Opinion

Patrick Von Dohlen, Brian Greco, Kevin Jason Khattar, Michael Knuffke, and Daniel Petri v. City of San Antonio

Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Apr 1, 2022
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.1%

holding that certain elements of 9 the Whistleblower Act “can be considered to determine both jurisdiction and liability”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that certain elements of 9 the Whistleblower Act “can be considered to determine both jurisdiction and liability”
  • “[A] pleader must be given an opportunity to amend in response to a plea to the jurisdiction only if it is possible to cure the pleading defect.”
  • “Congress’s creation of a statutory prohibition or obligation and a cause of action does not relieve courts of their responsibility to independently decide whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm . . . .”
  • “The allegations found in the pleadings may either affirmatively demonstrate or negate the court’s jurisdiction. If the pleadings do neither, it is an issue of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the pleadings.” (citations omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 20-0725

══════════

Patrick Von Dohlen, Brian Greco, Kevin Jason Khattar, Michael

Knuffke, and Daniel Petri,

Petitioners,

v.

City of San Antonio,

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued October 28, 2021

JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, Justice Busby,

Justice Bland, and Justice Young joined.

JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,

in which Justice Devine joined.

The petitioners in this case allege that the San Antonio City

Council voted to prohibit the opening of a Chick-fil-A in the San Antonio

airport based, at least in part, on Chick-fil-A’s contributions to religious

organizations that councilmembers found objectionable. Some months

later, Texas enacted the “Save Chick-fil-A law.” The statute prohibits a

governmental entity from taking any adverse action against any person

based wholly or partly on the person’s membership in, affiliation with,

or support of a religious organization. Petitioners, who are would-be

customers of the airport Chick-fil-A, sued the City, seeking declaratory

and injunctive relief, plus costs and attorney’s fees.

The City raised two jurisdictional challenges: governmental

immunity and lack of standing. The trial court denied both, but the

court of appeals reversed on governmental-immunity grounds and

dismissed the case. We hold that petitioners’ live pleading does not

demonstrate a waiver of governmental immunity. But because the

pleading does not affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, we

reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to allow petitioners

an opportunity to replead.

I. Background

In March 2019, the San Antonio City Council considered whether

to approve a proposed concession agreement pursuant to which

concessionaire Paradies Lagardère would contract with various vendors

who would operate in the San Antonio International Airport. The

agreement as initially proposed contemplated the installation of a

Chick-fil-A in a 985-square-foot space near Gate A6.

This proposal drew opposition at the March 21, 2019 City Council

meeting. According to the petition, Councilmember Roberto Treviño

objected to the concession agreement’s inclusion of Chick-fil-A and

“announced that he wanted Chick-fil-A banned from the San Antonio

airport.” He elaborated: “The inclusion of Chick-fil-A as a national

2

brand tenant is something I cannot support. The heart of the LGBTQ

community is in District One and the community has come together to

voice its disapproval of this proposal because it includes a company with

a legacy of anti-LGBTQ behavior.” It is alleged that Treviño “moved to

approve the agreement with Paradies Lagardère, but with an

amendment [that] would direct the city’s staff to work with Paradies

Lagardère in replacing Chick-fil-A with another vendor.”

The petition also alleges that, at that same meeting,

Councilmember Manny Pelaez seconded Treviño’s motion, citing Chick-

fil-A’s history of “funding anti-LGBTQ organizations.” Petitioners

allege Pelaez “explicitly stated that he wanted Chick-fil-A banned from

the airport because of its donations to certain religious organizations.”

The petition quotes Pelaez as having said: “I want to make [] sure that

when people traverse our airport, the first thing that they see is a San

Antonio that is welcoming, and that they not see a symbol that for many

people is a symbol of hate.”

The petition alleges that some councilmembers opposed the effort

to exclude Chick-fil-A from the airport. But, after debate, “the council

voted 6-4, with one abstention, to approve the contract with

Councilmember Treviño’s amendment to ban Chick-fil-A from the

airport.”

The Texas Legislature responded later that year by passing

Senate Bill 1978, popularly known as the “Save Chick-fil-A law.”

