Opinion

Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison

  • 668 F.3d 896
  • 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2549
  • 2012 WL 400692
Court
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Filed
Feb 9, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Kanne
On the bench
Posner, Kanne, Pratt
Cited by
1,258 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.5%

stating that to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) an injury-in-fact; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s action; and (3) *895 capable of being redressed by a favorable decision from the court”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) an injury-in-fact; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s action; and (3) *895 capable of being redressed by a favorable decision from the court”
  • requiring only a colorable claim of injury and noting that "[w]ere we to require more ..., we would decide the merits of the case before satisfying ourselves of standing"
  • finding that a prisoner had no protected property interest in the inmates’ recreation fund
  • noting that an argument that the plaintiff lacked standing because he lacked a protected property interest “conflates standing with the merits”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1490

S AMMIE L. B OOKER-E L,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

S UPERINTENDENT, INDIANA S TATE P RISON and

A LL A GENTS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:10-CV-017—Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

A RGUED N OVEMBER 29, 2011—D ECIDED F EBRUARY 9, 2012

Before P OSNER and K ANNE, Circuit Judges, and P RATT,

District Judge.Œ

K ANNE, Circuit Judge. Sammie L. Booker-El, an inmate

incarcerated in Indiana State Prison, alleges that prison

officials misappropriated funds intended by statute to

Œ

The Honorable Tanya W. Pratt, District Judge for the

Southern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.

2 No. 10-1490

be used for the inmates’ benefit without due process of

law. The district court dismissed Booker-El’s complaint,

finding that he did not have a protected property

interest in the funds. We affirm.

I. B ACKGROUND

As required by state law, Indiana State Prison main-

tains an inmates’ recreation fund. See Ind. Code § 4-24-6-

6(a)(3). The inmates’ recreation fund was designed to

accrue money from sources outside of the state budget,

such as profits from a prison commissary.1 Prison

officials are to then utilize this money for the inmates’

benefit by purchasing recreational items or using the

funds for a purpose not already covered under existing

state appropriations. Specifically, § 4-24-6-6 provides

that once money has accrued to the fund, it “shall be

used, at the discretion of the superintendent or warden . . .

1

Section 4-24-6-7 provides that “[m]oney may accrue” to the

fund from the following sources: “(1) Gifts to the fund.

(2) Profits from the operation of a commissary or canteen.

(3) Interest earned by deposit of trust funds in public deposito-

ries, or income derived from trust funds invested in United

States government securities . . . . (4) Sale of items produced

in occupational therapy. (5) Income derived from any kind

of benefit entertainment for the inmates or patients.

(6) Any other money derived from any source that is not

legally prohibited. (7) Any money derived from the income

of any trust fund which has been deposited in any special

fund of the institution.”

No. 10-1490 3

for the direct benefit of persons who are inmates or pa-

tients in such institutions, and shall not be used for

any purposes which are covered by state appropria-

tions.” Id. § 4-24-6-6(b). The statute then provides a non-

exhaustive list of acceptable expenditures for the fund.2

Booker-El claims that for the past ten years, prison

officials have misappropriated proceeds from the fund.

These alleged misappropriations range from prison

officials diverting money in the fund for their own per-

sonal uses, to using the fund for purposes already

covered under existing state allocations—such as the

purchase of cameras and other devices enhancing

prison security.

Accordingly, Booker-El filed a pro se prisoner com-

plaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern

District of Indiana, suing the Superintendent charged

with managing operations of the Indiana State Prison

and his current and former employees. In his complaint,

Booker-El claimed that the prison officials’ misappro-

priation of the inmates’ recreation fund denied him of

2

These possible expenditures include: “(1) purchased entertain-

ment; (2) magazine subscriptions for the libraries, wards,

or units of such institutions; (3) special recreational equipment

and supplies; (4) special foods for parties or celebrations;

(5) educational materials; (6) phonograph records, televisions,

radios, and similar items when the items cannot be pur-

chased from regular appropriations; and (7) any other pur-

poses not covered by regular appropriations.” Ind. Code § 4-24-

6-6(c).

