted,

provided that “a person who undertakes the towing or removal of a

vehicle from a parking lot . . . may not charge . . . more than twice

the amount of the total fees normally charged or authorized by the

political subdivision for the impound towing of vehicles . . . and . .

. except as provided in § 16-207(f)(1) of the Commercial Law

Article, more than $8 per day for storage.” 1989 Md. Laws, ch.

462 (emphases added).2

Section 21-10A-04 remained unchanged for nearly two

decades after its enactment. Throughout those years, however,

there was a fair amount of debate as to what extent the State should

regulate the trespass towing business. See, e.g., Report of the Task

Force to Study Motor Vehicle Liens, Regulation of Towing

Practices, and the Disposition of Unclaimed Vehicles 3 (Jan. 12,

1998) (making recommendations for further regulation of the

towing industry). In 2008, the General Assembly created the Task

2

A similar bill was introduced in 1988. That bill simply prohibited

charging more than $50 for the towing of a vehicle from a private parking

lot. H.B. 306, 1988 Leg., Reg. Sess. (First Reader). House Bill 306

apparently drew some opposition because its provisions would have

applied statewide and because, among other things, some felt that “the

$50 towing restriction” was “far too low for the cost and operation of

sophisticated equipment that must be used on newer model vehicles.”

Letter of Frederick C. Rummage, Esq., to the Hon. William Horne,

Chairman, House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 4, 1988). Legislative history

indicates that the 1989 bill was based largely upon the 1988 bill. Request

Form, Bill File on H.B. 1303, 1989 Leg., Reg. Sess. (requesting

“reintro[duction of] H.B. 306 (1988) with changes per attachment”).

Gen. 93] 97

Force to Study Motor Vehicle Towing Practices (“Task Force”),

2008 Md. Laws, ch. 514, and, the following year, extended the

Task Force’s authority to study State and local laws related to

towing practices, 2009 Md. Laws, ch. 704. The Task Force

considered a wide variety of issues stemming from motor vehicle

towing generally, including “numerous problems” related to

trespass towing. See A Report to Governor Martin O’Malley and

the Maryland General Assembly Regarding Task Force to Study

Motor Vehicle Towing Practices 7 (2009) (“Task Force Report”).

The Task Force’s final report recommended a few changes

that are relevant for our purposes. First, the Task Force

recommended that Subtitle 10A be amended so that its provisions

would apply statewide, rather than only in Baltimore City and

Baltimore County. Id. at 8-9. Second, the Task Force recommended

changing the permissible charge for storage fees from a set fee of

$8 per day to instead be equal to the amount authorized by the local

jurisdiction for the storage of impounded vehicles, because

“[c]apping the daily maximum storage rate for vehicles at the rate

allowable by the political subdivision for police initiated towing

was thought to be a reasonable limit taking into account economic

and geographic differences through the State.” Id. at 10. Finally,

the Task Force recommended imposing a specific maximum limit

(of $400 for towing and $35 per day for storage) on the fees that

could be charged for trespass towing in those jurisdictions “that do

not have a tow rate cap or a daily storage cap” for impound towing.

Id. In other words, the effect of the proposal would be to “[m]ake[]

the tow rate and daily storage rate maximum as set by the political

subdivision [for impound towing] or in the event that no limit is in

place, the limit is $400 for the tow and $35 per day for storage.”

Id. (emphasis added).3

Two cross-filed bills based on the recommendations of the

Task Force were introduced in 2010. In addition to adopting the

Task Force’s recommendation that Subtitle 10A of the

Transportation Article be made to apply statewide, the proposed

legislation amended TR § 21-10A-04 as urged in the Task Force

Report by, among other things, adding a provision limiting fees for

trespass towing and daily storage to discrete amounts in political

subdivisions without “fee limit[s]” for public safety impound

towing and storage. See S.B. 788, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (First

3

We have not been able to find the exact legislative language that was

proposed by the Task Force. Although the table of contents for the Task

Force’s report indicates that a proposed bill was attached as “Appendix

A,” that appendix is not attached to any of the copies of the Task Force

report that we have been able to locate.

98 [107 Op. Att’y

Reader); H.B. 1120, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (First Reader). During

the course of the legislative session, the House Bill was further

amended to clarify the status of local laws related to towing and to

provide that, in addition to fees for towing and storage, trespass

towing services could charge for “the actual cost of providing

notice” that the vehicle was towed. H.B. 1120, 2010 Leg., Reg.

Sess. (Third Reader). Though it appears that the bills were not

particularly controversial—H.B. 1120 passed with amendments

out of both the House Environmental Matters and Senate Judicial

Proceedings Committees with unanimous support—the 2010

session ended without a final version passing both chambers.

Substantially similar bills were introduced—and did not pass—

during the 2011 legislative session. See S.B. 570, 2011 Leg., Reg.

Sess.; H.B. 356, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess.

Finally, in 2012, some of the Task Force’s recommendations

became law. See 2012 Md. Laws, ch. 228. As enacted, the

legislation amended Subtitle 10A in three ways relevant to the

questions here.

First, the provisions of Subtitle 10A were made to apply

statewide, except that those jurisdictions that enact their own laws

regulating trespass towing are exempt from the duties and

limitations provided in TR § 21-10A-04(a), so long as those local

laws are “more stringent” than the State laws regulating “the

parking, towing or removal, or impounding of vehicles.” 2012 Md.

Laws, ch. 228; see also TR §§ 21-10A-01(b)(2), 21-10A-04(a).

Second, as recommended by the Task Force, the ordinary

maximum daily fee for storage of towed vehicles was changed

from no more than $8 per day to “the fee normally charged or

authorized by the political subdivision from which the vehicle was

towed for the daily storage of impounded vehicles.” 2012 Md.

Laws, ch. 228.

