in Re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC and Continental Homes of Texas, Lp

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 20-0384

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In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC and

Continental Homes of Texas, LP,

Relators

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On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

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Argued September 28, 2021

JUSTICE BUSBY delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief

Justice Hecht, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice Blacklock,

Justice Bland, Justice Huddle, and Justice Young joined, and in which

Justice Boyd joined except as to Part II.B.

This petition for writ of mandamus concerns the scope of available

discovery regarding personal jurisdiction under Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 120a. After the parties failed to agree on the scope of two

corporate representative depositions, the trial court granted a motion to

compel the depositions on a list of thirty topics proposed by the plaintiffs.

The court of appeals granted mandamus relief for the nonresident

defendant, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it

compelled discovery on certain topics that touched both jurisdictional

and merits issues. The plaintiffs seek mandamus relief from this Court,

contending that—at least where specific jurisdiction is asserted—Rule

120a discovery need not relate exclusively to the jurisdictional issue. We

agree.

Neither the text of Rule 120a nor our cases support the court of

appeals’ position. The trial court did not abuse its discretion simply by

compelling discovery on jurisdictional topics that overlap with the

merits. Rather, we hold that trial courts should apply the following

standard: the information sought must be essential to prove at least one

part of the plaintiff’s theory of personal jurisdiction. In addition, general

principles that limit the scope of discovery apply equally to jurisdictional

discovery. We conditionally grant mandamus relief, direct the court of

appeals to vacate its mandamus order, and instruct the trial court to

apply these standards to the particular deposition topics that remain in

dispute.

BACKGROUND

The underlying suit concerns water leaks from plastic pipe made

of crosslinked polyethylene, commonly known as PEX. The relators—

Texas plumbing installer Christianson Air Conditioning and Plumbing,

LLC and homebuilder Continental Homes of Texas, LP (together

“Christianson”)—sued Indiana pipe manufacturer NIBCO, alleging that

NIBCO-branded PEX leaked after Christianson installed it in

thousands of Central Texas homes built by Continental and others.

Christianson also brought claims for strict products liability, negligence,

and fraud—among others—against the real party in interest, Canadian

engineering firm Jana Corporation. Christianson alleged that NIBCO

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hired Jana to reformulate NIBCO’s defective PEX pipe and to maintain

certification of the pipe in the Texas market.

Jana filed a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction

under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a, asserting that Christianson

could not establish minimum contacts between Jana and Texas. In

response to Jana’s special appearance, Christianson moved for a

continuance and to compel jurisdictional discovery.

While Jana’s special appearance and Christianson’s motions were

pending, the parties entered into a Rule 11 agreement. Jana agreed to

make two of its executives—Wayne Bryce and Ken Oliphant—available

for corporate representative depositions related to the special

appearance, but the parties did not reach complete agreement on the

scope of the depositions.

At the trial court hearing on Christianson’s motion to compel,

Christianson proposed an amended list of thirty deposition topics. Jana

argued that the topics impermissibly touched the merits of the case. The

trial court received supplemental briefing after the hearing and granted

Christianson’s motion to compel, ordering that the depositions cover all

thirty topics. Jana then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the

Third Court of Appeals, challenging nine of the deposition topics. The

court of appeals granted Jana mandamus relief on eight of the nine

topics, holding that the trial court abused its discretion because

jurisdictional discovery “must relate exclusively to the jurisdictional

question.” In re Jana Corp., 628 S.W.3d 526, 528, 530 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2020, orig. proceeding).

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Christianson then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this

Court, arguing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

ordered jurisdictional discovery that overlapped with the merits. In

Christianson’s view, overlap between jurisdictional and merits issues is

inevitable when a plaintiff seeks discovery regarding a defendant’s

forum contacts related to the litigation.

Christianson challenges the court of appeals’ holding as to six

specific topics. The topics that remain in dispute are:

No. 17: JANA’s studies, tests, investigations and

assessments of NIBCO’s PEX 1006 as it relates to the

performance of NIBCO PEX 1006 in field conditions in

Texas.

No. 18: JANA’s studies, tests, investigations, and

assessments of PE and PEX generally as it relates to the

performance of PE and PEX in field conditions in Texas.

