Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC., ET AL.

11–391 v.

CLAYTON BROWN ET AL.

CLARKSBURG NURSING HOME & REHABILITATION

CENTER, LLC, DBA CLARKSBURG CONTINUOUS

CARE CENTER, ET AL.

11–394 v.

SHARON A. MARCHIO, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF

PAULINE VIRGINIA WILLETT

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME

COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

Nos. 11–391 and 11–394. Decided February 21, 2012

PER CURIAM.

State and federal courts must enforce the Federal Arbi-

tration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., with respect to all

arbitration agreements covered by that statute. Here, the

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, by misreading

and disregarding the precedents of this Court interpreting

the FAA, did not follow controlling federal law implement-

ing that basic principle. The state court held unenforce-

able all predispute arbitration agreements that apply to

claims alleging personal injury or wrongful death against

nursing homes.

The decision of the state court found the FAA’s coverage

to be more limited than mandated by this Court’s previous

cases. The decision of the State Supreme Court of Appeals

must be vacated. When this Court has fulfilled its duty to

interpret federal law, a state court may not contradict or

fail to implement the rule so established. See U. S. Const.,

Art. VI, cl. 2.

2 MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER v. BROWN

Per Curiam

I

This litigation involves three negligence suits against

nursing homes in West Virginia. The suits were brought

by Clayton Brown, Jeffrey Taylor, and Sharon Marchio.

In each case, a family member of a patient requiring ex-

tensive nursing care had signed an agreement with a

nursing home on behalf of the patient. The relevant parts

of the agreements in Brown’s case and Taylor’s case were

identical. The contracts included a clause requiring the

parties to arbitrate all disputes, other than claims to col-

lect late payments owed by the patient. The contracts

included a provision holding the party filing the arbitra-

tion responsible for paying a filing fee in accordance with

the Rules of the American Arbitration Association fee

schedules. The agreement in Marchio’s case also included

a clause requiring arbitration but made no exceptions to

the arbitration requirement and did not mention filing

fees.

In each of the three cases, a family member of a patient

who had died sued the nursing home in state court, alleg-

ing that negligence caused injuries or harm resulting in

death. A state trial court dismissed the suits by Brown

and Taylor based on the agreements to arbitrate. The

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia consolidated

those cases with Marchio’s, which was before the court on

other issues.

In a decision concerning all three cases, the state court

held that “as a matter of public policy under West Virginia

law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission

agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence

that results in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall

not be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concern-

ing the negligence.” Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.,

No. 35494 (W. Va., June 29, 2011), App. to Pet. for Cert.

in No. 11–391, pp. 85a–86a (hereinafter Pet. App.). The

state court considered whether the state public policy was

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3

Per Curiam

pre-empted by the FAA. The state court found unpersua-

sive this Court’s interpretation of the FAA, calling it “ten-

dentious,” id., at 51a, and “created from whole cloth,” id.,

at 53a. It later concluded that “Congress did not intend

for the FAA to be, in any way, applicable to personal

injury or wrongful death suits that only collaterally derive

from a written agreement that evidences a transaction

affecting interstate commerce, particularly where the

agreement involves a service that is a practical necessity

for members of the public,” id., at 84a. The court thus

concluded that the FAA does not pre-empt the state pub-

lic policy against predispute arbitration agreements that

apply to claims of personal injury or wrongful death

against nursing homes.

The West Virginia court’s interpretation of the FAA was

both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in

the precedents of this Court. The FAA provides that a

“written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transac-

tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-

versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction

. . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation

of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. The statute’s text includes

no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims.

It “requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to

arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S.

213, 217 (1985). It “reflects an emphatic federal policy in

favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” KPMG LLP v. Coc-

chi, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3)

(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-

Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 631 (1985); internal quota-

tion marks omitted).

As this Court reaffirmed last Term, “[w]hen state law

prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of

claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule

is displaced by the FAA.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-

4 MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER v. BROWN

Per Curiam

cion, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 6–7). That rule

resolves these cases. West Virginia’s prohibition against

predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or

wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a cate-

gorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of

claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage

of the FAA. See ibid. See also, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552

U. S. 346, 356 (2008) (FAA pre-empts state law granting

state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide issue

the parties agreed to arbitrate); Mastrobuono v. Shearson

Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 56 (1995) (FAA pre-

empts state law requiring judicial resolution of claims

involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S.

483, 491 (1987) (FAA pre-empts state-law requirement

that litigants be provided a judicial forum for wage dis-

putes); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 10

(1984) (FAA pre-empts state financial investment statute’s

prohibition of arbitration of claims brought under that

statute).

II

The West Virginia court proposed an “alternativ[e]” hold-

ing that the particular arbitration clauses in Brown’s

case and Taylor’s case were unconscionable. Pet. App.

89a–91a, 94a. See also id., at 98a (not addressing the

question whether the arbitration agreement in Marchio’s

case is unenforceable for reasons other than public policy).

It is unclear, however, to what degree the state court’s

alternative holding was influenced by the invalid, categor-

ical rule discussed above, the rule against predispute

arbitration agreements. For example, in its discussion of

the alternative holding, the state court found the arbitra-

tion clauses unconscionable in part because a predispute

arbitration agreement that applies to claims of personal

injury or wrongful death against nursing homes “clearly

violates public policy.” Id., at 91a.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 5

Per Curiam

On remand, the West Virginia court must consider

whether, absent that general public policy, the arbitration

clauses in Brown’s case and Taylor’s case are unenforce-

able under state common law principles that are not spe-

cific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA.

* * *

The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of

the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is vacated,

and the cases are remanded for proceedings not incon-

sistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.