Codified at Chapter 2400 of the Government Code, the statute prohibits

a governmental entity from taking “any adverse action against any

person based wholly or partly on the person’s membership in, affiliation

3

with, or contribution, donation, or other support provided to a religious

organization.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2400.002. Section 2400.001 defines

“adverse action” to mean “any action taken by a governmental entity”

to, among other things, “withhold, reduce, exclude, terminate, or

otherwise deny” the following:

• any grant, contract, subcontract, cooperative

agreement, loan, scholarship, license, registration,

accreditation, employment, or other similar status

from or to a person; or

• access to a property, educational institution, speech

forum, or charitable fund-raising campaign from or

to a person.

Id. § 2400.001(1)(A), (F).

Under the heading “Relief Available,” the statute provides:

A person may assert an actual or threatened violation of

Section 2400.002 as a claim or defense in a judicial or

administrative proceeding and obtain: (1) injunctive relief;

(2) declaratory relief; and (3) court costs and reasonable

attorney’s fees.

Id. § 2400.003(a). And Section 2400.004, entitled “Immunity Waived,”

provides:

A person who alleges a violation of Section 2400.002 may

sue the governmental entity for the relief provided under

Section 2400.003. Sovereign or governmental immunity,

as applicable, is waived and abolished to the extent of

liability for that relief.

Id. § 2400.004.

Chapter 2400 was signed into law in June 2019 and took effect

September 1, 2019. Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 666, 2019

Tex. Gen. Laws 1939 (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 2400.001–

4

.005). Four days later, petitioners, who are five individuals residing in

Bexar, Kendall, and Comal County, sued the City and Paradies1 in

Bexar County district court, asserting a violation of Section 2400.002.

Petitioners allege that they have standing because they “use[] the San

Antonio airport for travel and would patronize Chick-fil-A if the city had

not banned it from the airport.”

Petitioners allege “[t]he city of San Antonio is violating section

2400.002 by banning Chick-fil-A from its airport.” They further allege:

“The city’s continued exclusion of Chick-fil-A is based ‘wholly or partly’

on Chick-fil-A’s past and present contributions, donations, and support

for certain religious organizations, including the Salvation Army and

the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, which it provides through []

WinShape, its charitable foundation.”

The petition requests the following relief:

• a declaration that the City violated and continues to

violate Section 2400.002 by banning Chick-fil-A

from the San Antonio airport;

• a temporary and permanent injunction that

prevents the City from excluding Chick-fil-A from

the San Antonio airport;

• a temporary and permanent injunction that compels

the City to install a Chick-fil-A restaurant in the San

Antonio airport, consistent with the proposal

submitted by Paradies before the Treviño

amendment;

• a temporary and permanent injunction that

prohibits the City from taking any adverse action

1 Paradies filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, was nonsuited, and is no

longer a party. Chick-fil-A has never been a party.

5

against Chick-fil-A or any other person or entity

based wholly or partly on that person or entity’s

support for religious organizations that oppose

homosexual behavior;

• all costs of suit and reasonable attorney’s fees; and

• all other appropriate relief.

To support their request for a temporary injunction, petitioners

allege they “will suffer probable, imminent, and irreparable injury

absent a temporary injunction.” They add that “[t]he plaintiffs have a

probable right to relief because Councilmember Treviño and Pelaez’s

statements show that the city’s exclusion of Chick-fil-A from the San

Antonio airport is at least ‘partly’ based on Chick-fil-A’s donations to a

religious organization.”

The City sought dismissal based on governmental immunity and

lack of standing. The City argues, first, that Chapter 2400 does not

reach the City’s March 21, 2019 conduct—the City Council’s vote to

amend the concession agreement to exclude Chick-fil-A—because

Chapter 2400 was not in effect at the time, and the petition alleges no

facts to support the notion that the City violated Section 2400.002 on or

after its September 1, 2019 effective date. The City’s standing challenge

is premised on its contention that petitioners have suffered no injury in

fact because being deprived of the ability to buy Chick-fil-A products at

the airport is not a concrete, particularized injury, either actual or

imminent.

