Opinion

Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc.

  • 540 F.3d 333
  • 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 17115
  • 2008 WL 3274082
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Aug 11, 2008
Status
Published
Author
Clement
On the bench
Jones, Wiener, Clement
Cited by
831 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.9%

determining that “[glenerally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only the complaint and its proper attachments ... Because the court reviews only the well-pleaded facts inthe complaint, it may not consider new factual allegations made outside the complaint.”

How later courts described this case

  • determining that “[glenerally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only the complaint and its proper attachments ... Because the court reviews only the well-pleaded facts inthe complaint, it may not consider new factual allegations made outside the complaint.”
  • stating that “a court ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . reviews only the well-pleaded facts in the complaint” and “it may not consider new factual allegations made outside the complaint, including those made on appeal”
  • stating in another context that the ability to base pleadings “on information and belief” “must not be mistaken for license to base claims . . . on - 5 - speculation and conclusory allegations.”
  • affirming dismissal of Texas common-law fraud claims against two companies when the plaintiff failed to “allege in his complaint facts to support his assertion that [the individual who was an officer and director of the two companies] acted on behalf of those companies when he [made the allegedly false representations].”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 11, 2008

No. 07-10705 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

ROBERT DORSEY, On behalf of himself and others similarly situated

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

PORTFOLIO EQUITIES INC; CHARTER HOME FUNDING INC;

CHARTER ASSET MANAGEMENT INC; CHARTER EQUITIES CORP;

HAROLD P BARNES, JR; JAMES B BARNES

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before JONES, Chief Judge, WIENER and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge.

Robert Dorsey (“Dorsey”) challenges the district court’s dismissal of his

claims for fraud under federal securities law and Texas state law against

Portfolio Equities, Inc. (“PEI”), Charter Home Funding, Inc. (“CHF”), Charter

Asset Management, Inc. (“CAM”), Charter Equities Corp. (“CEC”), Harold

Barnes (“H. Barnes”), and James Barnes (“J. Barnes”) (collectively,

“Defendants”). For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part

the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

No. 07-10705

Dorsey purchased promissory notes in February 1998 from PEI, the

proceeds of which were used to fund a real estate business operated by CHF.

H. Barnes was president and a director of both PEI and CHF, as well as an

officer and director of CAM and CEC. According to the complaint, he “held the

largest financial interest in, and day-to-day operational control of, the

CHF/PEI/CAM/CEC businesses.” J. Barnes was vice-president and a director

of CHF.

Dorsey alleged in his complaint that the promissory notes purchased by

him were scheduled to pay twelve percent interest per year on a semiannual

basis and mature on December 31, 2002. He alleged that H. Barnes prepared

a Private Placement Memorandum (“PPM”) with assistance from J. Barnes,

dated April 1, 1997, which was used to offer and sell the promissory notes.

Dorsey alleged that, in 1998 and in each year thereafter, H. and J. Barnes, along

with unidentified PEI officers, solicited him and other investors to reinvest their

interest payments from the promissory notes in additional promissory notes that

had the same terms as the first offering outlined in the PPM. Dorsey alleged

that many investors purchased additional notes in response to those

solicitations.

The PPM states that PEI would lend the proceeds from the sale of the

promissory notes to CHF, which would “use the funds principally to acquire

single-family Residences . . . which CHF becomes obligated to purchase pursuant

to [its] Guaranteed Purchase Program.”1 At the time that the PPM was

1

Dorsey does not describe the nature of CAM’s and CEC’s business and fails to draw

a connection between those companies and this litigation, other than to identify H. Barnes as

the chief officer of those companies. The PPM mentions CAM and CEC in its description of

H.Barnes’s experience and education, stating:

Since 1980 Mr. Barnes, as President of Charter Equities Corp. and Charter

Asset Management Corp., has been responsible for the acquisition and

management of five (5) apartment communities comprised of 600 units. Charter

Equities Corp. serves as the General Partner of the partnerships that own the

communities and Charter Asset Management Corp. is the management agent

2

No. 07-10705

published in April 1997, Dorsey alleged that PEI was a newly established

company created for the specific purpose of financing a new business operation

run by CHF, a small company with no prior business activities. The PPM stated

that PEI would lend CHF up to $150,000 generated by the sale of the notes for

CHF’s use as general working capital. The remainder of the proceeds from the

sale of the promissory notes would be used to make secured short-term

acquisition loans to CHF pursuant to a loan agreement between CHF and PEI.

