People v. Crites

Filed 4/14/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

A162940

v.

GLENN DOUGLAS CRITES, (Humboldt County

Super. Ct. No. 8098)

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant, whose judgment for conviction for murder has been final for

over 40 years, appeals an order denying his motion to correct information

contained in his presentencing probation report. He contends the trial court

erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion. We

reverse.

Background

Defendant was convicted in August 1977 of first degree murder (Pen.

Code,1 § 187) receiving stolen property (§ 496), and auto theft (Veh. Code,

former § 10851). The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term as

prescribed under the law at the time. His conviction was affirmed (People v.

Crites (Oct. 17, 1979, A17358) [nonpub. opn.].]) and the remittitur was issued

in October 1979.

In March 2021, defendant filed a motion entitled, “motion for discovery

and/or correction/expungement of erroneous information affecting ‘liberty

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

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interests’ and ‘due process’ ” in the superior court. His motion sought to

correct information in his probation report regarding his alleged commission

of rape offenses in Oregon. A clerk of the court rejected the motion, stating it

lacked jurisdiction to consider the post-judgment motion.

On May 17, 2021, defendant filed a document arguing the court had

jurisdiction to consider his claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 916,

subdivision (b) and a motion for reconsideration. The court denied the motion,

stating it lacked the authority to consider the motion under People v. Davis

(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1353 and People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330.

Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.

Discussion

In denying defendant’s motion, the court relied on the long-standing

rule that “ ‘[t]here is no statutory authority for a trial court to entertain a

postjudgment motion that is unrelated to any proceeding then pending before

the court. [Citation.] Indeed, a motion is not an independent remedy. It is

ancillary to an on-going action and “ ‘implies the pendency of a suit between

the parties and is confined to incidental matters in the progress of the cause.

As the rule is sometimes expressed, a motion relates to some question

collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with, and

dependent on, the principal remedy.’ ” [Citation.] In most cases, after the

judgment has become final, there is nothing pending to which a motion may

attach.’ ” (People v. Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 337.)

Defendant contends, nonetheless, that the court had jurisdiction under

section 1203.01, subdivision (a) as interpreted by In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th

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439 (Cook).2 In Cook, the court held that a juvenile offender who is eligible for

a youthful offender parole hearing but who was sentenced before the change

in the law and thus was unable to provide the supplemental information

contemplated in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, may file a motion

pursuant to section 1203.01 requesting “an evidence preservation proceeding

as envisioned in Franklin.” (Cook, supra, at pp. 452, 458–459.) The court

explained that section 1203.01 authorizes the trial court to create a

postjudgment record for the benefit of the Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation but does not require that “statements by the judge and

prosecutor should be filed ‘[i]mmediately after judgment has been

pronounced.’ ” (Cook, supra, at p. 453.) Indeed, as the court observed, “There

is no indication . . . that the statute’s requirement deprives the court of

authority to act at a later time.” (Ibid.) The court concluded, “Penal Code

section 1203.01, augmented by the court’s inherent authority to craft

2 Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) reads: “(a) Immediately after

judgment has been pronounced, the judge and the district attorney,

respectively, may cause to be filed with the clerk of the court a brief

statement of their views respecting the person convicted or sentenced and the

crime committed, together with any reports the probation officer may have

filed relative to the prisoner. . . . The attorney for the defendant and the law

enforcement agency that investigated the case may likewise file with the

clerk of the court statements of their views respecting the defendant and the

crime of which they were convicted. Immediately after the filing of those

statements and reports, the clerk of the court shall mail a copy thereof,

certified by that clerk, with postage prepaid, addressed to the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation at the prison or other institution to which the

person convicted is delivered. The clerk shall also mail a copy of any

statement submitted by the court, district attorney, or law enforcement

agency, pursuant to this section, with postage prepaid, addressed to the

attorney for the defendant, if any, and to the defendant, in care of the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and a copy of any statement

submitted by the attorney for the defendant, with postage prepaid, shall be

mailed to the district attorney.”

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necessary procedures under Code of Civil Procedure section 187,[3] authorizes

it to preserve evidence as promptly as possible for future use by the Board of

Parole Hearings. Transmission of that record to the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, in turn, enables the board to ‘discharge its

obligation to “give great weight to” youth-related factors [citation] in

determining whether the offender is “fit to rejoin society.” ’ ” (Cook, supra, at

p. 455.)

Defendant acknowledges that he is not a juvenile offender entitled to a

youthful offender parole hearing. He contends, however, that the court’s

interpretation of section 1203.01 applies with equal force to his motion. Like

the appellant in Cook, “he is not seeking release. Nor does he challenge the

jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the proceedings that led to his now

final judgment and sentence. The relief he seeks . . . has nothing to do with

the validity of a trial court’s judgment.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 457.)

The Attorney General correctly notes that defendant failed to assert his

novel interpretation of section 1203.01 in the trial court and argues that

defendant has therefore forfeited this argument on appeal. The Attorney

General suggests that “given his argument that these authorities avoid the

jurisdictional bar in his 40-year-old case, he appears to have an available

remedy in the trial court. He can bring a section 1203.01/Cook motion in the

trial court to give the court an opportunity to grant his request or deny it and

develop an adequate record for appeal.” The Attorney General continues, “If

3 Code of Civil Procedure section 187 states: “When jurisdiction is, by

the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or

judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given;

and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not

specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or

mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to

the spirit of this Code.”

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the trial court agrees that the youthful offender cases apply by analogy, it

may grant his motion and hold such a hearing. [¶] The superior court could,

of course, reject appellant’s claim that Cook/Franklin extend beyond the

youthful offender context. In addressing the claim directly, the superior court

will develop an adequate record for appeal.”

We fail to see the benefit of asking the trial court to decide in the first

instance whether the trial court has jurisdiction under section 1203.01 to

correct the record transmitted to the Department of Corrections. Cook does

not carve out an exception for youthful offenders but instead relies on the

plain language of section 1203.01 in finding authority for the motion. We see

no reason why that holding would not apply in the present situation.

Accordingly, we will reverse the order denying defendant’s motion and

instruct the court to consider the motion under section 1203.01.

We note, however, that defendant is not entitled to the expanded

evidentiary preservation procedures afforded a youthful offender under

Franklin. (Franklin, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 284 [At the proceeding, “the court

may receive submissions and, if appropriate, testimony pursuant to

procedures set forth in section 1204 and rule 4.437 of the California Rules of

Court, and subject to the rules of evidence. [The defendant] may place on the

record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-

examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole

hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence

that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or

otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.”].) Rather, section

1203.01, subdivision (a) merely authorizes “[t]he attorney for the defendant

. . . [to] file with the clerk of the court [a] statement of their views respecting

the defendant and the crime of which they were convicted.”

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Disposition

The order denying defendant’s motion is reversed and remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

POLLAK, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.

BROWN, J.

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Trial court: Humboldt County Superior Court

Trial judge: Honorable Joyce D. Hinrichs

Counsel for plaintiff and respondent: Rob Bonta

Attorney General of California

Lance E. Winters

Chief Assistant Attorney General

Charles C. Ragland

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Melissa Mandel

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Joy Utomi

Deputy Attorney General

Counsel for defendant and appellant: Richard Schwartzberg, by appointment of

the Court of Appeal under the First District

Appellate Project case system.

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