Petitioners dispute the City’s contention that Section 2400.004

authorizes lawsuits only by the person who has suffered adverse action

at the hands of the governmental entity. They argue that, under Section

6

2400.004, a person need only “allege” a violation to sue, regardless of

whether that person was the victim of the adverse action. They argue,

in the alternative, that if a concrete, particularized injury must be

shown, theirs qualify. With respect to the statute’s temporal reach,

petitioners acknowledge that Chapter 2400 did not take effect until

September 1, 2019, and is not retroactive. They agree therefore that the

City Council’s March 21, 2019 vote did not violate Chapter 2400.

Rather, they argue the City’s exclusion of Chick-fil-A was “ongoing” and

that they seek relief solely for the City’s actions on or after September

1, 2019.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s jurisdictional

challenges, and the City appealed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 51.014(a)(8). The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s

order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment

dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 612 S.W.3d 503, 505 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2020). The court of appeals rejected petitioners’

argument that immunity was waived. Id. at 507–08. It concluded that,

although petitioners purported to be seeking only prospective relief, the

only plausible remedy for petitioners’ claims was invalidation of the

previously enacted concession agreement. Id. at 507. The court of

appeals further held that petitioners’ pleading was incurably defective

and thus dismissed the case without providing them an opportunity to

replead. Id. at 508. The court of appeals did not address standing.

In this Court, petitioners ask us to address standing and

governmental immunity. They argue that they have demonstrated a

waiver of immunity by alleging a violation of Section 2400.002 and

7

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 2400.003.

Petitioners also assert that Chapter 2400 confers standing and,

therefore, their argument goes, they need not demonstrate a concrete,

particularized injury. Petitioners argue alternatively that even if these

standing requirements did apply, they are satisfied here because they

have suffered or are at imminent risk of suffering a concrete and

particularized injury that is traceable to the City’s conduct and will be

redressed by a favorable decision.

II. Governmental Immunity

A. General Principles

We begin with immunity, the basis for the court of appeals’

decision. Governmental immunity protects the State’s political

subdivisions, including its cities, against suits and legal liability.

Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. 2019); Wichita

Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003).

Governmental immunity therefore bars suit against the City of San

Antonio unless the Legislature has waived the City’s immunity.

Chambers–Liberty Cntys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 344

(Tex. 2019). Cities retain immunity unless the Legislature clearly and

unambiguously waives it. See Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325,

330 (Tex. 2006) (“[A] statute that waives the State’s immunity must do

so beyond doubt . . . .” (quoting Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 697)). We defer to

the Legislature in waiving immunity because it is in a better position to

weigh the conflicting public policy interests associated with subjecting

the government to liability. See Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of

Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 432–33 (Tex. 2016).

8

Governmental immunity encompasses two related but distinct

concepts: “immunity from liability, which bars enforcement of a

judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which

bars suit against the entity altogether.” Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332. A

statute can waive immunity from suit, immunity from liability, or both.

State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009). Only immunity from

suit implicates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Hillman, 579

S.W.3d at 357. Thus, immunity from suit is properly raised in a plea to

the jurisdiction while immunity from liability is not. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d

at 696 (“Unlike immunity from suit, immunity from liability does not

affect a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case and cannot be raised in a plea

to the jurisdiction.”).

In some instances, though, the Legislature has waived immunity

from suit “to the extent of liability,” which merges the two. See, e.g., Tex.

Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004)

(“The Tort Claims Act creates a unique statutory scheme in which the

two immunities are co-extensive: ‘Sovereign immunity to suit is waived

and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.’” (quoting

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.025(a))). These immunity waivers

collapse the jurisdictional and merits inquiries to some degree. See

Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 784 (Tex.

2018). When a statute waives immunity from suit to the extent of

liability, it directs the inquiry to the statute’s elements and may require

a court to consider those elements at both the jurisdictional and merits

stages. See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 883 (holding that certain elements of

9

the Whistleblower Act “can be considered to determine both jurisdiction

and liability”).

