Maddox v. Love

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1139

M ANNIE M ADDOX,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

T IMOTHY L OVE, JASON G ARNETT, and L EE R YKER,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 06-cv-700-JPG—J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.

A RGUED F EBRUARY 8, 2011—D ECIDED A UGUST 24, 2011

Before SYKES, T INDER , and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.

T INDER, Circuit Judge. Inmate Mannie Maddox, a

member of the African Hebrew Israelite (AHI) faith

since 1998, was incarcerated at Illinois Lawrence Cor-

rectional Center (Lawrence) from March 2004 to

August 2007. When he arrived to serve his sentence, he

no doubt was pleased to discover that an AHI minister

performed religious services for AHI inmates bimonthly.

Maddox regularly attended these religious services until

2 No. 10-1139

September 2004, when the prison announced over its

television channel that AHI services were cancelled

until further notice. Maddox, upset about the cancella-

tion, filed a grievance asserting a denial of religious

fellowship. Lawrence denied his grievance, explaining

that the service was cancelled due to budget cuts.

Maddox appealed to the Grievance Officer and then to

the Department Director to no avail; they upheld the

denial of his grievance on the merits. During the three

stages of review, Maddox was never informed that his

grievance was incomplete or procedurally deficient.

Maddox filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against

the prison chaplain, Timothy Love, and prison wardens,

Jason Garnett and Lee Ryker (Ryker took over as warden

in 2005), in their individual and official capacities

alleging violations of his rights under the First and Four-

teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. He also

asserted related state law claims under the Illinois Con-

stitution, Art. I, §§ 2 and 3. Maddox sought declaratory,

injunctive, and monetary relief. In screening Maddox’s

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district

court reorganized Maddox’s allegations to structure

them into four separate counts, summarized as follows:

Count 1—failure to provide reasonable access to religious

materials; Counts 2 and 3—two manifestations of dis-

crimination in allocation of the prison religious budget;

and Count 4—failure to provide group worship services.

This restructuring did not distinguish between federal

and state law theories.

No. 10-1139 3

The district court dismissed Counts 2 and 3 for failure

to state a claim at the screening stage. The defendants

then moved for summary judgment on Counts 1 and 4,

arguing that Maddox didn’t properly exhaust his admin-

istrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), because he didn’t

indicate on his grievance form who the defendants were

that violated his rights, nor did he attempt to describe

them. The district court granted the defendants’ motion.

Maddox appeals the court’s dismissal of Counts 2 and 3

and grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendants on Counts 1 and 4.

We affirm in part and reverse and vacate in part. We

reverse the dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 and vacate entry

of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on

Count 4 with respect to Maddox’s § 1983 claims against

the defendants in their individual capacities. Because

Lawrence processed Maddox’s grievance that he was

denied religious fellowship (Count 4) on the merits with-

out rejecting it for procedural deficiencies, the grievance

served its function of providing prison officials a fair

opportunity to address his complaints; we therefore

find that Maddox sufficiently exhausted his administra-

tive remedies on that claim. We further find that the

district court’s characterization of Counts 2 and 3 was

too narrow a reading of Maddox’s complaint and led

to premature dismissal of his claims at the screening

stage. We, however, affirm the court’s dismissal of

Count 1 because Maddox only complained of a failure

to provide religious services in his grievance, not a

failure to provide religious materials, so he didn’t

properly exhaust that claim.

4 No. 10-1139

I. Facts 1

Maddox was an inmate at Lawrence from March 2004

until he was transferred to Danville Correctional Center

in August 2007. He brings this complaint against three

Lawrence employees: Defendant Jason Garnett, who

was the warden from January 2004 through July 2005,

Defendant Lee Ryker, who succeeded as the warden

in October 2005, and Defendant Timothy Love, who has

been the chaplain since the prison opened in 2001. Law-

rence is a Level 2 secure-medium adult facility housing

about 2,000 inmates. As of May 2009, the inmates at

Lawrence had declared 46 different religious affiliations,

which included 647 inmates who identified themselves

as Christians, 313 as Baptists, 299 as Catholics, 119 as

1

The defendants ask this court to strike portions of Maddox’s

brief that do not comply with Circuit Rule 28(c), which requires

that “[n]o fact shall be stated in [the Statement of Facts] unless

it is supported by a reference to the page or pages of the

record or the appendix where that fact appears.” As the de-

fendants point out, Maddox in numerous places cites to the

entire summary judgment record (or sometimes nothing at

all) to support some of his factual contentions. See Casna v.