Third, the Legislature added a provision for those political

subdivisions that did not have a “fee limit for the public safety

towing, recovery, or storage of impounded vehicles,” and

precluded trespass towers in those jurisdictions from charging

more than $250 for “towing and recovering” a vehicle, and more

than $30 per day for storage. Id. The Task Force had

recommended that those default maximums be set at $400 for

towing and $35 per day for storage, Task Force Report at 10, but

Gen. 93] 99

after some debate, the General Assembly ultimately opted for a

lower number.4

Since these amendments were enacted in 2012, there have

been few changes to § 21-10A-04(a)(1). In 2013, the Legislature

amended and limited the notice provisions of the statute so that

trespass towers could recoup the actual cost of providing the notice

required by TR §§ 21-10A-04(a)(2) and (3), but only in

circumstances where the vehicle was not claimed within 48 hours

of arriving at the storage facility. 2013 Md. Laws, ch. 388.

Then, in 2021, House Bill 1330 was introduced. As is

relevant here, that bill would have explicitly excluded “any

administrative fees or additional charges or fees for additional

services related to the towing” from the amount of “total fees

normally charged or authorized” that TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i)

permitted trespass towers in certain jurisdictions to double. H.B.

1330, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (First Reader). At the hearing before

the House Environment and Transportation Committee, the bill’s

sponsor said that the state of the law regarding how much private

towing companies could charge to remove cars from private

parking lots was “very nebulous.” Hearing on H.B. 1330 Before

the House Comm. on Env’t & Transp., 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess., at

1:52:50 (Mar. 4, 2021) (statement of Del. Marlon Amprey). He

explained that, currently, towers were permitted to charge double

the amount charged in the city or county where the tow took place,

and that if a city or county did not have an “actual fee set,” then the

cap was $250 for the tow and $30 per day for holding the vehicle.

Id. at 1:52:59-1:54:06. The problem the bill sought to address was

that, as the sponsor explained it, the existing language of TR § 21-

10A-04(a) could be read to include administrative and processing

fees unique to cities and counties in the amount doubled for

trespass towing, and thus, in his opinion, the law was “not a fair

law as it’s currently constructed.” Id. at 1:53:11-1:54:28. The

sponsor withdrew the bill before second reading.

4

The 2012 law also added a provision permitting trespass towers to

charge the “actual cost” of providing the required notice. 2012 Md.

Laws, ch. 228. Currently, a trespass tower may charge “the actual cost”

of providing the required notice to the owner, any secured party, and the

insurer of record, unless the owner, the owner’s agent, the insurer of

record, or any secured party retakes possession of the vehicles within 48

hours of its arrival at the storage facility. See TR §§ 21-10A-04(a)(1)(iv)

and (b). The statute also requires the person towing to notify the police

department and the owner, any secured party, and the insurer of record

that the vehicle was towed. Id. §§ 21-10A-04(a)(3) and (4).

100 [107 Op. Att’y

B. Baltimore City’s Local Towing Laws

Because TR § 21-10A-04 imposes limits on the fees that may

be charged for trespass towing based on the fees charged or

authorized by local jurisdictions for public safety impound towing,

it is necessary to provide some background about how local

governments set fees for impound towing. We will use Baltimore

City, which requested this opinion, as an example.

Article 31, Subtitle 31 of the Baltimore City Code contains

provisions for “clear streets and impoundment.” Under these

provisions, a vehicle may be “impounded” in Baltimore City if it

is: obstructing traffic; illegally parked on “any street, lane, or

alley”; abandoned, as defined by State law in the Transportation

Article; “involved in an accident or other disablement”; recovered

by police after being reported stolen; or parked on a street, lane, or

alley without displaying current registration or with its vehicle

identification number obscured. Baltimore City Code, Art. 31,

§§ 31-6 through 31-10, 31-12 (2021).5 The owner of a vehicle that

has been impounded by the City for any of these reasons “may be

charged a maximum of $150 for the tow,” unless the vehicle is a

commercial vehicle or the tow occurs under certain extenuating

circumstances, such as if the vehicle must be removed from “an

embankment, ditch, waterway, trench, hole, or heavily wooded

area.” Id. § 31-11(a). “Additional storage fees, administrative fees,

and fines for outstanding parking violations may also be charged

as allowed by applicable laws and regulations.” Id. § 31-11(b). For

non-commercial vehicles impounded by the City and towed to its

auto pound, storage charges are $50 for the first 48 hours or “any

shorter period,” and $15 for each 24-hour period or part of a 24-

hour period following the first 48 hours. Id. § 31-47.

Part 4 of Subtitle 31 provides for impoundment procedures.

Those provisions establish a Towing Division6 within the

Department of Transportation and require the Director of

Transportation (“Director”) to provide an “auto pound or storage

A section in a different part of Subtitle 31 authorizes “impounding

5

or immobilization” of an unattended vehicle where it has three or more

“unsatisfied citations” for parking violations and 30 days or more have

elapsed since the third citation issued. Baltimore City Code, Art. 31,

§ 31-21.

6

The Towing Division is “responsible for managing the towing of

vehicles on all City property, including but not limited to roads, alleys,

and public parking lots.” Baltimore City Dep’t of Transp., “Towing

Division,” https://transportation.baltimorecity.gov/towing (last visited

March 17, 2022).

Gen. 93] 101

area of sufficient size and staffed with sufficient personnel and

equipment to receive, hold, and dispose of the motor vehicles

delivered to it.” Id. § 31-41. The Police Commissioner, in turn, is

directed to cause the removal of vehicles that are “abandoned,

parked, stopped, left unattended in violation of law, or obstructing

traffic,” id. § 31-42(a), apparently using either City-employed

towing crews or private towing companies. And for those vehicles

that are “stolen, disabled by accident or otherwise, or parked so as

to block the entrance to a driveway in an impoundment zone,” the

Police Commissioner is generally required to use private licensed

towers (called medallion towers7) to tow the vehicles to the City’s

auto pound. Id. § 31-42(b) (requiring, “except in emergency

situations,” that the Police Commissioner employ private,

“licensed towers or towing companies” to tow such vehicles).8

The Code also directs that the specific fees charged for

removal of the vehicles under § 31-42(b) by these private, licensed

medallion towers “shall be set in advance, arrived at by agreement

between the towers, the [Police] Commissioner, and the Director,”

with any disputes settled by the Commissioner. Id. § 31-42(d)(1).