When immunity is waived for an alleged violation of a statute, at

the jurisdictional stage, a plaintiff must “actually allege” a violation of

the statute. Id. at 881. “Mere reference” to the statute’s elements in the

pleading is not enough. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d

583, 587 (Tex. 2001). A plaintiff “actually alleges” violation of a statute

“by pleading facts that state a claim thereunder.” Mission Consol.

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 636 (Tex. 2012); see also

Reynosa v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 57 S.W.3d 442, 444 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (“The plaintiff has the burden to

allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the lack of governmental

immunity and, hence, the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.”).

Requiring the plaintiff’s pleading to stand on more than bare allegations

to trigger immunity protects the use of pleas to the jurisdiction, a

longstanding “procedural vehicle to challenge subject matter

jurisdiction” that has been used in our “trial courts for over a century

and a half.” Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 884 (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at

232).

“When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we

determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively

demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Miranda, 133

S.W.3d at 226. If the pleading does not contain sufficient facts to

demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction but also does not affirmatively

demonstrate incurable defects, the plaintiffs are given an opportunity to

amend. Id. at 226–27. But if the pleading affirmatively negates

10

jurisdiction, then the plea to the jurisdiction should be granted without

the opportunity to amend. Id. at 227; see also Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v.

Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007) (“[A] pleader must be given

an opportunity to amend in response to a plea to the jurisdiction only if

it is possible to cure the pleading defect.”).

B. Analysis

As noted, Chapter 2400 explicitly waives sovereign and

governmental immunity when a person “alleges” a violation of Section

2400.002. The relevant provision states:

A person who alleges a violation of Section 2400.002 may

sue the governmental entity for the relief provided under

Section 2400.003. Sovereign or governmental immunity,

as applicable, is waived and abolished to the extent of

liability for that relief.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2400.004.

Petitioners allege the City “is violating” Section 2400.002. In the

“Factual Allegations” section of their pleading, petitioners describe at

length the history of Chick-fil-A’s commitment to Christian

organizations and the public statements of Chick-fil-A’s then-COO, Dan

Cathy. The petition also details the efforts by “activists” to attack Chick-

fil-A “because it gives money to Christian organizations that accept the

Bible as the Word of God.” Petitioners then describe in detail the process

by which the City ultimately approved the amended concession

agreement for the San Antonio airport that would replace Chick-fil-A

with another vendor, including multiple quotes from councilmembers on

both sides of the debate. All of the factual allegations describing actions

by the City relate to conduct that occurred at the March 21, 2019 City

11

Council meeting, well before the statute’s September 1, 2019 effective

date.

There is an assertion that the City’s alleged violation is

continuing in nature. Under the heading “Cause of Action,” petitioners

allege:

The city of San Antonio is violating section 2400.002 by

banning Chick-fil-A from its airport. The city’s continued

exclusion of Chick-fil-A is based “wholly or partly” on

Chick-fil-A’s past and present contributions, donations,

and support for certain religious organizations, including

the Salvation Army and the Fellowship of Christian

Athletes . . . . [Emphasis added.]

But the petition alleges no facts to support this assertion; it nowhere

describes any “action” by the City after September 1, 2019, that could

constitute a violation, as the statute requires. See id. § 2400.001(1)

(defining “adverse action” as “any action taken by a governmental

entity” to, among other things, withhold, exclude, or deny a contract or

access to a property (emphasis added)). At oral argument, petitioners

asserted that the City is taking actions to implement the agreement

approved by the City Council and urged us to conclude that is sufficient

to invoke Section 2400.004’s waiver of immunity. But petitioners

conceded that they have not alleged facts describing any actions relating

to the agreement’s implementation. Indeed, they concede that, without

the benefit of discovery, petitioners do not know what those actions may

be.