No. 21: JANA’s efforts to assist NIBCO in maintaining

certification for the sale of NIBCO PEX products at issue

in this lawsuit which caused injury to the Plaintiff in

Texas.

No. 24: JANA’s knowledge of problems with PEX pipe sold

by NIBCO and CPI (e.g., leaks, cracks, failures, pinhole

leaks, oxidative failure, outside diameter, certain failures

to meet ASTM 876 and F2023, variability in the PEX pipe,

aggressive environments, etc.) at issue in this lawsuit

which caused injury to the Plaintiff in Texas.1

No. 27: JANA’s knowledge and impact of conditions,

including but not limited to, high temperature, high

pressure, hot chlorinated water, level of antioxidants, level

1 CPI is a prior owner of NIBCO’s PEX product line.

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of cross-linking, levels of stabilization, electronic beaming,

oxidative degradation, and UV radiation on PEX pipe such

as the NIBCO PEX products at issue in this lawsuit with

end use or field conditions like those in Texas.

No. 30: JANA’s testing, inspection, investigation and

assessment of any failed NIBCO PEX products at issue in

this lawsuit.

ANALYSIS

I. Discovery under Rule 120a is limited to information

essential to the plaintiff’s theory of personal jurisdiction.

To determine the scope of available discovery regarding personal

jurisdiction, we begin with the relevant rule. Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 120a addresses the procedures for making and contesting

special appearances. Among other things, the rule sets out the

materials that may form the basis of a trial court’s ruling on a special

appearance: “the pleadings, any stipulations made by and between the

parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be filed by the parties,

the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” TEX. R. CIV.

P. 120a(3). We have described “relevant discovery” as “a vital part of

resolving a special appearance.” Exito Elecs. Co. v. Trejo, 142 S.W.3d

302, 307 (Tex. 2004).

When a party opposing a special appearance lacks “facts

essential” to its opposition, a trial court may order a continuance to allow

the party to obtain jurisdictional discovery. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(3)

(“Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion

that he cannot . . . present by affidavit facts essential to justify his

opposition, the court may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be

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obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make

such other order as is just.”). Continuances for jurisdictional discovery

are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. BMC Software

Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (concluding

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying party’s motion for

continuance to conduct further jurisdictional discovery where party had

“ample time to conduct, and did conduct, discovery”); see Villegas v.

Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986).

Though the text of Rule 120a does not address the scope of

jurisdictional discovery directly, its “essential” facts standard for a

continuance is informative, and our prior cases have suggested some

further guiding principles. In In re Doe, we observed that “[d]iscovery is

limited to matters directly relevant” to the jurisdictional issue. 444

S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding). Thus, in the

jurisdictional context, it is not enough that the discovery “is reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” TEX. R. CIV.

P. 192.3(a). Rather, the discovery must target evidence that would make

a disputed fact “of consequence in determining” the jurisdictional issue

“more or less probable.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. Merits discovery on matters

not directly relevant to jurisdiction should be taken only after a special

appearance is denied. Dawson–Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 321,

323 (Tex. 1998); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(2) (“Any motion to challenge the

jurisdiction provided for herein shall be heard and determined before a

motion to transfer venue or any other plea or pleading may be heard.”).

Nothing in Rule 120a or our cases suggests that jurisdictional

discovery must relate exclusively to the jurisdictional question, as the

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court of appeals held. To the contrary, we have indicated that

jurisdictional discovery may overlap with merits issues in certain

circumstances. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554–

55 (Tex. 2000) (comparing evidentiary inquiry to establish personal

jurisdiction with similar inquiries—such as challenges to standing—

that serve as “prerequisite[s] to the plaintiff’s presentation of its

substantive claims”). Indeed, Rule 120a itself recognizes that issues of

fact determined in a special appearance may also be relevant to the

merits, as it expressly leaves those issues open for redetermination at

the merits stage. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(2) (“No determination of any

issue of fact in connection with the objection to jurisdiction is a

determination of the merits of the case or any aspect thereof.”).

