Plaza Auto Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PLAZA AUTO CENTER, INC.,  Nos. 10-72728

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,

10-73125

v.

 NLRB No.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 28-CA-22256

BOARD,

OPINION

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.



On Petition for Review and Cross-Application

for Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

Argued and Submitted

October 27, 2011—San Francisco, California

Filed December 19, 2011

Before: Susan P. Graber and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges,

and Gordon J. Quist,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Quist

*The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

21025

21028 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB

COUNSEL

Stephanie R. Leach, Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P., Phoenix, Ari-

zona, for the petitioner.

Jill A. Griffin and Kira Dellinger Vol, National Labor Rela-

tions Board, Washington, D.C., for the respondent.

OPINION

QUIST, District Judge:

Plaza Auto Center, Inc. (“PAC” or “company”) seeks

review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board (the

“Board”) holding that PAC violated section 8(a)(1) of the

National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”), 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(1), by firing employee Nick Aguirre (“Aguirre”) for

his outburst during a meeting with PAC management regard-

ing PAC’s compensation policies. Applying the four-factor

PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21029

test in Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979), the Board

concluded that in spite of his inappropriate remarks toward

PAC’s owner, Aguirre did not lose his statutory protections

under the Act. The Board has filed a cross-application for

enforcement of its order, including its finding that PAC

repeatedly violated the Act by inviting Aguirre to quit in

response to his protected activities.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and

(f). For the reasons set forth below, we grant PAC’s petition

for review and remand to the Board to balance the Atlantic

Steel factors in light of our discussion below. We also grant

the Board’s petition for enforcement of Paragraphs 1 and

2(d)-(e) of the order.

BACKGROUND

PAC sells used cars in Yuma, Arizona, and is owned by

Tony Plaza (“Plaza”). PAC has two sales managers, Juan

Felix (“Felix”) and Gustavo MacGrew (“MacGrew”), and an

officer manager, Barbara Montenegro (“Montenegro”). PAC

hired Aguirre as a salesman at the end of August 2008. Dur-

ing Aguirre’s brief employment with PAC, which ended on

October 28, 2008, PAC conducted three-day weekend tent

sales in a Sears parking lot. Also during that time, Felix and

MacGrew held weekly meetings for the sales staff.

On his first day with PAC, Aguirre worked at a tent sale.

During his shift, when Aguirre inquired about bathroom facil-

ities, Felix pointed to the Sears store and a gas station across

the street. In a sales meeting the following week, Aguirre

asked whether salespeople could take a break to use the bath-

room and eat a meal during tent sales. Felix responded,

“you’re always on break buddy . . . you just wait for custom-

ers all day.” Felix also told Aguirre that he was free to leave

at any time if he did not like the company’s policies.

During PAC’s next tent sale in mid-September, Aguirre

spoke with other salespeople about PAC’s compensation pol-

21030 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB

icy. They informed Aguirre that salespeople were paid a

straight commission with no draw or guaranteed minimum. In

other words, salespeople were not paid the minimum wage

and had to rely solely on their sales commissions. Aguirre

also raised the issue of a system for salespeople to alternate

bathroom breaks, but when Aguirre asked Felix for a break to

use the bathroom and get something to eat, Felix refused, reit-

erating that the salespeople were “always on a break.”

At the next sales meeting, an employee other than Aguirre

raised the issue of compensation. MacGrew responded that if

employees did their jobs correctly and followed all of the pro-

cedures, they would make money. Sometime thereafter,

Aguirre sold a vehicle listed on the company’s “flat list”—a

list of vehicles that carried a special commission because they

were difficult to sell. A similar vehicle was listed on the “flat

list” with a commission of between $1,000 to $2,000. To

Aguirre’s surprise, however, he received a check for only

$150. His fellow employees agreed that it was unfair. Aguirre

confronted Felix about the size of the check, but Felix told

Aguirre that the commission was low because he had given

the vehicle away almost for free.

