LEYVA

Interim Decision #2559

MATTER OF LEYVA

In Deportation Proceedings

A-14170842

Decided by Board January 18, 1977

(1) Denial of respondent's request for a second continuance of his deportation hearing was

proper where no showing was made that respondent was prevented from presenting

evidence or testimony as a result.

(2) Once alienage has been established, it is presumed to continue absent evidence to the

contrary. Respondent failed to offer any evidence of United States citizenship, and that

fact will not be presumed.

(3) Convictions for oral sex perversion under section 288a of the California Penal Code and

for burglary with intent to commit theft under section 459 of the California Penal Code

are convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme

of criminal misconduct and subject respondent to deportability under section 241(a)(4) of

the Immigration and Nationality Act.

(4) A conflict in evidence tzunceining aliases used by respondent will be resolved against

respondent where a deportation charge is based on documentary evidence bearing a

name identical to that of respondent, absent evidence that it does not relate to him.

(5) Where each document relating to the record of conviction is accompanied by an entry

that the copy is a true and accurate copy of the original and is signed by a deputy of the

Clerk of Court, it will foe presumed that the custody requirement of Rule 44 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence has been met.

(6) Under Matter of Silva, Interim Decision 2532 (BIA 1976), respondent appears

eligible for discretionary relief under section 212(c) of the Act, and the record will be

remanded to afford him an opportunity to apply for a section 212(c) waiver and the entry

of a new decision.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(4) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4)j—After entry, convicted of

two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single

scheme of criminal misconduct.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Peter A. Schey, Esquire

3040 Imperial Avenue

San Diego, California 92102

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; 'Wilson, Torrington, Maniatis, and Appleman, Board Members

This is an appeal From an order of an immigration judge dated June

16, 1976, which found the respondent deportable as charged under

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section 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as an alien

who, after entry, had been convicted of two crimes involving moral

turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. He

found the respondent ineligible for any form of discretionary relief. The

respondent has appealed from that decision. The record will be re-

manded.

The respondent, a native and citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the

United States for permanent residence on July 1, 1964. On May 19,

1976, the respondent appeared before the immigration judge and was

granted a continuance until Tune 16, 1976. On that date the respondent

appeared for the hearing accompanied by counsel. His request for a

second continuance was denied.

Counsel contends on appeal that the immigration judge violated the

regulations and the respondent's rights of equal protection and due

process when he denied the respondent's request for a second con-

tinuance. He states that he was not able to meet with his client person-

ally or review the Order to Show Cause nor had he received copies of the

convictions upon which deportation was based until the morning of the

hearing.

The regulations provide that a continuance may be granted in the

immigration judge's discretion if good cause is shown. 8 C.F. R. 242.13.

A decision to deny a continuance will not be overturned on appeal unless

it appears that the respondent was deprived of a full and fair hearing.

Matter of Namio, Interim Decision 2221 (BIA 1973).

At the time of the initial hearing on May 19, 1976, the respondent had

already obtained counsel, but he was granted a continuance to prepare

for the hearing. The record does not indicate that the respondent was

prevented from presenting evidence or testimony. See Olvera v. 1NS,

504 F.2d 1372 (6 Cir. 1974); Moutsos v. Shaughnessy, 149 F. Supp. 116

(S.D. N.Y. 1957). We conclude that the immigration judge properly

denied the motion for a continuance.

As proof of alienage, the Service introduced into evidence a 1964 visa

(Ex. 3) containing a photograph allegedly bearing a resemblance to the

respondent and a name identical to his. The respondent admitted at the

hearing that the visa related to him and that it correctly listed his

birthplace as Mexico (Tr. pp. 8-9).

Once birth in a foreign country is established, there is a presumption

of alienage and the respondent has the burden of going forward with the

evidence to establish a claim to United States citizenship. Wisidis v.

Holland, 245 F.2d 812 (3 Cir. 1957); Matter of Vergara, Interim Deci-

sion 2408 (BIA 1975); Matter of Tijerina-Villareal, 13 I. & N. Dee. 327

(BIA 1969). The respondent refused to answer when asked by the

immigration judge if he were a United States citizen (Tr. p. 9). We note

the argument that the respondent's failure to testify was made the basis

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of an adverse inference. It has been clearly established that the respon-

dent was born in Mexico and became a resident alien in the United

States in 1964. In effect, we are asked to indulge a presumption that in

the intervening time he became a United States citizen. This we refuse

to do. He has made no offer in this connection. Once alienage is estab-

lished, it is presumed to continue absent countervailing evidence.' Far-

rell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368 (9 Cir_ 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.

963 (1967). U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923). We

conclude that the Service met its burden of proving the alienage of the

respondent.

The record contains certified copies of judicial documents relating to

convictions for oral sex perversion under section 288a of the California

Penal Code (Ex. 4) and for burglary with intent to commit theft under

section 459 of the California Penal Code (Ex. 5). Burglary with intent to

commit theft is a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of L—, 6 I. &

N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1955); Matter of Z—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 383 (BIA 1953).

