The opinion
Interim Decision * 3052
MATTER OF CHURCH SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL
In Visa Petition Proceedings
A-26781336
Decided by Commissioner March 15, 1988
(1) A person seeking a Schedule A, Group IV, labor certification must meet all eligi-
bility requirements for "L-1" classification as a manager or executive, including
those relating to a qualifying relationship between the entities for which the
person has been and would be employed.
(2) In view of congressional intent that the "L-1" provisions be used for personnel
transferred by international businesses, any religious personnel who are able to
meet all the same "L-1" requirements which apply to business or other personnel
may be granted "L-1" visas or Schedule A, Group IV, labor certifications.
(3) Ownership and control are the factors for establishing a qualifying relationship
between entities for purposes of "Lf-1" classification.
(4) Ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of
an entity with full power and authority to control.
(5) Control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the estab-
lishment, management, and operations of an entity.
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Jerald B. Serviss
Barat & Mulleins].
One Wilshire Building
624 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2620
Los Angeles, California 90017
Mark A. Mancini
Wasserman, Mancini & Chang
1724 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
The director, Western Regional Service Center, denied the sixth-
preference immigrant visa petition and certified his decision to the
Commissioner for review. The Commissioner affirmed the director's
decision.
Counsel now moves the matter be reconsidered_ The matter will
be reconsidered. The decisions of the director and the Commission-
er will be affirmed.
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Interim Decision #3052
The petitioner is the Mother Church of the Church of Scientol-
ogy. It seeks the beneficiary's services as an establishment execu-
tive.
The petitioner claims the beneficiary is eligible for a Schedule A,
Group N, labor certification under 20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d)(1) (1988).
That regulation relates to an alien in the United States who was
admitted to the United States to work in, and is currently working
in, a managerial or executive position with the same international
corporation or organization with which he or she was continuously
working as a manager or executive for 1 year immediately prior to
admission. For 1 year prior to her admission to the United States,
the beneficiary worked as a deputy commanding officer for tours
for the Church of Scientology, Inc. in Sydney, Australia.
The director and the Commissioner both determined the benefici-
ary does not qualify for a Schedule A, Group N, labor certification.
This is based on their findings that the United States and foreign
entities are not part of the same international corporation or orga-
nization for purposes of such a labor certification.
Counsel seeks reconsideration on the following four grounds:
(1) The petitioner (the Mother Church of a hierarchical religion) and the foreign
entity (another church of the same religion) satisfy the requirements of a qualify-
ing of liato rolationehip bocause of the nature of ecclesiastical control in A hierar-
chical. religion.
(2) The test and standards of proof applied to the petitioner are arbitrary and ca-
pricious.
(3) Denial of the petition constitutes religious discrimination in violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution.
(4) Denial of the petition violates the first amendment to the Constitution.
Although the beneficiary was found ineligible for a Schedule A,
Group IV, labor certification on the ground that the United States
and foreign entities are not part of the same international corpora-
tion or organization, there is another issue in this proceeding
which was not previously explored. This issue is whether or not the
beneficiary is eligible for such a labor certification as a manager or
executive. Each issue will be addressed separately.
QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND FOREIGN ENTITIES
Applicability of "L-1" standards to Schedule A, Group IV
A person seeking a Schedule A, Group N, labor certification
must meet all eligibility requirements for "L-1" nonimmigrant
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Interim Decision #3052
intra-company transferee classification as a manager or executive
pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and National-
ity Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(L) (1982), including those relating to a
qualifying relationship between the entities for which the person
has been and would be employed. Title 20 C.F.R. § 656.22(f)(1) (1988)
states:
Aliens seeking labor certifications under Group IV of Schedule A shall meet, at
the tune of filing the applinotion, the eligibility requirements of the Immigration
and Nationality Act for an L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification as a manager or
an executive.
Similarly, the Department of Labor's Technical Assistance Guide,
No. 656, Labor Certifications (1981) ("TAG"), provides on pages 14
and 15:
The only aliens who qualify for Group IV of Schedule A are those in executive or
managerial positions who can qualify to enter the United States under an "Mr
visa.