But even if the towing “is performed by City forces or vehicles,”

that same schedule of charges apparently applies, and “[s]uch

towing charges will be added to the cost of storage” as specified by

the Code. Id. § 31-42(d)(2); see also id. § 31-47 (providing that

storage fees are ordinarily $50 for the first 48 hours or less and $15

for each 24-hour period thereafter). Regardless of whether the

towing is done under § 31-42(a) or § 31-42(b), the Code specifies

that the maximum fee for the act of towing a non-commercial

7

See, e.g., Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 22-1(c) (defining

“[m]edallion towing company” to mean a towing company licensed

under City law); Baltimore City Dep’t of Transp., “Towing Division,”

https://transportation.baltimorecity.gov/towing (last visited March 17,

2022) (describing medallions as “third-party vendors of City towing

services” that “follow the same rules and protocols as City towing

crews”).

8

A different subtitle of the Traffic and Transit Article governs the

licensing and regulation of the private tow companies employed to tow

these vehicles. See Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, §§ 22-1 through 22-

33. Subtitle 22’s provisions relate to “accident towing” of disabled

vehicles—defined in the Code to include those found stolen or held for

evidence, id. § 22-1(b)—and require that towers of disabled vehicles

generally be licensed as a “medallion towing company,” id. § 22-6(a)(1).

As we understand it, to the extent that they are the private towers

employed under Art. 31, § 31-42(b), these “accident” towers are part of

the City’s overall impound towing scheme.

102 [107 Op. Att’y

vehicle performed under non-extenuating circumstances cannot

exceed $150. See id. § 31-11(a) (providing the maximum for

towing under Subtitle 31, “clear streets and impoundment”), § 22-

9(b) (providing the maximum fee for “accident” towing).9

The $150 fee limitation found in both § 31-11 and § 22-9(b)

is relatively new, having been added in 2014. See City of

Baltimore, Ordinance No. 14-266 (2014) (adding those

limitations). Before that, the actual fees charged for the impound

towing of vehicles were still, as they are now, a product of an

agreement between City officials and the private towers that were

sometimes employed, but that agreement was apparently

unrestrained by any limitations in the Code as to what those fees

might be. See Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 95 (1983 Repl. Vol.).

As is the case now, that same schedule of charges applied “[i]n the

event towing is performed by City forces or vehicles and no

employment of towers [was] necessary.” Id.

Currently, it is our understanding that both the City and private

towers charge $130 to tow vehicles impounded from locations east

of Charles Street and $140 to tow vehicles impounded from

locations west of Charles Street. Baltimore City Dep’t of Transp.,

“Towing Fees,” https://transportation.baltimorecity.gov/towing/fees

(last visited March 18, 2022); see also Memorandum on City

Council Bill No. 14-0350 from William M. Johnson, Director,

Dep’t of Transp., to the President and Members of the City Council

(June 27, 2014) (reporting that both private “accident” towers and

the City’s fleet of towing vehicles charge either $130 or $140 per

tow, depending on the location). These fees apparently represent

the amounts negotiated between the private towers licensed to

perform impounds for the City and City officials, and subsequently

approved by the City’s Board of Estimates, which has authority

over the City’s contracts for services. See Charter of Baltimore

City, Art. VI, § 11(a), (d); Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 31-

42(d)(1).

In addition to the local impound towing laws discussed above,

Baltimore City also regulates the licensure of and, to a certain

extent, the fees charged by private companies engaged in trespass

towing. See generally Baltimore City Code, Art. 15, §§ 22-1

through 22-18. The Subtitle creates a Board of Licenses for

Towing Services (“Tow Board”) comprising City officials,

9

To be clear, that $150 maximum does not apply to the “[a]dditional

storage fees, administrative fees, and fines for outstanding parking

violations” that “may also be charged as allowed by applicable laws and

regulations” under § 31-42(a). Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 31-11(b).

Gen. 93] 103

representatives from the property management and trespass towing

industries, and one citizen. Id. § 22-2. The Tow Board is

authorized to adopt rules and regulations to “carry out the purpose

and intent” of Subtitle 22, id. § 22-3(a), and to oversee the fees that

trespass towing companies charge, see id. § 22-8 (requiring

applicants for trespass towing licenses to “file with the Board a

schedule setting forth the applicant’s proposed charges for towing

and for any services incident to towing,” and precluding any

change in charges “without filing with the Board an amended

schedule showing the charges proposed”). But the Tow Board is

not empowered to set, on its own, the fees charged by private

trespass towers; rather, those fees are governed by TR § 21-10A-

04, unless and until the City opts to adopt its own ordinances more

stringently regulating trespass towing fees. See TR §§ 21-10A-

01(b); 26-301(b)(3).10

II

Analysis

Your question is one of statutory interpretation, the ultimate

goal of which is to “ascertain and effectuate the General

Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute.”

Wheeling v. Selene Finance LP, 473 Md. 356, 376 (2021) (citation

omitted). To achieve that goal, we look first to the “normal, plain

meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a

whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered

surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Berry v.

McQueen, 469 Md. 674, 687 (2020). Generally, where the

language of a statute is unambiguous, we give effect to the statute

as written. Kushell v. Department of Nat. Res., 385 Md. 563, 577

(2005). At the same time, it may also be “beneficial to review the

legislative history both as a check on [a] plain language reading and

to eliminate alternate theories of legislative intent.” Washington

Gas Light Co. v. Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 460 Md. 667, 686

(2018). A meaningful review of a statute’s legislative history will

employ all available “resources and tools of statutory

construction,” Watts v. State, 457 Md. 419, 430 (2018), including

“the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding

it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and

amendments proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind

the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of various

10

In 2021, several Baltimore City councilmembers introduced a bill

that would amend the City’s trespass towing laws in several ways,

including by placing a $250 limit on the fee that trespass towers are

permitted to charge for towing services. See City of Baltimore, Council

Bill No. 21-0125 (First Reader).

