R-O

Interim Decision #3170

MATTER OF R-0-

In Deportation Proceedings

A-28779166

Decided by Board April 22, 1992

(1) A guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into performing military service

does not, without more, constitute persecution on account of political opinion. INS v.

Elias Zacarias, 502 U.S 478, (1992), followed.

(2) A victim of forced recruitment must show that he is being persecuted on account of

his political opinion, and that his persecution is not solely the result of the guerrillas'

aim in seeking to fill their ranks in order to carry out their war with the government

and pursue their political goal, their political motive being irrelevant. INS v. Elias

Zacarias, supra, followed.

(3) The respondent has not established a well-founded fear of persecution by the

Government of El Salvador on account of political opinion due to his involvement

with the guerrillas, where the Government does have the legitimate right to investigate

the respondent regarding his suspected activities on behalf of the guerrillas and to

criminally prosecute and punish him under its laws for any activities found to be

illegal, and there is no evidence that the respondent has received any threats from the

Government on the grounds of political opinion, or otherwise. Blanco-Lopez v. INS,

858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988), distinguished.

CHARGE

Order: Act of 1952 —Sec. 241(a)(2)18 U.S.0 § 1251(a)(2)1—Entered without inspection

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:

Antonio G. Bueno, Esquire Robert Bryant

Bueno and Dresselhaus General Attorney

853 W. Washington Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90015

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members

In a decision dated July 2, 1991, an immigration judge found the

respondent deportable as charged under section 241(a)(2) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1988), as an

alien who had entered the United States without inspection. The

immigration judge also denied the respondent's applications for

asylum and withholding of deportation under sections 208(a) and

243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1253(h) (1988). However,

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the immigration judge granted his application for voluntary departure

under section 244(e) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1988). The

respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be

dismissed.

The respondent is a 32-year-old native and citizen of El Salvador,

who entered the United States without inspection on November 14,

1990. At his deportation hearing, he admitted the factual allegations

contained in the Order to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and

Warrant for Arrest of Alien (Form 1 221 S) and conceded his deporta-

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bility as charged. The Board finds that the respondent's deportability

under section 241(a)(2) of the Act, as an alien who had entered the

United States without inspection, has been established by clear,

unequivocal, and convincing evidence as required by Woodby v. INS,

385 U.S. 276 (1966), and 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1991). The only issues

on appeal are whether the immigration judge properly denied the

applications for asylum and withholding of deportation.

The respondent claims a fear of persecution by the El Salvadoran

guerrilla group known as the Farabundo Marti Front for the National

Liberation ("FMLN"). According to the respondent's testimony, he

first associated with the FMLN in 1988, when he was a student at the

University in San Salvador, where he participated in meetings and in

the distribution of guerrilla propaganda. The respondent explained

that he met his guerrilla contacts through his classes at the University,

but only knew their first names, except for one of the four he had

contact with, whom he referred to by his last name. The respondent

stated that he continued his association with the guerrillas until

approximately June 1990. At that time, the respondent decided to

cease his involvement with the group because he did not wish to

participate in more vigorous activities, such as those involving

weapons, and because he worried about being detected by the

Government. The respondent stated that upon his withdrawal, the

guerrillas threatened to kill him, and shortly thereafter he resigned

from the University and from his job in July 1990. He recalled being

threatened twice face-to-face, and once via the telephone while at his

place of employment. The respondent stated that he then moved to

San Miguel and prepared to depart for the United States. He noted

that he feared that the guerrillas would kill him upon his return

because of his knowledge about the FMLN, which he could relay to the

Government. The respondent also revealed that his parents and a

number of his siblings live in San. Salvador, and that the guerrillas

have not sent any threats to his home. He also expressed fear of the

military due to his past guerrilla involvement.

As allowed for by 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1991), the record includes an

advisory opinion, dated May 17, 1991, from the United States

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Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian

Affairs ("BHRHA"). In the opinion, the BHRHA stated that it had no

factual information pertaining to the respondent.

The immigration judge denied the applications for asylum and

withholding of deportation, finding that the respondent had not

established a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of the

five grounds enumerated in the Act. The immigration judge noted that

he did not find the testimony of the respondent plausible and pointed

out the respondent's failure to know the last names of the guerrillas

with whom he had contact.

On appeal, the respondent states that he established a well-founded

fear of persecution on the grounds of political opinion, and that he was

singled out by the guerrillas for his refusal to continue to collaborate

with them. The respondent further notes that he testified at the hearing

that it was common for persons involved in the guerrilla movement

not to reveal or discuss last names, and therefore this was not a

legitimate basis for discounting his credibility.

The respondent bears the evidentiary burdens of proof and

persuasion in any application for withholding of deportation under

section 243(h) or asylum under section 208 of the Act. 8 C.F.R.

§§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b), 242.17(c) (1991); Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N

Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), modified on other grounds, Matter of Mogharra-

bi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).