In an advisory opinion dated January 10, 1986, contained in the
record of proceeding, the Department of Labor reasserts its view
that this is the correct standard for Schedule A, Group IV.
Criteria for a qualifying relationship between entities
Case law has confirmed that ownership and control are the fac-
tors for establishing a qualifying relationship between United
States and foreign entities for purposes of "L-1" classification.
Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (Comm.
1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982); see also
Matter of Tassel, Inc., 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Acting Assoc. Comm. 1981).
Accordingly, to establish the existence of such a relationship, a pe-
titioner must demonstrate ownership and control.
Ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of posses-
sion of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to con-
trol. Control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority
to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an
entity. See the definitions of the terms "ownership" and "control"
in the Immigration and Naturalization Service Operations Instruc-
tions 214.2(1)(4). See also Matter of Hughes, supra. While an entity
is usually in the form of a corporation, partnership, or sole propri-
etorship and is either a profit or nonprofit organization, the nature
and form of the entity are not relevant. Johnson-Laird, Inc. v. INS,
537 F. Supp. 52 (D. Or. 1981).
The ownership and control of both entities must be the same for
a finding of a same employer, parent/subsidiary, or affiliate rela-
tionship, as required by the statute. In each case, the Service must
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Interim Decision #3052
determine whether the same individual(s) or organization owns
enough of the assets of both entities to enable the individual(s) or
organization to control the management and operations of both en-
tities.
Qualifying relationship between religious organizations
The "L-1" classification was originally created for business, not
religious, personnel. House of Representatives Report No. 91-851
(which accompanied Public Law 91-225 (1970) when the "L-1" pro-
visions were first enacted into law) states the purpose of the "L-1"
provisions is to facilitate the admission of "key personnel" and
"managerial personnel" of international businesses. H.R. Rep. No.
851, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2750. According to the report:
This amendment would help eliminate problems now faced by American compa-
nies having offices abroad in transferring key personnel freely within the organi-
zation This proposal would meet the objectives of American industry which has
been seriously hampered in transferring personnel.
Id. at 2754.
The report, however, makes no mention of religious organiza-
tions. The Service does not believe that Congress intended "L-1"
visas to be used by employees of religious organizations. There are
other statutory and regulatory provisions to facilitate the entry of
persons engaged in religious activities.
Nonetheless, the lack of a provision for employees of religious or-
ganizations to obtain "L-1" visas does not preclude their obtaining
these visas if they are otherwise qualified. The following interpre-
tation of the Department of State specifically indicates they are al-
lowed to do so:
An organized religious, charitable, service, or other nonprofit organization is con-
sidered to be 1. . . a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or
subsidiary thereof . . .' for purposes of section 101(aX15XL) of the Act.
,
Vol. 9, Foreign Affairs Manual, Part II, 22 C.F.R. § 41.67 note 2.9
("FAM").
The main thrust of counsel's argument is that a hierarchical reli-
gion such as that of the Church of Scientology, in which the
Mother Church exercises control over the theology and doctrines of
other Scientology churches, has the necessary qualifying relation-
ship between its entities to meet the requirements for "L-1" classi-
fication. Counsel argues further that, since members of a religious
organization, unlike stockholders in a business enterprise, do not
own any property, ecclesiastical and doctrinal control, not owner-
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Interim Decision #3052
ship, should be the standard for determining whether or not there
is a qualifying relationship between religious entities.
Additionally, counsel submits a copy of an unpublished Service
decision (NYC-N-109090) where a qualifying structural link be-
tween two separate Catholic religious orders was found for pur-
poses of "L-1" classification based on the fact that the transfer of
the beneficiary (a Roman Catholic nun) required and received the
administrative approval of the Vatican bureaucracy. Counsel also
notes the standards for determining qualifying relationships be-
tween entities have, in the past, varied from case to case.
The Service, in the absence of any legislative history, regula-
tions, or precedent decisions on the applicability to religious per-
sonnel of the "L-1" and Schedule A, Group IV, provisions, has been
attempting to set standards and may have inadvertently rendered
some inconsistent decisions. In spite of this, this Service is not re-
quired to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not
been demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals which may
have been erroneous. Matter of Khan, 14 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 1973),
by extension; Matter of M , 4 I&N Dec. 532 (BIA 1951; BIA, A.G.
