State v. Brown

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

DOCKET NO. 48305

STATE OF IDAHO, )

) Boise, November 2021 Term

Plaintiff-Respondent, ) AMENDED

) Opinion Filed: January 6, 2022

v. )

) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

VINCENT OTIS BROWN, ) THE COURT’S PRIOR

) OPINION DATED JANUARY 5

Defendant-Appellant. ) IS HEREBY AMENDED.

_______________________________________ )

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,

Kootenai County. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellant Public Defender, for Appellant. Kimberly

Coster argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Ken

Jorgensen argued.

_____________________

BRODY, Justice.

This appeal addresses the one motion limit under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) for motions

by a defendant to reduce sentence. Brown made two oral requests for reduction of sentence prior

to the district court relinquishing jurisdiction. After sentence was executed, Brown filed one

written motion to reduce sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b). The district court denied the motion,

and Brown appeals that denial.

Before reaching the merits of Brown’s appeal, we address three prior decisions concerning

Rule 35(b). We now disavow our decision in State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144

(1994) and abrogate the holding in State v. Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 (Ct. App. 2002)

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to the extent those cases treated the one motion limit in Rule 35(b) as jurisdictional in effect. We

also clarify that the one motion limit in Rule 35(b) is a procedural rule, but we apply this

announcement only prospectively. In addition, we abrogate State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 258

P.3d 950 (Ct. App. 2011) where the Court of Appeals interpreted the one motion limit in Rule

35(b) as applying to both written and oral motions for a reduction of sentence at any point after a

sentence is announced. Finally, we affirm the district court’s decision denying Brown’s Rule 35(b)

motion to reduce his sentence.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November of 2012, police in Kootenai County, Idaho, received a report of a stolen pistol.

Three months later, the State filed a criminal complaint against Vincent Otis Brown for burglary,

felony grand theft of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon after

police discovered he had pawned the same pistol. Following a preliminary hearing, the district

court dismissed all counts except for the felony grand theft charge.

Four months after being charged, Brown pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with

the State. The district court accepted Brown’s guilty plea and set his sentencing hearing for October

of 2013. The district court released Brown on his own recognizance, ordered a presentence

investigation, and ordered Brown to return for sentencing. However, Brown did not appear for his

presentence investigation interview, and the State filed a bench warrant request before the date of

his sentencing hearing. After Brown failed to appear and show cause why the warrant should not

issue, the district court granted the bench warrant request and vacated the sentencing hearing.

Brown alleged he showed up to the courthouse on the day of his vacated sentencing hearing, but

thought he was “good to go” because he did not see his name on the day’s docket. Brown then

moved to Louisiana to “live his life” without contacting his attorney or the court about his

sentencing.

Nearly three years after moving to Louisiana, Brown decided to return for sentencing after

a prospective employer ran a background check and informed him that he had an outstanding

warrant in Idaho. Brown traveled to Washington and turned himself in to the Spokane Police

Department for transfer to Idaho. After his transfer, Brown’s presentence investigation was finally

completed. The presentence report documented Brown’s criminal history as involving violent

crimes, theft, and felony convictions across several states: a 1986 felony conviction for breaking

and entering in Michigan; a 1986 felony conviction for carrying a concealed weapon in Michigan;

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a 1988 felony conviction for second degree murder in Michigan (Brown explained that this charge

involved him shooting an arrow “into the sky” and it landing on a homeless person who then died);

a 2006 felony fugitive charge in Minnesota; a 2010 misdemeanor conviction for petty theft in

Idaho; a 2011 misdemeanor assault charge in Washington; a 2012 misdemeanor assault charge in

Washington; a 2013 felony charge for grand theft of a firearm in Idaho with sentencing in 2016

(the underlying conviction in this appeal); and a 2013 misdemeanor assault charge in Washington.

On September 16, 2016, about two months after Brown turned himself in for sentencing,

District Court Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer, sentenced Brown to a unified term of six years, with

three years fixed and three years indeterminate. The court suspended the sentence and placed

Brown on supervised probation for three years. However, as a sanction for absconding to

Louisiana, the court ordered six months county jail time, after which Brown’s probation would

commence. Approximately three months after sentencing, Brown’s case was transferred to District

Court Judge Lansing L. Haynes.