Petitioners argue they are not required, at this stage of the

litigation, to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a waiver of immunity

because Section 2400.004 permits any person to “sue the governmental

12

entity for the relief provided under Section 2400.003” merely by alleging

in conclusory fashion that the governmental entity committed “a

violation of Section 2400.002.” See id. § 2400.004 (“A person who alleges

a violation of Section 2400.002 may sue the governmental entity for the

relief provided under Section 2400.003.”).2 But under our precedents

applying similar immunity-waiver language in other statutes, such a

bare assertion of a violation is insufficient. To invoke a waiver of

immunity, petitioners must allege facts to support their claim that the

City has violated Chapter 2400. See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 884; Miranda,

133 S.W.3d at 230.

Lueck is instructive because the Whistleblower Act’s immunity

provision is virtually identical to Section 2400.004: it states that “[a]

public employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may sue the

employing state or local governmental entity for the relief provided by

this chapter” and that “[s]overeign immunity is waived and abolished to

the extent of liability for the relief allowed under this chapter for a

violation of this chapter.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.0035. A violation of

the Whistleblower Act occurs when a governmental entity takes an

adverse personnel action against a public employee who in good faith

reports “a violation of law” by the employer or another employee to “an

appropriate law enforcement authority.” Id. § 554.002(a). In Lueck, the

2 The City argued in its Rule 91a motion that “[a] person” entitled to

sue under Sections 2400.003 and 2400.004 must be a person against whom an

alleged adverse action was taken. Under the City’s view, petitioners could not

sue under Chapter 2400 because no adverse action was alleged to have been

taken against them (as opposed to Chick-fil-A). Given our disposition, we

express no opinion on the issue and instead note that it may need to be

addressed on remand.

13

plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) for

allegedly firing him in violation of the Whistleblower Act. 290 S.W.3d

at 879. Lueck was tasked with coordinating with a private vendor to

develop the agency’s Statewide Traffic Analysis and Reporting System

(STARS), a program designed to collect, analyze, and report traffic data.

Id. After a billing dispute with the vendor caused TxDOT to suspend

work on STARS, Lueck sent an email to his supervisor warning him not

to terminate the contract with the vendor because, without STARS,

TxDOT “is not capable of handling this data and will, therefore, never

be in compliance” with state and federal law. Id. TxDOT terminated

the contract and fired Lueck on the basis that he knew the vendor had

overcharged TxDOT. Id.

Lueck’s petition alleged that the email to his supervisor

constituted a report of a violation of law to an appropriate law

enforcement authority because it reported that TxDOT would violate

state and federal law if TxDOT did not resolve the dispute with the

vendor. TxDOT filed a plea to the jurisdiction on immunity grounds,

arguing that Lueck’s report did not invoke the Whistleblower Act’s

waiver of immunity because he (1) did not actually report a violation of

law and (2) sent his report to his supervisor rather than an appropriate

law enforcement authority. Id. at 880. Lueck countered that his

allegations of a Whistleblower Act violation, standing alone, triggered

the statute’s waiver of immunity. Id. at 879–80.

We cautioned that, when a statute waives immunity for one who

“alleges a violation” of the statute, it is not enough for the pleading to

have “merely referenced the chapter” to invoke a waiver. Id. at 882.

14

Rather, we held that the Whistleblower Act’s immunity provision

required Lueck to “actually allege a violation” of the statute, meaning

the statute’s underlying elements were relevant to determining whether

immunity had been waived. Id. at 881. Lueck’s pleading affirmatively

demonstrated that he did not allege a violation of the statute because

his report detailed regulatory non-compliance, not a violation of law, and

was sent to his supervisor, not a law enforcement authority. Id. at 885–

86. We explained that, although a plaintiff does not have to “prove his

claim” at the jurisdictional stage, “bare allegations” are not enough to

waive immunity when immunity is predicated on “alleg[ing] a violation”

of a statute. Id. at 884. Otherwise, any superficial reference to the

statute in a pleading would be sufficient to waive immunity, a result the

Legislature did not intend. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 637.

The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) also contains an immunity-

waiver provision like Chapter 2400. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 101.025(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the

extent of liability created by this chapter.”). Our cases interpreting the

TTCA similarly look to the statute’s underlying elements in determining

whether immunity has been waived. See, e.g., Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at

225. In Miranda, a woman sustained injuries after a tree limb fell on

her at a state park. Id. at 220. The Mirandas sued the Texas Parks and

Wildlife Department for negligence and gross negligence. Id. at 220–21.