104 [107 Op. Att’y

competing constructions,” Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v.

Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 295 (2017).

A. What Fees May be Doubled

Your first question is: which of the towing-related fees in TR

§ 21-10A-04 may be doubled? Under the statute, a trespass tower

generally may not charge “more than” certain amounts that are

specified in an enumerated list. TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1). That

enumerated list, in turn, refers to three separate types of charges

related to the act of towing a vehicle, the subsequent storage of a

towed vehicle, and the provision of notice that a vehicle was towed

and stored. More specifically, a trespass tower ordinarily may

charge (1) “twice the amount of the total fees normally charged or

authorized by the political subdivision for the public safety

impound towing of vehicles,” (2) “the fee normally charged or

authorized by the political subdivision from which the vehicle was

towed for the daily storage of impounded vehicles,” and (3) for the

“actual cost of providing notice under th[e] section.” Id.

(emphases added).

As an initial matter, it is clear from the text and structure of

the statute that the General Assembly did not intend to permit the

doubling of charges for storage of impounded vehicles or for notice

as part of the “total fees” for impound towing. That is because the

word “twice” is used only to modify the fees “normally charged or

authorized” for the towing of vehicles as provided in subparagraph

(a)(1)(i) and does not appear in the later subparagraphs that refer

separately to charges for storage and notice. If the General

Assembly had intended the storage and notice fees to be doubled,

then it would have included “twice” in those later subparagraphs

(or would have used the word to modify paragraph (a)(1) in its

entirety). We can say with a high degree of confidence, therefore,

that storage and notice fees are not included in the “total fees” that

are to be doubled. Instead, the total fees for impound towing are

doubled and then added to the non-doubled storage fee (if

applicable) that is normally charged or authorized for impounded

vehicles in the jurisdiction and the actual cost of notice (if

applicable) to determine the overall maximum fee that may be

charged for trespass towing.11

11

The legislative history also supports this view. A bill introduced in

1988, as well as an early draft of the one introduced in 1989, set discrete

monetary limits on what trespass towers were permitted to charge. The

1988 bill allowed trespass towers statewide to charge no more than $50

“for the towing of the vehicle from the parking lot,” and made no

Gen. 93] 105

The text of the statute is less clear, however, as to what other

fees related to the “public safety impound towing of vehicles”

might be included in the “total fees” that may be doubled under TR

§ 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i). For example, should Baltimore City’s

“administrative” fee for impound towing be included in the “total

fees” that are doubled to determine the maximum fee for trespass

towing? See Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 31-11(b). Or what

about fines for outstanding parking violations that vehicle owners

might have to pay before recovering their vehicles from the

impound lot? See id. The statutory language is not entirely clear

on those points, see Letter from Jeremy M. McCoy, Assistant

Attorney General, to Delegate Brooke E. Lierman, at 3 (Dec. 30,

2020) (explaining that “total fees” could arguably include

administrative fees)12, so we turn to the legislative history and the

general purpose of the statutory scheme for guidance.

To start, it is important to remember that in 1989, when what

became TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1) was introduced and enacted, its

provisions applied only to Baltimore City and Baltimore County.

It is thus reasonable to assume that the contemporaneous

“impound” towing practices of those jurisdictions informed the

statute as originally enacted in 1989. Indeed, that assumption finds

support in the legislative history. While the bill was being

considered during the 1989 session, for example, it was amended

so that towers could not charge more than “twice the amount

normally charged or authorized by the political subdivision for the

impound towing of vehicles.” H.B. 1303, 1989 Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Second Reader) (emphases added). The addition of “or

authorized” and “impound” to the text of the bill changed the

standard for allowable trespass towing fees so that it mirrored the

impound practices outlined in the Baltimore City Code, under

which either City forces or private towers might be called upon to

impound vehicles. See Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 95 (1983

Repl. Vol.). That is, if the “City’s forces” performed the impound,

reference whatsoever to charges for storage. H.B. 306, 1988 Leg., Reg.

Sess. (First Reader). Handwritten notes on an early draft of House Bill

1303 of 1989, meanwhile, reveal the sponsor’s decision to raise the

maximum allowable fee for towing in Baltimore City and County to $75,

and to permit charges of “no more than $10 per day for storage.” Del.

Curt Anderson’s Work Papers, Bill File on H.B. 1303, 1989 Leg., Reg.

Sess. The intent to treat towing and storage as separate and distinct

chargeable categories is thus clear from the very beginning.

12

Although that advice letter also left open the question of whether

fees for storage and notice might be included within the “total fees” that

may be doubled, we have already concluded above that such fees may

not be doubled.

106 [107 Op. Att’y

there would be an amount “normally charged” by the City; if

private towers performed the impound, the City “authorized” those

towers to charge a pre-determined amount.13

To understand what is meant by the “total fees normally

charged or authorized” for impound towing, then, we look to the

impound towing practices of Baltimore City and Baltimore County

as they existed in 1989. We will focus here on Baltimore City, as

its practices are the most helpful in understanding the meaning of

the statute.

The City Code, for its part, provided at the time that “[t]he

towing charges shall be set in advance, arrived at by agreement by

the towers, the [Police] Commissioner and the Director,” and that

“[i]n the event towing is performed by City forces or vehicles and

no employment of towers becomes necessary, the same schedule of

charges shall apply,” and would be “added to the cost of storage”

specified by the Code. Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 95 (1983

Repl. Vol.) (emphases added).

