State ex rel. McKenney v. Jones (Slip Opinion)

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State

ex rel. McKenney v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-583.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-583

THE STATE EX REL. MCKENNEY, ADM. JUDGE, ET AL. v. JONES, ADM. JUDGE,

ET AL.

THE STATE EX REL. WILLIAMS, JUDGE, ET AL. v. JONES, ADM. JUDGE, ET AL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as State ex rel. McKenney v. Jones, Slip Opinion No.

2022-Ohio-583.]

Prohibition—Mandamus—Appointment of counsel for indigent criminal

defendants—To the extent that municipal-court judges sought to invalidate

an agreement for the appointment of counsel, the wrong parties were

named, because the parties to the agreement were not the common-pleas-

court judges—Municipal-court judges lacked standing to challenge the

appointment of counsel in the common pleas court, because the aggrieved

parties were the indigent defendants or the unpaid attorneys—When a local

rule is ambiguous, a common pleas court cannot have a clear legal duty to

repeal it—Writs denied.

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(Nos. 2020-1405 and 2021-0043—Submitted December 7, 2021—Decided

February 28, 2022.)

IN MANDAMUS and PROHIBITION.

________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In these consolidated cases, the relators, four Summit County

Municipal Court judges,1 seek writs of prohibition and mandamus against the

respondents, the Summit County Court of Common Pleas and its administrative

judge, Amy Corrigall Jones. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the requests

for writs.

I. BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} By statute, a municipal court has jurisdiction over certain portions of

a felony case. R.C. 1901.20(B). Specifically, a municipal court has jurisdiction to

conduct preliminary hearings and other necessary hearings prior to a criminal

defendant’s indictment or prior to a probable-cause determination (after each of

these, jurisdiction is transferred exclusively to the court of common pleas). Id. A

municipal-court judge has the power “to exercise any other powers that are

necessary to give effect to the jurisdiction of the court.” R.C. 1901.13(A)(1). These

cases concern a dispute over the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants

who appear in municipal court before they are bound over to the common pleas

court on a felony charge.

{¶ 3} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution confers on

any indigent defendant charged with a felony a constitutional right to appointed

counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).

In addition, Crim.R. 44(A) provides that when a defendant charged with “a serious

1. The relators in case No. 2020-1405 are Barberton Municipal Court Administrative Judge Todd

McKenney and Judge Jill Flagg Lanzinger and the relators in case No. 2021-0043 are Akron

Municipal Court Judges Annalisa S. Williams and David Hamilton.

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offense” is unable to obtain counsel, “counsel shall be assigned to represent the

defendant at every stage of the proceedings from their initial appearance before a

court through appeal as of right,” unless the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waives the right to counsel.

{¶ 4} The evidence establishes that at least one of the relators appoints

counsel to represent indigent felony defendants in cases originating in arraignment

“when the right to counsel attache[s].” The municipal court maintains a list of

qualified attorneys from which appointments for indigent defendants are made.

{¶ 5} The process by which common-pleas-court judges appoint counsel in

cases pending in their own court is more complicated. In Ohio, a county may

choose from different methods for appointing counsel for indigent defendants in its

jurisdiction, one of which is to create a “county public defender commission.” R.C.

120.13(A). A county public-defender commission may then contract with a

qualified nonprofit organization for that entity to provide legal representation to

indigent defendants. R.C. 120.14(F).

{¶ 6} In 1977, Summit County created a county public-defender

commission. Effective January 1, 2021, the commission entered into a

professional-services agreement with the Legal Defender’s Office of Summit

County (“the office”), a private corporation providing legal representation. See

Summit County Ordinance No. 2021-007 (authorizing the commission to enter into

an agreement with the office).

{¶ 7} Under section 1(A)(2) of the agreement, the office must provide legal

services to any indigent defendant2 in the municipal courts in Summit County.

