Greene v. Fisher

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GREENE, AKA TRICE v. FISHER, SUPERINTENDENT,

STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT

SMITHFIELD, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 10–637. Argued October 11, 2011—Decided November 8, 2011

During petitioner Greene’s trial for murder, robbery, and conspiracy,

the prosecution introduced the redacted confessions of two of

Greene’s nontestifying codefendants. A jury convicted Greene. The

Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that

the rule announced in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, did not

apply because the confessions were redacted to remove any specific

reference to Greene. While Greene’s petition to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court was pending, this Court announced in Gray v. Mary-

land, 523 U. S. 185, that Bruton does apply to some redacted confes-

sions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear Greene’s

appeal, and he then sought federal habeas relief. Under the Antiter-

rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal

court may not grant such relief to a state prisoner on any claim that

has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” un-

less that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28

U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Here, the District Court concluded that, because

the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Gray had not yet been

issued when the Pennsylvania Superior Court adjudicated Greene’s

claim, the condition for granting habeas relief had not been met. The

Third Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. Under §2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law, as deter-

mined by the Supreme Court of the United States” includes only this

2 GREENE v. FISHER

Syllabus

Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudica-

tion on the merits. The Court’s decision last Term in Cullen v. Pin-

holster, 563 U. S. ___, established that §2254(d)(1)’s “backward-

looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision

at the time it was made.” Id., at ___. As the Court explained in Cul-

len, §2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to measure state-court deci-

sions “against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time the state court

renders its decision.’ ” Id., at ___. That reasoning determines the re-

sult here. Pp. 3–6.

2. Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision—the last

state-court adjudication on the merits of Greene’s claim—predated

Gray by nearly three months, the Third Circuit correctly held that

Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” against which it could

measure the state-court decision. It therefore correctly concluded

that the state court’s decision neither was “contrary to,” nor “involved

an unreasonable application of,” any “clearly established Federal

law.” Pp. 6–7.

606 F. 3d 85, affirmed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 10–637

_________________

ERIC GREENE, AKA JARMAINE Q. TRICE, PETI-

TIONER v. JON FISHER, SUPERINTENDENT,

STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT

SMITHFIELD, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[November 8, 2011]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant habe-

as relief to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that

has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court pro-

ceedings” unless the state-court adjudication “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-

mined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28

U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). We consider whether “clearly estab-

lished Federal law” includes decisions of this Court that

are announced after the last adjudication of the merits in

state court but before the defendant’s conviction becomes

final.

I

In December 1993, petitioner Eric Greene and four

co-conspirators robbed a grocery store in North Philadel-

phia, Pennsylvania. During the robbery, one of the men

shot and killed the store’s owner. The five were appre-

2 GREENE v. FISHER

Opinion of the Court

hended, and two of them confessed to taking part in the

robbery. Greene did not confess, but he was implicated by

the others’ statements.

When the Commonwealth sought to try all of the co-

conspirators jointly, Greene sought severance, arguing,

inter alia, that the confessions of his nontestifying code-

fendants should not be introduced at his trial. The trial

court denied the motion to sever, but agreed to require

redaction of the confessions to eliminate proper names. As

redacted, the confessions replaced names with words like

“this guy,” “someone,” and “other guys,” or with the word

“blank,” or simply omitted the names without substitution.

A jury convicted Greene of second-degree murder, rob-

bery, and conspiracy. He appealed to the Pennsylvania

Superior Court, arguing that severance of his trial was

demanded by the rule announced in Bruton v. United

States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), that the Confrontation Clause

forbids the prosecution to introduce a nontestifying co-

defendant’s confession implicating the defendant in the

crime. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the

conviction, holding that the redaction had cured any prob-

lem under Bruton.

Greene filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, raising the same Bruton

claim. While that petition was pending, we held in Gray v.

Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 195 (1998), that “considered as a

class, redactions that replace a proper name with an

obvious blank, the word ‘delete,’ a symbol, or similarly

notify the jury that a name has been deleted are similar

enough to Bruton’s unredacted confessions as to warrant

the same legal results.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

granted the petition for allowance of appeal, limited to the

question whether admission of the redacted confessions

violated Greene’s Sixth Amendment rights. After the

parties filed merits briefs, however, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Opinion of the Court

granted.

Greene then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, alleging, inter alia, that the introduction

of his nontestifying codefendants’ statements violated the

Confrontation Clause. Adopting the report and recom-

mendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court de-

nied the petition. It concluded that since our decision in

Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” when the

Pennsylvania Superior Court adjudicated Greene’s Con-

frontation Clause claim, that court’s decision was not

“contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit affirmed. Greene v. Palakovich, 606

F. 3d 85 (2010). The majority held that the “clearly estab-

lished Federal law” referred to in §2254(d)(1) is the law at

the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Id.,

at 99. The dissenting judge contended that it is the law at

the time the conviction becomes final. Id., at 108. We

granted certiorari. 563 U. S. ___ (2011).