That the City Code referred to a “schedule of charges” for the

act of towing a vehicle, and used the term to refer back to the

“towing charges” mentioned earlier in the same section, suggests

that there was not one lump sum fee charged for the act of towing

but rather an itemized list of distinct fees that are all related to the

act of towing a vehicle. See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019) (defining “schedule” as a “written list or inventory; esp., a

statement that is attached to a document and that gives a detailed

showing of the matters referred to in the document”). There might

have been, for example, a flat fee charged in each case for

responding to tow a vehicle, and then a certain amount charged per

mile towed. Cf. Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 22-9(a) (charges

for “[accident] towing and for services incident to towing” may be

“measured by mileage, time, and type of service”); id. Art. 15,

13

The Baltimore County Code contained a similar scheme. Under

Baltimore County’s ordinances at the time, the Chief of Police was

authorized to “take possession of and remove any motor vehicle parked

upon any boulevard or through street in the county during the hours when

parking on any such boulevard or through street is prohibited.”

Baltimore County Code, § 17-27(a) (1978). To do so, the Chief of Police

was further “authorized to seize and remove motor vehicles by means of

county equipment or by contract,” and to store such vehicles “either upon

county property or upon private property by suitable contract; provided,

that any contract for the removal or storage of impounded motor vehicles

[was] entered into pursuant to the purchasing provisions of th[e] Code.”

Id. § 17-27(c) (1978 & 1988/89 Supp.) (emphasis added).

Gen. 93] 107

§ 22-8(b) (charges for trespass towing may be based on “mileage

time, and type of service,” or measured on a “flat fee basis”).14

Documentation of contemporary towing rates found in the bill

file for H.B. 306, introduced in 1988, supports this understanding

of how fees for a tow itself were broken down. See “Current

Metropolitan Area Towing Rates,” Bill File on H.B. 306, 1988

Leg., Reg. Sess. (providing a list of total fees charged by various

towing companies, including two in the Baltimore area, and

indicating the breakdown of that total for certain companies); see

also Patton v. Wells Fargo Fin. Md., 437 Md. 83, 99-100 (2014)

(relying on documents found in a bill file, including written

testimony and copies of federal legislation on the same topic as the

State bill); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Roberson, 420 Md. 649, 666

n.13 (2011) (relying on a Department of Legislative Services chart

in the bill file). According to that comparison, some companies

charged only a per-mile fee, while others appear to have charged a

flat fee (often referred to in industry parlance as a hookup fee) plus

mileage.

We recognize that, as currently written, the City Code allows

for “[a]dditional storage fees, administrative fees, and fines for

outstanding parking violations” to be charged on top of the fee for

impound towing, Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 31-11(b), and that

this provision is contained in the section governing “maximum

charges.” Based on this provision, one might argue that all of these

fees comprise the “total fees” charged or authorized for a public

safety impound tow and that, therefore, in Baltimore City, trespass

towers are permitted to double not only fees for towing, but also

these “additional storage fees, administrative fees, and fines for

outstanding parking violations.”

But when § 21-10A-04 was enacted in 1989, the City Code

contained no such provision. Instead, the City Code merely

directed towers, the Commissioner, and the Director to set the

“towing charges” in advance and allowed the City to add those

towing charges to the separate cost of storage. Baltimore City

14

The bill file for H.B. 1303, introduced in 1989, contains a copy of

the local bill introduced by Councilmember Ambridge that created the

Tow Board and included this provision addressing the approval and

measuring of charges. See Draft Bill Establishing Baltimore City Tow

Board, Bill File on H.B. 1303, 1989 Leg., Reg. Sess. Thus, the members

of the General Assembly were presumably aware of this proposed

measure of charges—i.e., by “mileage, time, and type of service.”

108 [107 Op. Att’y

Code, Art. 31, § 95 (1983 Repl. Vol.).15 That is important because

the language of TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1) has, since its original

enactment, referred to charges for “impound towing,” not simply

“impoundment” or “impounding” in general. Indeed, it is worth

noting that, today, the City Code continues to distinguish between

the charges for impound “towing,” Art. 31, § 31-11(a), and “other

charges,” id. § 31-11(b), which together comprise the maximum

charges for an “impoundment” governed by Subtitle 31 as a whole.

What is more, given H.B. 1303’s purpose of combating

“many well-publicized abuses by towing companies and parking

lot owners in the Baltimore area,” including the charging of

“exorbitant fees,” Floor Report, Senate Jud. Proc. Comm., H.B.

1303, 1989 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2, it would defy common sense to

suggest that the Legislature meant to authorize trespass towing

companies to increase their fees based on a doubling of impound

charges, such as fines owed to the City for parking violations, that

are entirely unrelated to the types of costs incurred by private

towers. See Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 358-59 (1994)

(statutes must be “construed in accordance with [their] general

purposes and policies”).16

15

The bill file for Senate Bill 570, introduced in 2011, contains a chart

that compared the maximum trespass towing rates permitted in counties

that licensed trespass towers, and we recognize that the maximum rate

listed in that chart for trespass towing in Baltimore City appears to have

been calculated by doubling each of the “maximum charges” related to

impounding, including the administrative fee, and then adding them

together. See “Maximum Trespass Towing Rates,” Bill File on S.B. 570,

2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. From this, one might argue that the Legislature

was aware that all of these fees were being included in the “total fees”

that were doubled under the statute as currently constructed and that its

failure to take corrective action is evidence of its intent to permit such

fee practices. However, the chart neither indicates how the maximums

were calculated, nor provides references to the local impound towing

laws ostensibly used to calculate those rates. In other words, it would

not have been clear to a legislator reading the chart that the maximum

fee listed for Baltimore City was calculated by doubling all of the fees,

including the administrative fees. We therefore do not consider the chart

as convincing evidence that the Legislature was on notice that Baltimore

City was doubling all fees associated with the entire process of

impounding a vehicle and, by failing to further clarify the term “total

fees,” gave tacit approval to the practice.

16

In fact, it is especially clear that fines for traffic or parking

violations would not be included within the fees that are doubled under

TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i), because those types of charges do not arise in

a normal tow—but rather only under certain limited circumstances—

they would not be part of the fees “normally charged or authorized.” TR

§ 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added).