Section 1(A)(3) of the agreement specifically provides that the office will provide

representation at the “initial appearance of [indigent defendants] for whom a

2. The agreement uses the term “Eligible Person,” which it defines as a person unable to pay for

counsel as determined under various statutes. See section 1(A)(4).

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criminal complaint alleging a felony violation has been filed prior to being bound

over to Common Pleas Court.”

{¶ 8} The common pleas court’s local rules provide that the court’s

designated assignment judge will appoint counsel for all defendants charged with a

felony in Summit County and eligible for appointed counsel. Loc.R. 21.09(A)(1)

and (4) of the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, General Division. “Upon

appointment, the attorney shall perform basic duties as warranted by the facts of

the case * * *.” Loc.R. 21.09(B)(4). The rules require that “any lawyer appointed

in municipal court” be notified of the identity of counsel appointed by the

assignment judge. Loc.R. 21.09(A)(3). In an email to the county’s municipal-court

judges about the process, the common pleas court’s administrative judge explained

that a public defender represents the indigent defendant at the initial arraignment,

pursuant to the public defender’s contract with the county; thereafter, the common

pleas court would appoint private counsel to handle the representation through

indictment and the remainder of the criminal proceedings. The administrative

judge also explained that the common-pleas-court judges would not approve fee

applications for counsel appointed by the municipal courts.

{¶ 9} Citing these local rules, the office of the county executive asked the

municipal-court judges to stop appointing counsel for indigent unindicted felony

defendants. According to the county, the agreement supersedes the municipal

court’s local rules: under those rules, municipal courts may appoint counsel to

indigent defendants “in need of an attorney,” but because the administrative judge

of the common pleas court declared that representation by a public defender is now

available after an arraignment, indigent defendants would no longer be “in need”

of counsel. Therefore, the county deems municipal-court appointments of private

counsel to be a “misuse of public funds” and will no longer “waste taxpayer money

to compensate an attorney when the representation is already provided for in the

contract with the Legal Defender Office.”

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 10} Barberton Municipal Court Administrative Judge Todd McKenney

and Judge Jill Flagg Lanzinger filed a complaint for writs of mandamus and

prohibition on November 16, 2020, to prevent the appointment of counsel by the

common-pleas-court judges while a case is pending in municipal court. We

referred the case to mediation. 160 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2020-Ohio-5393, 157 N.E.3d

786. The mediation stay was lifted, and the case returned to the docket, on

December 29, 2020. 160 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2020-Ohio-6923, 159 N.E.3d 1153.

{¶ 11} Akron Municipal Court Judges Annalisa S. Williams and David

Hamilton filed a similar complaint on January 11, 2021. We consolidated the two

cases, 161 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2021-Ohio-182, 161 N.E.3d 708, and the relators filed

amended complaints seeking two forms of relief. They demanded a writ of

prohibition to prevent the common-pleas-court judges from attempting to regulate

or interfere with the appointment of counsel in felony cases pending in the

municipal court, on the theory that these appointments interfered with the

jurisdiction of the municipal-court judges. And they sought a writ of mandamus

compelling the common-pleas-court judges to repeal their local rules purporting to

allow them to appoint counsel in municipal-court cases.3

{¶ 12} Judge Jones and the common pleas court filed an answer in each

case, along with a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On June 30, 2021, we

denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted an alternative writ.

163 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2021-Ohio-2097, 169 N.E.3d 1262. In addition to the

evidence and brief submitted by the parties, we have received amicus curiae briefs

3. The amended complaint in case No. 2020-1405 appears to also seek to compel the common-pleas-

court judges to withdraw any appointments they may have made in municipal-court cases.

However, as discussed below, this request receives no attention in the relators’ briefs.

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from the Legal Defender’s Office and the Office of the Ohio Public Defender

opposing relief.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The relators make three requests in seeking a writ of prohibition

{¶ 13} To state a claim for a writ of prohibition, a relator must allege the

exercise of judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and

the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Elder

v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. However,

if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a relator need not establish

the third prong, the lack of an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin

Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15.