At another sales meeting, Plaza informed the salespeople

that he was going to deduct the repair costs for a damaged

vehicle equally from all salespeople’s paychecks if no one

admitted responsibility. Aguirre responded that it would be

unfair to charge only the salespeople instead of all employees

who had access to the vehicle. Plaza then spoke about

employee negativity and stated that he had a stack of applica-

tions from prospects whom the company could easily hire as

salespeople.

In October, at another tent sale, Aguirre asked Felix which

vehicles would produce a good commission because Aguirre

thought that the company was stealing money from him in

calculating his commissions. Felix responded that Aguirre

was welcome to go elsewhere if he did not trust the company.

PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21031

Around the same time, Aguirre obtained information relating

to PAC’s compensation system from Arizona’s wage and

hour agency. Aguirre told his coworkers that the agency

advised him that the salespeople were entitled to the mini-

mum wage as a draw against commissions and that he

intended to speak with PAC’s office manager, Montenegro,

about this issue.

On October 28, Aguirre asked Montenegro whether PAC’s

salespeople were entitled to a minimum-wage draw. Montene-

gro responded that the company did not pay minimum wage

and that Aguirre should work elsewhere if he wanted a

minimum-wage job. Aguirre informed Montenegro that he

had spoken with the state wage agency about a draw and

asked her to look into the issue, perhaps by asking Plaza.

Later that afternoon, on October 28, Felix informed Plaza

that Aguirre complained about everything all the time and

wanted to know PAC’s vehicle costs because he did not trust

the company’s calculation of his sales commissions. Felix

then called Aguirre into Felix’s office to meet with Felix,

MacGrew, and Plaza. At the beginning of the meeting, Plaza

had no intention of firing Aguirre. Plaza began the meeting by

telling Aguirre that he was “talking a lot of negative stuff”

that would negatively affect the sales force and he was asking

too many questions. Aguirre responded that he had questions

about vehicle costs, commissions, and minimum wage. Plaza

told Aguirre that he had to follow the company’s policies and

procedures, that car salespeople normally do not know the

dealer’s cost of vehicles, and that he should not be complain-

ing about pay. Plaza twice told Aguirre that if he did not trust

the company, he need not work there. At that point, Aguirre

lost his temper and in a raised voice started berating Plaza,

calling him a “fucking mother fucking,” a “fucking crook,”

and an “asshole.” Aguirre also told Plaza that he was stupid,

nobody liked him, and everyone talked about him behind his

back. During the outburst, Aguirre stood up, pushed his chair

21032 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB

aside, and told Plaza that if Plaza fired him, Plaza would

regret it. Plaza then fired Aguirre.

Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law

judge (“ALJ”) found that PAC had violated section 8(a)(1)

several times by inviting Aguirre to quit in response to his

protected protests of working conditions. As to the discharge,

however, the ALJ applied Atlantic Steel Co. and concluded

that, although Aguirre was engaged in protected activity dur-

ing the October 28 meeting, his obscene remarks and personal

attacks on Plaza cost him the Act’s protection.

The General Counsel filed exceptions regarding the dis-

charge. Over a dissent, the Board concluded that Aguirre’s

conduct was not so severe as to cause him to lose his statutory

protection. The Board thus held that PAC had violated section

8(a)(1) by firing Aguirre and reversed the ALJ’s order on that

issue.

DISCUSSION

I. PAC’s Petition for Review of the Board’s Order

Regarding the Discharge

A.

“This court will enforce an NLRB order if the Board cor-

rectly applied the law and if its factual findings are supported

by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Sierra

Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 215 (9th Cir. 1989). The

substantial evidence test requires us to evaluate the entire

record to determine whether “it would have been possible for

a reasonable jury to reach the Board’s conclusion.” Allentown

Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366-67

(1998). Our review is more “searching” in instances where the

Board’s findings or conclusions are contrary to those of the

ALJ. United Steel Workers of Am. AFL-CIO-CLC v. NLRB,

482 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007); UAW v. NLRB, 834 F.2d

PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21033

816, 819 (9th Cir. 1987). The ALJ’s findings become part of

the record to be reviewed along with other evidence contrary

to the Board’s opinion. NLRB v. Searle Auto Glass, Inc., 762

F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the Supreme Court

has observed that “evidence supporting a conclusion may be

less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who

has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn

conclusions different from the Board’s than when he has

reached the same conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v.

NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951).

B.

[1] The issue for review is whether Aguirre forfeited the

protection of the Act because of his conduct during the Octo-

ber 28 meeting.1 “[W]here an employee engages in indefensi-

ble or abusive conduct, his concerted activity will lose the

protection of the Act.” Trus Joist MacMillan, 341 N.L.R.B.

369, 370 (2004); see also Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v.

NLRB, 560 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Even concerted

actions that are assumed to be protected by the Act may for-

feit such protection if they are ‘egregious or flagrant.’ ” (quot-

ing Care Initiatives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 144, 151 (1996))). To

determine whether an employee’ s conduct results in a loss of

protection, the Board considers the following factors: “(1) the

place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discus-

sion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4)

whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by the

employer’s unfair labor practice.” Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B.

at 816. The Board must “carefully balance” these factors and,

1

PAC argues that the termination was proper under the analysis set forth

in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980). The Board concluded that a

Wright Line analysis was unnecessary because PAC’s motivation was not

at issue—it was undisputed that PAC fired Aguirre because of his outburst

during the October 28 meeting. Because PAC’s motivation was not at

issue, this conclusion was correct. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B.

751, 753 (2001); see also Felix Indus., 331 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-46 (2000),

enforcement denied on other grounds by 251 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

21034 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB

where doing so shows that the employee engaged in “oppro-

brious conduct,” the employee loses the protection of the Act.

Id. These considerations recognize that “[e]mployers and

employees have a shared interest in maintaining order in the

workplace, an order that is made possible by maintaining a

certain level of decorum.” Trus Joist MacMillan, 341

N.L.R.B. at 371. Nonetheless, the Act permits some leeway

for impulsive behavior, which must be balanced against the

employer’s right to maintain order and discipline. NLRB v.

Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965).

The ALJ found that the first, second, and fourth factors

weigh against the loss of protection, while the third factor—

the nature of the outburst—favors the loss of protection. The

ALJ concluded that, under the circumstances, the nature of

Aguirre’s outburst was such that it resulted in Aguirre’s for-

feiting the Act’s protection. The Board agreed with the ALJ

with regard to the first, second, and fourth factors but, finding

a lack of support in the record to conclude that Aguirre’s con-

duct was physically threatening or intimidating, as the ALJ

had found, the Board concluded that all four Atlantic Steel

factors weigh in favor of finding that Aguirre retained his pro-

tection under the Act.

1. Place of the Discussion

[2] When the discussion occurs in a private location away

from the normal work area and other employees, such that it

causes no disruption to order or discipline in the workplace,

this factor normally weighs in favor of protection. See, e.g.,

Stanford Hotel, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 558 (2005) (where the

meeting was in an employee lunchroom away from the nor-

mal work area and the employee closed the door to maintain

privacy, the location weighed in favor of protection). The

Board and the ALJ concluded that this factor favored contin-

ued protection because the meeting occurred in Felix’s office

away from the workplace and did not affect employee disci-

pline. Nothing in the record undermines this finding.

PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21035

[3] PAC argues that this factor weighs in favor of a loss of

protection because Aguirre requested and initiated the meet-

ing with Plaza with the intent to humiliate Plaza in front of

Felix and MacGrew. We reject this argument because nothing

in the record suggests that Aguirre planned to humiliate Plaza

or any other supervisor at the start of, or before, the meeting

or that Aguirre’s conduct disrupted PAC’s business or under-

mined employee discipline.2 Trus Joist MacMillan, which

PAC cites, is distinguishable because the employee in that

case instigated the meeting for the express purpose of embar-

rassing a manager in front of other managers, which “accentu-

ate[d] and exacerbate[d] the disruptive effect of [the

employee’s] outburst.” 341 N.L.R.B. at 370. There is no such

evidence here.