City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2009) (striking “fact”

section and all portions of argument that relied on unsup-

ported facts). Although striking Maddox’s factual statements

would be permissible here, because the relevant facts for

purposes of this appeal are easily found within the record and

are largely undisputed, we merely admonish counsel for

Maddox to properly comply with Circuit Rule 28(c) in subse-

quent filings with this court.

No. 10-1139 5

Muslims, 32 as Moorish Science Temple followers, 30 as

Jehovah’s Witnesses, 28 as AHIs, and 5 as Jews. In 2004,

the prison offered approximately 17 regularly scheduled

religious services for various religions, including services

for AHI inmates.

Maddox, an AHI adherent 2 since 1998, began attending

AHI services when he first arrived at Lawrence. The

Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) had a contract

with an AHI minister 3 in Chicago who traveled to Law-

rence (nearly a 250 mile drive) to provide service to

AHI inmates. Lawrence held services bimonthly for

members of the AHI religion, as well as additional

services during religious holiday periods; the AHI services

were supervised by Love and a security officer. The

AHI minister provided inmates with religious literature

and fresh fruits for religious holidays. Maddox reg-

ularly attended these services until September 2004,

when he saw a message displayed on the prison’s televi-

2

The record doesn’t provide much information about this

religion and because the tenets of the religion are not im-

portant to this opinion, we don’t discuss them here other than

noting that it is a belief system following certain practices

of Judaism. See e.g., United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489,

493 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The Original African Hebrew Israelite

Nation of Jerusalem is a small religious group which

believes that its members are descendants of the original

Hebrews.”).

3

There might be some debate about whether the term “rabbi”

may be more appropriate, but we use the term “minister” to

conform with Maddox’s deposition testimony.

6 No. 10-1139

sion channel that AHI services were cancelled until

further notice. As Maddox later discovered, the IDOC

terminated the AHI minister’s contract because of

budget cuts. Decisions regarding the employment of

chaplains are made at the departmental level. At the

time the AHI services were cancelled, the IDOC con-

tinued its contract with a rabbi from Chicago to minister

to Jewish inmates in all Illinois prisons, including Law-

rence.

After viewing this announcement, Maddox had two

brief conversations with Warden Garnett about the can-

cellation of AHI services. Garnett first told Maddox

there was nothing he could do and that he should talk

to Chaplain Love. Garnett later told him to file a griev-

ance. Maddox also briefly spoke with Ryker about

the cancellation and Ryker told him to “talk to the person

in charge of it.” Despite not having religious services,

Maddox still practiced his faith by receiving religious

guidance from his mother over the phone and reading

religious literature, including two Bibles, 4 previously

provided to him by the AHI minister. He also testified

that he prayed in his cell and received a religious diet.

Maddox, heeding Garnett’s advice, filed a grievance

dated October 29, 2004, on a 2001 form provided by

the IDOC. (The date of the form is significant because

in 2003, Illinois Administrative Code was amended to

4

Maddox used the term “Bible” to refer to AHI’s religious

text; we assert no opinion on whether that is the proper termi-

nology.

No. 10-1139 7

require the inmate’s grievance to include the name of the

individual who is the subject of or involved in the com-

plaint. More on this later). The form requests that the

inmate provide a brief summary of the grievance.

Maddox filled out the form, but did not name or attempt

to describe any individual involved in his complaint.

He stated that on September 10, 2004, an announce-

ment was posted on the institution’s television channel

that AHI Services were cancelled until further notice.

He asserted denial of religious fellowship, stating “[i]n

each and every religious doctrine, one of the most funda-

mental concepts is in the act of ministering to those in

need, to educate those who seek, and to [outwardly]

pray with those who so request.” He asserted that his

“right to freely exercise his religion [was] abrogated,

limited, and rescinded”; he sought transfer to another

facility or $20,000 in damages.