{¶ 14} In their consolidated merit brief, the municipal-court judges discuss

at length the concept of “vertical representation,” which they define as “the same

attorney represent[ing] a client from when jeopardy attaches until it ceases.” They

contrast this with “horizontal representation,” which occurs “when different

lawyers represent poor people at different stages of the proceedings.” The

municipal-court judges argue that Ohio law requires vertical representation. They

further argue that the right of indigent criminal defendants to vertical representation

is being threatened in three ways.

{¶ 15} First, the municipal-court judges argue that the agreement between

the commission and the office ensures horizontal representation: a lawyer from the

office will appear only at the defendant’s initial court appearance, after which new

counsel will be appointed. According to the municipal-court judges, the provision

in the agreement limiting attorneys from the office to a single court appearance is

invalid and “[t]he remedy is to invalidate the portion of the contract respecting

limited felony representation.”

{¶ 16} Second, the municipal-court judges complain that after felony

defendants are bound over to the common pleas court, the common-pleas-court

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January Term, 2022

judges appoint new counsel of their own choosing to replace counsel initially

appointed by the municipal-court judges. The municipal-court judges ask us “[to]

hold that if a felony case is initiated in a municipal court and that court appoints a

licensed attorney who meets or exceeds the standards for reimbursement for

representing a particular indigent defendant, then that lawyer will continually

represent the client in all related successive proceedings, including defense of a

subsequent indictment in common pleas court, absent specific cause otherwise,

such as an ethical conflict or irreconcilable attorney-client dispute.” (Emphasis

sic.)

{¶ 17} Finally, the municipal-court judges argue that the common-pleas-

court judges should not appoint counsel for defendants while the defendants’ cases

are still pending in municipal court; they premise this argument on principles of

vertical representation more than on alleged interference with the jurisdiction of the

municipal court. In the section of their merit brief specifically addressing

prohibition, the municipal-court judges request a writ “prohibiting respondents

from (a) appointing counsel in any cases pending in municipal court and (b)

subsequently appointing different counsel than may have been appointed by a

municipal court absent specific cause otherwise.”

1. The relators’ request for a writ of prohibition declaring a clause of the

agreement unenforceable

{¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 120.16(A)(1), a county public defender must

provide representation to indigent defendants who are charged with the commission

of an offense, in violation of a state statute, when the penalty includes a possible

loss of liberty. R.C. 120.16(B) provides that the county public defender “shall

provide the legal representation authorized by division (A) of this section at every

stage of the proceedings following arrest, detention, service of summons, or

indictment.” The municipal-court judges contend that R.C. 120.16(B) imposes a

duty of vertical representation on all county public defenders. And the municipal-

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court judges contend that because a private entity that contracts with the county

public defender must “[c]omply with all statutory duties and other laws applicable

to county defenders,” R.C. 120.14(F)(3), the private entity—in these cases, the

office—is equally subject to a duty of vertical representation. And as noted above,

they contend that section 1(A)(3) of the agreement between the commission and

the office, which allows only a single limited appearance by an attorney, violates

this statutory duty.

{¶ 19} R.C. 120.14(F) authorizes a county public-defender commission to

contract with a nonprofit organization “to provide all or any part of the services that

a county public defender is required or permitted to provide.” Far from requiring

vertical representation, the statute plainly contemplates that the county may

contract with the office to provide representation for only a portion of a case.

Regardless, to the extent that the municipal-court judges seek to invalidate the

agreement or control how obligations under the contract will be performed, they

have named the wrong parties in this litigation. The parties to the agreement are

the county public-defender commission and the office, not the Summit County

Court of Common Pleas and Judge Jones.

{¶ 20} Moreover, in challenging a specific term of the agreement, the

municipal-court judges have strayed from their prohibition case and are instead

seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the meaning of the agreement and a

prohibitory injunction to prevent its enforcement. We have no original jurisdiction

to provide such relief. See State ex rel. Esarco v. Youngstown City Council, 116

Ohio St.3d 131, 2007-Ohio-5699, 876 N.E.2d 953, ¶ 8.