Gen. 93] 109

In sum, because both the text of TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1) and its

legislative history make plain the General Assembly’s intent to

treat fees for towing as separate from fees for storage and notice

(and to treat them differently for purposes of calculating allowable

charges for trespass towing), we conclude that the “total fees

normally charged or authorized” do not include fees for storage or

notice, nor fines owed for violating traffic or parking laws.

Similarly, as to administrative fees, although it is not entirely clear

from the text of the statute itself, the legislative history leads us to

conclude that the Legislature likely did not intend to include, in the

“total fees” doubled under TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i), administrative

fees charged by a political subdivision for impounding a vehicle.17

Rather, it appears that the intent was for only those fees directly

related to the act of towing a vehicle to be doubled pursuant to TR

§ 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i).

B. Meaning of “Normally Charged or Authorized”

Your second question, about the meaning of and relationship

between the phrases “fees normally charged or authorized” and

“fee limit,” is more difficult to answer. As explained above, the

maximum fees that may be charged for trespass towing in a

jurisdiction are ordinarily determined based on the fees “normally

charged or authorized” in that local jurisdiction for public safety

impound towing and the storage of an impounded vehicle. TR

§ 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i), (ii). But the statute provides for a different

17

The bill introduced in 2021, which would have explicitly excluded

“any administrative fees or additional charges or fees for additional

services related to the towing,” from the amount that could be doubled

under TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i), could arguably be taken as evidence that

at least one legislator believed that the subsection as written permits the

doubling of the administrative fees charged by a political subdivision for

public safety impound towing. H.B. 1330, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (First

Reader); see also Fiscal & Policy Note, H.B. 1330, 2021 Leg., Reg.

Sess., at 1 (“[T]he bill alters the amount a person may charge for towing

by specifying that the total permissible charges authorized under State

law exclude any administrative fees or additional charges or fees for

additional services related to the towing.”). However, although the

Legislature’s failure to pass a bill can be “significant where bills have

repeatedly been introduced in the General Assembly to accomplish a

particular result, and where the General Assembly has persistently

refused to enact such bills,” Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 641 (2005),

here we have neither repeated introductions of this language nor a

persistent refusal by the General Assembly to adopt it. Rather, the bill—

which represents the first time any limiting or clarifying language related

to “total fees” was proposed—was withdrawn by its sponsor before the

measure was even considered by the entire General Assembly.

110 [107 Op. Att’y

rule if the local jurisdiction does not have a so-called “fee limit”

for public safety towing: “If a political subdivision does not

establish a fee limit for the public safety towing, recovery, or

storage of impounded vehicles, [the maximum charges are] $250

for towing and recovering a vehicle and $30 per day for vehicle

storage.” TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). So the

question is—what does “fee limit” mean in this context? Is it the

same as the “fee[] normally charged or authorized” in the

jurisdiction or does it refer to something else?

Before we decide that question, however, we first need to

understand what the phrase “fees normally charged or authorized”

was intended to mean. As explained above, see Part II.A, supra,

our understanding is that an amount “normally charged” refers to a

fee when the political subdivision itself is performing an impound-

related tow, while an amount “normally . . . authorized” refers to a

fee when the political subdivision sets or approves the fees charged

by private companies licensed to do the impound towing. But,

either way, the point is that the local jurisdiction is setting

limitations, through legislative enactment or through some other

formal means, on the fees that may be charged for public safety

impound towing. That is, the “normal” fees to be charged or

authorized are subject to oversight and control by the government;

they are not merely the product of the practices of private towing

companies that, though they might converge around an amount that

is “normal” to charge for a public safety impound tow, are

nevertheless unrestrained. In other words, the fee “normally

charged or authorized” in a jurisdiction is the predetermined, fixed

amount the jurisdiction charges (or authorizes private towers to

charge) for an ordinary public safety impound-related tow that

takes place under normal circumstances. Although the actual fee

for a particular impound tow might be higher or lower than

ordinary under certain circumstances (such as if there is a surcharge

for the towing of a vehicle out of a ditch), the fee “normally charged

or authorized” is the set fee for a normal tow.18

18

Unfortunately, given the varied towing practices around the State,

it will not always be easy to determine this amount in practice. In

Baltimore City, for example, the amount “normally charged or

authorized” by the City for impound towing appears to be $130 for

vehicles east of Charles Street and $140 for vehicles west of Charles

Street. See Baltimore City Department of Transportation, Towing Fees,

https://transportation.baltimorecity.gov/towing/fees (last visited March

18, 2022). Assuming that the fee “normally charged or authorized” is

either $130 or $140, however, there is no guidance in the statute about

how to choose between the two. While the City is in the best position to

Gen. 93] 111

With that understanding, we return to the question of whether

“fees normally charged or authorized” in subparagraph (a)(1)(i)

means the same thing as “fee limit[s]” in subparagraph (a)(1)(iii).

At first blush, one’s instinct might be that the two concepts are

entirely different. In ordinary parlance, after all, the term “fee

limit” implies a maximum allowable fee, while the amount

“normally charged or authorized by the political subdivision”

might well be lower than that maximum allowable fee. It is also

true that “when a legislature uses different words, especially in the

same section or in a part of the statute that deals with the same

subject, it usually intends different things.” Toler v. Motor Vehicle

Admin., 373 Md. 214, 223 (2003).