Three days after filing his grievance, a grievance coun-

selor responded that “Chaplain Love was contacted and

stated this service was cancelled due to budget cuts.”

Maddox’s grievance was formally denied on January 12,

2005, by the Grievance Officer who issued a report

stating that “[t]he facility cancelled the services due to

budget cuts. While the facility has several volunteers

to help with religious services, the leader of the African

Hebrew Israelite services was being compensated.” The

report recommended the grievance be denied. It stated:

“The facility is in compliance with DR 425.30 Accom-

modation of Religious Beliefs which is based in part

on availability of resources.” See 20 Ill. Admin. Code

§ 425.30(a) (prisoners “shall be provided reasonable

8 No. 10-1139

opportunities to pursue their religious beliefs and prac-

tices subject to concerns regarding . . . resources”).

Garnett, as Chief Administrative Officer, concurred with

the recommendation and denied the grievance. Maddox

appealed to the IDOC Director who concurred with a

recommendation by the IDOC Administrative Review

Board Office of Inmate Issues to deny the grievance.

During these three stages of review, Maddox was

never informed that his grievance was incomplete or

procedurally infirm in any way.

At some point, Maddox asked Love if the AHI

inmates could just meet in a group with supervision;

Love rejected the idea because, according to Love, there

was no one who could properly supervise the meeting.

Love attested that his schedule would not accommodate

the addition of another service or prayer meeting, particu-

larly for a faith that has so few members. Love spends

half his time conducting or supervising services and

religious study periods for Catholics, other Christians,

Muslims, Moorish Science Temple followers, Jehovah’s

Witnesses, and Jews, as well as non-denominational

events; he also monitors services conducted by volun-

teers to ensure that the inmates follow their pre-approved

lesson plan. Love spends his remaining time making

rounds to talk to inmates about their religious needs,

responding to religious request slips, placing inmates on

call-pass for services, delivering death notices to

inmates, and enforcing prison regulations as they relate

to religious services and symbols. Love’s salary

comprises nearly all of Lawrence’s budget for religious

related matters. Garnett attested that prison officials

No. 10-1139 9

“looked at other options for providing the services, but

could not find a satisfactory solution.” Love asked AHI

inmates (the record is unclear whether Maddox was

one) to provide him with names of outside faith represen-

tatives so he could ask them to volunteer to provide

services, but they never provided him with any names.

For security reasons, the prison has required the

chaplain or a religious program volunteer to conduct

or supervise religious activities, which are also moni-

tored by security staff. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.60(a)

(“Religious activities approved by the Chief Administra-

tive Officer shall be conducted or supervised by a chap-

lain or religious program volunteer.”). The chaplain

or religious volunteer is in a better position to recognize

if the inmates deviate from their pre-approved lesson

plan. For example, Love attested that “although the 119

Muslim inmates and the 32 Moorish Science Temple

inmates meet without an outside faith representative,

they do not meet unsupervised. I have monitored their

meetings since 2001 and 2002, respectively.” The prison

has recently (in 2009) made exceptions to this rule on a

trial basis by occasionally allowing some religious

groups to meet with only security officers when the

chaplain is unavailable due to vacation or illness as long

as the chaplain pre-approves their lesson plan. The de-

fendants averred, however, that the prison doesn’t

allow groups of inmates to meet regularly without the

supervision of the chaplain. These rules are intended

to reduce gang-related activity.

10 No. 10-1139

II. Discussion

Before proceeding to the merits, we must pause to

consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

See Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2004)

(“[W]e have an independent duty to determine that

jurisdiction exists before we can proceed to the merits.”).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over “all

final decisions of the district courts of the United States.”

A final judgment, for purposes of section 1291, is one

that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves

nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”

McMillian v. Sheraton Chi. Hotel & Towers, 567 F.3d 839,

842 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).

The district court dismissed Maddox’s Counts 1 and 4

“without prejudice” on exhaustion grounds. A dismissal

without prejudice normally “does not qualify as an

appealable final judgment because the plaintiff is free

to re-file the case.” Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718, 721

(7th Cir. 2001). But certain circumstances allow us to

consider such a dismissal as final. For example, “if the

plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his complaint, the

dismissal in effect was with prejudice and is final for

purposes of appellate review.” Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d

673, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). There is

nothing to indicate that Maddox can fix his grievances

and he has no more remedies to exhaust. Accordingly,

the dismissal without prejudice does not preclude our

appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 677 (district court’s dis-

missal of complaint without prejudice for failure to ex-

haust administrative remedies was final appealable

No. 10-1139 11

order where inmate filed grievances and pursued them

to conclusion and there was no indication that Illinois

would allow him to file another).