{¶ 21} We also note that the municipal-court judges did not raise the issue

of the enforceability of section 1(A)(3) of the agreement in their amended

complaint. In State ex rel. Massie v. Gahanna-Jefferson Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn.,

76 Ohio St.3d 584, 589, 669 N.E.2d 839 (1996), we recognized the unfairness of

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January Term, 2022

considering a new claim when the respondent had no notice of the claim at the time

it submitted its evidence.

{¶ 22} For all these reasons, we deny the request for a writ of prohibition

declaring section 1(A)(3) of the agreement unenforceable.

2. The relators’ request for a writ of prohibition preventing the removal of the

municipal-court-appointed counsel

{¶ 23} Second, the municipal-court judges claim that once indigent criminal

defendants facing felony charges are bound over to the common pleas court, the

common-pleas-court judges are (1) removing counsel the municipal-court judges

have appointed, (2) appointing new counsel to represent the defendants, and (3)

refusing to approve fee requests submitted by the former counsel.

{¶ 24} Under R.C. 120.33(A)(2), a common pleas court has authority to

appoint counsel for indigent persons in proceedings over which the court has

jurisdiction. This statute does not prohibit a common pleas court from appointing

different counsel from the one assigned at a preindictment arraignment. Continuity

of counsel may be the better practice, but it is not required by the statute. Moreover,

the relators before us lack standing to challenge the appointment of counsel in the

common pleas court or that court’s alleged refusal to pay fees incurred by prior

counsel: the aggrieved parties would be the indigent defendants or the unpaid

attorneys, not the municipal-court judges.

3. The relators’ request for a writ of prohibition preventing the common-pleas-

court judges from appointing counsel to represent indigent defendants while

their cases are pending in municipal court

{¶ 25} The municipal-court judges brought this litigation to stop the

practice of common-pleas-court judges appointing counsel to appear on behalf of

indigent criminal defendants in municipal court. However, the municipal-court

judges have not proved that this practice is actually taking place.

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{¶ 26} In her affidavit, Judge Jones attests that the common-pleas-court

judges “do not issue orders appointing counsel until a case is bound over, a common

pleas case number is assigned, and the matter is pending in the Summit County

Common Pleas General Division.” Judge Jones does not deny that attorneys from

the office are appearing in municipal court but contends that those attorneys are not

doing so based on appointments by common-pleas-court judges. Rather, the

attorneys are appearing pursuant to the terms of the county’s agreement with the

office, an agreement to which the common-pleas-court judges are not parties.

{¶ 27} In response, the relators have submitted nine volumes of exhibits.

The first exhibit is an affidavit of Montrella S. Jackson, court administrator for the

Akron Municipal Court. Jackson attests that from November 4, 2020, to July 20,

2021, she received more than 1,700 emails, which were attached to her affidavit,

from the common pleas court identifying an attorney appointed to represent a

defendant in cases in which the municipal court had conducted arraignments and

appointed counsel. According to Jackson, “[e]ach email notice either listed the

attorney retained or a new attorney appointed by Summit County Common Pleas.”

{¶ 28} However, the relators provide no context for these emails. The first

email, for example, announces the appointment of counsel for a defendant in

municipal case No. 20CRA09043. But there is no evidence in the record to indicate

whether, as of the date of the email (November 25, 2020), that case was still pending

in municipal court or whether the defendant had been bound over to the common

pleas court. And the same is true of the other emails. It is not the role of this court

to “search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties,” State

v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19, much

less to conduct research to develop evidence the parties did not submit.

{¶ 29} A court “speaks only through its journal and not by oral

pronouncement,” Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109, 113 N.E.2d 625 (1953),

paragraph one of the syllabus, or in this case, not by emails or press releases.

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January Term, 2022

Because no orders have been submitted as evidence that show that the common

pleas court appointed attorneys in cases other than in the common-pleas-court

cases, the precise conduct that this court is being asked to prohibit is not clearly

identified.