2. Subject Matter of the Discussion

[4] The Board and the ALJ concluded that the second fac-

tor favors protection because the subject matter of the meeting

concerned Aguirre’s complaints related to terms and condi-

tions of employment, including PAC’s compensation policies

toward its salespeople. PAC concedes that the meeting, at

least initially, concerned issues afforded protection under the

Act, but it argues that this was no longer true when the subject

matter changed to Aguirre’s demand to know PAC’s vehicle

costs, which PAC had no legal obligation to disclose. PAC

contends that Aguirre’s obscenities and personal attacks were

triggered by Plaza’s response to Aguirre’s demand for this

information, rather than anything having to do with protected

2

There was conflicting evidence regarding who initiated the meeting.

Aguirre indicated that management arranged the meeting, stating that

Felix directed Aguirre to go into Felix’s office. ER 124. Montenegro, on

the other hand, testified that Aguirre asked to meet with Plaza to discuss

the minimum wage issue. ER 244-45. Neither the ALJ nor the Board

resolved this specific issue, although both found that Aguirre asked Mon-

tenegro to look into the issue, perhaps by asking Plaza, and that Felix cal-

led Aguirre into his office. ER 2,8. In any event, there is no basis for

concluding that Aguirre ever asked to meet with anyone other than Plaza.

21036 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB

conduct. We disagree. The topic of vehicle costs was closely

related to—in fact intertwined with—Aguirre’s concerns

about receiving proper compensation. Aguirre’s desire to

know PAC’s costs related directly to PAC’s pay structure

because his complaint, in part, was that he could verify that

his commissions were correct only if he knew what PAC paid

for the vehicles. Moreover, as the ALJ observed, Aguirre’s

outburst was contemporaneous with Plaza’s characterization

of Aguirre’s complaints as “a lot of negative stuff” and his

statement that Aguirre should work elsewhere if he did not

like or trust the company. ER at 13. Thus, there is no basis to

segregate Aguirre’s outburst from his protected complaints

about PAC’s employment policies and practices.

3. Nature of the Outburst

The Board rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that the nature of

Aguirre’s outburst weighed against protection. The ALJ

described Aguirre’s outburst as “repeated, extensive, and per-

sonally derogatory statements to a supervisor,” noting further

that “Mr. Aguirre repeatedly reviled Mr. Plaza in obscene and

personally denigrating terms accompanied by menacing con-

duct and language.” ER 14. In contrast, while the Board

acknowledged that Aguirre “uttered more than a brief profan-

ity against Plaza,” it characterized his conduct as a single,

brief outburst provoked by Plaza’s failure to respond to

Aguirre’s concerns and Plaza’s suggestion that Aguirre work

elsewhere. ER 3. Also, finding no evidence of actual or

threatened physical harm or aggression, the Board concluded

that Aguirre’s outburst was “unaccompanied by insubordina-

tion, physical contact, threatening gestures, or threat of physi-

cal harm.” ER 4. Finally, the Board concluded that Aguirre’s

conduct was not outside the range of acceptable conduct

because Felix himself had used obscene language when deal-

ing with employees.