It is apparent that the district court is finished with this

case. When the district court dismissed Counts 1 and 4

for failure to exhaust, it stated: “All the other matters and

issues, once the Court makes the finding, the failure to

exhaust the other matters, become moot and the Court

cannot address those. So you will have a right to

appeal this decision, Mr. Maddox, but that will be the

finding and ruling of this Court.” The court made the

following entry: “The Court after hearing argument from

parties, hereby GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judg-

ment, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all ad-

ministrative remedies by failing to name[] Love, Garnett

and Ryker in his grievances[.] The Court finds that all

other matters are Moot, and advises the plaintiff of

his appeal rights.” The court then entered judgment,

dismissing Counts 2 and 3 with prejudice and Counts 1

and 4 without prejudice. The court could have at that

point declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Maddox’s state law claims, but it didn’t do that. Instead,

it in effect dismissed those claims as moot.5

5

The defendants correctly point out that the district court

didn’t separately address Maddox’s state law claims that

defendants violated the Illinois Constitution. The defendants

argue that the district court never had subject matter jurisdic-

tion over Maddox’s state law claims, citing to Illinois State

Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat 5/0.01 et seq. We

(continued...)

12 No. 10-1139

Satisfied that our jurisdiction is secure, we move on

to the merits. We can quickly dispose of several of Mad-

dox’s claims. Maddox’s prayers for injunctive relief

are moot because he is no longer an inmate at Lawrence.

See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009).

Maddox has not shown a realistic possibility that he

will again be incarcerated in the same state facility and

therefore be subject to the actions of which he com-

plains here. As such, “[a]ny relief that our judgment

might permit would be purely speculative in nature.” See

id. Further, the defendants are immune from suit under

§ 1983 for monetary damages in their official capacities.

See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 917-18 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“To the extent [the plaintiff] seeks monetary damages

from defendants acting in their official capacity, those

claims . . . are dismissed as they are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.”).

Maddox’s RLUIPA claim also fails. Sovereign

immunity shields state officials from monetary damages

in their official capacity under RLUIPA. See Sossamon v.

Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59 (2011); see also

Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 884-85 (7th Cir. 2009). We

have also held that RLUIPA does not allow for suits

against prison officials in their individual capacity.

Nelson, 570 F.3d at 886-89. Because Maddox has no claim

5

(...continued)

don’t need to address whether this immunity applies here or

the mootness dismissal of the state law claims because

Maddox abandoned those claims on appeal.

No. 10-1139 13

to injunctive relief in light of his transfer to Danville,

he cannot seek relief under RLUIPA.

So that leaves us with Maddox’s 1983 claims for mone-

tary damages against the defendants in their individual

capacities. It is to those claims we now turn.

A. Section 1915A Screening—Dismissal of Counts 2

and 3

Maddox’s complaint alleges that the defendants sub-

stantially burdened the free exercise of his religion as

an AHI and discriminated against his religion in

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment. (Pl.

Compl., App. 1, preliminary statement). He set forth a

number of factual allegations in support of his claims. He

asserted that the “study of the [AHI] religion both by

Plaintiff and with other [AHI] members is an integral

part of the daily practice of his sincere beliefs.” (Id. at

App. 3, ¶ 14). He stated that the defendants discrim-

inated “between Christian and [AHI] inmates by pro-

viding reasonable access to religious materials to the

former and not to the latter.” (Id. at App. 4, ¶ 17). He

further stated that the defendants refused to com-

pensate the AHI minister in the same manner as other

religious leaders and allocated “a disproportionately

small share of the Lawrence religious budget . . . to

[AHI] activities . . . .” (Id. at App. 4, ¶ 18). The defendants

exaggerated their response, according to Maddox, by

stating that the prison lacked resources due to budget

cuts when Love could have supervised their meetings

since he was available and already being compensated

14 No. 10-1139

by the prison. (Id. at App. 4, ¶ 19). Maddox complains

that his “right to freely exercise his religion has been

infringed on by Defendants because their acts and omis-

sions substantially diminished his qualitative spiritual

experience(s) as an [AHI] at Lawrence.” (Id. at App. 4,

¶ 20).