In 2019, following a report of probation violations, the district court revoked Brown’s

probation. At the revocation hearing, Brown admitted to the following violations: poor attendance

and participation in his substance abuse program; dismissal from the same program; an arrest by

Lewiston Police for possession of methamphetamine; failure to attend a scheduled appointment

with his probation officer; and three urinalysis tests which were positive for marijuana. At the

hearing, the district court asked for defense counsel’s “recommendation” as to the case disposition.

Brown’s counsel recommended a rider or reducing the sentence by commuting it:

Your Honor, we’re asking the Court to consider a rider in this case or alternatively

commuting the indeterminate period—excuse me, the determinate period of the

sentence to a year and a half, and then adding the remaining year and a half to the

indeterminate period of the sentence.

Ruling from the bench, the district court concluded that Brown violated multiple terms of his

probation. The district court made the decision to retain jurisdiction and send Brown on a rider.

Approximately eight months into his rider program, Brown was accused of engaging in

two violent incidents against other inmates, as well as other non-violent violations. The first violent

incident involved Brown striking an inmate with an “easy clamp” cane after that inmate allegedly

directed racial slurs at Brown. The second violent incident involved Brown, apparently

unprovoked, striking another inmate in the face with his fist.

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On January 31, 2020, the district court held a jurisdictional review hearing to examine these

incidents and decide Brown’s case disposition. At the hearing, Brown’s defense counsel

recommended probation, another rider, or reducing the fixed term of Brown’s sentence:

With respect to our recommendations, your Honor. We’re asking the Court to

consider probation in this case. He has a place to live. He’s completed a substantial

amount of his programming . . . . If your Honor feels that probation is inappropriate

in this case, we’re asking the Court to consider [giving] him another chance at the

rider . . . . Finally, Judge, if your Honor feels a rider is not appropriate we’re asking

the Court to consider reducing the fixed term in this case.

Before rendering its decision, the district court described its concerns with Brown’s previous

probation violations, his extensive criminal history, and the two violent incidents during the rider

program. Ultimately, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered the execution of

Brown’s original sentence of six years, with three years fixed and three years indeterminate.

After the district court relinquished jurisdiction, Brown timely filed a written Rule 35(b)

motion requesting a reduction of his sentence. The district court denied Brown’s motion,

reiterating, among other things, the sentencing factors, the court’s concerns from the previous

jurisdictional review hearing, and the need to protect society from Brown’s inability to control his

conduct. Brown timely appealed the district court’s denial to this Court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The one motion limit in Rule 35(b) is a procedural limit on the sentencing court.

The State contends the district court erred by entertaining Brown’s written motion for a

reduced sentence because the one motion limit in Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) deprives the district

court of subject matter jurisdiction whenever the limit is offended. The State’s position is based

on our opinion in State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 505, 873 P.2d 144, 150 (1994) and the holding

of the Court of Appeals in State v. Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 732–33, 52 P.3d 875, 877–78 (Ct. App.

2002). Today we disavow Wersland and abrogate Bottens to the extent either case held the one

motion limit in Rule 35(b) was jurisdictional in effect. Instead, we clarify that the one motion limit

in Rule 35(b) is a procedural limit on the district court’s authority—not power—to entertain

successive motions to reduce a defendant’s sentence.

“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent

is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is

necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v.

Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4–5, 343 P.3d 30, 33–34 (2015). Issues of subject matter jurisdiction are

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unwaivable questions of law subject to this Court’s free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755,

757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). Here, we are concerned not so much with directly overruling

controlling precedent as we are with cleaning up the imprecise use of the term “jurisdiction” in

Wersland and Bottens.

Precise use of the term “jurisdiction” refers only to: (1) personal jurisdiction over the

parties; or (2) subject matter jurisdiction. Matter of Hanson, 121 Idaho 507, 509, 826 P.2d 468,

470 (1992); State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 375, 195 P.3d 731, 734 (Ct. App. 2008).

Nonetheless, courts and parties sometimes imprecisely say a court “lacked jurisdiction” when what

is really meant is a court committed an error by taking an action that does not comply with the

governing authority. See Allen v. Campbell, No. 48452, 2021 WL 5707019, at *3 (Idaho Dec. 2,

2021); Richardson et al. v. Ruddy, 15 Idaho 488, 494–95, 98 P. 842, 844–45 (1908); Armstrong,

146 Idaho at 375, 195 P.3d at 734 (listing cases where the term “jurisdiction” is loosely used);

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11 (2006) (confessing that the United States Supreme

Court, as well as lower federal courts, have “sometimes been profligate” in the use of “jurisdiction”

to characterize matters that are “not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.’ ”).