CHF would use the borrowed money to buy residential real estate and would

repay PEI when CHF sold the property. As security for the loans, CHF would

either grant PEI a mortgage in the purchased property or, if CHF took title to

the property in trust, assign a beneficial ownership in the trust to PEI. If CHF

defaulted on its loan from PEI, PEI’s security interest in CHF’s properties was

PEI’s sole recourse against CHF.

PEI failed to repay the principal due on the promissory notes on the

December 31, 2002 maturity date. Certain unidentified investors demanded

payment, but PEI indicated that it had no ability to repay any principal or

accrued interest due. Those investors conducted an investigation of PEI’s claim,

during which H. Barnes admitted that no documents exist to show that PEI

received security interests in any of the properties purchased by CHF.

On March 5, 2004, Dorsey filed a putative class action against the

Defendants on behalf of investors who had purchased the promissory notes

issued by PEI. The complaint alleged various claims, including federal securities

fraud, state common-law fraud, state statutory fraud, and state securities fraud.

The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including

failure to state a claim. The district court granted Dorsey permission to file an

amended complaint to conform to the requirements for pleading fraud under

responsible for the daily operations of those apartment communities. Charter

Asset Management Corp. is a HUD approved management agent.

3

No. 07-10705

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Private Securities

Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b), (d).

Dorsey’s amended complaint alleged that H. Barnes had falsely

represented to investors that collateral security interests would be available to

repay the promissory notes in the event that PEI or CHF were unable to pay on

the maturity date. He alleged that the representations of H. Barnes were false

at the time Dorsey purchased his promissory notes in February 1998 and

thereafter because PEI had already made unsecured loans to CHF from mid-

1997 to early 1998 in violation of the terms of the PPM. Dorsey pointed to

H. Barnes’s admission that no documents exist to show that security interests

had been given in any of CHF’s properties as the factual basis of his allegation.

The Defendants moved to dismiss Dorsey’s amended complaint pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court

dismissed with prejudice all but one of Dorsey’s claims for failure to state a

claim, but Dorsey voluntarily dismissed that claim and his petition for class

certification. The district court entered a final order disposing of all claims.

Dorsey appealed, seeking relief only for himself as a single investor and

challenging the dismissal of his claims for fraud under federal securities law and

Texas state law.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo,

“accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiffs.” Stokes v. Gann, 498 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 2007)

(per curiam). This court, however, “will not strain to find inferences favorable

to the plaintiff.” Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d

353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). To avoid a dismissal for

failure to state a claim, “a plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory

4

No. 07-10705

allegations.” Tuchman v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir.

1994) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only the

complaint and its proper attachments. Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v.

Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006). A court is permitted, however, to

rely on “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of

which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,

Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007). Because the court reviews only the well-

pleaded facts in the complaint, it may not consider new factual allegations made

outside the complaint, including those made on appeal. See Fin. Acquisition

Partners LP, 440 F.3d at 289.

III. DISCUSSION

Both federal securities claims and state-law fraud claims are subject to the

pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). See Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d

424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002); Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177

(5th Cir. 1997) (“We see no principled reason why the state claims of fraud

should escape the pleading requirements of the federal rules . . . .”). A

heightened level of pleading is imposed for fraud claims: “In alleging fraud or

mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting

fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). “This Court interprets Rule 9(b) strictly,

requiring a plaintiff pleading fraud to specify the statements contended to be

fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were

made, and explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Herrmann Holdings

Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 564–65 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotations omitted). Put simply, Rule 9(b) requires the complaint to set forth

“the who, what, when, where, and how” of the events at issue. ABC Arbitrage

Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 350 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotations omitted).