Particularly when a plaintiff asserts a theory of specific personal

jurisdiction, information that is essential in determining whether the

required “connection between the defendant, the forum, and the

litigation”2 exists may also be relevant to the merits. For example, if a

plaintiff sues a nonresident manufacturer or non-manufacturing seller

under the Texas Products Liability Act and alleges specific jurisdiction

under a stream-of-commerce-plus theory, the plaintiff must show that

the defendant placed a product in the stream of commerce to satisfy

elements of both the jurisdictional theory and the statutory standard for

liability on the merits. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.001; Asahi

Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality

opinion). Discovery about placement of the product in the stream of

2 Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 584 (Tex.

2007).

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commerce, if disputed, should not be disallowed merely because that

discovery is also relevant to whether the defendant qualifies as a

statutory seller.

Rule 120a’s “facts essential” phrase has provided a workable

standard for managing discovery in the summary judgment context

under both Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(g) and Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(d).3 Courts have not construed the phrase “facts

essential” in our Rule 166a(g) to mean exclusive. Rather, an “essential”

fact is one necessary to resolve the issue at hand;4 thus, “facts essential”

to one issue may also be relevant to another. Likewise, the Supreme

Court of the United States has interpreted Federal Rule 56(d) to provide

“limited discovery . . . for the purpose of showing facts sufficient to

withstand a summary judgment motion.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v.

Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 265 (1968) (emphasis added). Like

“necessary,” “sufficient” does not indicate exclusivity.

Because neither Rule 120a nor Doe imposes an exclusivity

requirement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion simply because

3 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g) (“Should it appear from the affidavits of a

party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that he cannot for reasons

stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court

may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit

affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or

may make such other order as is just.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)(2) (“If a

nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it

cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: . . . allow

time . . . to take discovery . . . .”).

4 See Essential, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“1. Of,

relating to, or involving the essence or intrinsic nature of something. 2. Of the

utmost importance; basic and necessary.”).

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it ordered jurisdictional depositions on topics that also touched merits

issues. “Essential” (Rule 120a(3)) and “directly relevant” (Doe) are

useful starting points for analyzing the scope of jurisdictional discovery.

Courts must apply these standards with the disputed issues

firmly in mind. Thus, we hold that information sought in jurisdictional

discovery must be essential to prove at least one disputed factor that is

necessary to the plaintiff’s proposed theory or theories of personal

jurisdiction.5 Discovery is not available at the special appearance stage

on any factor that is undisputed, as it is not essential to the plaintiff’s

opposition.

General principles that limit the scope of discovery also apply

equally to jurisdictional discovery. For example, discovery “should be

limited by the court if it determines” that the “discovery sought is

unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some

other source that is more convenient,” or if “the burden . . . outweighs

its likely benefit.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4. Similarly, discovery requests

must be “reasonably tailored” and not “overbroad.” In re CSX Corp., 124

S.W.3d 149, 152–53 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding). Requests must be

“proportional,” In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. 2017)

(orig. proceeding), and not “overly burdensome,” In re Weekley Homes,

L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).

5 See In re Perl, No. 05-20-00170-CV, 2020 WL 2847533, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Dallas June 2, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (rejecting

jurisdictional interrogatories not “confined to any of the three purposeful

availment factors: Relators’ own activities, aimed at Texas, or the specific

benefit, advantage, or profit Relators would earn from a Texas relationship”).

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II. Although the disputed deposition topics include matters

essential to Christianson’s theory of personal jurisdiction

over Jana, they are not tailored to cover only those

matters.

A. Defining the essential topics

Applying these principles here, the record shows that

Christianson is using a stream-of-commerce-plus theory to argue that

Texas courts have specific personal jurisdiction over Jana in this suit.

Christianson’s challenged jurisdictional discovery must therefore seek

facts essential to prove at least one disputed part of that theory.

The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution imposes no

obstacle to a Texas court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant if that defendant has minimum contacts with the

State and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795

(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). These

constitutional requirements are the reason that courts must guard the

boundaries of jurisdictional discovery carefully, keeping in mind that

they cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a defendant

challenging jurisdiction unless the plaintiff proves these requirements.

This Court “has repeatedly emphasized that discovery may not be used

as a fishing expedition,” and ensuring that “requests [are] reasonably

tailored to include only matters relevant to” the disputed issues is

particularly important in the jurisdictional context. In re Am. Optical

Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

A nonresident defendant’s contacts may give rise to either general

or specific jurisdiction. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. Eng.