The Idaho Constitution confers general jurisdiction on Idaho district courts to hear all cases

in law and equity. Idaho Const. Article V, § 20; State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127,

1132 (2004). Once a district court acquires subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a criminal

defendant, the court’s “jurisdiction continues until extinguished by some event.” State v. McIntosh,

160 Idaho 1, 6, 368 P.3d 621, 626 (2016). Generally, once a defendant is placed into actual physical

custody of the Board of Corrections, the district court’s jurisdiction is extinguished. State v.

Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 585, 618 P.2d 759, 763 (1980); State v. McGonigal, 122 Idaho 939, 940,

842 P.2d 275, 276 (1992). However, a “statute or rule” may extend the district court’s subject

matter jurisdiction beyond an event that otherwise extinguishes it. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352,

355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). For example, this principle is at work when a district court

announces a sentence and enters judgment upon it but either suspends the sentence to grant

probation or “retains jurisdiction” to send a defendant on a rider.

To explain, a district court may suspend execution of a judgment and either (1) order

probation, I.C. § 19-2601(2); or (2) retain jurisdiction for 365 days while giving custody of the

defendant to the Board of Corrections (i.e., grant a rider), I.C. § 19-2601(4). If probation is granted

under section 19-2601(2), the district court retains jurisdiction to revoke or modify the terms of

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probation. State v. Fleshman, 144 Idaho 772, 774, 171 P.3d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing I.C.

§§ 20-221, 20-222); State v. Peterson, 149 Idaho 808, 811-12, 241 P.3d 981, 984-85 (Ct. App.

2010). “If the trial court revokes probation and executes the imposed sentence, however,

jurisdiction then transfers to the Board of Correction.” Fleshman, 144 Idaho at 774, 171 P.3d at

265. Thus, during a term of probation, a district court is always operating under its jurisdiction

provided by Article V, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution—not the statutes authorizing probation

as an alternative case disposition.

Next, if the district court orders a rider under section 19-2601(4), the district court retains

jurisdiction of the defendant, which in essence means it shares “concurrent” jurisdiction with the

Board. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 163, 244 P.3d 1244, 1249 (2010) (emphasis added)

abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 896,

265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011); Fleshman, 144 Idaho at 774, 171 P.3d at 265. During a rider, this shared

jurisdiction automatically terminates in favor of the Board if the district court does not grant

probation within 365 days. Peterson, 149 Idaho at 811-12, 241 P.3d at 984-85. In other words,

when a rider is granted, section 19-2601(4) limits the district court’s jurisdiction by placing an

outer boundary on it (i.e., the extinguishing event). Urrabazo, 150 Idaho at 163, 244 P.3d at 1249

(2010) (emphasis added). Thus, in the case of a rider, the authorizing statute, section 19-2601(4),

is not the source of the district court’s jurisdiction after sentence is announced and suspended—

that is the function of Article V, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution.

These same principles apply when a defendant brings a Rule 35(b) motion to reduce a

sentence after it has been imposed and the custody of the defendant has been transferred to the

Board. Like the time limit for a rider, the time limit in Rule 35(b) for bringing a motion to reduce

sentence in this scenario supplies a limit on the district court’s jurisdiction. See I.C.R. 35; see

generally Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. Rule 35(b) does not operate as the source of

the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a motion(s) to reduce a sentence after it

is imposed, and a defendant is relinquished to the Board’s custody. Instead, the district court’s

power to hear such a motion(s) remains sourced from Article V, Section 20 of the Idaho

Constitution.

Once this framework is understood, we can turn to the one motion limit set out in Rule

35(b). The one motion limit in Rule 35(b) is a non-flexible procedural rule. It mandates how and

when a defendant’s request to reduce sentence must be processed: through one motion filed during

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the applicable window of authority. If this procedural rule is violated, the district court is not

automatically deprived of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the violating motion. Ignoring the one

motion limit may be an abuse of discretion, but an abuse of discretion under the applicable

authority (Rule 35(b)) does not extinguish the district court’s power to have made that decision in

the first place. See Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950); Rogers, 140

Idaho at 227, 91 P.3d at 1131. Offending the one motion limit is wholly distinct from a scenario

where the time limit in Rule 35(b) runs and the district court entertains the motion anyway.