The crime of oral sex perversion as defined in section 288a 2 is similar to

other crimes which we have held to involve moral turpitude. See Matter

of K — , 3 T _ & Th.r. 575 (BIA 1949) (solicitation to commit sodomy);

Matter of A—, 3 I. & N. Dee. 168 (BIA 1948) (adultery, lewdness). See

also Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (consensual

sodomy).

' Counsel relies on Sint v. INS, 500 F.24 120 (1 Cir. 1974) for the proposition that the

Government must prove that the respondent is currently an alien. In that case, the

Second Circuit held that an admission of foreign citizenship made by the respondent four

years prior to the deportation hearing did not, of itself, constitute dear, convincing, and

unequivocal evidence of alienage for the purpose of determining deportability. The court

held that the Service must demonstrate that the respondent remained an alien during the

period of time at issue. We are not persuaded by Sint to depart from the well-established

rule that once the Service establishes birth in a foreign country, the respondent must

come forward with evidence of a claim to United States citizenship. Furthermore, Farrell

v. United States, infra, would control here since this case arises in the Ninth Circuit.

2 Section 288a provides that:

Any person participating in an act of copulating the mouth of one person with the

sexual organ of another is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not to exceed

15 years or by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year provided,

however, whenever any person is found guilty of the offense specified herein, and it is

charged and admitted or found to be true that he is more than 10 years older than his

coparticipant in such an act, which coparticipant is under the age of 14, or that he has

compelled the other's participation in such an act by force, violence, duress, menace, or

threat of great bodily harm, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for

not less than three years. The order of commitment shall expressly state whether a

person convicted thereunder is more than 10 years older than his coparticipant and

whether such coparticipant is under the age of 14_ The order shall also state whether a

person convicted hereunder has compelled copartieipation in his act by force, violence,

duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm.

Section 288a was repealed in 1975. See 1975 California Laws ch. 71.

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With respect to the conviction for oral sex perversion the information

lists the defendant as Mario Dominguez Leyva; the probation order

adds the alias Jose Mario Leyva (Ex. 4). The complaint and probation

order with respect to the burglary conviction list Jose Mario Leyva as

the defendant (Ex. 5). A copy of a document from the FBI Identification

Division (Ex. 6) was received into evidence as proof that both names

were used by the respondent.

Counsel contends that the similarity of names in the record of convic-

tion is not sufficient to establish that the respondent wa_q the subject of

the proceedings. We disagree. Where a deportation charge is based on

documentary evidence bearing a name identical to that of the respon-

dent, the immigration judge may reasonably infer that such evidence

relates to the respondent in the absence of evidence that it does not

relate to him. United States v. Rebore-Delgado, 467 F.2d 11 (9 Cir.

1972); Matter of Li, Interim Decision 2451 (BIA 1975); Matter of

Choung , 13 I. & N. Dec, 794 (BIA 1971).

Although the record of conviction with respect to the burglary charge

lists a different first and middle name from that of the respondent, the

last name is identical. The FBI document indicat e s that Mario

Dominiguez Leyva and Jose Mario Leyva are the same person. Fur-

thermore, the probation order relating to the conviction for oral sex

perversion lists both names. Although the respondent denied at the

hearing that the record of conviction with respect to the burglary charge

and the FBI document relate to him (Tr. pp. 12, 13), he introduced no

affirmative evidence in support of that statement. There is sufficient

evidence in the record indicating that the name Jose Mario Leyva is an

alias used by the respondent. We therefore conclude that the Service

met its burden of showing that the record of conviction relates to the

respondent and that he has been convicted of two crimes involving

moral turpitude.

Counsel further suggests that the court records have not been

properly authenticated since it has not been shown that the attesting

officer had custody of the original as required by Rule 44 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence. The record shows that each document relating to the

record of conviction is accompanied by an entry that the copy is a true

and accurate copy of the original and is signed by a deputy of the Clerk

of the Court. Where the certification is executed with reference to the

Clerk of the Court, it will be presumed that the custody requirement

has been met. Maroon v. INS, 364 F.2d 982 (8 Cir. 1966). 3

We hold that deportability has been established by clear, convincing,

and unequivocal evidence. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).

3 Chung Young Chain v Road, 209 F2d 857 (9 Cir. 1962). cited by counsel, is distin-

guishable since the method of authentication was not identified in that case and the court

concluded that there was no way to be assured of the document's authenticity.

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The immigration judge held that the respondent was ineligible for any

form of discretionary relief. Since his decision, we have determined that

a lawful permanent resident with seven consecutive years of unrelin-

quished domicile in the United States who is charged with deportability

on the basis of one of the provisions enumerated in section 212(c) of the

Act is eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under that section. Matter

of Silva-Ovalle, Interim Decision 2532 (BIA September 10, 1976). In-

asmuch as it appeais that the respondent may qualify for discretionary

relief under section 212(c), we shall remand the record to the immigra-

tion judge so that the respondent may be afforded an opportunity to

make an application for a section 212(c) waiver.

ORDER: The record is remanded to the immigration judge for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the entry of a new

decision.

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