The Department filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign

immunity. Id. at 221.

We noted that the TTCA waives sovereign immunity for claims

arising from premises defects and incorporates the limitations on

15

liability articulated in the recreational use statute under Chapter 75.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.058 (“To the extent that Chapter

75 limits the liability of a governmental unit under circumstances in

which the governmental unit would be liable under [the TTCA], Chapter

75 controls.”). Because the Mirandas were camping and picnicking at

the time of the incident, we looked to the recreational use statute to

determine whether immunity was waived under the TTCA. Miranda,

133 S.W.3d at 225. The recreational use statute limits the Department’s

duty for premises defects to that owed to a trespasser, and thus

sovereign immunity was waived only if the governmental entity was

grossly negligent. Id. We explained that for immunity to be waived the

Mirandas had to “allege sufficient facts to establish that the Department

was grossly negligent.” Id. at 230. Turning to the pleadings, we held

that the Mirandas met that standard by detailing several factual

allegations, including that Miranda was struck by a falling tree branch

that severely injured her; that the unpruned and uninspected tree

branches created a dangerous, defective condition; and that the

Department knew of the dangers of the tree branches but failed to make

the premises safe or warn her of the danger. Id.

Consistent with Lueck and Miranda, to waive immunity, a

plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to actually allege a violation of

Chapter 2400. The immunity provision in Section 2400.004 directs the

inquiry to Section 2400.002, which prohibits “adverse actions” based in

part on support of a religious organization. TEX. GOV’T CODE

§§ 2400.002, .004. And Section 2400.001 defines “adverse action” to

require an “action” by the governmental entity. Id. § 2400.001(1). Thus,

16

to invoke Section 2400.004’s waiver of immunity, a plaintiff must plead

facts describing actions that constitute the prohibited “adverse action”

the governmental entity took based on a person’s membership in,

affiliation with, or support provided to a religious organization.

Here, petitioners do not plead sufficient facts to “actually allege a

violation” of Chapter 2400 because they fail to point to any specific

“action” the City took on or after September 1, 2019, that could

constitute an “adverse action” under Section 2400.002. See Lueck, 290

S.W.3d at 881. The City Council’s vote to adopt the Treviño amendment

and thereby exclude Chick-fil-A from the airport cannot constitute an

adverse action because all agree it occurred six months before Chapter

2400 took effect. Because there is no factual allegation to support

petitioners’ assertion that the City has taken actions that could

constitute an adverse action after the statute’s effective date, the

petition is insufficient to invoke Section 2400.004’s waiver of immunity.

See id. at 884.

Our concurring colleagues concede that the petition alleges no

adverse action by the City after Chapter 2400’s effective date. Yet, in

their view, petitioners have sufficiently alleged a credible threat of a

violation because the City Council’s vote and other conduct pre-dating

Chapter 2400’s effective date constitute “forward-looking direction” from

the City Council, which allows “a permissible assumption” that the City

would violate Chapter 2400 after it became effective. Post at 5

(Blacklock, J., concurring in the judgment). The concurrence relies on

In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2020), in which we held that judges

challenging an executive order lacked standing. We reasoned that

17

although “[a] plaintiff does not need to be arrested and prosecuted before

suing to challenge the constitutionality of a criminal law,” he does have

to allege, among other things, that a credible threat of prosecution

exists. Id. at 812. We question the relevance of Abbott’s standing

analysis to this immunity issue. But, more importantly, we do not think

the City’s March 2019 conduct standing alone permits a reasonable

inference that there exists a “credible threat” of a post-September 1,

2019 adverse action against Chick-fil-A by the City. Indeed, the

contrary is true. Rather than assume the City would violate Chapter

2400, we presume the City would comply with Chapter 2400, until the

contrary is shown. See Avelo Mortg., LLC v. Infinity Cap., LLC, 366

S.W.3d 258, 263 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“In the

absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that . . . a public

official discharges his duty or performs an act required by law in

accordance with the law.”); Sanchez v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 485 S.W.2d 385,