Wersland and Bottens strayed from these principles when they penned the one motion limit in Rule

35(b) as “jurisdictional” in effect.

In Wersland, we reached the merits of Wersland’s appeal from the district court’s denial

of her first Rule 35(b) motion to reduce sentence and affirmed. 125 Idaho at 504, 873 P.2d at 149.

However, we dismissed Wersland’s appeal from the denial of her second Rule 35(b) motion to

reduce sentence without reaching the merits by reasoning that “the district court lacked

jurisdiction” to even entertain the second motion. Id. at 505, 873 P.2d at 150. Later, in Bottens, the

Court of Appeals held that “the prohibition of successive motions under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional

limit” on a sentencing court’s power to hear more than one motion to reduce sentence. 137 Idaho

at 733, 52 P.3d at 878 (emphasis added). In sum, both Wersland and Bottens used the term

“jurisdiction” imprecisely. Again, the one motion limit in Rule 35(b) is procedural; therefore, its

mandate may be forfeited if not objected to by the State. We disavow Wersland and abrogate

Bottens to the extent they hold otherwise.

Typically, our decisions apply both prospectively and retroactively, but this Court can limit

the retroactive application of a particular decision in its discretion. See BHA Inv., Inc. v. City of

Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P.3d 315, 320 (2004); Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 25, 523

P.2d 1365, 1371 (1974). Here, the State did not object below to any of Brown’s multiple requests

to reduce sentence based on State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 258 P.3d 950 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding

that Rule 35(b) one motion limit applies to both oral and written motions). Today we correct the

imprecise use of “jurisdiction” in Wersland and Bottens, but we do not announce a “new rule” of

criminal procedure that requires the retroactivity analysis from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288

(1989) as adopted in Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 133, 233 P.3d 61, 64 (2010). We exercise

our discretion and apply our clarification of the one motion limit only prospectively—not to

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Brown’s case. Thus, despite the State’s failure to preserve its objection to the alleged procedural

error, we reach the question of whether Hurst was correctly decided.

B. The one motion limit in Rule 35(b) only applies to written motions filed within the

appropriate procedural window of the court’s authority.

The Court of Appeals in State v. Hurst held the one motion limit in Rule 35(b) applies to

both oral and written motions for sentence reduction despite the rule’s plain language that “[a]

defendant may only file one motion seeking a reduction of sentence.”151 Idaho 430, 439, 258 P.3d

950, 959 (Ct. App. 2011); see I.C.R. 35(b) (emphasis added). Brown argues Hurst’s interpretation

of Rule 35(b) should be abrogated because, among other things, it does not give the term “file” its

plain meaning; its interpretation does not serve the purpose of Rule 35(b)’s one motion limit; and

it creates a chilling effect on defense counsel’s ability to advise a sentencing court of its legal

options at dispositional hearings (e.g., probation revocation and rider review hearings). The State

responds by arguing that Hurst is consistent with the purpose of the one motion limit: to require a

defendant to gather all favorable evidence into one motion, oral or written, before asking the court

to reduce his or her sentence. We agree with Brown.

“Where the lower court’s decision turns on the interpretation of a criminal rule, this Court

exercises free review.” State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175, 177 P.3d 387, 389 (2008). The

standards of construction we apply in interpreting the Idaho Criminal Rules are different from

those we apply to statutes enacted by the Idaho legislature. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40,

44, 408 P.3d 38, 42 (2017). When we interpret a rule promulgated by this Court, such as Idaho

Criminal Rule 35, we are “not constrained by the constitutional separation of powers.” Id. “[T]he

interpretation of a court rule must always begin with the plain, ordinary meaning of the rule’s

language” but we may temper that meaning by the rule’s purpose. Id. Unlike statutory construction,

“[w]e will not interpret a rule in a way that would produce an absurd result.” Id. “[I]n keeping with

the Idaho Criminal Rules’ aim of ‘provid[ing] for the just determination of every criminal

proceeding[]’ we construe the rules ‘to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration

and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.’ ” Id. (quoting I.C.R. 2(a)).