4 No. 10-1490

his property interest in the fund without due process

of law.

On January 22, 2010, the district court screened and

dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. The court held that Booker-El

did not have a statutorily protected property interest in

the inmates’ recreation fund and, consequently, there

was no basis on which it could review his claim.

The district court reasoned that because neither the Con-

stitution nor the laws of the United States mandated

that state penal facilities maintain an inmates’ recreation

fund or dictate how money in such funds be spent, Booker-

El could only state a claim if Indiana law provided

the inmates with a property interest in the fund. After

examining § 4-24-6-6, the court concluded that the

statute did not give inmates a property interest in the

fund, and thus dismissed the case. See Booker v. Superin-

tendent, No. 3:10-CV-017, 2010 WL 339093 (N.D. Ind.

Jan. 22, 2010). Booker-El now appeals.

II. A NALYSIS

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for

failure to state a claim under § 1915A, Maddox v. Love, 655

F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011), and apply the same

standard used for evaluating dismissals under Rule

12(b)(6), Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010).

We must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true

and draw all reasonable inferences in Booker-El’s favor.

No. 10-1490 5

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 820

(7th Cir. 2009).

A. Standing

Although the district court did not specifically address

the matter, Booker-El wisely raises the issue of standing

in his opening brief. See Rhodes v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 785,

787 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e hope that litigants will be

mindful of our obligation to satisfy ourselves of our

jurisdiction and when, in cases like this, standing is an

obvious issue, they will cite to the relevant parts of the

record to avoid wasting judicial time and resources.”); see

also Schirmer v. Nagode, 621 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2010)

(“[W]e must consider this jurisdictional issue even

though the parties have not raised it.”).

Article III of the Constitution confines the federal

courts to adjudicating actual “Cases” or “Controversies.”

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “[T]he requirements of

Article III case-or-controversy standing are threefold:

(1) an injury in-fact; (2) fairly traceable to the

defendant’s action; and (3) capable of being redressed by

a favorable decision from the court.” Parvati Corp. v. City

of Oak Forest, Ill., 630 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

Here, the main issue for standing purposes is whether

Booker-El has suffered an injury in-fact. “[T]he in-

jury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat

of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff

only by increasing the risk of future harm that the

6 No. 10-1490

plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defen-

dant’s actions.” Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d

629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007). Momentarily assuming that § 4-24-

6-6 confers a property interest to the inmates, as alleged

in the complaint, Booker-El would have a high prob-

ability of receiving benefits under a properly ad-

ministered recreation fund. Because Booker-El would

face a substantial risk in losing benefits to which he was

entitled, misappropriation of these funds thus creates

a substantial risk of harm.

The Indiana Attorney General, as amicus curiae in

support of the prison officials, argues that Booker-El

lacks standing because he has no property interest in the

inmates’ recreation fund. Without a property interest,

amicus curiae contends, Booker-El has no remedy in

federal court and thus no standing to bring a claim. But

this argument conflates standing with the merits of the

case. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794-95 (7th Cir.

2008) (“Although the two concepts unfortunately are

blurred at times, standing and entitlement to relief

are not the same thing. Standing is a prerequisite to

filing suit, while the underlying merits of a claim . . .

determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief.”); see

also Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1073 (7th Cir. 2009)

(“[W]hile a litigant need not definitively establish that

a right of his has been infringed, he must have a colorable

claim to such a right to satisfy Article III.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Booker-El has a colorable

claim to a property interest in the inmates’ recreation

fund. Were we to require more than a colorable claim,

we would decide the merits of the case before satisfying

ourselves of standing.

No. 10-1490 7

B. Property Interest

In order to state a claim for a procedural due process

violation of a property right, Booker-El must establish:

(1) a protected property interest; (2) a deprivation of

that property interest by someone acting under the color

of state law; and (3) a denial of due process. Tenny v.

Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2011). In any due

process case alleging a deprivation of property, “the

threshold question is whether a protected property

interest actually exists.” Cole v. Milwaukee Area Technical

Coll. Dist., 634 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2011).