-
1952); see also Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281(1906); Lazarescu v.
United States, 199 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1952); United States ex rel.
Vajta v. Watkins, 179 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1950); Mannerfricl v. Brow-
nell, 145 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 288 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
In view of the congressional intent that the "L-1" provisions be
used for personnel transferred by international businesses, the only
appropriate standards for determining "L-1" eligibility are those
applied to businesses. Accordingly, this Service withdraws from the
decision in NYC-N-109090 involving a Roman Catholic nun (men-
tioned above) and any other prior "L-1" or Schedule A, Group IV,
decisions which apply other standards. Since personnel of religious
organizations are not precluded from obtaining "L-1" visas or
Schedule A, Group IV, labor certifications, any religious personnel
who are able to meet the same "L-1" requirements which apply to
business or other personnel may be granted these benefits.
With reference to NYC-N-109090, it should be noted that evi-
dence of the Vatican's administrative approval of the beneficiary's
transfer, in and of itself, does not establish the existence of a quali-
fying relationship between the two religious orders. Based upon a
review of the narrative decision only and without reference to the
record of proceeding in that case, it is not possible to determine
whether or not the petition met the standards articulated here for
a qualifying relationship between the relevant entities.
Applying the same standards to all business, religious, and other
personnel is the only fair way to adjudicate "L-1" and Schedule A,
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Interim Decision #3052
Group IV, cases. These standards apply equally to personnel of all
religions (whether newly established or older) seeking the benefits
in question.
Type of qualifying relationship claimed in this proceeding
The Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the terms
"subsidiary" and "affiliate," but new "L-1" regulations defining
these terms went into effect March 30, 1987, after this petition was
filed. The new regulations do not reflect a change in Service policy.
They merely codify definitions already set forth in administrative
case law. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra;
Matter of Hughes, supra.
Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1X1)(ii)(K) (1988), effective March 30, 1987,
states:
`Subsidiary' means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent
owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity;
or owns, directly or indirectly, 50% of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control
and - veto power, or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in
fact controls the entity.
Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(L) (1988) states:
`Affiliate' means one of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled
by the same parent or individual or one of two legal entities owned and controlled
by the same group of individuals, each individual owning and controlling approxi-
mately the same share or proportion of each entity.
The record in this proceeding attempts to establish the existence
of an affiliate relationship between the petitioning Mother Church
and the foreign entity. Since it is asserted that the Mother Church
controls the subordinate foreign entity in Australia, the actual
question in this case is whether a parent/subsidiary relationship
exists.
Counsel's citations from the TAG and PAM
In a brief dated August 16, 1985, counsel argues the United
States and foreign entities constitute a qualifying association
within the meaning of the following discussion of Schedule A,
Group IV, on page 13 of the TAG:
For Group IV purposes, corporations and organizations shall also include associa-
tions, firms, partnerships, joint ventures, joint stock companies, affiliates, and
subsidiaries, but shall not include relationships which are only licensor-licensee or
franchisor-franchisee.
This citation from the TAG explains the types of entities which
may have qualifying relationships. It does not mean that all such
entities qualify for purposes of Schedule A, Group IV. Further-
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Interim Decision 4t3052
more, the Commissioner's decision found no evidence establishing
the existence of a qualifying association.
In the brief dated August 16, 1985, and in the motion to reconsid-
er, counsel advances the argument that the United States and
foreign entities in question, as "an organized religious . . . organi-
zation," are part of the same international organization within the
meaning of the State Department interpretation from the FAM
cited previously. In the motion, counsel takes issue with the Com-
missioner's conclusion that components of international churches
have qualifying relationships no more automatically than do com-
ponents of international commercial enterprises. Counsel argues
the FAM merely requires the religious, charitable, or service orga-
nization to be organized. According to counsel, if the organization
is organized, no further examination is necessary to determine af-
filiation.