387 (Tex. App.—Waco 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The law presumes, until

the contrary is shown, that every public official will discharge the duties

imposed upon him by the law.”).3 Because petitioners have not alleged

a violation of Chapter 2400—and we cannot assume one—we hold that

petitioners have not invoked a waiver of governmental immunity.4

This principle coheres with similar presumptions that governmental

3

officials will act in accordance with law. See In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 635

(Tex. 2008) (“We start with the presumption that the legislature intended to

comply with the United States and Texas constitutions.”); In re C.J.C., 603

S.W.3d 804, 820 (Tex. 2020) (“We are confident the trial court will comply; our

writ [of mandamus] will issue only if it fails to [vacate its temporary orders].”).

Our concurring colleagues argue that we should infer a credible threat

4

of a post-September 1, 2019 adverse action based on the City’s argument in the

18

The question then becomes whether petitioners are entitled to an

opportunity to amend. Texas courts allow parties to replead unless their

pleadings demonstrate incurable defects. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2011) (“When this Court upholds a

plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds, we allow the

plaintiff the opportunity to replead if the defect can be cured.”); City of

Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2009) (“The allegations found

in the pleadings may either affirmatively demonstrate or negate the

court’s jurisdiction. If the pleadings do neither, it is an issue of pleading

sufficiency and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend

the pleadings.” (citations omitted)); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27 (“If

the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively

demonstrate the trial court[’]s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively

demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading

sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to

court of appeals that its March 2019 vote would not have violated Chapter 2400

even if it had occurred after Chapter 2400 became effective. Post at 4 n.3

(noting the City argued that no “statement or action taken on March 21, 2019

would constitute a violation of Chapter 2400, even if the statute had been in

effect at that time”). But we cannot abandon our longstanding, objective

pleading requirements governing immunity cases based on the City’s legal

posturing. Our precedents do not allow parties to invoke a waiver of immunity

on conclusory or barebones pleading—they require more detailed pleading that

is simply absent from the petition. In the absence of such allegations, we

cannot assume that the City would violate or threaten violation of Chapter

2400 after its effective date. Indeed, as our concurring colleagues concede,

information outside the record suggests the City dropped its earlier opposition

to Chick-fil-A’s presence at the airport. Post at 5 n.4 (noting that “[i]nformation

outside the pleadings indicates that, since the time the petition was filed,

. . . the City may have dropped its opposition to Chick-fil-A’s presence at the

airport”). In any event, as noted below, petitioners will have the opportunity

on remand to plead any details our concurring colleagues would have us infer.

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amend.”). Texas law does not favor striking defective pleadings without

providing plaintiffs an opportunity to replead. KSNG Architects, Inc. v.

Beasley, 109 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); see also

Robinson v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 298 S.W.3d 321, 328 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“[T]he general rule expresses a

preference to allow a plaintiff the opportunity to amend . . . .”). Thus, so

long as petitioners’ pleading does not affirmatively demonstrate the

absence of jurisdiction, they should be given an opportunity to amend.

Petitioners’ pleading does not allege sufficient facts to support

their assertion that the City took an adverse action on or after

September 1, 2019. But neither does the petition affirmatively negate

jurisdiction. Thus, the pleading here differs from that in Lueck, where

the plaintiff’s petition affirmatively showed that his “report” was not

reporting a violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority

and, therefore, he could not allege a violation of the Whistleblower Act.

