Jackson v. Dallas County Juvenile Department

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 30, 2008

No. 07-10818 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Summary Calendar Clerk

SAIDRICK JACKSON

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

DALLAS COUNTY JUVENILE DEPARTMENT; DOUGLAS VANCE, in his

official and individual capacity

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:06-CV-264

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Saidrick Jackson appeals the district court’s grant of the defendants’

motion for summary judgment. We AFFIRM.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The Dallas County Juvenile Department (the “Department”) employed

Jackson in February 1989 as a detention officer at the Dallas County Juvenile

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

No. 07-10818

Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). In September 2004, Jackson

received an unsatisfactory performance evaluation from his supervisor, Michael

Jett. Both Jackson and Jett are black. Jackson, dissatisfied with the evaluation,

exhausted the available appeals process, but was unsuccessful in altering the

evaluation. On the morning of February 3, 2005, Rodrick Mitchell, a black

security officer stationed in the parking lot of the Detention Center, reported to

Douglas Vance, the Superintendent of the Detention Center, that he had

observed Jackson puncture a tire on a Jett’s car, which was parked in the lot.

That incident was videotaped. Mitchell followed up the report with a formal

incident report.

Later that morning, Vance met with Jackson and the Director of Human

Resources. Vance informed Jackson of Mitchell’s report and the videotape of the

incident. Vance denied vandalizing Jett’s tire; instead, he claimed that as he got

out of his car that morning, papers flew out of the car and he had to chase the

papers down between parked cars to retrieve them. Vance stated that the

Department had strong reason to believe that Jackson punctured Jett’s tire,

notwithstanding Jackson’s denial. Vance terminated Jackson and directed him

to turn in his identification card. An officer from the Sheriff’s Department

arrived, arrested Jackson, and transported him to jail. Jackson was charged

with criminal mischief and spent thirty-six hours in jail; ultimately, however,

the charge was dropped. The Department filled Jackson’s position with Wallace

Peel, who is also black.

Jackson appealed his termination and exhausted the Department’s

administrative procedures; however, at no time during that process did Jackson

claim that any racial or retaliatory bias had been involved in his termination.

Once his administrative appeal was final, he filed suit in federal court in

February 2006, naming the Department and Vance, individually and in his

official capacity (collectively, “the Defendants”). Jackson alleged that the

2

No. 07-10818

Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h-6, and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and

1871, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by terminating his employment because of

his race and in retaliation for his complaints regarding the Department’s

unlawful employment practices. Jackson also alleged that Vance made

defamatory statements that injured Jackson’s professional reputation.

The Defendants moved for summary judgment in January 2007, arguing

that Jackson failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination; he

could not overcome the Defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating him; and his state-law claim against Vance failed as a matter of

law. The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation to grant summary

judgment for the Defendants, finding that Jackson had failed to establish a

prima facie case for racial discrimination or retaliation and, alternatively, that

Jackson failed to show that the Defendants’ actions were a pretext for

discrimination. After retaining jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state-

law claim, the magistrate judge also recommended that the district court grant

summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, finding that Vance was protected

from liability for defamation by qualified privilege. Because Jackson did not

object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court

reviewed the magistrate judge’s findings for plain error. It adopted the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and granted summary judgment

to the Defendants for all claims. Jackson appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, this court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Strong v. Univ.

Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 2007). However, here we

may review the district court’s decision only for plain error because Jackson

failed to object timely to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,

3

No. 07-10818

which was adopted by the district court in its summary judgment ruling. See

Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en

banc).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jackson’s Title VII and § 1981 Claims

Title VII disallows discrimination in hiring or termination of an individual

based on his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a)(1). In cases where no direct evidence exists, we analyze discrimination

claims under Title VII using the burden-shifting framework created by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).1 In

cases involving termination for workplace rule violations, an individual must

first establish a prima facie case for discrimination. Id. at 802. Jackson can

establish a prima facie case for discrimination if he can show “that he (1) is a

member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was subject to

an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside of the

protected class, or, in the case of disparate treatment, shows that other similarly

situated employees were treated more favorably.” Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., 375

F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004). If a prima facie case for discrimination can be

established, then the burden shifts to the Defendants to rebut Jackson’s case by

articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the Defendants present such a reason,

then the burden shifts back to Jackson to show that the Defendants’ reasons for

terminating his employment are not true, but are mere pretexts for

1

The analysis for claims under Title VII and § 1981 employ identical burden-shifting

frameworks for evaluating discrimination claims, so we analyze Jackson’s claims under both

simultaneously. See Jones v. Robinson Prop. Group, L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005).