Nevertheless, as in the case of the above citation from the TAG,
the excerpt from the FAM simply explains that religious, charita-
ble, and service organizations may have qualifying relationships for
purposes of "L-1" nonimmigrant intra-company transferee classifi-
cation. It does not mean that all organizations of this type qualify
for purposes of "L-1" and Schedule A, Group IV, benefits.
The Church of Scientology and the Roman Catholic Church
Counsel asserts the hierarchical structure of the Church of Scien-
tology is similar to, if not identical to, that of other longer estab-
lished hierarchical religions, where the Service has recognized
qualifying relationships between entities for purposes of "L-1" clas-
sification. Specifically, counsel asserts "the parallels between the
Roman Catholic Church and the Church of Scientology are particu-
larly strong!' While the Mother Church of Scientology controls the
doctrine and theology of local Scientology churches, review of the
evidence in the record does not support counsel's proposition.
The Church of Scientology does exhibit some of the same charac-
teristics as the Roman Catholic Church. Both religions have similar
structures in that both have separately incorporated individual
units. Both also have hierarchies consisting of nonprofit entities.
Consequently, neither has stock ownership or accrual of profits. In
spite of these similarities, the two hierarchies must be compared
with profit-making organizations in many other respects in order
to determine ownership of assets and control of the entities.
The petitioner has submitted, as a sample of a typical incorpora-
tion in the Roman Catholic Church, a copy of an amendment of the
articles of incorporation of a Roman Catholic bishop (designated as
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Interim Decision #3052
a corporation sole) changing its jurisdiction and changing its name
to that of an archbishop. Comparison of this document with a copy
of the constitution and general rules of a typical Scientology
church reflects markedly different control of the subordinate enti-
ties.
The sample document indicates that a Roman Catholic bishop or
archbishop incorporates a diocese or archdiocese on authority and
under order or proclamation of the Pope. The Pope has sole author-
ity to appoint or remove the bishop or archbishop. It is the Pope
who entrusts the bishop or archbishop with the corporate powers to
manage and operate the diocese or archdiocese under rules, regula-
tions, and disciplines of the Roman Catholic Church, just as the
parent corporation of a business enterprise appoints a board of di-
rectors to manage and operate its subsidiaries according to its
rules, regulations, and philosophy. In addition, the Pope has au-
thority to change jurisdictions and names of dioceses and archdio-
ceses and to create new ones.
Thue, not only does the Pope have control over theological doc-
trines, but he also has control over the assets, management, and
operations of each diocese or archdiocese, as well as control over
bishops and archbishops. A bishop or archbishop, as shown in the
sample document, is designated as a corporation sole. Therefore,
the Pope also indirectly owns the assets of the diocese or archdio-
cese.
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) states:
A corporation sole is one consisting of one person only, and his successors in some
particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal
capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural
persons they could not have had.
The sample document reflects that a bishop or archbishop (the
corporation sole) is "authorized to hold, own and administer prop-
erties." Since the Pope may appoint, promote, or remove the
person who is designated as the corporation sole or change his ju-
risdiction, the Pope indirectly owns the corporation sole's property.
On the other hand, the foreign entity (local church) in Australia
in this case is subject only to the theological and doctrinal control
of the petitioning Mother Church. Although a trustee must be a
duly ordained minister of Scientology in good standing with the
Mother Church, whose tenure may be terminated for failure to con-
tinue in this status, the members of the Board of Trustees of the
foreign entity are elected by local church members or other trust-
ees. They manage the foreign entity's own affairs and elect other
church officers.
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Interim Decision #3052
While the foreign entity must follow the doctrines of the Mother
Church and contract with it for trademarks, products, literature,
and services used in the practice of Scientology, there is a major
distinction between its theological and corporate relationship with
the Mother Church. Unlike the Roman Catholic hierarchy, where
the Pope alone has the authority to create and change jurisdictions
of dioceses and archdioceses, the foreign entity can be dissolved by
a majority of four-fifths of the votes at a general meeting.
Notwithstanding counsel's assertion that all religious organiza-
tions are based on voluntary participation, the Church of Scientol-
ogy in Sydney, Australia, according to its constitution and general
rules, is bound by the hierarchical structure of the international
organisation only through a voluntary and self-determined agree-
ment which is not present in the Roman Catholic Church. Such an
agreement does not establish control of one entity by the other.