5

No. 07-10705

“Importantly, though, the second sentence of Rule 9(b) relaxes the

particularity requirement for conditions of the mind, such as scienter: ‘Malice,

intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind of a person may be averred

generally.’” Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1068 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). “Although

Rule 9(b) expressly allows scienter to be ‘averred generally’, simple allegations

that defendants possess fraudulent intent will not satisfy Rule 9(b).” Melder v.

Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1102 (5th Cir. 1994). “The plaintiffs must set forth specific

facts supporting an inference of fraud.” Id. “Alleged facts are sufficient to

support such an inference if they either (1) show a defendant’s motive to commit

securities fraud or (2) identify circumstances that indicate conscious behavior on

the part of the defendant.” Herrmann Holdings Ltd., 302 F.3d at 565 (internal

quotations omitted). “If the facts pleaded in a complaint are peculiarly within

the opposing party’s knowledge, fraud pleadings may be based on information

and belief. However, this luxury must not be mistaken for license to base claims

of fraud on speculation and conclusory allegations.” Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1068

(internal quotations and citation omitted).

Federal securities fraud claims are also subject to the pleading

requirements of the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b); Abrams, 292 F.3d at 430.

The PSLRA enhances the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). See

Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 362–63. Under the PSLRA, plaintiffs must

“specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons

why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement

or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with

particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).

We now address each of Dorsey’s fraud claims.

A. Federal Securities Fraud Claims

Dorsey alleged in his complaint that the Defendants violated § 78j(b) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm,

6

No. 07-10705

and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (collectively, the

“Rule 10b-5 claim”). He further alleged that H. Barnes and J. Barnes violated

§ 78t(a) of the Exchange Act, which assigns joint and several liability to a

“controlling person” for a controlled person’s fraudulent acts.2 To establish a

claim for securities fraud under those provisions, Dorsey must plead with

particularity that the Defendants’ misstatement or omission of material fact was

made with the intent to defraud, that he relied on the misstatement, and that

the misstatement proximately caused his injuries. See Williams v. WMX

Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1997). The district court

dismissed Dorsey’s claims for two reasons, only one of which he appeals.3 The

district court found that Dorsey had failed to plead his claims arising from

purchases of promissory notes made after March 5, 1999 with the requisite

particularity under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA.

We hold that the district court properly dismissed Dorsey’s federal

securities law claims arising from purchases of promissory notes made after his

initial February 1998 purchase. Dorsey’s allegations regarding the solicitation

and purchases after February 1998 appear in paragraphs 35 and 42 of his

complaint:

In 1998 and thereafter, many holders of the [promissory notes] were

successfully solicited by the defendants to reinvest their annual

interest payment under the Notes in additional Notes purportedly

issued by PEI having the same terms and security as the notes

originally purchased. These solicitations were conducted by PEI

officers under the supervision and control of defendants [H.] Barnes

and J. Barnes without any revised offering document or meaningful

disclosure of the material facts concerning the PEI business.

2

To recover under § 78t(a), a plaintiff must first adequately plead a primary violation

of securities laws—here, violations of § 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Southland Sec. Corp., 365

F.3d at 383–84.

3

The district court dismissed Dorsey’s Rule 10b-5 claim arising from the purchase of

promissory notes on or before March 5, 1999, finding that they were barred by the statute of

repose. Dorsey does not challenge the dismissal of those claims.

7

No. 07-10705

....

The fraudulent conduct of defendant [H.] Barnes and J. Barnes,

acting individually and on behalf of PEI and CHF, continued to

occur each year when they, directly and indirectly, solicited

plaintiffs and other Class members to reinvest their interest

earnings in additional notes without disclosing the absence of

collateral security for the existing [sic] and the failure of CHF to

repay loans made by PEI upon the sale of specific properties

acquired, in part, with funds loaned by PEI.

