William Hower Melendez v. State of Florida Department of Corrections

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13455

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WILLIAM H. MELENDEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

JOHN PALMER,

Assistant Regional Director,

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

an agency of the State of Florida,

DONALD DAVIS,

JEFFREY R. MCCLELLAN,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

Defendants-Appellants,

WARDEN, FLORIDA STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01023-BJD-JBT

____________________

____________________

No. 22-10306

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WILLIAM HOWER MELENDEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

an agency of the State of Florida,

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 3

Defendant-Appellant,

WARDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01023-BJD-JBT

____________________

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated cases concern the appeals of two dis-

trict court orders granting William Melendez’s first and second

motions for preliminary injunction against the Florida Depart-

ment of Corrections (“FDC”), Mark Inch, in his official capacity as

the Secretary of FDC, and various FDC officers and officials (col-

lectively, “Defendants”). For the reasons explained below, we

conclude that Defendants’ appeal as to the first preliminary in-

junction is moot and that no exception to mootness applies. We

therefore dismiss the appeal as to case number 21-13455. As to

the second preliminary injunction, we conclude that the district

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

court did not abuse its discretion in granting Melendez’s motion.

We therefore affirm the appeal as to case number 22-10306.

I. BACKGROUND

Melendez, a sixty-two-year-old inmate in Florida state pris-

on, filed a second amended complaint for damages and injunctive

relief against Defendants and other nonparty state officials. In his

complaint, Melendez brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, al-

leging violations under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabili-

ties Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

Of relevance to this appeal, Melendez alleged that Defend-

ants had held him in solitary confinement continuously, except

for a four-month period, since he attempted suicide on August 24,

2016. During his term of solitary confinement, Melendez alleged

that he was classified as “Close Management” (“CM”), which is

used by FDC to isolate inmates that FDC has determined cannot

remain in the general prison population without abusing the

rights and privileges of others. He alleged that he had remained

in the most restrictive level of CM, “CM I,” for most of his con-

finement. He additionally alleged that Defendants, through their

isolation-related practices and policies, had “subjected [him] to a

substantial risk of serious harm and deprived him of the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities and basic human dignity by

exposing him to excessive periods of isolation in deplorable condi-

tions.” He further alleged that Defendants were aware of these

deprivations and remained deliberately indifferent to them and

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 5

had not acted to reduce or eliminate the risk posed by them, all in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendants filed an answer

generally denying Melendez’s allegations.

A. First Preliminary Injunction (Case No. 21-13455)

On September 27, 2021, Melendez filed his first motion for

preliminary injunction, alleging that he was “in existential crisis,

having recently made multiple attempts to kill himself,” and

needed “immediate inpatient psychiatric treatment.” He claimed

that a mental health expert had evaluated him and determined

that he was “at an extremely high risk of suicide” and required

“prompt transfer to an inpatient treatment unit.” Melendez ar-

gued that he satisfied the four-part test for issuing a preliminary

injunction because: (1) he was likely to succeed on the merits of

his claims; (2) he would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction

was not granted, as he was at extremely high risk of suicide and

other serious injury due to his ongoing isolation and subsequently

worsening mental illness; (3) the balance of harms and the public

interest favored granting the injunction; and (4) the injunction

met the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”) “needs-

narrowness-intrusiveness requirements.” In support of his mo-

tion, Melendez submitted: (1) reports authored by Dr. Terry

Kupers, a board-certified psychiatrist who had twice evaluated

Melendez, as recently as September 15, 2021, and diagnosed him

with “major depressive disorder with psychotic features (includ-

ing paranoia) and very high suicide risk”; (2) Melendez’s declara-

tions; (3) FDC records documenting Melendez’s self-harm; (4) dis-

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

ciplinary and classification records; and (5) a declaration from Dan

Pacholke, a veteran correctional administrator, who opined that

CM was not appropriate housing for Melendez. Melendez re-

quested an evidentiary hearing.

The district court ordered Defendants to respond to the

first preliminary injunction motion and set a hearing for October

6, 2021. The district court denied Melendez’s request for an evi-

dentiary hearing because the motion did not appear to involve

“bitterly contested” facts or require it to make credibility deter-

minations.

Defendants responded, arguing that Melendez did not have

a “serious mental illness” but suffered from “a generalized anxiety

disorder and an antisocial personality disorder.” They argued that

Melendez was not actively suicidal, that he inflicted self-harm for

secondary gain, that he was being offered mental health services

consistent with his diagnoses, and that a higher level of care was

not warranted. Defendants further argued that Melendez failed

to satisfy the elements for an injunction, contending that the evi-

dence showed he had repeatedly demonstrated an inability to live

in the general population (“GP”) of the prison without abusing

the rights and privileges of others. They submitted the following

evidence in support of their response: (1) an affidavit from Assis-

tant Warden Jeffrey McClellan that summarized Melendez’s dis-

ciplinary history and CM classification (with attached records); (2)

records listing FDC’s reviews of Melendez’s placement in solitary

confinement; (3) a request for judicial notice of an expert report

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 7

from another case; and (4) a report from FDC mental health di-

rector Dr. George Emanoilidis. Melendez filed a reply to Defend-

ants’ response.

Following the hearing on the first preliminary injunction

motion, the district court made the following findings: (1) Melen-

dez was likely to succeed on his Eighth Amendment claim as to

his conditions of confinement based on the record evidence; (2)

Melendez showed irreparable harm, specifically death; (3) Melen-

dez’s transfer to a psychiatric hospital within FDC was a

“miniscule, if nonexistent” harm to Defendants; and (4) the public

interest favored adequate treatment of mentally ill people.” The

district court entered an endorsed order the same day granting

the first motion for preliminary injunction. The district court di-

rected Defendants to immediately transfer Melendez from CM to

“a suitable mental health unit for inpatient psychiatric treatment

where [he] shall remain until a qualified licensed mental health

provider at the transferee institution determines [he] is medically

and psychologically capable of returning to [GP]” and to “video

record all of [his] interactions with staff on account of [his] physi-

cal or mental health or problematic behavior and transportation

until [he] is transferred to an inpatient psychiatric facility and up-

on his return therefrom.”

Then, on October 15, 2021, the district court issued a writ-

ten order explaining its findings and reasoning for granting the

injunction. First, the district court found that Melendez had

demonstrated a likelihood of success as to his Eighth Amendment

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

claim against Defendants. The district court recognized that soli-

tary confinement, in and of itself, was not prohibited by the

Eighth Amendment, but that the length of such confinement

could not be ignored, noting several recent concurring and dis-

senting opinions from the Supreme Court that questioned the

constitutionality of lengthy terms of solitary confinement. The

district court noted that Melendez did not object to solitary con-

finement in a general sense but rather complained that his ex-

tended commitment deprived him of the most basic constitution-

al guarantees of humane treatment. The court recognized that

the evidence showed Melendez spent most of the previous five

years in CM. Specifically, Melendez had CM I status from Sep-

tember 13, 2016, through June 17, 2019, and again from October

19, 2020, through October 6, 2021, resulting from disciplinary

charges against Melendez that were overturned. The court noted

that, after the first CM I stint, he was downgraded to CM II then

CM III, successfully completing the CM step-down program on

March 23, 2020. The court also explained that, pursuant to the

Florida Administrative Code (“FAC”), the Institutional Classifica-

tion Team (“ICT”) was required to conduct regular reviews of an

inmate’s CM status—once a week for the first sixty days, and then

once every thirty days thereafter. And, after an inmate is on CM

status for six months, the district court explained that the classifi-

cation officer was required to interview the inmate and prepare a

formal assessment and evaluation.

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 9

The district court credited Pacholke’s opinions as to soli-

tary confinement, i.e., that it should be used sparingly and for the

shortest time possible, aligned with the stated purpose of regular

reviews for inmates’ CM statuses and with Eighth Amendment

jurisprudence that harsh conditions may become cruel and unu-

sual if they persist for long periods of time without penological

justification. The district court also found the opinions of Dr.

Kupers— who had interviewed Melendez twice within the last six

months and had reviewed his prison medical records—

convincing, credible, and entitled to significant weight. Specifical-

ly, Dr. Kupers opined that solitary confinement exacerbated

Melendez’s mental illness—diagnosed as major depressive disor-

der with psychotic features, including paranoia, and very high sui-

cide risk—and created daily situations where he was in conflict

with custody staff and that Melendez needed to be transferred to

a unit where more intensive mental health treatment was availa-

ble. Dr. Kupers explained that Melendez thought about suicide

all the time and had attempted suicide at least seven times since

2013, most recently in August 2021, and that despite these inci-

dents, FDC did not recognize that he was at risk of self-injury.

As to Dr. Emanoilidis’s opinion that Melendez was not cur-

rently in crisis and that his mental health needs were being met,

the district court noted that Dr. Emanoilidis had not personally

evaluated Melendez nor spoken to him for more than ten

minutes. Additionally, Dr. Emanoilidis’s opinions were based on

his limited interactions with Melendez, the results of Melendez’s

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

last full psychiatric evaluation, and records prepared by FDC cli-

nicians who, the district court found, had spent little time examin-

ing Melendez and had underreported his “serious psychopatholo-

gy.” By contrast, Dr. Kupers had personally evaluated Melendez

for nearly five hours.