“To claim a property interest protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment, a person must have more than

a unilateral expectation of the claimed interest. He

must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to

it.” Khan v. Bland, 630 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks and punctuation omitted) (quoting Bd.

of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). A

legitimate claim of entitlement is “defined by existing

rules or understandings that stem from an independent

source such as state law.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Tenny,

659 F.3d at 581. A protected property interest exists only

when the state’s discretion is “clearly limited such that

the plaintiff cannot be denied the interest unless specific

conditions are met.” Brown v. City of Michigan City, Ind.,

462 F.3d 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Booker-El argues that the district court erred in dis-

missing his complaint because Indiana state law creates

a protected interest in the inmates’ recreation fund.

8 No. 10-1490

He contends that § 4-24-6-6 imposes a mandatory obliga-

tion for prison officials to spend the fund for the benefit

of inmates. Specifically, Booker-El points to the direc-

tion that “[t]hese funds shall be used . . . for the direct

benefit of persons who are inmates” in § 4-24-6-6(b).

The word “shall,” absent some other clearly expressed

intent, is a mandatory term that does not confer discre-

tion upon an administrative decision maker interpreting

such language. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad

Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he mandatory

‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to

judicial discretion.”). Because § 4-24-6-6 mandates

that the funds be spent for the benefit of the inmates,

Booker-El concludes, the discretion of prison officials

is sufficiently limited to create a protected property

interest. We disagree.

The text of § 4-24-6-6 requires only that, if prison

officials in their discretion decide to utilize money from

the inmates’ recreation fund, then it must be spent for

the direct benefit of prisoners. What § 4-24-6-6 does not

impose, however, is any obligation for prison officials

to expend these funds within a given period of time.

Conceivably, prison officials could decline to use

money from the recreation fund indefinitely. Thus,

prison officials were under no obligation to ever use

the money in the inmates’ recreation fund for the benefit

of Booker-El or any other inmate in Indiana State Prison.

Moreover, § 4-24-6-11 gives prison officials discretion

to transfer a recreation fund established by § 4-24-6-6

from one institution to another without consulting any

No. 10-1490 9

inmate.3 Therefore, prison officials were free to transfer

the entirety of the inmates’ recreation fund at the Indiana

State Prison to another institution at any time without

notice. Given this discretion, Booker-El has no legitimate

expectation to any benefit derived from the inmates’

recreation fund, and thus no protected property interest.

Booker-El also points to a decision by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Eubanks v.

McCotter, 802 F.2d 790, 794 (5th Cir. 1986), to support his

argument that he has a property right in the inmates’

recreation fund. In Eubanks, a Texas prisoner claimed

that the state misappropriated the inmates’ property

interest in an “Education and Recreation Fund” without

affording due process. The Texas regulation provided

that the funds “are used to complement treatment pro-

grams for the inmates.” 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 61.26

(1989) (repealed 1994). The district court dismissed the

case as frivolous, but the Fifth Circuit held that the

claim was “not frivolous on its face” and reversed.

Eubanks, 802 F.2d at 794. But in so holding, the Fifth Cir-

cuit found only that the prisoner’s claims were “mini-

mally sufficient to require a decision on the merits,” and

expressly declined to address the merits of the prisoner’s

claim. Id. Thus, it is not clear how Eubanks supports

3

Under § 4-24-6-11, prison officials “may transfer money

from the institution’s fund to one (1) or more other funds

established under section 6 of this chapter.” The only condi-

tion placed on these transferred funds is that “[t]he institu-

tion receiving the transferred money shall use the transferred

money in conformity with section 6 of this chapter.” Id.

10 No. 10-1490

Booker-El’s claim to a property interest; Eubanks held

only that the inmate in question was entitled to a decision

on the merits, and that is exactly what Booker-El received.

III. C ONCLUSION

Because we find that Booker-El has no property

interest in the inmates’ recreation fund, we A FFIRM the

judgment of the district court.

2-9-12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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