Similarly, notwithstanding counsel's assertion to the contrary,
approval by the Mother Church of transfers of personnel from one
church entity to another, in and of itself, does not establish the ex-
istence of a qualifying relationship between entities. As noted
above, this is equally true in the case of the Roman Catholic nun
(NYC-N- 109090), discussed previously.
In addition, the agreement for services between the Mother
Church and the foreign entity clearly provides for binding arbitra-
tion, under the auspices of the Los Angeles office of the American
Arbitration Association, of disputes between the two entities. The
license agreement between them also provides for arbitration. In
the Roman Catholic Church, however, the Pope is the supreme
pastor, supreme legislator, and supreme judge_
Other distinctions between the Church of Scientology and the
Roman Catholic Church are that, unlike the Roman Catholic
Church, the Mother Church of Scientology does not own, either di-
rectly or indirectly, or control any of the assets of the foreign
entity. Moreover, the Mother Church does not ordain local church
ministers. Rather, the assets are owned locally and ordinations are
performed, and may be revoked, by the local church. Accordingly,
the petitioning Mother Church clearly does not own or have the ul-
timate legal right to control the local church.
The relationship between the Mother Church and the foreign
entity is, in business terms, that of a franchisor/franchisee, not a
parent/subsidiary relationship. According to Black's Law Diction-
ary:
In its simplest terms, a franchise is a license from [the] owner of a trademark or
trade name permitting another to sell a product or service under that name or
mark More broadly stated, a 'franchise has evolved into an elaborate agreement
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Interim Decision #3052
under which the franchisee undertakes to conduct a business or sell a product or
service in accordance with methods and procedures prescribed by the franchisor,
and the franchisor undertakes to assist the franchisee through advertising, pro-
motion, and other advisory services.
In this case, the petitioning Mother Church provides continuous
religious guidance to the local church, gives training to its minis-
ters, and ensures the standardization of its doctrines and practices,
much as a franchisor in the business world would guide, give train-
ing to and regulate a franchisee. The local church, which is locally
owned and solely responsible for acquiring trustees and church offi-
cers and managing its affairs, may likewise be compared with the
independently owned business of a franchisee.
The Mother Church and the foreign entity are joined by a license
agreement and an agreement for services. The Mother Church and
the religious Technology Center (another Scientology organization)
own and control, by trademarks and service marks, the products,
literature, and services used in the practice of Scientology. The
Mother Church and the Religious Technology Center permit the
foreign entity to use (diem under the terms of a license. A contrac-
tual relationship of this type is not considered to be a qualifying
relationship for purposes of "L-1" classification. See Matter of
Schick, 18 I&N Dec 647 (RC. 19'70)
The above discussion cannot be construed to mean that there is a
qualifying relationship between all organizations associated with
the Roman Catholic Church, or that there is not a qualifying rela-
tionship between the Church of Scientology and its other associated
organizations. Such a determination is made on a case-by-case basis
after considering the petitioner's evidence of ownership and con-
trol.
Test and standards of proof applied to the petitioner
Counsel argues the test and standards of proof applied to the pe-
titioner are arbitrary and capricious. In considering the nature of
relationships between religious entities for purposes of "L-1" classi-
fication, the Service, while applying law and regulation equally,
must examine organizational structure and relevant factors. As
with nonreligious entities, this must be accomplished by reviewing
the documentary evidence of record.
In each case, all evidence must be evaluated, and there is no pre-
sumption of eligibility. The fact that some religious entities may be
able to establish qualifying relationships while others are not able
to do so may lead to the erroneous conclusion asserted by counsel
that the findings are subjective opinions relating to individual peti-
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Interim Decision #3052
tioners. This is not the case. Varying opinions should be expected
where diverse structures are found.
The tests and standards of proof utilized in this proceeding have
been clearly established through regulation and administrative
case law, as discussed at length above. The record demonstrates
that all due consideration has been accorded the petitioner in ac-
cordance with current Service policy.