290 S.W.3d at 885. Because petitioners’ pleading does not contain

sufficient facts to demonstrate either the court’s jurisdiction or incurable

defects, petitioners should be given an opportunity to amend. Miranda,

133 S.W.3d at 227. This conclusion does not mean petitioners will be

required to marshal evidence and prove their claim to invoke the waiver

of immunity. They need only plead facts supporting the elements of the

statutory cause of action—here, facts describing the “actions” the City

took that constitute an alleged violation of Section 2400.002. See Garcia,

372 S.W.3d at 637.

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III. Standing

Petitioners urge us to reach standing, which was raised in the

trial court but not addressed by the court of appeals. The City argued

in its Rule 91a motion that the petitioners lack standing because (1) they

do not fall within the class of plaintiffs whom the Legislature has

authorized to sue and (2) their injury is not a concrete, particularized

injury, either actual or imminent. See Data Foundry, Inc. v. City of

Austin, 620 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2021) (“To maintain standing, a

plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact that is both concrete and

particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged

action; and (3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that

the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”); see also Tex. Bd.

of Chiropractic Exam’rs v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 616 S.W.3d 558, 567 (Tex.

2021) (discussing the proper use of the term “standing”); Pike v. Tex.

EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 773–74 & nn.2–6 (Tex. 2020) (same).

Petitioners argue first that they have standing based on Section

2400.004. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2400.004 (“A person who alleges a

violation of Section 2400.002 may sue the governmental entity for the

relief provided under Section 2400.003.”). They contend that because

the Legislature created this private right of action and they fall within

the class of persons authorized to sue, they need not plead an injury in

fact. In their view, it matters not that petitioners themselves were not

the parties excluded from the San Antonio airport. Petitioners further

argue that, even if they are required to satisfy the usual standing

elements, those elements are met here because “the denial of a preferred

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eating option at the airport” is a sufficiently concrete and particularized

injury.

In response, the City notes that the U.S. Supreme Court recently

rejected a similar argument. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.

Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (“Congress’s creation of a statutory prohibition or

obligation and a cause of action does not relieve courts of their

responsibility to independently decide whether a plaintiff has suffered a

concrete harm . . . .”). Because we have “adopted the federal

requirements for standing,” Data Foundry, 620 S.W.3d at 696, the City

argues that petitioners’ standing argument necessarily fails in Texas

courts. The City further counters that petitioners’ injuries are

insufficiently concrete.

Because we hold that petitioners have not demonstrated a waiver

of governmental immunity and should have the opportunity to replead,

we decline petitioners’ invitation to address standing at this stage.

Standing should be determined based on a plaintiff’s live pleading, and

it would be premature for us to weigh in on the City’s standing

arguments before petitioners have repleaded. See Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of

Fam. & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011,

no pet.) (“[A]nalysis of whether a party has standing begins with the

plaintiff’s live pleadings.”). On remand, the trial court and the court of

appeals may have an opportunity to address the important questions

raised on the issue with the benefit of full briefing and argument. See

City of Fort Worth v. Rylie, 602 S.W.3d 459, 469 (Tex. 2020) (“Because

the question presents an important issue of first impression in this

Court, we decline to address the question in the first instance and defer

22

instead for the court of appeals to address it after full briefing and

argument by the parties.”); Wasson Ints., 489 S.W.3d at 439 (remanding

case for “court of appeals to address [unaddressed] questions in the first

instance”). 5

IV. Conclusion

Government Code Section 2400.004 requires more than

conclusory references to the statute’s elements. To invoke the waiver of

immunity, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to actually allege a

violation of Section 2400.002. We hold that petitioners’ pleading does

not allege sufficient facts to invoke Chapter 2400’s waiver of

governmental immunity. But because the pleading also does not

affirmatively negate jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to an

opportunity to replead. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’

judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and remand to the

trial court to give them that opportunity.

5 Finally, we note this case may present another jurisdictional issue

that has not yet been addressed and should be considered on remand: whether

Chick-fil-A’s public statement that it is no longer interested in pursuing a

space in the San Antonio airport renders the case moot. Acacia Coronado,

Chick-fil-A no longer pursuing restaurant at San Antonio airport after chain’s

plans denied more than a year ago, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2020. Our courts

address issues concerning subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See State ex

rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6–7 (Tex. 2018) (“Harper argues we cannot

address mootness at all because the trial court’s record contains no evidence

that he lost his reelection bid . . . . But we must consider issues affecting our

jurisdiction sua sponte.”).

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Rebeca A. Huddle

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: April 1, 2022

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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