Today, we expressly abrogate the interpretation of the one motion limit in Rule 35(b)

announced by the Court of Appeals in Hurst. We hold that the one motion limit in Rule 35(b)

applies only to written motions to reduce sentence filed after the sentencing court has entered

judgment, revoked probation, or relinquished jurisdiction. Each of these dispositions has a

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procedural window of authority under Rule 35(b) for a defendant to file his or her one motion to

reduce sentence.

A plain reading of Rule 35(b) shows that the rule contemplates limiting motions to reduce

sentence only when the rule’s procedural windows are open:

(b) Sentences Imposed in an Illegal Manner or Reduction of Sentence. Within

120 days of the entry of judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained

jurisdiction, a motion may be filed to correct a sentence that has been imposed in

an illegal manner or to reduce a sentence and the court may correct or reduce the

sentence. The court may also reduce a sentence on revocation of probation or on

motion made within 14 days after the filing of the order revoking probation.

Motions are considered and determined by the court without additional testimony

and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered. A defendant may only file

one motion seeking a reduction of sentence.

I.C.R. 35(b).

There are three triggers that open Rule 35(b)’s procedural windows so a defendant may file

his or her one motion to reduce sentence. To begin, the first sentence of Rule 35(b) states: “Within

120 days of the entry of judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction, a

motion may be filed to correct a sentence that has been imposed in an illegal manner or to reduce

a sentence and the court may correct or reduce the sentence.” I.C.R. 35(b). This sentence supplies

two windows of authority to grant a defendant relief. First, when the district court enters judgment,

the window opens for 120 days. If a Rule 35 motion is not filed during that 120-day period, the

window closes but there are additional events which can trigger the opening of another window of

authority. The first sentence goes on to provide that when a defendant is on a rider and the district

court enters an order relinquishing jurisdiction (i.e., ending the rider without granting probation),

the window opens for 120 days.

Next, the second sentence in Rule 35(b) reads: “The court may also reduce a sentence on

revocation of probation or on motion made within 14 days after the filing of the order revoking

probation.” I.C.R. 35(b). This sentence has two parts, and the second part supplies the third trigger.

First, it acknowledges the inherent power of the district court to reduce a sentence during the term

of probation. Second, it contemplates a motion filed by a defendant after the court enters the order

revoking probation. In other words, the procedural window here is only open to the defendant for

14 days after entry of an order revoking probation.

Finally, the last sentence reads: “A defendant may only file one motion seeking a reduction

of sentence.” I.C.R. 35(b) (emphasis added). This is the one motion limit at issue in this case. The

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word “file” here is used as a verb. Its plain meaning is: “[t]o deliver a legal document to the court

clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record[.]” File, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

(11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). Thus, its plain meaning requires the Rule 35(b) motion be

written, submitted to, and filed with the court. Considered in the context of Rule 35(b)’s three

triggers, it is plain that this limit only operates within the three procedural windows discussed

above. In other words, the windows to file a Rule 35 motion open after the imposition of sentence,

or after the relinquishment of jurisdiction, or after the revocation of probation. To be clear, Rule

35(b) limits a defendant to one written motion to reduce sentence in total, i.e., the one motion limit

does not reset every time a new procedural window opens.

Treating oral requests to reduce sentence made at any time after sentence is announced as

motions under Rule 35(b) does not comport with the plain meaning of the rule. For example,

Brown made two oral requests for reduction of his sentence. One was at his probation revocation

hearing and the other at his rider review hearing. During his probation revocation hearing, no order

had been entered to revoke his probation at the time he made his request. In addition, at his rider

review hearing (held more than 14 days after Brown’s probation was revoked), no order had been

entered to relinquish jurisdiction at the time he made his oral request. Thus, neither oral request

could trigger the one motion limit in Rule 35(b) because each oral request was before the applicable

procedural window opened—i.e., each request would be a premature Rule 35(b) motion. Once this

is understood, Hurst’s interpretation of the one motion limit in Rule 35(b) breaks down.