4

No. 07-10818

discrimination, or that the reasons are true, but his race was a motivating factor.

Id. at 804–05.

The parties agree that Jackson satisfies the first three requirements to

show a prima facie case for discrimination. The parties also agree that Jackson

was not replaced by someone outside of his class; however, Jackson argues that

he was treated differently than similarly situated counterparts outside of his

protected class and was thus subject to disparate treatment. “To establish

disparate treatment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a ‘similarly situated’

employee under ‘nearly identical’ circumstances, was treated differently.”

Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mayberry

v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1995)).

In his own sworn statement accompanying his opposition to summary

judgment, Jackson stated that two other coworkers had committed felonies, but

were nevertheless allowed to continue their employment with the Department.

Jackson did not present competent evidence regarding the race of the other

coworkers or the circumstances of their respective situations; rather, he

discussed some of the details only in his opposition to summary judgment. The

district court found that Jackson failed to produce any competent evidence, apart

from those conclusory allegations, to raise a genuine issue of material fact that

he received disparate treatment as compared to other employees of a different

race in nearly identical circumstances. After a review of the record, we agree

and hold that the district court did not plainly err in finding that Jackson failed

to establish a prima facie case for race discrimination and granting summary

judgment for the Defendants.2

2

Jackson’s claims for race discrimination and retaliation fail because he did not make

a prima facie case; therefore, the burden does not shift to the Defendants to show a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for Jackson’s termination or discuss whether Jackson could show

pretext for the Defendants’ behavior.

5

No. 07-10818

Applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to Jackson’s claim for

retaliation, he must make a prima facie showing that “(1) he engaged in an

activity protected by Title VII; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment

action; and (3) a causual link exists between the protected activity and the

adverse employment action.” Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309,

319 (5th Cir. 2004). “An employee has engaged in activity protected by Title VII

if she has either (1) ‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

practice’ by Title VII or (2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under Title VII.” Long

v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

3(a)). Although Jackson presented evidence that he filed grievances to the

Department regarding its employment practices, the district court found that the

evidence did not contain any details related to any factor to which Title VII

applies. Upon review of the record, we agree and hold that the district court did

not clearly err in finding that Jackson failed to establish a prima facie case for

retaliation and granting summary judgment for the Defendants.

B. Jackson’s State-Law Claim

Jackson claims that, under Texas law, Vance is liable to him for

defamation. In Texas, an employer is protected from liability for defamation by

a qualified privilege “that attaches to communications made in the course of an

investigation following a report of wrongdoing [and it] remains intact as long as

communications pass only to persons having an interest or duty in the matter

to which the communications relate.” Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson,

891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (1995) (citation omitted). To overcome the privilege,

Jackson must show that the statement was made with actual malice. See id. “In

the defamation context, a statement is made with actual malice when the

statement is made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard as to

its truth.” Id. Once a defendant asserts the defense of privilege, the plaintiff

6

No. 07-10818

must produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to survive summary

judgment. See ContiCommodity Servs., Inc. v. Ragan, 63 F.3d 438, 442–43 (5th

Cir. 1995).

A review of the record reveals that Jackson presented no clear and

convincing evidence that Vance communicated to anyone before he met with

Jackson that Jackson had vandalized Jett’s tire, much less that Vance acted

with actual malice. Although Jackson briefed his allegations in his opposition

to summary judgment, he presented no competent evidence to support his

conclusory allegations. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not plainly

err in granting summary judgment in favor of Vance and dismissing Jackson’s

defamation claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

7