Opinion

Nick Mennick v. J. Smith

  • 459 F. App'x 649
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Nov 23, 2011
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Tashima, Berzon, Tallman
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 45.4%

holding that for placement in administrative segregation, due process requires a nonadversarial hearing be held within a reasonable time, the prisoner be informed of the charges or reasons segregation is being considered and the prisoner be allowed to present his views, but does not require written notice of charges, representation by counsel or counsel-substitute, the opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for placing a prisoner in administrative segregation

How later courts described this case

  • holding that for placement in administrative segregation, due process requires a nonadversarial hearing be held within a reasonable time, the prisoner be informed of the charges or reasons segregation is being considered and the prisoner be allowed to present his views, but does not require written notice of charges, representation by counsel or counsel-substitute, the opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for placing a prisoner in administrative segregation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 23 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS

NICK BRADLEY MENNICK, No. 10-35747

Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:08-cv-00161-BLW

v.

MEMORANDUM *

J. SMITH, Warden of IMSI; et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 21, 2011 **

Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Idaho state prisoner Nick Bradley Mennick appeals pro se from the district

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process,

Eighth Amendment, and retaliation claims in connection with his confinement in

administrative segregation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

review de novo, and may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Corales v.

Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 562 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mennick’s claim

that his confinement in administrative segregation violated his due process rights

because, even assuming that there was a liberty interest at stake, prison officials

afforded Neal all the process he was due under the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01, 1104 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated

in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Mennick’s Eighth

Amendment claim because Mennick failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether his continued confinement in administrative segregation placed

him at substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994).

Summary judgement was properly granted on Mennick’s retaliation claim

because Mennick failed to raise a triable dispute as to retaliatory motive. See

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth the

elements of a retaliation claim).

Mennick’s challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion for a

preliminary injunction is either moot or will not be considered by this court under

2 10-35747

the doctrine of law of the case. See Teamsters Joint Council No. 42 v. Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 82 F.3d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Affirmance of the district

court’s grant of summary judgment moots the preliminary injunction appeal.”); see

also United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] court is

generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by

the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

Mennick’s “Motion for Clarification” is granted. We have reviewed the

opening brief filed in this appeal.

AFFIRMED.

3 10-35747

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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