Hurst interpreted a version of Rule 35(b) materially the same as the version we now

interpret, but Hurst went beyond the plain meaning of the rule. Specifically, Hurst interpreted the

phrase “may only file one motion” as applying to both written and oral motions. 151 Idaho at 439,

259 P.3d at 959. Hurst misconstrued the plain meaning of the word “file” so it would include oral

motions by relying on the rule’s purported purpose: to secure “simplicity or fairness in

administration[.]” Id. The problem with the Hurst approach is that it results in a trap for the unwary

during disposition hearings. For example, under Hurst, defense counsel could unintentionally

trigger the limit by merely conversing with the district court about the court’s choice between a

sentence reduction, probation, or a rider. Hurst would treat the mere mention of reducing the

sentence as equivalent to a Rule 35(b) motion to reduce sentence. The Hurst approach also presents

procedural problems for the district court. The clerk’s record may not reflect oral requests for

leniency made during disposition hearings so judges may unwittingly entertain successive

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motions. In sum, we decline to affirm Hurst’s interpretation of the one motion limit in Rule 35(b)

as contrary to the rule’s plain meaning. The one motion limit in Rule 35(b) only applies to written

filings to reduce sentence made within the rule’s appropriate procedural windows.

Here, Brown made two oral requests for a sentence reduction as an alternative case

disposition. Neither request was a written motion filed within the 14-day window after revocation

of probation or the 120-day window after an order relinquishing jurisdiction. Instead, Brown

timely filed one written motion under Rule 35(b) to reduce sentence after the district court entered

its order relinquishing jurisdiction. Thus, at no point did Brown offend the one motion limit in

Rule 35(b). From this, we reach the merits of Brown’s appeal.

C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s Rule 35(b) motion

for reduction of sentence.

For felony grand theft of a firearm, the district court sentenced Brown to an underlying six

years with three years fixed, and three years indeterminate. On appeal, Brown argues that under

any reasonable view of the facts, his sentence was excessive, and the district court abused its

discretion in denying his written Rule 35(b) motion to reduce sentence.

The decision on a motion to reduce a sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b) is “vested within the

sound discretion of the sentencing court.” State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 845, 828 P.2d 871, 874

(1992). “Where an appeal is taken from the denial of a Rule 35 motion, as in this case, we review

all information presented at the original sentencing hearing and at a later hearing on the motion.”

State v. Mosqueda, 123 Idaho 858, 860, 853 P.2d 603, 605 (Ct. App. 1993). To establish that the

district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to reduce sentence, a defendant must show

that in light of the governing criteria, their sentence was excessive under any reasonable view of

the facts. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). The Court “will

not substitute [its] view for that of a sentencing judge where reasonable minds might differ.” Id.

Here, Brown’s sentence is not excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. First, after

pleading guilty to the underlying felony grand theft charge and being released on his own

recognizance, Brown absconded to Louisiana. Once he missed his sentencing date, Brown did not

inform his attorney or the district court about his status. Instead, he chose to leave Idaho without

being sentenced. Second, the record shows that Brown has a protracted criminal history, across

multiple states, involving violent crimes and theft. Third, once he returned to Idaho, the record

shows Brown performed poorly when offered an alternative to prison by the district court, by

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repeatedly violating the terms of his probation and performing poorly on his rider due to his

inability to control his own behavior.

Finally, the district court reasonably considered the additional information Brown

presented along with his Rule 35(b) motion and determined it did not warrant reducing Brown’s

sentence. The district court’s reasoning emphasized that it based its decision to deny Brown’s

motion on the need to protect society from Brown’s inability to control his own behavior. “The

paramount goal of sentencing is the ‘good order and protection of society.’ ” State v. Dobbs, 166

Idaho 202, 206, 457 P.3d 854, 858 (2020) (quoting State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at

710). Thus, Brown did not show that under any reasonable view of the facts, the district court’s

sentence is excessive. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the

denial of Brown’s Rule 35(b) motion to reduce his sentence.

III. CONCLUSION

We disavow Wersland and abrogate Bottens to the extent they conflict with our holding

today that the one motion limit in Rule 35(b) is a procedural limit. This announcement applies only

prospectively. In addition, we abrogate the interpretation of Rule 35(b)’s one motion limit in Hurst.

We clarify that the one motion limit in Rule 35(b) only applies to written motions filed with the

court. Finally, we affirm the district court’s denial of Brown’s Rule 35(b) motion to reduce his

sentence.

Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN, CONCUR.

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