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China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 227–28 (Tex. 1991). General

jurisdiction requires that a defendant be “essentially at home” in the

forum State. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.

915, 919 (2011). Specific jurisdiction exists when (1) the defendant has

“made minimum contacts with Texas by purposefully availing itself of

the privilege of conducting activities [in the state],” and (2) the

defendant’s potential liability arose from or is related to those contacts.

Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2007).

Because specific jurisdiction is at issue here, we examine these two

elements in turn.

To show purposeful availment, a plaintiff must prove that a

nonresident defendant seeks a benefit, advantage, or profit from the

forum market. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d

777, 785 (Tex. 2005). Only the defendant’s contacts are relevant, not the

unilateral activity of another party or third person. And those contacts

“must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.”

Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013)

(quoting Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d

333, 338–39 (Tex. 2009)). In products liability cases, showing that the

defendant placed the product in the stream of commerce is not alone

sufficient to establish purposeful availment; some additional conduct or

“plus factor”—such as design for use in the target market—must also be

shown. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (explaining that “[a]dditional conduct

of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market

in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in

the forum State”); Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex.

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2010); see also Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1,

18 (Tex. 2021) (“Additional conduct that [the defendant] tapped into the

Texas market is evinced by its use of a Texas distribution center and a

Texas sales representative to create a market to sell to local installers.”).

Turning to relatedness, a plaintiff must demonstrate a

“substantial connection” between the “defendant’s forum

contacts . . . and the operative facts of the litigation.” Moki Mac, 221

S.W.3d at 585. A special appearance must be granted when this

connection is “too attenuated to satisfy specific jurisdiction’s due-process

concerns.” Id. at 588. The foreseeability of litigation in the forum is

relevant in determining whether a substantial connection exists.

Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 227.

Here, the parties’ dispute concerns the permissible scope of

corporate representative depositions, a matter that courts commonly

address on a topic-by-topic basis. Given the theory of specific

jurisdiction that Christianson asserts, each topic must target discovery

that is essential to prove (1) Jana’s purposeful availment (placement in

the stream and “additional conduct”) or (2) relatedness (substantial

connection between the forum contacts and the litigation). A proper

topic need not be essential to all disputed factors simultaneously.6

6 We have not required plaintiffs to use the same evidence to prove all

disputed elements. See Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17 (rejecting “conflat[ion of]

the purposeful-availment inquiry and the relatedness inquiry,” which are “two

co-equal components” of specific jurisdiction (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at

579)); id. at 18 (“[I]f the actionable conduct occurs in Texas, we have never

required that the lawsuit also arise directly from the nonresident defendant’s

additional conduct.”). Thus, for example, a proper topic may seek facts

essential to prove “additional conduct” without also seeking facts essential to

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The six deposition topics currently in dispute encompass some

matters that are essential to prove purposeful availment or relatedness

under Christianson’s stream-of-commerce-plus theory of personal

jurisdiction. But they also include matters that are not essential in

determining either factor, and they are overbroad and duplicative in

certain respects. We do not fault the parties or the trial court for failing

to anticipate the contours of the approach we have articulated today.

Rather, we conclude that the parties should have an opportunity to

discuss and reformulate the six topics with this approach in mind, and

the trial court should have the opportunity in the first instance to rule

on any disputes that remain.

B. Tailoring the topics

To assist in this effort, we observe that the current deposition

topics regarding Jana’s alleged design and compliance services could

include questions essential in determining whether Jana engaged in

additional conduct indicating its purpose to serve the Texas market

under the stream-of-commerce-plus theory. Christianson claims that its

proposed discovery seeks information about “Jana’s role in the

reformulation project and in maintaining certification,” as well as Jana’s

knowledge of “product needs” in Texas. Questions that target whether

Jana had such knowledge and used it to reformulate products for the

Texas market are essential to determine whether Jana’s actions meet

the plus factor of “designing the product for the market in the forum

“placement” of the product in the stream of commerce, or facts that tie the

additional conduct causally to the litigation.

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State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. But Christianson’s topics regarding

Jana’s general knowledge or activities do not seek essential information.