Furthermore, the court explained that it was troubled by

the fact that FDC officials ignored Melendez’s “suicidal gestures”

and returned him to solitary confinement after such incidents and

that mental health professionals in the prison neither intervened

when Melendez unilaterally refused mental health treatment nor

recorded the extent of Melendez’s psychosis. In particular, the

court noted that, as to Melendez’s August 2021 “suicidal gesture”

in which he inserted two nails into his arm, a Multidisciplinary

Service Team (“MDST”) neither acknowledged the incident in its

treatment progress meeting and report conducted within days of

the incident, nor did the team have a psychiatrist evaluate Melen-

dez. The district court also noted that Melendez averred he told

MDST at the meeting that he was hearing voices but that he was

returned to his solitary confinement cell instead of immediately

being taken to a medical unit or the hospital. And, the court ex-

plained, when Melendez was eventually taken to the hospital, the

doctor who evaluated him recognized his serious need for psychi-

atric intervention, bolstering Dr. Kupers’s opinion.

The district court further stated that Melendez not only

had been consigned to CM I status for an inordinately long time

period, but that time period, in combination with the conditions

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 11

of CM I, suggested he was deprived of the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities, including human interaction, exer-

cise, and regular opportunities to cleanse himself. The court not-

ed Melendez’s statements that, despite the rules governing CM

inmates, he was not permitted to exercise outdoors since July 26,

2020, and, as of September 24, 2021, he had not showered in four

weeks, leading to a staph infection in his legs. Melendez also

averred that he laid awake at night afraid that officers would enter

his cell and assault him. The court noted that Defendants had not

offered evidence to rebut those assertions. Thus, the evidence

demonstrated that Melendez’s “lengthy confinement in [CM I]

pose[d] a substantial risk of serious harm to his mental and physi-

cal health.”

The district court also determined that Melendez was likely

to establish that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the

risk of harm he faced “by the very fact that the risk is obvious,” as

the risks of harm associated with prolonged periods of isolation

are well known, including by corrections officials tasked with

promulgating and enforcing rules for safety and well-being of in-

mates. The court explained that FDC staff was aware of Melen-

dez’s stay in CM I because of their obligation to visit CM units

and because, prior to Melendez’s action, his attorney sent a letter

to the then-warden of the prison detailing Melendez’s mental

health deterioration, his grievances, and the fact that he was, at

the time, on a hunger strike.

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As to the other injunction elements, the district court

found that Melendez demonstrated the threat of irreparable harm

because of his suicidal behavior and depression and because po-

tential death constituted the ultimate irreparable injury. The

court found the risk of harm to Defendants was minor, given that

FDC already maintained facilities equipped to treat mentally ill

prisoners. And the court explained it was in the public interest to

ensure prisoners with mental illness are humanely treated in ac-

cordance with the Constitution. The court further explained that

its relief was “narrowly drawn and extends no further than neces-

sary to address the harm [he] was facing when he filed his emer-

gency motion,” as its directives ensured Melendez’s rights were

not further infringed in addition to safeguarding prison staff inter-

acting with him.

Defendants appealed and moved to stay the first prelimi-

nary injunction in the district court pending their appeal. The dis-

trict court denied Defendants’ stay motion. Defendants filed an

emergency motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending ap-

peal in this Court, which we denied on October 11, 2021. On

January 4, 2022, the first preliminary injunction expired by opera-

tion of law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

B. Second Preliminary Injunction (Case No. 22-10306)

On January 3, 2022, Melendez filed a second motion for a

preliminary injunction. Melendez stated that, following the first

preliminary injunction, Defendants began to comply with the

court’s injunction under threat of sanctions but, within days of

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 13

transfer, filed a report to the court downplaying his mental illness

and portraying him as a malingerer. According to Melendez, on

November 4, 2021, FDC’s counsel notified his counsel that FDC

had cleared him to return to CM. Then, on November 9, 2021,

Melendez was returned to administrative solitary confinement,

where FDC stated he would stay pending resolution of its inter-

locutory appeal. Melendez asserted that FDC would likely return

him to a CM unit upon the expiration of the first preliminary in-

junction.

Melendez asserted that Defendants had “no intention” of

providing him with adequate mental health treatment and there-

fore sought an order requiring that: (1) Defendants return Melen-

dez to the Transitional Care Unit (“TCU”) for inpatient mental

health care; (2) a court-appointed, independent expert opine as to

his mental health needs; (3) the parties have the opportunity to

review the findings of the court-appointed expert and a reasona-

ble opportunity to challenge any proposed discharge from the

TCU; and (4) Defendants not hold Melendez in solitary confine-

ment conditions, i.e., confinement to his cell for at least 22 hours

per day or any other confinement characterized by minimal to

rare meaningful contact with other individuals and the lack of op-

portunities for congregate recreation, meals, and programming.

Melendez asserted that he satisfied the test for issuing a prelimi-

nary injunction for substantially the same reasons as the first pre-

liminary injunction and noted that the court granted his previous

injunction. Melendez filed several exhibits in support of his mo-

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

tion, including a demonstrative exhibit summarizing his special

housing unit records from December 2011 to July 2021, which

were produced by Defendants during expedited discovery.

Melendez also requested an evidentiary hearing.

Defendants again opposed Melendez’s motion, arguing

that he was not likely to succeed on the merits of his Eighth

Amendment claim because he could not demonstrate deliberate

indifference and because his placement in CM was penologically

justified. Specifically, they contended that Melendez was classi-

fied as CM I status because FDC officials determined he could not

be housed in GP. They further argued that his claim should have

been brought as a writ for habeas corpus relief and was not ac-

tionable under § 1983. And they argued that the requested relief

did not satisfy the PLRA.

The district court held a three-day evidentiary hearing on

the second preliminary injunction motion. At the evidentiary

hearing, Melendez presented his own testimony as well as the tes-

timony of Pacholke and Dr. Kupers, both of whom had previous-

ly provided declarations in support of his preliminary injunction

motions. In opposing the injunction motion, Defendants pre-

sented testimony from: (1) Carl Wesley Kirkland, Jr., the deputy

director of institutional operations at FDC; (2) Dr. Ryan Labrec-

que, an assistant professor of criminal justice; (3) Dr. Emanoilidis;

(4) Dr. Johnathan Greenfield, the assistant statewide psychiatric

director for FDC; and (5) Sergeant Eugene Williams.

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At the conclusion of the hearing on January 24, 2022, the

district court found that Melendez was likely to succeed in estab-

lishing that Defendants, through a pattern and practice, had main-

tained Melendez on CM status for a majority of the previous five

years and that such pattern and practice of administration and

maintenance constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The dis-

trict court found there was no evidence establishing that Melen-

dez should currently be placed in CM status. The court noted

that FDC’s clinicians indicated that Melendez had “demonstrated

he has the coping resources to manage [CM] or [GP] environ-

ments” on November 8, 2021. The court further noted Dr.

Greenfield’s testimony that Melendez could care for himself and

follow FDC’s rules. And the court recognized that Melendez’s

security evaluations for September and October 2021 were satis-

factory and above satisfactory. As such, the court ordered De-

fendants to return Melendez to a GP status. The court further

ordered the parties to provide proposed findings of fact and con-

clusions of law regarding any additional preliminary relief. In an

endorsed order issued the same day, the district court directed

Defendants to return Melendez to GP status “as quickly as can be

done safely.” The court explained that if Melendez engaged in

conduct warranting a recommendation for CM status, FDC shall

immediately begin the Institutional Classification Team (“ICT”)

process—i.e., the process for making and reviewing prisoners’

housing status classifications—and record by video and audio any

ICT hearings, and any related mental health examinations, relat-

ing to his housing status.

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16 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

Defendants filed their notice of appeal and an emergency

motion to stay in the district court. Subsequently, the district

court issued a written order explaining its findings and reasons for

granting the second preliminary injunction, adopting its reasoning

from the first preliminary injunction, and denying Defendants’

motion to stay. The district court found that Melendez demon-

strated a likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth

Amendment claim as to his conditions of confinement. The court

explained that Melendez had offered evidence in support of the

allegations in his second amended complaint and second prelimi-

nary injunction motion—i.e., that Defendants had intentionally

deprived Melendez of basic human needs while holding him in

excessive periods of solitary confinement, that Melendez’s mental

and physical health had dramatically declined, and that he was not

allowed outdoor recreation during his entire isolation in CM I and

CM II nor allowed the minimum number of weekly showers, in

violation of the FAC.

Reviewing the evidence, the court noted Pacholke exam-

ined Melendez’s confinement status records and testified that

Melendez “very rarely gets out of his cell and has participated in

little to no recreation and little to no therapeutic programming or

classes.” The court noted Melendez’s testimony that he received

little to no out-of-cell time while in CM status, that he was not

permitted to keep his walker because he would not be out of his

cell enough to justify it, and that his requests for outdoor recrea-

tion were ignored or denied by FDC officers. Additionally, the

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district court explained that, based on the summary of Melendez’s

special housing records, he was allowed outdoor recreation only

20 times, and 14 of those instances were when he was under the

least restrictive CM III status. The court also noted that Melen-

dez’s records showed that he received the required minimum of

three showers per week only 195 out of 361 weeks and that, at the

evidentiary hearing, Melendez showed the black marks that re-

main on his legs from the staph infection he developed from be-

ing deprived of showers for so long.

The court rejected Defendants’ contention that Melendez

received the privileges to which he is entitled, based on his cur-

rent housing status, as contradictory to Melendez’s evidence, not-

ing that Defendants had failed to offer evidence to dispute Melen-

dez’s evidence and that their witness, Kirkland, acknowledged

that correctional staff were required to document the program-

ming or privileges inmates on CM status receive. Therefore, the

district court, in accordance with its prior ruling in the first pre-

liminary injunction, found that Defendants subjected Melendez to

cruel and unusual conditions of confinement and had subjective

knowledge of the risk he faced.