Maddox then set forth two counts. In his first “count,” he

asserted that the “[t]he restrictions and cancellation of

the [AHI] services at Lawrence by the Defendants were

and are arbitrarily imposed and has put a substantial

burden on Plaintiff’s right to freely exercise his religion”

in violation of the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and Art. I,

§ 3 (Religious Freedom) of the Illinois Constitution. (Id.

at App. 5, ¶ 27). In his second “count,” he asserted that

the defendants violated his rights under the Equal Pro-

tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RLUIPA,

and Art. I, § 2 (Due Process and Equal Protection) of

the Illinois Constitution “in discriminating between

Christian and [AHI] inmates by both providing the

former and not the latter with reasonable access to reli-

gious reading materials, and by refusing to propor-

tionately distribute to . . . the [AHI] group at Lawrence . . .

funds allocated for religious purposes, as well as by

failing to compensate an outside religious leader and/or

faith representatives at Lawrence.” (Id. at App. 5, ¶ 28).

In screening Maddox’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, the district court restructured it to assert

four separate counts: Count 1: the defendants provided

reasonable access to religious materials for members of

Christian faiths, but not to adherents of the AHI faith;

No. 10-1139 15

Count 2: the defendants failed to compensate the

outside leader of the AHI faith in the same manner as

leaders of other religious groups; Count 3: the defendants

allocated a disproportionately small portion of the avail-

able religious budget at Lawrence to the AHI faith;

and Count 4: the defendants failed to permit members

of the AHI faith to participate in group worship services

even under the auspices of defendant Love. In the re-

mainder of this opinion, we refer to Maddox’s counts

as restructured by the district court. The district court

dismissed Counts 2 and 3 for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The court reasoned that the constitution doesn’t re-

quire prisons to “provide each religious group or sect

the exact same personnel, facilities, or other resources” or

that “state resources allocated for religious activities in

prisons be equally or proportionally distributed among

the various religious groups.” Maddox v. Love, No. 06-700-

JPG, 2007 WL 3333251, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2007) (citing

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972)).

We review a failure to state a claim under § 1915A in

the same manner as an “ordinary 12(b)(6) dismissal,” so

our review is de novo. Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626,

626 (7th Cir. 1999). To satisfy the notice-pleading

standard, a complaint must provide a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief,” which is sufficient to provide the

defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and its basis.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). Recent cases instruct us to

16 No. 10-1139

examine whether the allegations in the complaint state a

“plausible” claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___,

___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (to survive a motion

to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”). The complaint “must actually suggest that the

plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations

that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech.

Fin. Servs., 536 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Tamayo

v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)). We,

however, construe pro se complaints liberally and hold

them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citation

omitted); Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n. 2 (7th

Cir. 2008).

If the district court’s restructuring and narrowing of

Maddox’s complaint in Counts 2 and 3 are accepted, a

conclusion that these counts fail to state a claim perhaps

can be understood. “Prison walls do not form a barrier

separating prison inmates from the protections of the

Constitution, but prisoners’ constitutional rights may

be restricted by the fact of confinement and the needs

of the penal institution.” Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 374

(7th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citations omit-

ted). Prisons need not provide every religious sect or

group within a prison with identical facilities or per-

No. 10-1139 17

sonnel and need not employ chaplains representing

every faith among the inmate population. See Cruz, 405

U.S. at 322 n. 2. “[T]he free exercise clause guarantees

a liberty interest, a substantive right; it does not

guarantee that all religious sects will be treated alike in

all respects.” Young, 922 F.2d at 377 (citing Cruz, 405 U.S.

at 322 n. 2). A plaintiff doesn’t state a cause of action

under the First Amendment merely because a prison

allocates a disproportionately smaller amount of its

religious budget to certain sects or provides clergy for

one religion and not another. See id. at 377-78 (finding

no precedent that would require defendants to

reimburse rabbis for their travel expenses when they

constituted less than one percent of the prison population

even though defendants reimbursed other clergy

visiting the prison). After all, if a budget for religious-

related matters were to be divided too many ways, the

result could be an inadequate provision of religious

access for the prisoners as a whole.