II

Section 2254(d) of Title 28, U. S. C., as amended by

AEDPA, provides:

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim—

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an un-

4 GREENE v. FISHER

Opinion of the Court

reasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

The issue here pertains to the first exception. We have

said that its standard of “contrary to, or involv[ing] an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law” is “difficult to meet,” because the purpose of AEDPA

is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a

“ ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal

justice systems,’ ” and not as a means of error correction.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at

12–13) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 332,

n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).

In light of that objective, and relying upon the text of

the provision, we held last Term, in Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U. S. ___ (2011), that review under §2254(d)(1) is

limited to the record that was before the state court that

adjudicated the prisoner’s claim on the merits. We said

that the provision’s “backward-looking language requires

an examination of the state-court decision at the time it

was made.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). The reasoning of

Cullen determines the result here. As we explained,

§2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to “focu[s] on what a

state court knew and did,” and to measure state-court

decisions “against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time

the state court renders its decision.’ ” Id., at __ (slip op., at

10) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71–72

(2003); emphasis added).

Greene resists that conclusion by appealing to our deci-

sion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Teague held

that, with two exceptions not pertinent here, a prisoner

seeking federal habeas relief may rely on new constitu-

tional rules of criminal procedure announced before the

prisoner’s conviction became final. Id., at 310 (plurality

opinion); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313

(1989) (affirming and applying Teague rule). Finality

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 5

Opinion of the Court

occurs when direct state appeals have been exhausted and

a petition for writ of certiorari from this Court has become

time barred or has been disposed of. Griffith v. Kentucky,

479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6 (1987). Greene contends that,

because finality marks the temporal cutoff for Teague

purposes, it must mark the temporal cutoff for “clearly

established Federal law” under AEDPA.

The analogy has been rejected by our cases. We have

explained that AEDPA did not codify Teague, and that

“the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.” Horn v.

Banks, 536 U. S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam). The retro-

activity rules that govern federal habeas review on the

merits—which include Teague—are quite separate from

the relitigation bar imposed by AEDPA; neither abrogates

or qualifies the other. If §2254(d)(1) was, indeed, pegged

to Teague, it would authorize relief when a state-court

merits adjudication “resulted in a decision that became

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, before the conviction became

final.” The statute says no such thing, and we see no

reason why Teague should alter AEDPA’s plain meaning.*

Greene alternatively contends that the relevant “deci-

sion” to which the “clearly established Federal law” crite-

rion must be applied is the decision of the state supreme

court that disposes of a direct appeal from a defendant’s

conviction or sentence, even when (as here) that decision

does not adjudicate the relevant claim on the merits. This

is an implausible reading of §2254(d)(1). The text, we

repeat, provides that habeas relief

——————

* Whether §2254(d)(1) would bar a federal habeas petitioner from

relying on a decision that came after the last state-court adjudication

on the merits, but fell within one of the exceptions recognized in

Teague, 489 U. S., at 311, is a question we need not address to resolve

this case.

6 GREENE v. FISHER

Opinion of the Court

“shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceed-

ings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an un-

reasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

The words “the adjudication” in the “unless” clause obvi-

ously refer back to the “adjudicat[ion] on the merits,” and

the phrase “resulted in a decision” in the “unless” clause

obviously refers to the decision produced by that same

adjudication on the merits. A later affirmance of that

decision on alternative procedural grounds, for example,

would not be a decision resulting from the merits adjudica-

tion. And much less would be (what is at issue here)

a decision by the state supreme court not to hear the

appeal—that is, not to decide at all.

III

The Third Circuit held, and the parties do not dispute,

that the last state-court adjudication on the merits of

Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim occurred on direct

appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 606 F. 3d, at

92, and n. 1. The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision

predated our decision in Gray by nearly three months.

The Third Circuit thus correctly held that Gray was not

“clearly established Federal law” against which it could

measure the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision. 606

F. 3d, at 99. The panel then concluded (and the parties do

not dispute) that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s deci-

sion neither was “contrary to,” nor “involved an unreason-

able application of,” any “clearly established Federal law”

that existed at the time. Id., at 106. Consequently,

§2254(d)(1) bars the federal courts from granting Greene’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus.

We must observe that Greene’s predicament is an unu-

sual one of his own creation. Before applying for federal

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2011) 7

Opinion of the Court

habeas, he missed two opportunities to obtain relief under

Gray: After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed

his appeal, he did not file a petition for writ of certiorari

from this Court, which would almost certainly have pro-

duced a remand in light of the intervening Gray decision.

“Where intervening developments . . . reveal a reasonable

probability that the decision below rests upon a premise

that the lower court would reject if given the opportunity

for further consideration, and where it appears that such a

redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of

the litigation, [an order granting the petition, vacating the

judgment below, and remanding the case (GVR)] is, we

believe, potentially appropriate.” Lawrence v. Chater, 516

U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam). See, e.g., Stanbridge v.

New York, 395 U. S. 709 (1969) (per curiam) (GVR in light

of Bruton). Nor did Greene assert his Gray claim in a

petition for state postconviction relief. Having forgone two

obvious means of asserting his claim, Greene asks us to

provide him relief by interpreting AEDPA in a manner

contrary to both its text and our precedents. We decline to

do so, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.