The district court additionally found that Melendez will

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunctive relief and

that his harm outweighed any harm Defendants may incur in

complying with the injunction. The court noted that the mental

health experts disagreed on whether Melendez was legitimately

suicidal or harmed himself for secondary gain but found there

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18 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

was no dispute that Melendez had engaged in multiple acts of self-

harm, with some requiring emergency treatment. The court ex-

plained that such acts of self-harm could result in his death, even

if there was a dispute as to the rationale behind the acts. And the

court noted that Melendez testified that he thought about self-

harm “a lot” and, within the last month, had come close to cut-

ting himself, although he changed his mind after thinking about

his sister. The district court further found that, given the evi-

dence of a potential past and continuing constitutional violation,

granting Melendez’s motion in part by ordering his transfer to GP

status served the public interest.

As to the PLRA’s requirements, the district court found

that the granted relief “is narrowly tailored, extends no further

than necessary, and is the least intrusive means to correct the vio-

lation.” The court noted that Melendez had sought much broad-

er relief than what was granted: transfer to the TCU and for an

independent expert to weigh in before being released from the

TCU. It noted that both parties’ experts did not believe Melendez

currently required long-term inpatient treatment. The court ex-

plained that the relief was tailored to address the violation, as the

evidence indisputably showed that Melendez had spent a majority

of the last five years in CM I status with little to no out-of-cell

time and that there was no dispute that solitary confinement was

a long-term housing solution for inmates. The court further ex-

plained that the relief was narrowly tailored because Defendants’

own witnesses and the correctional records demonstrated une-

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 19

quivocally that Melendez’s consignment to solitary confinement

was not currently warranted, i.e., no FDC witness could explain

why a CM or administrative confinement status was currently

justified based on his present risk assessment. For example,

Melendez’s recent security evaluations were satisfactory and

above satisfactory, FDC’s own clinicians indicated that Melendez

demonstrated he has the coping resources to manage CM or GP

environments, and Dr. Greenfield testified that Melendez was

able to care for himself and follow the rules.

Further, the court noted that it had not directed FDC to

keep Melendez in GP status regardless of his future behavior, ex-

plaining that its order did not prevent Defendants from managing

their prisons or enforcing rules designed to protect inmates and

staff. For example, if Melendez engaged in future behavior war-

ranting imposition of disciplinary measures, Defendants were en-

titled to impose such measures in accordance with FDC policies.

It further explained that the requirement that ICT hearings being

recorded, along with any mental health evaluations that may be

conducted or used in connection with the ICT process, was also

narrowly tailored and the least intrusive means of developing a

record for the parties and the court, should future violations oc-

cur.

The court stated that it was “not unsympathetic to [FDC’s]

extraordinary responsibility to administer safe prisons under im-

mense pressures,” but “[w]hen a court is confronted with con-

vincing evidence of inhumane conditions, ‘court-ordered correc-

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20 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

tion of [those] . . . conditions’ is appropriate,” especially when

prison officials have been informed their practices are infringing

an inmate’s constitutional rights but persist in that conduct. And

the court stated that Defendants failed to show how the injunc-

tion would adversely impact the public safety or operation of the

criminal justice system. Accordingly, the district court granted

Melendez’s motion in part and entered the second preliminary

injunction.

Following their notice of appeal, Defendants again moved

for an emergency stay in this Court pending the resolution of

their appeal. We denied Defendants’ motion but expedited the

case for merits disposition purposes and consolidated the cases.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a district court’s grant of preliminary injunc-

tive relief for abuse of discretion.” Jones v. Governor of Florida,

950 F.3d 795, 806 (11th Cir. 2020). Our review of an order grant-

ing a preliminary injunction “is extremely narrow in scope.” Id.

(quoting Carillon Imps., Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Int’l Grp., Ltd., 112

F.3d 1125, 1126 (11th Cir. 1997)). “[W]e review the district court’s

underlying legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for

clear error.” Id. “This deferential standard follows from ‘[t]he

expedited nature of preliminary injunction proceedings,’ in which

‘judgments . . . about the viability of a plaintiff’s claims and the

balancing of equities and the public interest . . . are the district

court’s to make.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting BellSouth

Telecomms., Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., LLC,

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 21

425 F.3d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 2005)). “For a factual finding to be

clearly erroneous, this court, after reviewing all of the evidence,

must be left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1377 (11th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager,

465 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006)); accord Thomas v. Bryant,

614 F.3d 1288, 1307 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[A] finding is ‘clearly erro-

neous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the review-

ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (alteration in

original) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.

564, 573 (1985))).

We review the question of mootness de novo. FTC v. On

Point Cap. Partners LLC, 17 F.4th 1066, 1078 (11th Cir. 2021).

III. ANALYSIS

In their consolidated appeals, Defendants contend that the

district court erred in granting Melendez’s motions for prelimi-

nary injunction in its first and second preliminary injunction or-

ders. We address the two injunction orders in turn.

A. First Preliminary Injunction in Case No. 21-13455

In their first appeal, Defendants argue that the district court

erred in granting Melendez’s first motion for preliminary injunc-

tion. In their briefing, Defendants recognize that the district

court’s first preliminary injunction, entered on October 6, 2021,

expired by operation of law on January 4, 2022. But Defendants

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22 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

assert that we should not find its appeal of the first preliminary

injunction moot under the “capable of repetition, yet evading re-

view” exception to mootness because Melendez sought (and ob-

tained) a second preliminary injunction. See Sierra Club v. Mar-

tin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir. 1997).

Congress enacted the PLRA “to expedite prison litigation

and end judicial overreach into the management of prisons.” Ga.

Advoc. Off. v. Jackson, 4 F.4th 1200, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2021). In

doing so, Congress established the limited circumstances in which

district courts can issue “prospective relief” in inmates’ civil ac-

tions challenging their prison conditions. Id. at 1206. Specifically,

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) provides:

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to

prison conditions shall extend no further than neces-

sary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a

particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not

grant or approve any prospective relief unless the

court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, ex-

tends no further than necessary to correct the viola-

tion of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive

means necessary to correct the violation of the Fed-

eral right. The court shall give substantial weight to

any adverse impact on public safety or the operation

of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.

Section 3626(a)(1)(A)’s requirements are often referred to as the

“need-narrowness-intrusiveness” requirements. Ga. Advoc. Off.,

4 F.4th at 1206.

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 23

Section 3626(a)(2) sets forth the requirements for prelimi-

nary injunctive relief.1 The statute “confirms that courts can issue

preliminary injunctions in prison cases ‘to the extent otherwise

authorized by law.’” Ga. Advoc. Off., 4 F.4th at 1206–07 (quoting

§ 3626(a)(2)). The statute also provides that “preliminary injunc-

tive relief must meet the need-narrowness-intrusiveness require-

ments.” Id. at 1207. And “it provides that preliminary injunctive

relief shall expire within 90 days unless the court does two things:

(1) makes the need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings for prospec-

tive relief under § 3626(a)(1), and (2) makes the order final.” Id.

Melendez argues that Defendants’ appeal of the first pre-

liminary injunction is now moot, given that the injunction has

1 Section 3626(a)(2) provides in full:

In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, to the

extent otherwise authorized by law, the court may enter a

temporary restraining order or an order for preliminary in-

junctive relief. Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly

drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm

the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least in-

trusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall

give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety

or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the

preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity

set out in paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring any preliminary relief.

Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically expire on the

date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court makes the

findings required under subsection (a)(1) for the entry of pro-

spective relief and makes the order final before the expiration

of the 90-day period.

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24 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

expired. We agree. “An appeal is moot ‘when, by virtue of an

intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual

relief whatever in favor of the appellant.’” United States v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996)). “One such inter-

vening event is the expiration of a preliminary injunction that is

being challenged in an interlocutory appeal.” Id. at 1228–29.

And, as we have recently explained, “when a preliminary injunc-

tion expires by operation of law under § 3626(a)(2), any appeal

from that injunction is moot.” Ga. Advoc. Off., 4 F.4th at 1215. It

is undisputed that the first preliminary injunction, which was not

made final by the district court, expired on January 4, 2022.

Therefore, Defendants’ appeal of the first preliminary injunction

is now moot.

While Defendants argue that we should apply the capable

of repetition, yet evading review exception to mootness, we de-

cline to do so. The capable of repetition, yet evading review ex-

ception “applies in ‘exceptional circumstances’ where ‘(1) there is

a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the

same controversy will recur involving the same complaining par-

ty, and (2) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be

fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.” Ga. Advoc.

Off., 4 F.4th at 1215 (alteration adopted) (quoting United States v.

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d at 1228–29). “The remote pos-

sibility that an event might recur is not enough to overcome

mootness, and even a likely recurrence is insufficient if there

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 25

would be ample opportunity for review at that time.” Al Najjar v.

Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001). And, in the context

of a preliminary injunction under the PLRA, the exception does

not apply “merely because the district court might enter another

preliminary injunction without making additional need-

narrowness-intrusiveness findings and making the order final

within 90 days.” See Ga. Advoc. Off., 4 F.4th at 1216.

Moreover, the issues that Defendants raise as to the first

preliminary injunction, even if capable of repetition, are not

“evading review.” Indeed, we address below the merits of De-

fendants’ arguments against the second preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, we conclude that Defendants’ appeal of the

district court’s order granting Melendez’s first motion for prelim-

inary injunction is now moot. We therefore dismiss the appeal as

to case number 21-13455.