Constitutional issues
Counsel also claims that denial of the petition raises constitu-
tional issues. Counsel does not, however, claim that the statute is
unconstitutional. Of course, the Service cannot pass upon the con-
stitutionality of the statute it administers. Nevertheless, we can ad-
dress questions relating to the constitutionality of its application.
Since all petitioners who seek "L-1" or Schedule A, Group IV, ben-
efits must qualify on the same basis regardless of their religion, no
violation of the equal protection or due process clauses can be
found.
Counsel argues that the Service has denied the petitioner a
mechanism for bringing its personnel to the United States, thereby
violating the free exercise clause. The fact is the Service treats all
religions the same. Whether or not religious employees qualify for
"L-1" classification on merits not relating to religious preference
or practice is a different matter.
Counsel asserts that the Service's review of the petitioning reli-
gion's internal organization is a violation of the establishment
clause. Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 1966), holds
that, in visa petition proceedings, the burden of proof to establish
eligibility for the benefit sought rests with the petitioner. In carry-
ing out its obligation to ensure compliance with the congressional
intent of the immigration laws, the Service must examine the orga-
nizational structure of an entity seeking "L-1" or Schedule A,
Group IV, benefits in order to determine whether or not it has met
its burden of proof. This does not violate the establishment clause_
MANAGERIAL OR EXECUTIVE CAPACITY
As in the case of the definitions of the terms "subsidiary" and
"affiliate," the new "L-1" regulations, effective March 30, 1987,
define qualifying managerial and executive capacities. The defini-
tions of "managerial capacity" and "executive capacity" also do not
reflect a policy change. As noted on February 26, 1987, when the
new regulations were published, "The standards included the pro-
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posed regulations were intended to clarify the Service's interpreta-
tion of the statute and current regulations, not to make a change
in policy." 52 Fed. Reg. 5739 (1987).
Generally speaking, under either the old or new regulations, two
factors identify a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, as
defined in 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(1)(1)(i1)(A) and (B) (1987), now cited at 8
C.F.R. §§ 214-2(1)(1Xii)(B) and (C) (1988), and both must be present.
First, the position must involve significant authority over general-
ized policy of an organization or a major subdivision of an organiza-
tion. Second, the employee's duties must be primarily at the mana-
gerial or executive level. An employee who primarily performs the
tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not
considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity.
Moreover, a managerial or executive employee must have author-
ity over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in
a first-line supervisor.
Having discretionary authority and a managerial or executive
title (such as establishment executive and deputy commanding offi-
cer for tours) does not, in and of itself, mean a person is employed
in a managerial or executive capacity. Here, the beneficiary's posi-
tions for both. the United States and foreign entities have manage-
rial or executive titles and discretionary authority.
While working for the foreign entity, the beneficiary was respon-
sible for a staff of 20, including 2 division heads, but she also
"wrote programs which she implemented" to ensure that Church
policy was followed regarding "dissemination tours for Church ex-
pansion." This appears to be the function of a staff officer or spe-
cialist not usually performed by a manager or executive. In her
current position with the petitioning United States entity, the ben-
eficiary is responsible for running an entire division, but she super-
vises only five other employees.
The record does not contain sufficiently detailed descriptions of
the beneficiary's job duties, the job duties of her subordinates, and
the organizational structures at her job sites to determine whether
her employment is in a qualifying managerial or executive capac-
ity. This issue was not raised in prior decisions. As the petition is
otherwise not approvable, it does not need to be addressed further.
It is simply noted for the record..
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, the decisions of the director and
the Commissioner will be affirmed. This action is without prejudice
to consideration of a new sixth-preference visa petition accompa-
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Interim Decision #3052
nied by a labor certification based upon a specific job offer pursu-
ant to 20 C.F.R. § 656.21 (1988).
This action also does not preclude a finding of a qualifying rela-
tionship between the petitioner and a foreign entity which it owns
and controls. The Church of Scientology, as with all other religious
or nonreligious organizations, may secure "L-1" or Schedule A,
Group IV, benefits for its employees when all requirements of the
statute and related regulations are met.
ORDER: The decision of May 29, 1986, dismissing the appeal
is affirmed.
605