Dorsey’s allegations fail to state a Rule 10b-5 claim for several reasons,

first of which is his failure to allege the purchase of a security. Dorsey alleged

that he and others were solicited to make purchases, but he does not allege that

he acted on those solicitations and made purchases after his initial purchase in

February 1998. “Rule 9(b) does not allow the plaintiffs to force the

defendants—or the court—to make such assumptions.” Bagby v. Rydex Invs.,

No. 3:06-CV-0648-G, 2007 WL 507042, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2007). Dorsey

argued on appeal that he made additional purchases. However, because our

review is limited to his complaint and its proper attachments, we may not

consider any additional evidence or pleadings.

Even assuming Dorsey made additional purchases after his initial

purchase in February 1998, he failed to allege specifically when those purchases

were made. All purchases made before March 5, 1999 are barred by the statute

of repose; therefore, the dates of any additional purchases are crucial to the

success of his claim.

Dorsey attempted to remedy the defects in his complaint on appeal by

alleging new facts regarding precisely who solicited him to purchase additional

promissory notes. Again, because our review is limited to the complaint and

proper attachments, we may not consider any additional evidence or pleadings.

Therefore, the district court’s dismissal of Dorsey’s federal securities fraud

claims is affirmed.

8

No. 07-10705

B. Texas Common-Law Fraud Claims4

Dorsey alleged in his complaint that the Defendants made affirmative

false representations and failed to disclose material facts. Under Texas law, to

state a claim for common-law fraud based upon an affirmative false

representation, Dorsey must allege that the Defendants made “a material

misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false

when made or was asserted without knowledge of the truth, which was intended

to be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused injury.” Johnson &

Johnson Med., Inc. v. Sanchez, 924 S.W.2d 925, 929–30 (Tex. 1996). To state a

claim for common-law fraud based on nondisclosure, Texas law requires Dorsey

to allege that the Defendants concealed or failed to disclose a material fact that

they knew Dorsey was ignorant of or did not have the opportunity to discover,

that they intended to induce him to take some action by concealing or failing to

disclose the material fact, and that he suffered as a result of acting on the

Defendants’ nondisclosure. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754–55 (Tex.

2001). However, “for there to be actionable nondisclosure fraud, there must be

a duty to disclose.” Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &

“ERISA” Litig.), 388 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (citing Texas case

law). A duty to disclose may arise “where one makes a representation and fails

to disclose new information that makes the earlier representation misleading or

untrue . . . .” Id.

The district court dismissed all of Dorsey’s common-law fraud claims,

finding that Dorsey failed to plead scienter adequately pursuant to Rule 9(b).

4

As discussed above, all claims made pursuant to federal securities law, Texas common-

law fraud, and Texas securities law related to purchases of promissory notes allegedly made

after Dorsey’s initial purchase in February 1998 were properly dismissed due to Dorsey’s

failure to plead the elements of fraud with particularity because he did not include the specific

dates of any subsequent transactions and did not identify the speakers making alleged

misrepresentations. Therefore, our review of Dorsey’s claims is limited to his pleadings

regarding his initial purchase of promissory notes in February 1998.

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No. 07-10705

Although the PSLRA’s stricter scienter requirement does not apply to state-law

fraud claims, Rule 9(b) nevertheless incorporates an element of scienter;

however, after examining Dorsey’s pleadings, the district court found neither

sufficient allegations of motive nor any identifying circumstances that indicated

the Defendants’ conscious behavior. See Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent

Technologies Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 565 (5th Cir. 2002).

As an initial matter, we hold that Dorsey’s state-law fraud claims against

CAM and CEC were properly dismissed; indeed, Dorsey does not allege that

CAM and CEC made any false representations. He also fails to link them to the

alleged misrepresentations in the PPM. Dorsey failed to allege in his complaint

facts to support his assertion that H. Barnes, an officer and director of CAM and

CEC, acted on behalf of those companies when he drafted the PPM. The PPM

was issued by PEI to sell PEI’s promissory notes. Even if H. Barnes were liable

for fraud involving PEI, CAM and CEC are not liable for fraud merely because

one of their officers committed fraud while wearing a different corporate hat.