B. Second Preliminary Injunction in Case No. 22-10306

We now turn to Defendants’ appeal of the second prelimi-

nary injunction. Defendants argue that the district court erred in

granting the second preliminary injunction for several reasons.

First, they contend that the injunction impermissibly grants relief

beyond the purported constitutional violation. Second, they ar-

gue that the injunction does not comply with the PLRA. Third,

they contend that the district court erred in finding Melendez met

his burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to establish

the required elements for granting a preliminary injunction.

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26 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

Fourth, they claim that the district court erred in ordering Melen-

dez released from restrictive housing under § 1983. Finally, they

argue that the injunction violates the separation of powers and

federalism. We begin our analysis by determining whether the

second preliminary injunction satisfies all the elements required

for entry of injunctive relief and then turn to Defendants’ other

arguments.

1. Whether Melendez demonstrated all the elements required

for entry of a preliminary injunction

For a district court to grant preliminary injunctive relief,

the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) there is a substantial like-

lihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the

plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not grant-

ed; (3) the threatened harm to the plaintiff outweighs the harm an

injunction may cause to the defendants; and (4) the injunction

does not disserve the public interest. Ga. Advoc. Off., 4 F.4th at

1200. We are mindful that, in this Circuit, a preliminary injunc-

tion is an extraordinary remedy not to be granted unless the mo-

vant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion for each of the

four elements. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir.

2000).

On appeal, Defendants argue that the second preliminary

injunction satisfies none of these elements.

a. Substantial likelihood of success on the merits

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 27

“A substantial likelihood of success on the merits requires

a showing of only likely or probable, rather than certain success.”

Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir.

2005) (emphasis in original). Here, Defendants argue that the dis-

trict court erred in finding that Melendez was likely to succeed on

the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim as to the conditions of

his confinement.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment “prohibits the ‘unnecessary and wanton in-

fliction of pain,’” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1303 (11th Cir. 2010) (quot-

ing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)), “or the infliction

of pain totally without penological justification,” Ort v. White,

813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987). The Eighth Amendment can

serve as a basis for a claim challenging specific conditions of con-

finement. Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1303. A conditions-of-

confinement claim “requires a two-prong showing”: (1) “an objec-

tive showing of a deprivation or injury that is ‘sufficiently serious’

to constitute a denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities’” and (2) “a subjective showing that the official had a

‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Id. at 1304 (quoting Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)); see also Hamm v. DeKalb

County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining an Eighth

Amendment violation may occur when a state fails “to provide

prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, and

sanitation”). Whether an injury or deprivation is sufficiently seri-

ous to satisfy the objective prong “is a question of law we evalu-

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28 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

ate based on ‘evolving standards of decency,’” and “[w]e balance

these standards of decency against prison officials’ need to keep

the prison safe.” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)). An inmate does not need to

await a tragic event before seeking relief, but he must show that

“a condition of his confinement ‘pose[s] an unreasonable risk of

serious damage to his future health’ or safety.” Chandler v. Cros-

by, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)

(quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)).

With respect to the subjective inquiry in prison conditions

cases, “the relevant state of mind for purposes of liability is delib-

erate indifference.” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304; Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834. The deliberate indifference standard sets a “high bar” in the

prison context. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.

2020). “Ordinary malpractice or simple negligence won’t do; in-

stead, the plaintiff must show ‘subjective recklessness as used in

the criminal law.’” Id. at 1285–86 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

839–40). Thus, the plaintiff must show defendants “subjectively

knew of the substantial risk of serious harm and that [they] know-

ingly or recklessly disregarded that risk.” Goodman v. Kim-

brough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013) (alteration in origi-

nal) (quoting Halte v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1583

(11th Cir. 1995)). Whether prison officials possessed the requisite

awareness of the risk “is a question of fact subject to demonstra-

tion in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial

evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 29

knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was ob-

vious.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

We have long held that “administrative segregation and

solitary confinement do not, in and of themselves, constitute cru-

el and unusual punishment.” Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420,

1428–29 (11th Cir. 1987). But “the length of confinement cannot

be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitu-

tional standards”; therefore, “the length of time in isolation is a

factor which must be considered” in analyzing an inmate’s Eighth

Amendment claim. Id. at 1429 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.

678, 686 (1978); accord Hutto, 437 U.S. at 486–87 (“[T]he length of

confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confine-

ment meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell

and a diet of ‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days and intolera-

bly cruel for weeks or months.”). Indeed, certain “conditions of

confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in

combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when

they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the depriva-

tion of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or

exercise.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). And there is

a “‘well established’ Eighth Amendment right ‘not to be confined

. . . in conditions lacking’” either basic sanitation or hygiene. See

Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2015) (quot-

ing Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 1991));

see also Chandler, 926 F.2d at 1063–66.

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30 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

Given our deferential standard of review at the preliminary

injunction stage, see Jones, 950 F.3d at 806, we cannot say that the

district court abused its discretion in finding that Melendez’s

Eighth Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits. At

the outset, we note that many of Defendants’ arguments center

on the district court’s factual findings and credibility determina-

tions made in granting the second preliminary injunction. But

our review of the district court’s factual findings is for clear error,

meaning that, after reviewing the record evidence, we “must be

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1377 (1377 (quoting Dresdner

Bank, 465 F.3d at 1275); Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1307. And here, we

find that the district court’s factual findings are supported by the

record evidence and based on credibility determinations it made

after listening to the witnesses’ testimonies. The district court

was permitted to make credibility determinations as to the wit-

nesses during the three-day evidentiary hearing, see McDonald’s

Corp v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 1998), and

we give the district court’s credibility determinations made at a

preliminary injunction evidentiary hearing “a great deal of defer-

ence,” see Mesa Air Grp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 573 F.3d 1124,

1130 n.7 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Stano v. Butterworth, 51 F.3d

942, 944 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[A]s mandated by the Supreme Court,

we will give even ‘greater deference’ to factfindings of the district

court that are based on determinations of the credibility of wit-

nesses.” (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575)).

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 31

Turning to the objective prong, the district court did not

abuse its discretion at the preliminary injunction stage in finding

that Melendez made a “showing of a deprivation or injury that is

‘sufficiently serious’ to constitute a denial of the ‘minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities’” based on the record before us. See

Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). As

the district court found, for a vast majority of the relevant time

period, Melendez was placed in CM I status. The FAC defines

CM as “the separation of an inmate apart from the general popu-

lation, for reasons of security or the order and effective manage-

ment of the institution, when the inmate, through his or her be-

havior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general popu-

lation without abusing the rights and privileges of others.” Fla.

Admin. Code r. 33-601.800(1)(a). CM I is the most restrictive of

CM designations. Id. r. 33-601.800(2)(a). The FAC states that CM

inmates shall have an exercise schedule “to ensure a minimum of

six hours per week . . . of exercise out of doors,” id. r. 33-

601.800(10)(m), and a minimum of three showers per week, id. r.

33-601.800(10)(e). FDC staff are required to visit CM units week-

ly, id. r. 33-601.800(15), and the warden (or assistant warden) is a

member of the ICT, id. r. 33-601.800(1)(g), which “evaluate[s] the

recommendations for CM placement and the mental health as-

sessment, interview[s] the inmate, and consider[s] all relevant in-

formation provided to the ICT by the inmate, id. r. 33-

601.800(3)(h). ICT is required to review an inmate’s CM status

once per week for the first 60 days and once every 30 days there-

after. Id. r. 33-601.800(16)(a). “The purposes of this review shall

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32 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

be to reduce the inmate’s status to the lowest management level

possible or return the inmate to general population as soon as the

facts of the case indicate that this can be done safely.” Id.

Here, the district court—relying in part on the reasoning

from its first injunction—found that there was evidence showing

Melendez’s “lengthy confinement in [CM I] pose[d] a substantial

risk of serious harm” such that he was likely to succeed on his

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. The district

court explained that Melendez was consigned to CM I status for

an “inordinately long period of time,” which “in combination”

with the conditions of how CM I status was applied to him, sug-

gested that he had been deprived of the “minimal civilized meas-

ure of life’s necessities.” The district court found that Melendez

was placed in excessive periods of isolation and deprived of the

minimum out-of-cell recreation time and number of showers re-

quired by the FAC for CM I status inmates. The district court

credited the testimony of Pacholke and Melendez, who both stat-

ed that Melendez had little to no out-of-cell time and went ex-

tended periods of time without showering, to the point he had

developed a staph infection on his legs. The court further relied

on Melendez’s summary of the special housing unit records pro-

duced by Defendants during discovery, finding that Melendez was

allowed outdoor recreation only 20 times out of 2,527 days and

received the required weekly minimum of showers only 195 out

of 361 weeks while having CM status. Furthermore, the district

court found that the evidence demonstrated Melendez’s confine-

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 33

ment in CM I posed a substantial risk of serious harm to his men-

tal and physical health, crediting Dr. Kupers’s opinions that: (1)

Melendez suffered from major depressive disorder with psychotic

features; (2) Melendez’s mental illness had worsened considerably

during his years of solitary confinement; and (3) he often thought

about suicide. The court also expressed concern that FDC mental

health professionals did not recognize nor record the extent of

Melendez’s mental illness. The court pointed specifically to

MDST’s August 19 review of Melendez’s treatment progress,

which did not mention Melendez’s days-earlier “suicidal gesture”

of inserting battery nails into his arm nor that Melendez was

“hearing voices,” even though Melendez testified that he had in-

formed MDST of the occurrence.