{¶ 30} No statute grants either municipal courts or courts of common pleas

exclusive jurisdiction over felony matters prior to an indictment, see R.C.

1901.20(B) and 2931.03. The municipal court has jurisdiction to conduct

preliminary hearings in felony cases preindictment, R.C. 1901.20(B), but the

common pleas court also has original jurisdiction over criminal charges, R.C.

2931.03. Thus, the relators have not established that the common-pleas-court

judges lack authority to proceed under their local rules. And if, as the amended

complaint filed by Judges McKenney and Lanzinger alleges, the assignment judge

in the common pleas court is appointing private counsel within 24 hours of the

initial municipal-court felony arraignment, such practice would seem to further the

goals of the vertical representation espoused by the relators: if a new attorney is to

be appointed for the duration of the case in the common pleas court, it makes sense

for the defendant to know who that attorney is as soon as possible so that the client

can communicate with counsel and counsel can begin to investigate and work on

the client’s behalf.

{¶ 31} While we deny the requested writ of prohibition, we emphasize the

importance of providing competent and effective counsel to indigent criminal

defendants at all stages of their cases. Courts—in this instance, a municipal court

and a court of common pleas—that have jurisdiction at various steps in the same

case should work together cooperatively to provide a system for the representation

of indigent criminal defendants that will result in competent representation and fair

proceedings throughout the adjudication of defendants’ cases. And while courts

must ensure that a defendant’s right to counsel is satisfied, the responsibility in the

first instance to provide competent counsel belongs to a county public-defender

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commission. No court should interfere with that process absent indications or

evidence in a particular case that counsel may not be serving the indigent criminal

defendant’s need for representation.

{¶ 32} We deny the relators’ request for a writ of prohibition.

B. The relators are not entitled to a writ of mandamus

{¶ 33} Finally, the relators seek a writ of mandamus compelling the

respondents to “lift or rescind any ‘local rule’ or ‘orders’ (or interpretations of those

orders) purporting to (1) govern felony proceedings pending in the Akron or

Barberton municipal courts or (2) enable the common pleas court judges to annul

preexisting attorney-client relationships forged by the judicial branch through a

municipal court appointing counsel when the fundamental right to counsel first

attached.” To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a party must establish by clear

and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty

on the part of a respondent to provide the requested relief, and the lack of an

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell,

150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.

{¶ 34} We deny the request for a writ of mandamus. The relators object to

Loc.R. 21.09(A) of the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, General

Division, which provides that the common pleas court’s designated assignment

judge will appoint counsel for all defendants charged with a felony in Summit

County and eligible for appointed counsel. Contrary to the relators’ allegation, the

rule does not expressly state that the common pleas court will appoint counsel in

cases pending in municipal court. The rule is susceptible to the interpretation

offered by the respondents that appointments occur only after the case is transferred

to the common pleas court. And if the rule is ambiguous, then the common pleas

court cannot have a clear legal duty to repeal it.

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IV. CONCLUSION

{¶ 35} Based on the evidence and the arguments of the parties, we deny the

requests for writs of prohibition and mandamus.

Writs denied.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and

STEWART, JJ., concur.

BRUNNER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.

_________________

BRUNNER, J., concurring in judgment only.

{¶ 36} Relators, Barberton Municipal Court Administrative Judge Todd

McKenney, and Judge Jill Flagg Lanzinger in case No. 2020-1405 and Akron

Municipal Court Judges Annalisa S. Williams and David Hamilton in case No.

2021-0043, brought this action to stop respondents, the Summit County Court of

Common Pleas and its administrative judge, Amy Corrigall Jones, from appointing

counsel for indigent criminal defendants in cases in municipal courts. This court

finds that the municipal-court judges have not established that common-pleas-court

judges are in fact making such appointments and that nothing in the local rules

clearly states that the common-pleas-court judges may do so.