Maddox, however, urges us on appeal to read these

counts more broadly in the context of his overall com-

plaint and allegations that defendants denied AHI ad-

herents a reasonable opportunity to pursue their faith

by allocating a disproportionally small amount of the

religious budget to AHI services and signaling out those

services for cancellation. We agree with Maddox that his

complaint should be read more broadly. The problem,

as we see it, is trying to separate Maddox’s claim for

religious fellowship (the subject of his grievance)

into separate counts (Counts 2, 3, and 4). The better

approach is to examine the facts in the aggregate to

18 No. 10-1139

determine whether, based on the totality of the situa-

tion, the defendants “denied [Maddox] a reasonable

opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the

opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to

conventional religious precepts.” Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322;

see, e.g., Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1312 (7th Cir.

1988) (remanding for determination whether prison

officials unreasonably delayed making arrangements for

Moorish ministers to visit prison and finding “troubling”

that prison pays for full-time Catholic and Protestant

chaplains, but would not reimburse visiting Moorish

minister for travel expenses). Maddox alleges that the

defendants singled out AHI services for cancellation

purportedly due to budget cuts, disproportionally al-

located the prison’s religious budget and resources (in-

cluding Chaplain Love’s time) to other religions, and

failed to pursue alternatives to allow the inmates to

pursue their faith. These facts, as set forth in Maddox’s

complaint, sufficiently state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.

Prisons must permit inmates the reasonable oppor-

tunity to exercise religious freedom. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322

& n. 2. However, prison restrictions that infringe on an

inmate’s exercise of his religion are permissible if they

are reasonably related to a legitimate penological

objective, such as security and economic concerns. See

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (listing factors

relevant in determining whether the “reasonableness” test

has been met); see also Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680,

686 (7th Cir. 1991). The court must balance Maddox’s

right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise

No. 10-1139 19

the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Four-

teenth Amendments against the legitimate penological

goals of the prison. See Young, 922 F.2d at 374. Within

these confines, a prison is required to make “only rea-

sonable efforts” to provide “some opportunity” for reli-

gious practice. Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1040-41

(7th Cir. 1994). This test is less restrictive than that ordi-

narily applied to infringements on constitutional rights

in consideration of the need to give appropriate defer-

ence to prison officials, avoiding unnecessary judicial

intrusion into security problems and other prison con-

cerns. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-49

(1987).

“In providing this opportunity, the efforts of prison

administrators, when assessed in their totality, must be

evenhanded.” Al-Alamin, 926 F.2d at 686. Prisons cannot

discriminate against a particular religion “except to the

extent required by the exigencies of prison administra-

tion.” Johnson-Bey, 863 F.2d at 1312. “The rights of

inmates belonging to minority or non-traditional re-

ligions must be respected to the same degree as the

rights of those belonging to larger and more tradi-

tional denominations. Of course, economic and, at

times, security constraints may require that the needs of

inmates adhering to one faith be accommodated dif-

ferently from those adhering to another.” Al-Alamin,

926 F.2d at 686. “[T]he treatment of all inmates must be

qualitatively comparable.” Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. Lane,

851 F.2d 867, 885 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming trial court’s

determination after bench trial that defendants violated

protective custody inmates’ First Amendment rights

20 No. 10-1139

by denying them, but not general population inmates,

opportunities for regular communal worship, religious

instruction, and private religious counseling without

legitimate penological interests).

Whether the defendants made reasonable efforts to

provide Maddox some opportunity for religious practice

or whether they were justified in signaling out AHI

services for cancellation because of budgetary restric-

tions remains to be seen. It is premature to make that

determination at the pleading stage. See e.g., Ortiz v.

Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669-70 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding

that the district court’s determination at the pleading

stage that the prison had a legitimate penological reason

to deny detainee religious articles of rosary and prayer

booklet was premature); see Alston, 13 F.3d at 1040

(holding dismissal improper where the district court

assumed that the defendants were justified in

restricting the inmate’s religious freedom because he

was in administrative segregation). We do not make

any determination about the ultimate merits of the al-

legations contained in the complaint, nor should our

decision today be read as suggesting an outcome. We

only conclude that Maddox has stated a claim “plausible

on its face” that he was denied a reasonable opportunity

to exercise his religion without adequate penological

justification.

B. Summary Judgment—Dismissal of Counts 1 and 4

The district court allowed Maddox’s complaint to go

forward on Counts 1 and 4, but then granted the defen-

No. 10-1139 21

dants’ motion for summary judgment on both counts

because Maddox failed to properly exhaust his admini-

strative remedies. Maddox concedes that he failed to

grieve his complaint for access to religious materials

(Count 1), Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 2 n.1 (stating that

his “grievance did not address alleged denial of access

to religious literature, and therefore, his claims as to this

issue were properly dismissed on summary judgment”),

so we find that the district court properly dismissed

that count. The district court, however, also dismissed

Maddox’s claim for group worship (Count 4) because

he failed to list the names of the defendants, or if not

known at the time, their description, in the grievance

pursuant to 20 Illinois Administrative Code § 504.810.

We review de novo the question whether the prisoner

has met the exhaustion requirement. See Conyers v.

Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2005). Exhaustion is an

affirmative defense with the burden of proof on the

defendants. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007).

The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . .

until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a)

requires “proper exhaustion”; that is, the inmate must

file a timely grievance utilizing the procedures and rules

of the state’s prison grievance process. See Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 93 (2006); see also Conyers, 416 F.3d

at 584. The “applicable procedural rules” that a prisoner

must properly exhaust are defined not by the PLRA, but

by the prison grievance process itself. Jones, 549 U.S. at

218. We have taken a “strict compliance approach to

22 No. 10-1139

exhaustion.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir.

2006). Thus, “[a] prisoner must properly use the prison’s

grievance process. If he or she fails to do so, the prison

administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and

the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Id.

Grievances are intended to “[allow prisons] to address

complaints about the program it administers before

being subjected to suit, [reduce] litigation to the extent

complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and [improve]

litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation

of a useful record.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 219.

The Illinois Administrative Code requires that the

grievance “contain factual details regarding each aspect

of the offender’s complaint, including what happened,

when, where, and the name of each person who is

the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the com-

plaint.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(b). If names of

individuals are unknown to the offender, he can still

file the grievance, but “must include as much descrip-

tive information about the individual as possible.” Id.

This version of the Code provision became effective in

2003 and was in effect when Maddox filed his grievance.

However, Maddox filed his grievance on a prison form

dated 2001 and the form only asked for a “Brief

Summary of Grievance”; there was no indication on the

form that names had to be provided. That’s because

under the prior version of § 504.810, inmates were not

required to draft their grievances with any specific

degree of factual particularity and were not required

to identify, by name or otherwise, the individuals respon-

sible for the events that gave rise to their respective

No. 10-1139 23

grievances. See 27 Ill. Reg. § 6214 (amending § 504.810).

Prior to 2003, a grievance sufficed simply by “object[ing]

intelligently to some asserted shortcoming.” Cannon v.

Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Strong

v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Illinois has

not established any rule or regulation prescribing the

contents of a grievance or the necessary degree of

factual particularity.”).

The defendants argue that Maddox failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies because he did not name

the defendants or describe them in his grievance; the

defendants do not otherwise contend that Maddox

failed to follow the prison three-step grievance process.

See 20 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 504.800 et seq. (detailing griev-

ance procedure); see also Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284

(7th Cir. 2005) (explaining process). This argument fails

because before this suit, Maddox’s compliance with the

grievance process was never in question. Maddox’s

grievance was rejected on the merits at every

stage of review without any indication from prison offi-

cials that it was procedurally deficient.6 “[A] procedural

6

The defendants contend that Maddox has waived this argu-

ment on appeal by not developing it below. We disagree. First,

Maddox was acting pro se in the district court, and as a pro se

litigant, his submissions should be held to less exacting stan-

dards than those drafted by counsel. See Alvardo v. Litscher, 267

F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). Second, and more importantly,

Maddox did respond to the defendants’ summary judgment

motion by contending that he exhausted available administra-

(continued...)