Without commenting on the district court’s assessment that Dorsey did not

sufficiently allege motive, we do not agree with the district court’s conclusion

that Dorsey’s allegations were insufficient to plead fraudulent intent on the part

of the Defendants. This court has repeatedly stated in cases governed by the

PSLRA that “normally an officer’s position with a company does not suffice to

create an inference of scienter.” Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 424

(5th Cir. 2001). In Rule 9(b) cases, the same standard should arguably apply; to

hold otherwise would effectively eliminate the scienter requirement for corporate

officers. But even in federal cases governed by the PSLRA’s heightened

requirements for pleading scienter, we have recognized that there can be “a

number of special circumstances” which, taken together with an officer’s

position, may support a strong inference of scienter. Id. at 424–25; see also

Goldstein v. MCI Worldcom, 340 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 2003).

10

No. 07-10705

For example, in Nathenson, investors filed a securities fraud class action

against a biopharmaceutical company, its CEO, and two outside directors

alleging, among other things, that the defendants misrepresented to investors

that one of the company’s patents covered a potential product in order to inflate

the company’s share price artificially. 267 F.3d at 405–06. Although we agreed

with the district court’s dismissal of most of the investors’ claims, we held that

the circumstances alleged, when considered cumulatively, provided a strong

inference of scienter with respect to the CEO and the company. See id. at 425.

Those circumstances included the facts that the company was essentially a one-

product company with its future prospects substantially dependent on that one

product, the acquisition of the patent for that product was crucial for the

company, the CEO publicly stated that the company’s patent covered the product

even when the company had ample opportunity to discover whether or not that

was actually the case, and the company itself was small—it had less than forty

employees. See id.

This case presents similar special circumstances that, when considered

together, lend themselves to a sufficient inference of scienter. In paragraph 15

of his complaint, Dorsey alleged that “[b]ecause of their executive and board

positions, defendants [H.] Barnes and J. Barnes knew of the false

representations and material omissions adversely effecting [sic] the purchasers

of [promissory notes], and were aware that the accurate information was being

actively concealed from [them].” Dorsey further alleged that the Defendants’

fraudulent intent was demonstrated by the fact that, at the time he purchased

his promissory notes in February 1998, PEI had allegedly already failed to

obtain security interests for loans it made to CHF. PEI was essentially a one-

trick pony: it made loans to CHF. If CHF defaulted on its loans, PEI’s ability

to pay the interest and principal on its promissory notes was dependent upon

having security interests in CHF’s real estate. PEI had no employees, but was

11

No. 07-10705

managed by CHF, a company with only eight employees. Neither of the

companies had extensive operating histories nor significant assets. H. Barnes

served as president and director of PEI and CHF, and maintained day-to-day

operational control of both businesses. J. Barnes was vice-president and a

director of CHF. Those circumstances indicate that H. Barnes and J. Barnes

knew or were severely reckless in not knowing whether PEI had failed to make

secured loans to CHF at the time Dorsey purchased his promissory notes in

February 1998, suggesting that Dorsey sufficiently pleaded scienter for his

common-law fraud claims against H. Barnes, J. Barnes, PEI, and CHF.

Therefore, we reverse the finding of the district court regarding Dorsey’s

common-law fraud claims against H. Barnes, J. Barnes, PEI, and CHF with

respect to Dorsey’s initial purchase of promissory notes in February 1998.

C. Texas Statutory Fraud Claims

1. Violation of the Texas Business and Commerce Code

Dorsey alleged in his complaint that H. Barnes, J. Barnes, and the

“corporations under their domination and control” violated section 27.01 of the

Texas Business and Commerce Code, entitled “Fraud in Real Estate and Stock

Transactions.” That section states:

Fraud in a transaction involving real estate or stock in a corporation

or joint stock company consists of a

(1) false representation of a past or existing material fact,

when the false representation is

(A) made to a person for the purpose of inducting that

person to enter into a contract; and

(B) relied upon by that person in entering into that

contract.