In issuing the second preliminary injunction, which ex-

pressly incorporated the reasoning of the first injunction, the dis-

trict court credited Melendez’s testimony, as well as his two wit-

nesses, Pacholke and Dr. Kupers. Dr. Kupers extensively testified

as to his evaluation and diagnosis of Melendez and as to the ef-

fects of long-term solitary confinement on mentally ill inmates.

For example, Dr. Kupers testified that Melendez had major de-

pressive disorder and suffered from auditory “command halluci-

nations,” that solitary confinement can exacerbate mental illness,

that Melendez’s mental health had deteriorated while in solitary

confinement, and that Melendez “is someone who is an extremely

serious suicide risk” with a long history of suicidal behavior. Ad-

ditionally, Pacholke testified that, based on his review of Melen-

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34 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

dez’s records, Melendez very rarely gets out of his cell and had

participated in little to no recreation or therapeutic programing or

classes while in CM, and that Melendez did not require confine-

ment in solitary on a near-permanent basis. The court relied on

Melendez’s testimony that he had little to no out-of-cell time

while in CM, that he was not allowed to keep his walker in CM

because officials told him he would not need it, and that his re-

quests for outdoor recreation were either ignored or denied. And

the court recognized that, even though the mental health experts

disagreed on whether Melendez was legitimately suicidal, Melen-

dez had testified that he thought about self-harm “a lot.”

Thus, the district court concluded that Melendez—an in-

mate (1) diagnosed with major depressive disorder with psychotic

features that was exacerbated by his extended stay in solitary con-

finement, (2) having a history of self-injurious acts while in CM,

with some requiring emergency treatment, and (3) determined to

be suicidal by a psychiatrist (Dr. Kupers)—had demonstrated his

lengthy confinement in CM I, in combination with him receiving

little to no out-of-cell recreation over the majority of a five-year

period and being denied showers for multi-week periods, posed a

substantial enough risk of serious harm to his mental and physical

health to satisfy the objective prong of his Eighth Amendment

claim.

Based on the record and our deferential review at the pre-

liminary injunction stage, we conclude that the district court did

not err in its conclusion or clearly err in its factual findings. In-

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 35

deed, while solitary confinement, in and of itself, does not consti-

tute cruel and unusual punishment, we must consider the length

of the confinement in analyzing Melendez’s claim. See Hutto,

437 U.S. at 686–87 (“[T]he length of confinement cannot be ig-

nored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional

standards.”); Sheley, 833 F.2d at 1428–29 (remanding for an evi-

dentiary hearing because “Sheley’s twelve-year confinement in

CM raises serious constitutional questions,” and noting that “[i]n

addition to the mental and physical deterioration he alleges,

Sheley’s Eighth Amendment claim is supported, at this stage of

the litigation, by his contention that his confinement in CM is pu-

nitive in nature”). And certain conditions of confinement in com-

bination with one another can constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation, even if each would not do so alone, “when they have a

mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a sin-

gle, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.”

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304. The district court found that the evidence

showed Melendez had been deprived of out-of-cell recreation for

extended periods of time and of basic hygiene (i.e., being unable

to shower for weeks, which led to a staph infection) during his

time in CM. See id.; Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1303–04 (collecting cas-

es). Coupled with Dr. Kupers’s opinion, credited by the district

court, that Melendez’s mental illness was exacerbated by the

lengthy stay in solitary confinement, we agree that Melendez—at

this stage and on this record—has made “an objective showing of

a deprivation or injury that is ‘sufficiently serious’ to constitute a

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36 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” See

Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

Defendants, however, contend that the district court erred

by failing to consider their “legitimate penological justifications”

for placing (and retaining) Melendez in CM. Defendants assert

that “[a]mong ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are

those that are ‘totally without penological justification,’” Rhodes,

452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183

(1976)), and that the conditions inflicting unnecessary pain or suf-

fering upon the prisoner “must be balanced against competing

penological goals,” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th

Cir. 1993). Defendants assert that the district court failed to de-

termine whether Melendez’s placement in CM was totally with-

out penological justification.

Defendants misread our precedents. We agree that, in de-

termining whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred,

we must balance the conditions inflicting unnecessary pain or suf-

fering upon the prisoner against competing penological goals.

See Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1307; LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535; Ort, 813

F.2d at 321. And one way to prove an injury was “unnecessary

and wanton” is to show that the infliction of pain is without peno-

logical justification. But, contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, that

is not the only way an inmate can prove an Eighth Amendment

violation. Rather, when penological justifications exist, we must

balance those justifications against countervailing considerations

suggesting that an injury or deprivation alleged by an inmate is

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 37

“objectively ‘sufficiently serious’ to satisfy the objective prong.”

Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1307 (first quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346;

then quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

Defendants additionally contend that the district court

failed to consider Melendez’s actions while under CM status, such

as disobeying orders, disrespecting a prison officer, and tampering

with a safety device. While Defendants recognize these infrac-

tions are “non-violent,” they point to their expert’s testimony that

they are “serious violations” because disruptions and disturbances

can interfere with staff’s ability to hear an inmate calling for help

in an emergency. Defendants further point to an incident be-

tween Melendez and Sergeant Williams in July 2020, which

served as the basis for Melendez’s most recent placement in CM I.

During this incident, Melendez allegedly placed his hands around

Williams’s throat during a medical examination following Melen-

dez’s act of self-harm after Williams placed an ammonia stick on

Melendez. Defendants note that the disciplinary report as to this

incident was overturned, but contend that it was based on a tech-

nical error and that the underlying conduct can serve as a basis for

retaining Melendez in CM I.

In its order, the district court found that none of Defend-

ants’ witnesses “could explain why a CM or administrative con-

finement status is currently justified based on [Melendez’s] pre-

sent risk assessment.” The court noted that Melendez’s security

evaluations for September and October 2021 were “satisfactory

and above satisfactory” and that Dr. Greenberg had testified that

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38 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

Melendez could “care for himself” and that he ”follows the rules.”

The district court relied on an FDC document stating Melendez

“has demonstrated that he has the coping resources to manage

CM or GP environments.” The district court also credited

Pacholke’s opinion that there was no sound penological purpose

served by continuing to keep Melendez in CM. And the district

court, at the hearing and in its written order, explained that if

Melendez engaged in conduct warranting a return to CM status,

Defendants were permitted to immediately begin the ICT status

so long as it was recorded by video and audio. The district court’s

findings are not clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its discre-

tion in finding that CM was not currently penologically justified

on this record at this stage in the litigation.

Defendants also cite to Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (11th

Cir. 1999), but we find Bass factually distinguishable. In Bass, two

CM inmates had their outdoor recreation time suspended for

years through a formal process based on their possession of fire-

arms, stabbing another inmate, murdering a correctional officer,

and participating in a violent escape attempt. See id. at 1315. The

inmates challenged this deprivation of outdoor time as an Eighth

Amendment violation. Id. On appeal, we explained that com-

plete lack of outdoor recreation time “certainly involves the ‘in-

fliction of pain’” because, while “being in solitary confinement

with minimal time outside is only marginally different from being

in solitary confinement with no time outside, there is nevertheless

a significant difference between some time outside—even a min-

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 39

imal amount—and none at all.” Id. at 1316. However, we ex-

plained that the “pain” was not “unnecessary” or “totally without

penological justification” and that “it would be hard to imagine a

situation in which two persons had shown a greater threat to the

safety and security of the prison,” given the inmates’ violent crim-

inal convictions and their continued violent behavior including

battery and murder since being incarcerated. See id. (quoting

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183). Thus, the complete deprivation of out-

door recreation time “was a rational, albeit debatable, response to

the substantial threat posed by the plaintiffs.” Id. at 1317. Melen-

dez, however, has not engaged in the pervasive violent conduct

we found penologically justified the Bass inmates’ complete dep-

rivation of out-of-cell recreation.

Defendants further claim that the district court relied on

insufficient evidence to determine Melendez had little to no out-

of-cell time. Defendants contend that the district court improper-

ly considered Melendez’s demonstrative exhibit, in support of his

motion, summarizing the special housing unit records that “were

produced by FDC in expedited discovery” and recorded Melen-

dez’s “time out of cell.” Defendants assert that the summary was

hearsay, not authenticated, and they were not given the oppor-

tunity to challenge it. Defendants, however, did not object to

Melendez’s reliance on the summary of the records in their re-

sponse to the motion. At the evidentiary hearing, the district

court informed Defendants’ counsel that “the logs . . . that

were . . . of record do not show that Mr. Melendez has been pro-

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40 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

vided those opportunities not to be isolated.” Similarly, the dis-

trict court asked Defendants’ witness, Kirkland, whether FDC had

records of inmates receiving privileges and program opportuni-

ties, Kirkland stated that there were such records, and Melendez’s

counsel confirmed with Kirkland that the “logs” in question were

titled “Daily Record of Special Housing” and their form number

was “DC6-229.” These two labels corresponded with the sample

records Melendez submitted with his motion. Yet Defendants’

counsel did not object to the court’s consideration of the sum-

mary of records. Generally, a failure to object to evidence on the

ground of hearsay results in waiver of appellate review of the is-

sue. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212, 1221

(11th Cir. 1991).

Moreover, “[a]t the preliminary injunction stage, a district

court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would

not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evi-

dence is ‘appropriate given the character and objectives of the in-

junctive proceeding.’” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading

Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Asseo v. Pan Am.

Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986)); see also Univ. of Tex. v.

Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“[A] preliminary injunction

is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less

formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the

merits.”). Relying on Levi Strauss, Defendants contend that the

record summary was not appropriate for the court to consider be-

cause there was an evidentiary hearing where witnesses testified

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 41

and exhibits were introduced. We find Defendants’ argument

without merit. Indeed, the district court in Levi Strauss held an

evidentiary hearing regarding the preliminary injunction at issue

where it took witness testimony. See 51 F.3d at 984. Therefore,

regardless of whether the record summary would be admissible

evidence in support of a permanent injunction, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in relying on the summary at the pre-

liminary injunction stage. 2

In a similar vein, Defendants criticize the district court’s

reliance on the testimonies of Pacholke and Melendez in finding

Melendez had little to no out-of-cell time. Defendants speculate

that Pacholke relied on the summary of records, rather than the

records themselves (that were provided by Defendants), in form-

ing his opinion. As to Melendez, Defendants contend that his tes-

timony was “self-serving,” and that prisoners’ suits should be

viewed with skepticism, are predicated upon a prisoner’s bore-

dom and resentment of authority, and can lack substantial basis in

fact. But, as we have explained, the district court’s factual find-

ings are reviewed for clear error, and the district court was per-

mitted to resolve credibility determinations after considering the

evidence and testimony at the evidentiary hearing. And the dis-

2 We express no opinion as to whether Melendez’s summary of the special

housing unit records would be admissible at a permanent injunction eviden-

tiary hearing nor at trial if Defendants later choose to object to its introduc-

tion into evidence.

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42 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

trict court did so, relying in part on their testimonies to find that

Melendez had received little to no out-of-cell time while in CM I.

We therefore reject this argument.

The subjective prong of Melendez’s Eighth Amendment

claim—the deliberate indifference standard—is a closer call. In its

written order, the district court incorporated its findings and rea-

soning from the first preliminary injunction as to deliberate indif-

ference. The court found that deliberate indifference was estab-

lished because “the risk was obvious,” i.e., the risks of physical

and mental harm associated with prolonged periods of isolation

“are well known, certainly by corrections officials tasked with

promulgating and enforcing rules for safety and well-being of in-

mates and staff.” In finding so, the court relied on Dr. Kupers’s

opinions about the literature on the effects of long-term solitary

confinement as well as commentary by Supreme Court Justices

and by some circuit court opinions. The court also explained that

the prison warden and assistant wardens were aware of Melen-

dez’s extended stay in CM I given their obligations under the FAC

to visit CM units weekly. The district court further relied on a

July 2018 letter sent by Melendez’s attorney to the then-warden of

the prison where Melendez was held, describing his mental health

deterioration after spending two years in solitary confinement.

As to the district court’s conclusion that Defendants knew

the substantial risk Melendez faced by the fact that the risk was

“obvious,” we hesitate to reach the same conclusion at this stage.

Dr. Kupers explained that there was “large literature on the ef-

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 43

fects of long-term . . . solitary confinement” with an “evolving

consensus” that, for inmates with serious mental illness, time

served in isolation greatly exacerbates mental illness and “too of-

ten results in suicide.” But Dr. Ryan Labrecque, Defendants’ ex-

pert witness, testified that Dr. Kupers relied on “opinion pieces

and other low-methodological-quality studies, largely those with-

out comparison groups” in support of his position and dismissed

as outliers “findings from the more methodologically rigorous

studies.” We hesitate to conclude, based on this record, that the

risk of harm to mentally ill inmates in lengthy solitary confine-

ment was obvious to Defendants such that they were deliberately

indifferent. On the other hand, we recognize that Melendez’s

claims of the risk of substantial harm go further. Melendez claims

that he was held for the vast majority of a five-year period in re-

strictive housing during which: (1) his mental health substantially

deteriorated due to his mental illness, resulting in acts of self-

harm, and (2) he received little to no out-of-cell time for months

(or years) and often was denied the FAC-required number of

three showers per week, including a four-week period where

Melendez was not permitted to shower and subsequently devel-

oped a staph infection in his legs.

Nonetheless, without deciding whether the risk of serious

harm Melendez faced was obvious to Defendants, we conclude

that the district court did not err in determining that, at this stage,

Melendez had demonstrated deliberate indifference by Defend-

ants based on the July 2018 letter his attorney sent to the prison

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44 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

warden. Melendez’s attorney informed the warden that Melen-

dez had been in CM since September 2016, during which he spent

24 hours per day in his cell, and that his mental health had “dete-

riorated substantially.” The attorney also informed the warden

that Melendez reported that (1) “he informed officers that he was

having a psychological crisis and needed to go to medical,” (2) of-

ficers refused to take him to the medical unit for a crisis visit, and

(3) he punctured a vein with a foreign object and began bleeding

in his cell, which resulted in Melendez being taken to the infirma-

ry and beaten off camera by several officers. The attorney addi-

tionally listed grievances Melendez had filed, including one that

stated the solitary confinement process prevented him from

meaningful social interactions and was harmful to him

“[m]entally, [p]hysically and [e]motionally.” The attorney asked

the warden to investigate Melendez’s reports, respond to his

grievances, and transfer him to the medical unit to receive appro-

priate medical and mental health care. 3 And an assistant warden

at the prison acknowledged receipt of the attorney’s letter, con-

firming that the allegations had been documented, Melendez had

3 Although not explicitly relied upon by the district court, we note that

Melendez’s attorney sent a second letter to FDC regional director John

Palmer on August 4, 2020—before the filing of the instant action—to inform

the director of Melendez’s suicidal behavior and history of self-harm while in

isolation and to state that this behavior should have resulted in immediate

transfer to an intensive psychiatric care facility. And, after filing suit, Melen-

dez sent two letters to Defendants’ attorney before he filed his first prelimi-

nary injunction motion complaining of grievances, including the lack of

showers and lack of out-of-cell recreation time.

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 45

been evaluated, and that the grievances had been reviewed and

addressed. 4 Finally, we note that FDC’s records as to Melendez

show a history of self-harm attempts, even if they do not state

that the attempts were committed with suicidal intent.

Thus, the court did not clearly err in finding that Melendez,

through his attorney, specifically informed Defendants of the sub-

stantial risk of serious harm he faced—the deterioration of his

mental health based on his extended stay in CM, evidenced by his

acts of self-harm, without the “minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities,” see Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834), including, e.g., the allowance of any out-of-cell time

for recreation. Cf. Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d

611, 621–22 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding a reasonable juror could

determine that the defendant “actually knew” the inmate faced a

substantial risk of serious harm based on the plaintiff’s testimony

4 For the first time in their reply brief, Defendants contend that the letters

submitted by Melendez that pre-date January 2021, the beginning of his cur-

rent CM placement, are outside the scope of his challenge and thus were not

relevant for the court to consider. We generally decline to address argu-

ments raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief. See Sapuppo v.

Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2014). Moreover, we

disagree with Defendants’ premise—the July 2018 letter informed FDC offi-

cials of Melendez’s mental health issues, including self-injurious behavior,

and that Melendez’s nearly two-year stay in CM I, without any out-of-cell

recreation time, had resulted in his mental health deteriorating substantially.

We fail to see how this letter is not relevant to the determination of whether

Defendants actually knew of the substantial risk Melendez faced such that

they were deliberately indifferent.

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46 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

that he told the defendant specific information about the risk to

his life and asked to be transferred or placed in protective custo-

dy).

Defendants, however, assert that their records show that

Melendez either did not express to their mental health staff his

complaints of being harmed by the restrictive housing or denied

that he was being harmed or suicidal, instead stating his self-harm

acts were “instrumental” or for “secondary gain”; in other words,

for the purpose of being removed from CM. In essence, Defend-

ants complain that the district court did not credit the evidence

and testimony they presented against the issuance of the second

preliminary injunction.

We recognize that there is evidence in the record to sup-

port Defendants’ position that they did not know of any substan-

tial risk of serious harm Melendez faced nor knowingly or reck-

lessly disregarded that risk. For example, Defendants submitted

an October 11, 2021, psychiatric evaluation written by Dr. Green-

field, in which he wrote that Melendez denied suicidality and au-

ditory hallucinations. But Melendez presented testimony and ev-

idence to the contrary in support of the injunction. During his

testimony, Melendez stated that he experienced auditory halluci-

nations, which he claimed he had informed FDC officials of dur-

ing his mental health examinations. He denied making the state-

ments in his evaluations that he was not suicidal. In an October 8,

2021, evaluation, Melendez reported that he was “suicidal due to

voices telling him to kill himself.” Dr. Kupers also expressed

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 47

skepticism during his testimony that Melendez had denied audito-

ry hallucinations and suicide to FDC officials and questioned the

lack of reference to Melendez’s past self-harm attempts in many

of the medical records. Indeed, the district court was troubled by

the omission of Melendez’s August 2021 self-harm act involving

“nails” in an MDST treatment progress report written only days

later.

The district court was permitted to make credibility deter-

minations and resolve conflicts in the evidence and testimony

presented by the parties. While we may not have made the same

factual findings if we were in the position of the district court, our

review of those factual findings is for clear error. And, after re-

viewing the record, we are not “left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” See Thomas, 614

F.3d at 1307 (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573).

Accordingly, while we do not rule on the merits of Melen-

dez’s claim, 5 we conclude that the district court, at the prelimi-

nary injunction stage, did not abuse its discretion in finding that

5 Indeed, in the preliminary injunction context, “the findings of fact and con-

clusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not

binding at trial on the merits,” and “it is generally inappropriate for a federal

court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the mer-

its.” See Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395.