At the same time, neither phrase is specifically defined, and the

statutory scheme becomes more difficult to follow if the fee

“normally charged or authorized by a political subdivision” does

not qualify as a “fee limit” under subparagraph (a)(1)(iii). If read

that way, the fee normally charged or authorized by the local

jurisdiction for impound towing (which the statutory design

suggests is the usual basis for calculating the allowable fees for

trespass towing) becomes entirely irrelevant unless the jurisdiction

also has an overall maximum cap on fees for impound towing. It

is not clear to us that the General Assembly intended that result,

especially given that having a set fee that is normally charged or

authorized already imposes a substantial limitation on the fees that

can permissibly be assessed for impound towing. It is thus possible

the term “fee limit” was meant to encompass a variety of ways in

which a local jurisdiction might set limitations on the fees that can

be charged for public safety impound towing. In other words,

perhaps the General Assembly meant “a fee limit” to refer more

generally to a limitation on the fees that can be assessed for

impound towing, one of which might be to have a predetermined,

fixed amount that is “normally charged or authorized” by the local

jurisdiction.

determine which fee is properly characterized as the fee “normally

charged or authorized,” we note that the City’s main impound lot is

located at 6700 Pulaski Highway, far on the eastern side of the City, and

it appears that this location accounts for the higher fee for towing

vehicles from the western side of the City. See Memorandum on City

Council Bill No. 14-0350 from William M. Johnson, Director, Dep’t of

Transportation, to the President and Members of the City Council (June

27, 2014) (explaining that the fee differential “accommodates for the

extended distance of the tow from the west side of the City to the tow

yards on the east side”). Our sense, then, is that $130 is more likely the

“normal” fee, and that vehicles located further from the auto pound are,

in effect, assessed an additional $10 to compensate for the longer haul.

112 [107 Op. Att’y

In light of that ambiguity, we turn to the legislative history for

further guidance. To begin, it is important to remember that Senate

Bill 401 was largely based on recommendations made by the

towing practices Task Force in 2008. See Floor Report, Senate Jud.

Proc. Comm., S.B. 401, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1 (“This bill

generally implements the Task Force to Study Motor Vehicle

Towing Practices’ recommended legislative changes relating

primarily to the regulation of nonconsensual towing of vehicles

from private property and the disposition of towed vehicles.”).

A close reading of the Task Force Report suggests that the

term “fee limit” did not mean only a legislatively enacted

maximum fee, but rather was intended to encompass a broader

understanding of what it means to limit fees that may be charged,

which would include the “fees normally charged or authorized” by

a political subdivision, at least as we understand that concept.

More specifically, the Task Force indicated that it had been

“uncomfortable with potential areas that do not have a tow rate cap

or a daily storage rate cap,” and that “[t]o address this, the Task

Force voted . . . in favor of placing maximum limits, only where

there is no local cap, of $400 for the tow and $35 per day for

storage.” Task Force Report at 10 (emphasis added). In 2008 and

2009, when the Task Force was meeting and deliberating,

Baltimore City did not appear to have any sort of set, maximum

“cap” in its code for impound or any other form of towing. See

Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 95 (1983 Repl. Vol.) (fees for

impound towing set by agreement between towers, the Police

Commissioner, and the Director of Public Works, with no

limitation in the Code as to how high those fees could be). 19 Yet,

earlier in its report, the Task Force indicated that there had been

“consensus that [Subtitle 10A] worked relatively well in Baltimore

City and County,” Task Force Report at 7, which would suggest

that Baltimore City and County were not among the “cap”-lacking

areas causing discomfort and, further, that the Task Force expected

that TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i) and (ii)—and not the new provision

for jurisdictions without a “fee limit”—would continue to apply in

Baltimore City and County.

19

Arguably, the City’s code did have a cap for fees related to storage

of impounded vehicles. See Baltimore City Code, Art. 31, § 96 (1983

Repl. Vol.) (storage charges for non-commercial vehicles are $15 for the

first 48 hours and $4 per day thereafter). Section 31-11(a) of Article 31,

which provides that the owner of an impounded vehicle may be charged

a maximum of $150 for impound-related towing unless the vehicle

requires certain “specialized and exceptional services” for removal, was

not added to the Code until 2014.

Gen. 93] 113

The Task Force Report also sheds light on how the Task Force

viewed the relationship between the concepts embodied by the

phrases “fees normally charged or authorized” and “fee limit.”

Throughout its report, the Task Force referred to the rates normally

charged or authorized in the jurisdiction as a type of “limit.” For

example, the Task Force explained that its proposal “ma[de] the

tow rate and daily storage rate maximum as set by the political

subdivision [i.e., based on the amount normally charged or

authorized by the jurisdiction] or in the event that no limit is in

place, the limit is $400 for the tow and $35 per day for storage.”

Task Force Report at 10 (emphasis added). Similarly, the report

also explained the recommended changes to subsection (a)(1)(ii)’s

storage fees provision: “Capping the daily maximum storage rate

for vehicles at the rate allowable by the political subdivision for

police initiated towing was thought to be a reasonable limit taking

into account economic and geographic differences throughout the

State.” Id. (emphases added). Thus, it seems that the Task Force

understood the word “limit” to describe both the concept embodied

by TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i)’s “fees normally charged or

authorized” language and the substantive recommendation later

articulated as a “fee limit” in TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(iii). This, in

turn, suggests that the Task Force might have viewed these two

phrases—“fees normally charged or authorized” and “fee limit”—

as conceptually interchangeable or that, at least, it viewed the “fees

normally charged or authorized” as a type of “fee limit.”

The legislative history of the bills subsequently introduced to

implement the Task Force’s recommendations also suggests that

the General Assembly had the same general understanding. For

example, the Senate Floor Report related to the 2012 bill advised

that “[t]he bill establishes the towing and daily storage rates based

on the limits set by the political subdivision for a public safety tow

from which the vehicle was towed, or if no limit is established, no

more than $250 for towing or $30 per day for storage.” Floor

Report, Senate Jud. Proc. Comm., S.B. 401, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess.,

at 2 (emphases added); see also Floor Report, Env’t Matters

Comm., H.B. 1120, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (containing nearly

identical language). That summary is illuminating because the

phrase “the limits set by the political subdivision” in the summary

clearly refers to the fees that are “normally charged or authorized”

by the jurisdiction—because those were the only possible “limits”

found in TR § 21-10A-04(a) at the time—and suggests that the

default maximum in subparagraph (a)(1)(iii) is triggered only if

there are no such “limits.” Similarly, at a committee hearing on the

2012 legislation that ultimately became law, the sponsor explained

that the fees for trespass towing were largely “left to local

114 [107 Op. Att’y

jurisdictions,” and that the bill would only apply if there were no

“action” at the local level. Hearing on H.B. 160 Before the House

Comm. on Env’t Matters, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 00:04:20 (Feb.