In order to qualify for withholding of deportation, an alien must

show that his life or freedom would be threatened in the country of

deportation on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership

in a particular social group, or political opinion. Section 243(h)(1) of

the Act. In order to make this showing, the alien must establish a

"clear probability" of persecution on account of one of these

enumerated grounds. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984). This

clear prof; ability standard requires a showing that it is more likely than

not an alien would be subject to persecution. Id. at 429 30; see also 8

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C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1) (1991). If the alien is determined to have

suffered such persecution in the past, it shall be presumed that his life

or freedom would be threatened on return to that same country unless

a preponderance of the evidence establishes that conditions in that

country have changed to such an extent that it is no longer more likely

than not that the alien would be persecuted there. 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.163)(2) (1991).

In order to establish eligibility for a grant of asylum, an alien must

demonstrate that he is a "refugee" within the meaning of section

101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). That

definitior includes the requirement that an alien demonstrate that he

is unwilling or unable to return to his country because of persecution

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or a "well-founded fear" of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion. See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (1991). In INS v. Cardoza

Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held

that the clear probability of persecution standard employed for

withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the Act is

significantly different from the well-founded fear of persecution

standard used for asylum under section 208 of the Act, and that the

well-founded fear standard requires a lesser degree of proof than the

clear probability standard. Id.

In light of the Supreme Court's decision, this Board held that an

applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear of persecution

if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear

persecution. Matter of Mogharrabi, supra. A reasonable person may

well fear persecution even where its likelihood is significantly less than

clearly probable. Id. However, there must be a reasonable possibility of

actually suffering such persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (1991).

The applicant must show that his fear of persecution is both

subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Blanco-Comarribas v.

INS, 830 F_2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1987); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d

1571 (9th Cir. 1986). The objective component requires a showing by

credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would

support a reasonable fear that the applicant faces persecution. Diaz-

Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). In view of this standard

of proof, there must be a showing that (I) the alien possesses a belief or

characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in others by means of

punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is aware or could become

aware that the alien possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the

persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien; and (4) the

persecutor Las the inclination to punish the alien. Matter of Mogharra-

bi, supra.

A respondent may also establish statutory eligibility for asylum by

demonstrating that he was persecuted in the past on account of

political opinion or any of the other grounds enumerated in the Act for

which asylum may be granted. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)( 1) (1991); Matter

of Chen, 20 l&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989).

In the case at hand, the Board concludes that the respondent has not

established past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of any of the grounds enumerated in the Act for which asylum

may be granted. The respondent alleges that he fears persecution by

the guerrillas on account of his political opinion. However, even

assuming the truthfulness of his claims regarding guerrilla threats, the

respondent has not proven that the threat of harm was made by the

guerrillas on account of a political opinion held by him underlying his

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refusal to continue to participate in guerrilla activities. He has only

established that the threats were made solely on account of his refusal

to continue his participation. In INS v. Elias Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,

(1992), the Supreme Court held that a guerrilla organization's attempt

to coerce a person into performing military service does not, without

more, constitute persecution on account of political opinion. See also

Perlera-Escobar v. EOIR, 894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990); Matter of

Vigil, 19 I&N Dec. 572 (BIA 1988). In the respondent's case, he stated

that he left the guerrillas because he did not want to be involved in

more complex activities, particularly armed conflict, and because of

his fear that he would be discovered by the Government. Neither

reason is related to political opinion. The victim must show that he is

being persecuted on account of his political opinion, and that his

persecution is not solely the result of the guerrillas' aim in seeking to

fill their ranks in order to carry out their war with the government and

pursue their political goal, their political motive being irrelevant. INS

v. Elias Zacarias, supra. Therefore, we find that the respondent is

ineligible for asylum based on his claim of persecution by the

guerrillas_)

At the hearing, the respondent expressed some fear that he would be

persecuted by the army due to his involvement with the guerrillas.

However, the record is devoid of any facts which even remotely

suggest that the respondent has received any threats from the

Government due to his involvement with the guerrillas, or that the

Government is even aware of his past involvement. Further, we note

that the Government does have the legitimate right to investigate the

respondent regarding his suspected activities on behalf of the guerril-

las, and to criminally prosecute and punish him under its laws for any

activities found to be illegal. Perlera-Escobar v. EOIR, supra. In the

case of Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988), the court

held that persecution within the meaning of the statute may be found

where harm is inflicted by the government on the basis of a political

belief rather than in furtherance of criminal prosecution. However, we

again note that there is no evidence that the respondent has received

any threats from the Government on the grounds of political opinion,

or otherwise.

Inasmuch as the respondent has failed to satisfy the lower burden of

proof required for asylum, it follows that he has also failed to satisfy

the clear probability standard of eligibility required for withholding of

I The immigration judge found the respondent's testimony implausible because he did

not know the last names of the guerrillas involved. Because we have found the

respondent ineligible for relief on other grounds, we need not evaluate this credibility

determination.

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deportation. See Matter of Mogharrabi, supra. The evidence does not

establish that it is more likely than not that the respondent would be

subject to persecution on account of one of the five grounds specified

in section 243(h) of the Act. See INS v. Stevie, supra. We therefore

conclude that the respondent is statutorily ineligible for asylum and for

withholding of deportation. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER; The appeal is dismissed.

FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the immigration judge's

order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris, 16

I&N Dec 168 (BIA 1977), the respondent is permitted to depart from

the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this

order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the

district director; and, in the event of his failure to so depart, the

respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's

order.

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