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48 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

Melendez’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim

had a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits. 6

b. Substantial threat of irreparable harm

Defendants also contend that the district court abused its

discretion in finding Melendez demonstrated a risk of irreparable

harm. Specifically, Defendants argue that Melendez has not

shown irreparable harm because the district court stated that

“death may not be ‘probable’ based on [his] history and mental

health assessments,” because Melendez did not commit an act of

self-harm between November 2021 and January 2022, and be-

cause Melendez’s “self-serving behavior” should not constitute

irreparable harm.

Here, the district court found that Melendez would suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. While noting

the experts disagreed on whether he was legitimately suicidal or

harmed himself for “secondary gain,” it was undisputed that

Melendez had engaged in multiple acts of self-harm, with some

requiring emergency treatment. The court noted that regardless

of Melendez’s intent, “acts of self-harm can result in death,” citing

6 Defendants also raise a “respondeat superior” argument, i.e., that the dis-

trict court was required to, but did not find, the Secretary in his individual

capacity played a role in the unconstitutional conduct alleged in the case.

Defendants, however, did not raise this argument in their response to the

second preliminary injunction or at the evidentiary hearing, and we decline

to address it for the first time on appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines

Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 49

Dr. Kupers’s testimony that “self-harm is an extreme action” and

should be treated “as serious because it can, and at times does,

lead to death.”

Reviewing the record, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that there was a substantial threat

Melendez will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not

granted. See Ga. Advoc. Off., 4 F.4th at 1208. Although the dis-

trict court did not resolve the factual dispute of the intent behind

Melendez’s self-harm acts, it nonetheless found that those acts

could—intentionally or not—result in Melendez’s death. Indeed,

the record reflects that some of Melendez’s acts of self-harm have

resulted in hospitalization and emergency treatment. The district

court also noted Melendez’s testimony that he thought about self-

harm “a lot” and “came close” to harming himself in the month

preceding the second preliminary injunction. Additionally, while

one recent FDC record states that Melendez’s “mood and behav-

iors have been stable,” and he has not engaged in any self-

injurious behavior, another record shows that Melendez told

FDC mental health staff he was “suicidal due to voices telling him

to kill himself.” And Dr. Kupers, in an affidavit attached to

Melendez’s motion, warned that if Melendez was replaced in CM

at that time, “his level of despair and anxiety will rise quickly”

such that, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, he would

be at extremely high risk of engaging in further acts of self-harm

and dying of the wounds he inflicts on himself.”

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50 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

As such, the district court did not err in finding that Melen-

dez has shown a substantial risk of irreparable harm if the injunc-

tive relief were not granted.

c. Balance of the harms and the public interest

Defendants also contend that the district court erred in

finding that the threatened harm to Melendez outweighed any

potential harm to Defendants and that the injunction would not

disservice the public interest. The balance-of-the-harms and pub-

lic-interest elements merge when the government is the party op-

posing the injunctive relief. Swain, 961 F.3d at 1293.

Here, the district court found that the balance of the par-

ties’ harms weighed in favor of Melendez and that its order trans-

ferring him to GP served the public interest given its finding that

there was a past and continuing constitutional violation. The

court explained that it was “not unsympathetic to [FDC’s] ex-

traordinary responsibility to administer safe prisons under im-

mense pressures” but that, “[w]hen a court is confronted with

convincing evidence of inhumane conditions, ‘court-ordered cor-

rection of [those] inhumane prison conditions’ is appropriate.” It

found this was “especially true when prison officials have been

informed their practices have infringed or are infringing an in-

mate’s constitutional rights, but those officials persist in that con-

duct.”

Defendants argue that the district court, in weighing the

parties’ harms, ignored the risk FDC faces by requiring FDC to

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 51

discharge Melendez, who they assert belongs in CM I due to his

history of violence and non-violent disruptive behavior, to GP.

They assert that the district court’s injunction undermines FDC’s

ability to effectively manage prison administration.

We recognize that “[p]rison administrators . . . should be

accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to pre-

serve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional

security.” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2020)

(alterations in original) (emphasis removed) (quoting Bell v. Wolf-

ish, 411 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). But, at the same time, “the public

interest is served when constitutional rights are protected.”

Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th

Cir. 2019). As explained previously, Melendez has, at this stage,

shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his

Eighth Amendment claim based on his extended stay in CM I

over the majority of a five-year period that was often without the

privileges afforded to CM I inmates such as out-of-cell recreation

time or showers and that, as a result, exacerbated his mental ill-

ness, as evidenced by his acts of self-harm.

Furthermore, the district court found that none of Defend-

ants’ witnesses “could explain why a CM or administrative con-

finement status is currently justified based on [Melendez’s] pre-

sent risk assessment.” As the district court found, since being re-

leased from CM pursuant to the first preliminary injunction,

Melendez has received satisfactory and above satisfactory security

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52 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

evaluations. Dr. Greenberg testified that Melendez could care for

himself and follow the rules, and an FDC record stated that

Melendez had the coping resources to manage CM or GP envi-

ronments. The district court also credited Pacholke’s opinion that

there was no sound penological purpose served by continuing to

keep Melendez in CM. And we note that the district court specif-

ically asked Defendants’ counsel during the evidentiary hearing to

provide evidence explaining Melendez’s current security risk if

placed in GP and why it was necessary for him to return to CM

status.

Moreover, the second preliminary injunction only pertains

to Melendez individually—specifically, his housing in GP—and

does not prevent Defendants from initiating the ICT process if

Melendez engages in conduct warranting a recommendation for

CM status. Defendants simply must record by audio and video

the ICT hearings and any mental health examinations related

thereto and file them with the court under seal. Defendants

therefore are not hamstringed from placing Melendez back in CM

if he, in their judgment, becomes a safety threat to FDC staff and

other inmates while housed in GP.

Defendants also contend that the district court should have

“preserve[d] the status quo” in issuing the second preliminary in-

junction by ordering Defendants to provide Melendez his statuto-

rily required privileges as a CM I inmate, e.g., allowing him the

required hours of out-of-cell time and number of showers per

week. But “[i]f the currently existing status quo itself is causing

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 53

one of the parties irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the sit-

uation so as to prevent the injury,” e.g., “by allowing the parties

to take proposed action that the court finds will minimize the ir-

reparable injury.” Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th

Cir. 1974). 7 As noted above, Melendez has demonstrated, at the

preliminary injunction stage, a substantial risk of irreparable

harm. In addition, as the district court found, Melendez was only

allowed 20 instances of outdoor recreation over a period 2,527

days and received the required three showers for CM inmates on-

ly 195 out of 361 weeks, contrary to the FAC provisions govern-

ing CM. Based on Defendants’ history of failing to comply with

those rules, we do not believe it was error for the district court to

not merely order Defendants to comply with the FAC instead of

ordering him released to the GP.

We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in concluding the balance-of-harms and public inter-

est elements favored granting an injunction.

2. Whether the injunction complies with the PLRA

Defendants also contend that the district court failed to

comply with the PLRA in issuing the second preliminary injunc-

tion. Specifically, Defendants assert that the district court’s order

is not “narrowly tailored” because alternative relief could have

7 InBonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-

cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.

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54 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

been ordered—ordering FDC to comply with their existing statu-

tory obligations with respect to out-of-cell-time and showering in

applying CM status to Melendez. Defendants further contend

that the injunction is not the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the violation and claim that the district court failed to ad-

dress this prong of the PLRA. Finally, Defendants assert that the

district court failed to make particularized findings as to any of the

“need-narrowness-intrusiveness” criteria.

As previously noted, the PLRA provides that “[t]he court

shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court

finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the

least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right.” § 3626(a)(1)(A). The PLRA “require[s] particular-

ized findings that each requirement imposed by the preliminary

injunction satisfies each of the need-narrowness-intrusiveness cri-

teria.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1278

(11th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d at 1228). Particularized find-

ings must be made to each of the criteria, and a district court can-

not “‘simply state in conclusory fashion that the requirements of

the [injunction] satisfy’ the PLRA’s narrowness, necessity, and

non-intrusiveness standards.” Id. at 1279 (alteration in original)

(quoting Cason v. Seckinger, 231 F.3d 777, 785 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Reviewing the district court’s order, it made the following

findings as to the PLRA’s requirements. The district court began

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 55

by finding that the relief was “narrowly tailored, extends no fur-

ther than necessary, and is the least intrusive means to correct the

violation.” The district court explained that Melendez had

“sought much broader relief than what [it] granted”—i.e., transfer

to the TCU and an independent expert evaluation—but it had not

ordered that relief, noting Dr. Kupers’s testimony that he did not

disagree with Dr. Greenfield that Melendez did not currently re-

quire long-term inpatient treatment. The court stated the relief

was tailored to address the constitutional violation because the

evidence showed that Melendez had “spent a majority of the last

five years in CM I status with little to no out-of-cell time” and that

there was “no dispute that solitary confinement should not be a

long-term housing solution for inmates,” citing to the FAC and

the testimony of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Labrecque. The court

found the relief was also “narrowly tailored to address the harm”

because FDC’s own witnesses and records demonstrate unequiv-

ocally that Melendez’s “consignment to solitary conditions [was]

not currently warranted.” Indeed, the court noted the recent sat-

isfactory security evaluations and the lack of testimony from FDC

witnesses to explain why CM status was currently justified based

on Melendez’s present risk assessment. The court also explained

that it had not directed FDC to keep Melendez in GP regardless of

his future behavior and that its order “in no way prevents [De-

fendants] from managing its prisons or enforcing rules designed to

protect inmates and staff.” Furthermore, the court noted that if

Melendez engaged in “future behavior that warrants the imposi-

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56 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

tion of disciplinary measures,” e.g., placement back into CM,

FDC was entitled to do so in accordance with FDC policies.