[5] Implicit in the Board’s analysis is the suggestion that

an employee’s outburst does not factor into the loss of the

PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21037

Act’s protection unless accompanied by physical conduct, or

at least a threat that is physical in nature. We arrive at this

interpretation because the Board seemingly considered imma-

terial the ALJ’s finding that Aguirre personally denigrated

Plaza with obscene and insulting language. Aguirre’s verbal

attack—involving repeated insults and obscenities, all

directed at Plaza, as the ALJ found—was not brief and was,

in fact, insubordination. The rule the Board seems to espouse

is at odds with its own precedents, which recognize that an

employee’s offensive and personally denigrating remarks

alone can result in loss of protection. See, e.g., Care Initia-

tives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. at 151 (“Among the specific types of

conduct that could exceed the protection of the Act are vulgar,

profane, and obscene language directed at a supervisor or

employer, even though uttered in the course of protected con-

certed activity.”). For example, in Stanford Hotel, 344

N.L.R.B. at 558, an employee responded to his supervisor’s

repeated demands that he admit he was not covered under the

collective bargaining agreement by calling his supervisor a

“liar,” a “bitch,” and a “f—ing son of a bitch.” Although it

ultimately decided that the employee retained his protection

in light of the other factors, the Board concluded that the

employee’s obscene and offensive outburst favored a loss of

protection. Id. at 559; see also Daimler Chrysler Corp., 344

N.L.R.B. 1324, 1328-29 (2005) (concluding that the outburst,

in which the employee called his supervisor an “asshole” and

stated, “Bullshit, I want this meeting now,” “fuck this shit,”

and that he did not “have to put up with this bullshit” was

insubordinate and profane and weighed against protection).

The District of Columbia Circuit had occasion to consider

the Board’s application of the third Atlantic Steel factor in

Felix Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir.

2001). In that case, Yonta, a 42-year-old employee, was

supervised by Petrillo, a 25-year-old whose father was the

president of the company. While at home, Yonta called

Petrillo at his office to inquire about not receiving a night

shift differential. Petrillo assured Yonta that he would get

21038 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB

“every penny” to which he was entitled, but then told Yonta

that he was tired of “carrying” him. Yonta responded that

Petrillo was “just a fucking kid” and added, “I don’t have to

listen to a fucking kid.” When Petrillo asked Yonta what he

had just called him, Yonta confirmed, “a fucking kid.” In

response, Petrillo fired Yonta. An ALJ concluded that Yonta

lost his protection, but the Board disagreed, finding that

“ ‘Yonta’s conduct consisted of a brief, verbal outburst of

profane language, unaccompanied by any threat or physical

gestures or contact.’ ” Id. at 1054 (quoting the Board’s deci-

sion). The court observed that the Board’s rationale contra-

dicted Atlantic Steel, in which it disavowed any rule “whereby

otherwise protected activity would shield any obscene insub-

ordination short of physical violence.” Id. at 1055 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court reasoned, “[i]f an

employee is fired for denouncing a supervisor in obscene,

personally-denigrating, or insubordinate terms—and Yonta

here managed all three with economy—then the nature of his

outburst properly counts against according him the protection

of the Act.” Id. The court remanded the matter for the Board

to conduct a proper balancing, with Yonta’s statements

weighing against protection. Id.

[6] The Board’s explanation here is similar to its reasoning

in Felix Industries. But Aguirre’s outburst, even if brief, was

no less obscene, degrading, and insubordinate than Yonta’s

outburst toward his supervisor. Even in that brief moment, as

the Board characterized it, Aguirre called Plaza a “fucking

mother fucking,” a “fucking crook,” and an “asshole” and told

him that he was stupid, that nobody liked him, and that every-

one talked about him behind his back. This conduct alone

counts against Aguirre’s retaining protection. Thus, like the

Felix Industries court, we find it necessary to remand this

matter to the Board to allow it to properly consider whether

the nature of Aguirre’s outburst caused him to forfeit his pro-

tection. See Trus Joist MacMillan, 341 N.L.R.B. at 371-72

(concluding that the third Atlantic Steel factor alone may

carry enough weight to forfeit the Act’s protection).

PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21039

The Board argues that we still should conclude that it prop-

erly balanced the factors because it stated that it would have

reached the same result even if the third factor weighs against

protection. But the reasoning supporting that statement is

internally inconsistent. After stating that it was adopting the

ALJ’s credibility and factual findings regarding the October

28 meeting, the Board rejected the ALJ’s findings that Aguir-

re’s conduct was “belligerent,” “menacing,” and “at least

physically aggressive if not menacing.” In another, similarly

inconsistent statement, the Board claimed to rely on the ALJ’s

findings in concluding that Aguirre’s outburst did not amount

to a threat of physical harm. But, the belligerence finding was

essentially a credibility finding: the only evidence regarding

the nature of the outburst was the competing testimony of

Aguirre and PAC’s witnesses. The ALJ expressly determined

that Aguirre’s testimony was incongruous and “not as believ-

able” as the PAC witnesses’ testimony, and she did not credit

Aguirre’s account of the October 28 meeting where it con-

flicted with the accounts of the three PAC supervisors. Thus,

it was precisely because the ALJ gave more credence to the

testimony of the PAC witnesses that she found the outburst

was physically aggressive and menacing.

We cannot be sure whether this inconsistent logic colored

the Board’s statement regarding how it would balance the fac-

tors if the third factor weighed in favor of lost protection. In

other words, although the Board stated that it would have

reached the same result even if Aguirre’s outburst, as the

Board characterized it, weighed in favor of lost protection, we

cannot be sure that the Board would have reached the same

result had it adopted the ALJ’s finding that Aguirre’s outburst

involved physically aggressive and menacing conduct.

Accordingly, we remand this case to the Board to re-balance

the Atlantic Steel factors as discussed in this opinion. In doing

so, the Board should either (1) reject, with a reasoned expla-

nation, the ALJ’s credibility and factual findings regarding

the October 28 meeting, or (2) adopt those findings in their

entirety, including the finding regarding belligerence.

21040 PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB

4. Provocation by Unfair Labor Practices

[7] The Board agreed with the ALJ that the fourth factor

weighs in favor of protection because Aguirre’s outburst was

contemporaneous with both Plaza’s censure of Aguirre’s pro-

tected activities as “a lot of negative stuff” and Plaza’s unfair

labor practice of suggesting that Aguirre could work else-

where if he did not like the company’s policies. The Board’s

conclusion on this factor, like its conclusion on the second

factor, is well supported. PAC nonetheless argues that this

factor weighs in favor of loss of protection, once again

advancing its contention that the outburst was provoked by

Plaza’s lawful statement that he would not disclose informa-

tion regarding the price of cars. We reject this argument for

the reasons cited above.

II. Application for Summary Enforcement

[8] The Board is entitled to enforcement of the portion of

its order finding that PAC management violated section

8(a)(1) of the Act in several instances by inviting Aguirre to

quit in response to his protected inquiries. PAC’s failure to

challenge before the Board the ALJ’s finding on this issue

means that “the Board’s finding of those unfair labor practices

violations must be taken as established.” NLRB v. Advanced

Stretchforming Int’l, Inc., 233 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir.

2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the Board for

proper balancing of the Atlantic Steel factors in light of our

conclusion that the Board erred in its initial assessment that

the nature of Aguirre’s outburst weighs in favor of protection.

As we have explained, under the Board’s own precedents,

obscene, degrading, and insubordinate comments may weigh

in favor of lost protection even absent a threat of physical

harm. In addition, the Board should give full effect to the

PLAZA AUTO CENTER v. NLRB 21041

ALJ’s factual and credibility findings, including the finding

that Aguirre’s behavior was menacing or at least physically

aggressive in that small room, unless “the clear preponder-

ance of all the relevant evidence convinces” the Board that

they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Prods., 91 N.L.R.B.

544, 545 (1950), enforced by 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).

Finally, we grant the Board’s petition for enforcement of the

order with regard to the Board’s findings that PAC committed

unfair labor practices by inviting Aguirre to quit in response

to his protected concerted protests of labor conditions.

Accordingly, Paragraphs 2(a)-(c) of the Board’s order are

vacated, and Paragraphs 1 and 2(d)-(e) are enforced.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED; ORDER

ENFORCED IN PART.