24 No. 10-1139

shortcoming like failing to follow the prison’s time dead-

lines amounts to a failure to exhaust only if prison ad-

ministrators explicitly relied on that shortcoming.”

Conyers, 416 F.3d at 585. Where prison officials address

an inmate’s grievance on the merits without rejecting it

on procedural grounds, the grievance has served its

function of alerting the state and inviting corrective

action, and defendants cannot rely on the failure to

exhaust defense. See id.; see also Riccardo v. Rausch, 375

F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a state treats a

filing as timely and resolves it on the merits, the federal

judiciary will not second-guess that action, for the griev-

ance has served its function of alerting the state and

inviting corrective action.”); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395,

398 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that by deciding prisoner’s

grievance without invoking a forfeiture doctrine, the

Administrative Review Board established that the

prisoner exhausted his state remedies).

Maddox’s grievance served its function by providing

prison officials a fair opportunity to address his com-

6

(...continued)

tive remedies and that he received a response to his grievance

at every level denying his request due to budget cuts. During

the summary judgment hearing, Maddox also stated that the

grievance goes to the warden and he even talked to the

warden about his grievance. He stated, “I exhausted my

remedy by filing a grievance.” The defendants had the burden

to prove their affirmative defense of exhaustion and to show

that they were entitled to summary judgment on that basis.

Based on the record submitted and the undisputed facts,

they failed to make that showing.

No. 10-1139 25

plaint. He complained about an administrative deci-

sion—the cancellation of AHI services—and it belies

reason to suggest that prison administrators at Lawrence

were unaware of who was responsible for that decision.

In fact, defendant Love was asked to respond to Maddox’s

grievance and defendant Garnett, as Chief Administra-

tive Officer, was directly involved in denying it. That

Maddox didn’t specifically name the defendants in the

grievance was a mere technical defect that had no effect

on the process and didn’t limit the usefulness of the

exhaustion requirement. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 219 (pro-

viding early notice to those who might later be sued

has not been thought to be one of the leading purposes of

the exhaustion requirement) (citing Johnson v. Johnson,

385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004) (“We are mindful that

the primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison

officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to

a particular official that he may be sued; the grievance

is not a summons and complaint that initiates adversarial

litigation.”)).

This conclusion is particularly appropriate in this case

where the form provided by the prison didn’t request

inmates to provide the name of the person subject to

the complaint. See, e.g., Curtis v. Timberlake, 436 F.3d 709,

712 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment in

favor of defendant on exhaustion grounds where

prisoner presented evidence that he followed the

prison’s “accepted practice” with regard to submitting

grievances even though he didn’t follow the letter of the

written grievance procedure). The grievance form pro-

vided to Maddox asked for a brief summary of the griev-

26 No. 10-1139

ance; Maddox provided a brief summary. He was

never informed that his summary was procedurally

deficient, and prison officials (including defendant

Garnett) acted on his grievance by addressing it on the

merits after contacting defendant Love to respond.

Based on these facts, we find that Maddox properly

exhausted his administrative remedies.

We therefore reverse the district court’s entry of sum-

mary judgment in favor of the defendants on Count 4 and

remand for further consideration. The defendants ad-

dressed the merits of Count 4 in their memorandum in

support of summary judgment and raised the defense of

qualified immunity, but the district court didn’t address

those issues, nor has either party addressed them on

appeal. We therefore remand to the district court to

consider the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits in the first

instance. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hix Wrecker Serv., Inc., ___ F.3d

___, No. 09-3023, 2011 WL 2586284, at *4 (7th Cir. July 1,

2011) (declining to address issue raised on summary

judgment that the district court hadn’t first considered);

see also Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 634

F.3d 906, 916-17 (7th Cir. 2011) (remanding to the

district court the issue of whether the defendants are en-

titled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we R EVERSE the dismissal of

Counts 2 and 3 and V ACATE the entry of summary judg-

ment in favor of the defendants on Count 4 as to Maddox’s

No. 10-1139 27

§ 1983 claims against the defendants in their individual

capacities and otherwise A FFIRM . The case is R EMANDED

for further proceedings.

8-24-11