And questions regarding any other party’s intent to target the Texas

market are not relevant because that intent cannot be imputed to Jana.

Importantly, simply inserting the phrase “in Texas” or “in Texas

field conditions” into a topic does not make it essential to prove specific

jurisdiction. Knowledge of how a product works “in Texas”—the subject

of one disputed topic—is akin to “awareness that the stream of

commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State,” which is

an insufficient basis for specific jurisdiction. See id. Jana’s knowledge

of, or tests concerning, how a product at issue functions in Texas field

conditions may be essential in determining purposeful availment under

a stream-of-commerce-plus theory if such knowledge or tests are tied to

Jana’s intent to target the market in Texas. See id. Likewise, any

design work that Jana did using knowledge of Texas field conditions

may be essential in determining whether there is a substantial

connection between Jana’s alleged contacts and Christianson’s claims

against it. But mere general awareness of a range of conditions within

which a product must operate does not itself show a purpose to serve all

markets in which those conditions exist.

Moreover, applying general discovery principles, the disputed

topics are too broad. See CSX, 124 S.W.3d at 152–53. Though deposition

topics—by their nature—may be broader in scope than individual

deposition questions or interrogatories, the principle that discovery

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requests should not be overbroad nevertheless applies.7 See id. at 153

(noting that we have not “identified different standards for evaluating

various discovery methods”) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937

S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1996)); In re Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 617

S.W.3d 635, 643–44, 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig.

proceeding) (concluding that some deposition topics at issue were “broad

enough to encompass other matters irrelevant to the underlying . . .

claim”). The topics should be tailored to provide further limitations as

to time and subject matter. See CSX, 124 S.W.3d at 153 (citing Texaco,

Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995)).

Finally, some of the disputed topics are cumulative or duplicative

of topics that the parties do not dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4.

Taking the total list of thirty proposed topics into consideration, some

disputed topics target information already accessible through topic 19,

which includes “Jana’s participation in studies, tests, investigations and

assessments of the performance of plastic tubing in Texas.” The

mandamus record does not indicate that Jana challenged topic 19.

Studies, tests, and investigations related to the performance of “plastic

tubing” could include the same studies, tests, and investigations sought

in topics 17, 18, and 30. Whether that overlap constitutes “unreasonably

cumulative or duplicative” discovery is a question for the trial court. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4 (emphasis added).

7 We recognize that it is common practice to provide topics rather than

individual questions when noticing the depositions of corporate

representatives, and we do not disturb this general practice. But in contexts

such as jurisdictional disputes where the availability of discovery is limited,

topics should be tailored to take those limits into account.

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III. Mandamus relief is proper.

Having concluded that the court of appeals clearly erred in

restricting discovery more than Rule 120a requires, we next consider

whether mandamus relief is a proper remedy. We review a court of

appeals’ issuance of a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion, but

in doing so our focus remains on the trial court’s order. In re Turner,

591 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re State,

556 S.W.3d 821, 826 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding)). A court of appeals

may issue a writ of mandamus only if the trial court abused its

discretion and there is no adequate remedy by appeal. Johnson v.

Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985). “If the trial

court did not abuse its discretion, then the court of appeals erred in

granting mandamus relief.” In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50

S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding) (citing Johnson, 700

S.W.2d at 917); see also In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex.

2020) (orig. proceeding); Scott v. Twelfth Ct. of Appeals, 843 S.W.2d 439,

440 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

As we have explained, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

for the reason identified by the court of appeals. We conclude that the

court of appeals erred when it held that discovery on eight of the nine

disputed deposition topics should be denied because Rule 120a(3)

discovery must relate exclusively to the jurisdictional issue. Therefore,

mandamus relief is proper.

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CONCLUSION

Because the court of appeals’ grant of mandamus relief narrowing

Christianson’s jurisdictional discovery was based on a legally incorrect

understanding of the available scope of discovery, we conditionally grant

mandamus relief to Christianson. We direct the court of appeals to

vacate its mandamus order, and we instruct the trial court to apply the

standards explained above to the six deposition topics that remain in

dispute. Our writ will issue only if the court of appeals fails to act in

accordance with this opinion.

J. Brett Busby

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: February 4, 2022

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