As an initial matter, we reject Defendants’ argument that

the district court failed to address the intrusiveness prong. The

district court’s order explicitly states that the granted relief was

the least intrusive means of correcting the violation. Additionally,

the court made findings as to how FDC was not prevented from

managing its prisons and enforcing its rules by the injunction and

could initiate the ICT process against Melendez if he engaged in

behavior warranting a return to CM, and these findings go to the

PLRA’s intrusiveness prong. We also reject Defendants’ argu-

ment that the district court’s order was merely a conclusory or

formulaic recitation of the PLRA requirements; clearly, the dis-

trict court made findings in support of the “needs-narrowness-

intrusiveness requirements,” even if Defendants believe those

findings are erroneous.

Turning to Defendants’ other PLRA arguments, we con-

clude that none of them have merit. As to the narrowly tailored

requirement, Defendants contend that alternative relief could

have been ordered, e.g., ordering them to comply with their stat-

utory duties set forth in the FAC as to CM inmates that they had

not previously complied with during Melendez’s previous con-

finements in CM. In a similar vein, Defendants argue that the

second preliminary injunction grants relief beyond targeting the

existing wrong because its order releasing Melendez from CM

eliminated a condition that did not violate the Constitution. See

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 57

LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1543 (“While district courts have broad dis-

cretion to fashion equitable relief, such relief must target the exist-

ing wrong.”).

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in finding the granted relief—ordering Melendez released into GP

housing—was narrowly tailored to the alleged constitutional vio-

lation. While Defendants contend that the constitutional viola-

tion found by the district court was limited to the fact that

Melendez was receiving little to no out-of-cell time, the district

court’s findings were not so limited. As explained previously, the

district court incorporated the reasoning from its first preliminary

injunction, in which the court found that: (1) Melendez’s inordi-

nately long confinement in CM I, coupled with conditions such as

lack of out-of-cell recreation and lack of showering (in violation of

the FAC provisions as to CM), suggested he had been deprived of

“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”; and (2) the

lengthy confinement posed a substantial risk of serious harm to

Melendez’s physical and mental health. Moreover, the district

court found that there was no evidence establishing that Melen-

dez should currently be placed on CM status based on the recent

satisfactory security evaluations and lack of testimony from FDC

to the contrary. And the district court had previously credited Dr.

Kupers’s testimony that solitary confinement exacerbated Melen-

dez’s mental illness. Thus, the relief granted is narrowly tailored

to the alleged constitutional violation identified by the court. We

additionally note that the injunction only applies to Melendez’s

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58 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

individual placement in GP and does not bar Defendants from ini-

tiating the process to place Melendez back in CM should his be-

havior warrant doing so. Cf. Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1324 (conclud-

ing an injunction was narrowly tailored where it governed the

department’s treatment of only one inmate “only target[ed] the

narrow constitutional violation identified by the district court”—

i.e., “the district court's injunction [did] not prohibit all non-

spontaneous use of chemical agents on [the inmate] but merely

require[d] that the [department’s] trained mental health staff

evaluate his psychological state prior to authorizing such force”).

Defendants also contend that the injunction does not satis-

fy the “least intrusive means necessary” requirement because they

must wait for Melendez to commit behavior warranting a return

to CM before initiating an ICT hearing to do so. We disagree.

The district court found that FDC’s witnesses and correctional

records demonstrated that Melendez’s “consignment to solitary

conditions is not currently warranted” and that finding is not

clearly erroneous. In other words, Melendez would need to ex-

hibit behavior constituting a security risk for Defendants to begin

the process to place him back in CM. And the district court’s or-

der has given Defendants the discretion to do so—Defendants can

impose disciplinary measures in accordance with FDC policies

and may initiate the ICT process if warranted, so long as they are

recorded and presented to the court. Cf. id. at 1325–26 (uphold-

ing injunction that required “little to no additional expenditures

on the part of” the department of corrections and that did not re-

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 59

quire “onerous continuous supervision by the court or judicial in-

terference in running [the prison]”). Contrary to Defendants’

suggestion, this is not a case where the district court is microman-

aging “the minutiae of prison operations.” See id. at 1325 (quot-

ing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996)).

We thus conclude that the district court did not err in find-

ing that the second preliminary injunction satisfied the PRLA’s

requirements.

3. Defendants’ remaining arguments

Defendants raise two final arguments against the second

preliminary injunction. They contend that Melendez’s challenge

to the decision to place him in CM and his requests to be released

from CM could only be made pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus,

and not under § 1983.

“When an inmate challenges the ‘circumstances of his con-

finement’ but not the validity of his conviction and/or sentence,

then the claim is properly raised in a civil rights action un-

der § 1983.” Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir.

2006) (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006)). By

contrast, “when an inmate raises any challenge to the ‘lawfulness

of confinement or [the] particulars affecting its duration,’ his

claim falls solely within ‘the province of habeas corpus.’” Id. (al-

teration in original) (quoting Hill, 547 U.S. at 579). As the Su-

preme Court has stated, “[w]here the prisoner’s claim would not

‘necessarily spell speedier release,’ . . . suit may be brought under

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60 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

§ 1983.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011) (quoting

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)).

In his second amended complaint, Melendez sought the

following relief as to his Eighth Amendment claim: (1) an order

requiring that he be removed from CM and transferred to an ap-

propriate FDC facility for inpatient mental health care; (2) an or-

der preventing Defendants from imposing isolation lasting longer

than 72 hours; and (3) an order requiring Defendants to provide

him privileges such as outdoor recreation time, access to his tab-

let, and the minimum-required three showers per week, as well as

to allow him to attend ICT hearings as to his housing status. In

his second preliminary injunction motion, Melendez sought a

similar type of relief. But neither of these requests for relief seek

Melendez’s “‘immediate release from prison,’ or the ‘shortening’

of his term of confinement.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 79 (quoting

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 482 (1973)); accord Jenkins v.

Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[Conditions of confine-

ment] quite simply encompasses all conditions under which a

prisoner is confined for his term of imprisonment. These include

terms of disciplinary or administrative segregation such as

keeplock or solitary confinement, as well as more general condi-

tions affecting a prisoner’s quality of life . . . .”); Preiser, 411 U.S.

at 488 (explaining that, in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972),

the prisoner’s claim that prison officials had acted unconstitution-

ally in placing him in solitary confinement as a disciplinary meas-

ure was properly brought in a § 1983 action, as it was solely relat-

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 61

ed to the state’s alleged unconstitutional treatment of him while

in confinement and did not “challenge the very fact or duration of

the confinement itself”); see also, e.g., Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730

F. App’x 738, 742 (11th Cir. 2018) (reversing a district court’s dis-

missal for failure to state plausible claims of relief as to an in-

mate’s challenge to his solitary confinement as violating the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments brought in a § 1983 com-

plaint). Similarly, the relief granted by the district court—

ordering Melendez released into GP housing from CM—did not

result in altering the legality or duration of Melendez’s term of

confinement. We therefore find that § 1983 is a proper vehicle for

the Eighth Amendment claim Melendez raises.

Finally, Defendants briefly argue that the injunction vio-

lates the separations of powers and federalism. Defendants again

point to their interest in prison management security and that

prison administrators “should be accorded wide-ranging defer-

ence in the adoption and execution of policies and practices.” See

Mosley, 966 F.3d at 1273–74. They assert that the district court

acted as a “super-warden” by sidestepping their expertise and

judgment and requiring them to release Melendez to GP and that

the injunction “hamstrings” their officials by “seeking a permis-

sion slip from the district court” if they wish to change Melen-

dez’s housing status. See Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1090

(11th Cir. 2020).

We find this argument without merit. Federal courts have

the authority to eliminate and remedy unconstitutional condi-

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62 Opinion of the Court 21-13455

tions, e.g., those constituting cruel and unusual punishment un-

der the Eighth Amendment. See Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997,

1015 (5th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (“If

government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts have a re-

sponsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment viola-

tion.”); see also e.g., Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1318–22. “Courts must

be sensitive to the State’s interest in punishment, deterrence, and

rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to experienced

and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and dan-

gerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.”

Brown, 563 U.S. at 511. Nevertheless, we “must not shrink from

[our] obligation to ‘enforce the constitutional rights of all “per-

sons,” including prisoners.’” Id. (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.

319, 321 (1972)). As we have already explained, the district court

did not err in concluding that, at the preliminary injunction stage,

Melendez’s Eighth Amendment claim had a substantial likelihood

of success on the merits. And, contrary to Defendants’ assertion,

the injunction does not hamstring their officials by requiring them

to seek permission from the district court to move Melendez back

to CM status. Again, as the district court explained, Defendants

are entitled to impose disciplinary measures on Melendez in ac-

cordance with FDC policies and may initiate the ICT process to

place Melendez in CM should his future conduct warrant it.

****

Accordingly, under our deferential standard of review at

the preliminary injunction stage, we conclude that the district

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21-13455 Opinion of the Court 63

court did not abuse its discretion in entering the second prelimi-

nary injunction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Defendants’ appeal

of the district court’s first preliminary injunction in case number

21-13455, and we affirm the district court’s second preliminary

injunction in case number 22-10306.

DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.