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(1). That statute, by its own terms,

applies only to fraud in real estate or stock transactions. See id.; Burleson State

Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App. 2000). “A loan transaction, even

if secured by land, is not considered to come under the statute.” Burleson State

12

No. 07-10705

Bank, 27 S.W.3d at 611; see also Greenway Bank & Trust of Houston v. Smith,

679 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. App. 1984) (“The statute makes no mention of any

application to guaranty agreements, secured by real estate, or to a party who

‘merely’ loaned money for the purchase of real estate.”).

Because Dorsey did not allege facts to show that the Defendants induced

him to participate in a transaction for the transfer of real estate or stock, his

claims against all defendants fail as a matter of law.

2. Violation of the Texas Securities Act

Dorsey alleged in his complaint that H. Barnes and J. Barnes, acting

individually and on behalf of PEI, CHF, CAM, and CEC, violated the anti-fraud

provisions of the securities laws of Texas. The Texas Securities Act (the “TSA”)

creates causes of action for securities fraud against various parties, including

sellers of securities and aiders and abettors. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-

1 to 581-39. Regarding sellers of securities, the TSA states:

A person who offers or sells a security . . . by means of an untrue

statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact

necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the

circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, is liable

to the person buying the security from him. . . . However, a person

is not liable if he sustains the burden of proof that either (a) the

buyer knew of the untruth or omission or (b) he (the offeror or seller)

did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have

known, of the untruth or omission.

Id. art. 581-33(A)(2).

The district court dismissed Dorsey’s claims under Texas securities law for

his purchases made in February 1998 for failure to plead scienter with

particularity. But “unlike a common law fraud cause of action, an article 581-33

claim does not require scienter—i.e., proof that the speaker knew that the

representation was false, or made it without regard to its truth or falsity.”

Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 563 (5th Cir.

13

No. 07-10705

2002) (footnote omitted).5 Because Dorsey was not required to plead scienter,

and he alleged all of the elements of Texas securities fraud under the TSA with

sufficient particularity, his claims against H. Barnes, acting as a seller,

individually and on behalf of PEI and CHF, should not have been dismissed.

The district court did not explicitly consider whether Dorsey had stated a

claim against J. Barnes as an aider and abettor under the TSA. Regarding

aiding and abetting, the TSA states:

A person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud

or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a

seller, buyer, or issuer of a security is liable [under the TSA] jointly

and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer, and to the same

extent as if he were the seller, buyer, or issuer.

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(2). To state a claim for aider and

abettor liability under the TSA, a plaintiff must show “(1) a primary violation of

the securities laws, (2) that the aider and abettor has a general awareness of his

role in the violation, (3) that he gave substantial assistance in the violation, and

(4) that he intended to deceive the plaintiff or acted with reckless disregard for

the truth of the primary violator’s misrepresentations.” Newby v. Enron Corp.

(In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig.), 388 F. Supp. 2d 780, 787

(S.D. Tex. 2005). Unlike a claim for seller liability under the TSA, a claim for

aider and abettor liability does require that a plaintiff plead and prove scienter.

In his brief, however, Dorsey disavows any need to plead scienter. We therefore

conclude that Dorsey relies solely on seller liability as a cause of action, which

can only extend to H. Barnes, PEI, and CHF.

IV. CONCLUSION

5

Although intent or scienter is not an element of a claim under article 581-33 for an

untrue statement of an existing fact, we have held that intent or scienter is an element of a

claim under article 581-33 for an untrue promise of future performance. See Herrmann

Holdings Ltd., 302 F.3d at 563.

14

No. 07-10705

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of

Dorsey’s federal securities fraud claims, his Texas statutory fraud claims

pursuant to section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, and his

aiding-and-abetting claim against J. Barnes pursuant to article 581-33(F)(2) of

the Texas Securities Act. We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Dorsey’s

common-law fraud claims against H. Barnes, J. Barnes, PEI, and CHF with

respect to Dorsey’s initial purchase of promissory notes in February 1998 and his

claims against H. Barnes, PEI, and CHF pursuant to article 581-33(A)(2) of the

Texas Securities Act.

15

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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