{¶ 37} I concur in judgment only, because I do not find the facts to be as

unequivocal as expressed in the majority opinion. The municipal-court judges

submitted more than 2,000 pages of emails sent from the common pleas court to a

municipal-court administrator identifying attorneys appointed for defendants in

cases that arose in the municipal court. The administrator submitted an affidavit

stating that each of the emails “either listed the attorney retained or a new attorney

appointed by Summit County Common Pleas.” Having determined that relators

have not provided enough context to understand the timing or purpose of the emails,

the majority states that it will not “ ‘search the record or formulate legal arguments

on behalf of the parties.’ ” Majority opinion, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Quartermain,

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140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19. The majority’s

statement could be understood as suggesting that there is no evidentiary value to

the emails supporting relators’ claims.

{¶ 38} While the emails (on a cursory review of their contents) may not be

direct evidence that the common-pleas-court judges appointed attorneys to

represent defendants in municipal court, certain inferences may be drawn from

them. A number of the emails were sent to the municipal court and inform that

court of the name of the attorney who has been appointed in the case, with that

attorney’s name also listed as the municipal-court attorney. Specifically, the

subject line in each of the emails submitted by the municipal-court administrator is

“ATTORNEY APPOINTMENT,” and each email begins, “Notice of SCCP

APPOINTMENT.” The first email was sent on November 25, 2020, and states,

“JORDAN E. KNABB HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO REPRESENT THE ABOVE

DEFENDANT BY SCCP ASSIGNMENT JUDGE: AMY CORRIGALL JONES.”

It then states, “MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY: JORDAN E. KNABB.” (All

capitalizations sic.)

{¶ 39} Thus, while the evidence offered by relators may not involve an

entry or order from the common pleas court appointing the attorneys in the

municipal-court case, it supports—to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the

view of the trier of fact—the municipal court judges’ allegations that the common-

pleas-court judges were attempting to exercise authority in the municipal courts.

{¶ 40} Conversely, I agree with the majority in that a court “speaks only

through its journal and not by oral pronouncement,” Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio

St. 109, 111, 113 N.E.2d 625 (1953), or in this case, by emails or press releases. I

also agree that the common-pleas-court judges established a process by which the

contract between the county public-defender commission and the Legal Defender’s

Office of Summit County would be carried out not only in their court but also in

the municipal courts, refusing to authorize any other attorneys than those stated in

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the emails to be paid, leaving the municipal court with no other feasible way to

appoint counsel. Finally, I agree that because there do not appear to be any orders

from the common pleas court appointing attorneys in cases other than in the

common-pleas-court cases, the precise conduct that this court is being asked to

prohibit is not clearly identified. I would further note that given that neither

municipal courts nor courts of common pleas have exclusive jurisdiction over

felony matters prior to an indictment, see R.C. 1901.20(B) and 2931.03, I cannot

say the common-pleas-court judges lack authority to proceed under their

promulgated local rules.

{¶ 41} In the end, it is every court’s duty to individuals accused of a crime,

and to the state, that federal and state constitutional requirements for fair trials must

be observed and guaranteed. Courts must constitutionally provide competent

counsel in criminal proceedings to those who are indigent, and this must be central

to the process, with territorial differences and interests subordinated to this singular

purpose.

_________________

Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, Ronald J. Mayle, and Benjamin G.

Padanilam, for relators in case No. 2021-0043.

The Pattakos Law Firm, L.L.C., Peter Pattakos, and Rachel Hazelet, for

relators in case No. 2020-1405.

Isaac, Wiles & Burkholder, L.L.C., Mark Landes, Donald C. Brey, C.

Awele Nwajei, and Madeline Shanahan, for respondents.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, for amicus curiae Office of the

Ohio Public Defender, in support of respondents in case No. 2020-1405.

Kushner & Hamed Co., L.P.A., Phillip S. Kushner, Michael R. Hamed, and

Brandon Mordue, for amicus curiae Summit County Legal Defender’s Office, in

support of respondents.

_________________

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