21, 2012) (statement of Del. Doyle Niemann).

These statements suggest that subsection (a)(1)(iii) was added

to set default limits for those jurisdictions whose fees would not

have been regulated at the local level, either by stricter trespass

towing laws or via the locality’s “limits” on fees for public safety

impound towing. Although one way for a political subdivision to

achieve such “limits” might be by codifying a maximum allowable

charge for impound towing, the Legislature appeared to recognize

that another way was by having set fees that were “normally

charged or authorized” by the government for those tows. The

statements contained in the floor reports—that the tow and storage

rates were “based on the limits set by the political subdivision for a

public safety tow”—further support the conclusion that the General

Assembly meant the term “fee limit” in TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(iii)

to include the “fees normally charged or authorized” found in TR

§ 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i) and (ii). Thus, the history of TR § 21-10A-

04(a) reveals that legislators (and those with knowledge of the

trespass towing industry) have treated the phrase “fees normally

charged or authorized by a political subdivision” as a type of “fee

limit” for purposes of subsection (a)(1)(iii), despite the fact that the

two terms might not, in ordinary usage, be synonymous.

In fact, it appears that the Legislature may have contemplated

three broad categories of political subdivisions that would be

subject to TR § 21-10A-04(a)20 and that the default fees in

subparagraph (a)(1)(iii)’s “fee limit” provision were intended to

apply only to the third category. The first category would include

those jurisdictions with maximum limits for public safety impound

towing and storage set by code or some sort of regulation with legal

force. These jurisdictions would have had clear “fee limits” for

impound towing and thus would not have been considered subject

to the default limits for trespass towing in TR § 21-10A-

04(a)(1)(iii).21

20

As a reminder, a local jurisdiction would not be subject to TR § 21-

10A-04(a) if it chose to adopt its own more stringent limits on trespass

fees via local law. See TR § 21-10A-01(b)(2); see also TR § 21-10A-

04(a) (providing that the fees limitation on trespass towing apply

“[u]nless otherwise set by local law”).

21

In these jurisdictions, there might be a question as to which

impound towing fee is the fee “normally charged or authorized” and,

Gen. 93] 115

The second category would comprise jurisdictions that might

not have had discrete monetary limits set in their codes for public

safety impound towing but did have other means of formally

limiting and fixing the fees that were charged for impounding

vehicles—for example, by having predetermined fees and

requiring, as Baltimore City did in 2012 and still does, that the fees

be negotiated by the private towers and the City and ultimately

approved by a spending board—and thereby creating a fee that was

“normally charged or authorized.” See Baltimore City Code, Art.

31, § 31-42(d) (2000 & 2008 Supp.). Because the City had been

subject to TR § 21-10A-04 since 1989, and the members of the

Task Force appeared to agree that the law was working “relatively

well,” the City and any other jurisdictions with similar schemes to

determine and fix fees that are “normally charged or authorized”

for public safety impound towing likely would also not have been

considered subject to subsection (a)(1)(iii).

Third would be those jurisdictions that did not set any formal,

predetermined limits on the amount of the fees charged for public

safety impound towing and thus have neither a maximum fee nor a

fee “normally charged or authorized” as we understand that term.

Although we have not reviewed every local jurisdiction’s towing

scheme and cannot categorize them with certainty, these were

likely the types of jurisdictions that the Task Force had in mind

when it recommended that the General Assembly add TR § 21-

10A-04(a)(1)(iii)’s “fee limit” provision. Cf. Hearing on H.B. 160

Before the House Comm. on Env’t Matters, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess.,

at 00:04:20 (Feb. 21, 2012) (statement of Del. Doyle Niemann)

(explaining that the default limits in the bill would only apply if

there were no “action” at the local level). Read this way, the “fees

normally charged or authorized,” and subject to some sort of formal

process for determining and fixing those fees, effectively function

as a type of “fee limit” under TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(iii).

thus, doubled for purposes of determining the maximum fee for trespass

towing. Assuming that there is a maximum fee for public safety

impound towing and nothing else in the jurisdiction’s regime would

establish a fee lower than the maximum as the fee “normally” charged

or authorized for impounding towing and storage, that codified

maximum would presumably be the amount “normally charged or

authorized” used to calculate permissible trespass towing fees under TR

§ 21-10A-04(a)(1), as the jurisdiction has effectively “authorized” a fee

to be charged up to the maximum amount. But, in jurisdictions that have

both a maximum fee limit and a lower amount that is “normally charged

or authorized,” the lower amount would be used to calculate the

maximum fee for the trespass tow.

116 [107 Op. Att’y

III

Conclusion

In our opinion, it is clear that TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1)(i) does

not permit the doubling of fees for storage or notice related to

impounding a vehicle, or any fines that the local jurisdiction

imposes for traffic violations. Although it is less clear, we also

conclude that the General Assembly likely did not intend that

administrative fees charged by a political subdivision for public

safety impounding be included in the “total fees” doubled under

TR § 21-10A-04(a)(1).

As to your second question, although not free from doubt, our

conclusion is that the General Assembly intended a “fee normally

charged or authorized” to operate as a type of fee limit; thus, a

jurisdiction that has set “fees normally charged or authorized” for

public safety towing within the jurisdiction has a “fee limit” within

the meaning of TR § 21-10A-04(a).

Brian E. Frosh

Attorney General of Maryland

Sara Klemm

Assistant Attorney General

Patrick B. Hughes

Chief Counsel, Opinions and Advice