Opinion

J-J-G

  • 27 I. & N. Dec. 808
Court
Board of Immigration Appeals
Filed
Jul 1, 2020
Status
Published
Cited by
73 cases
Authority
More cited than 91.5%

holding applicant claiming qualifying relative would 2 Case: 24-60326 Document: 36-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/31/2025 No. 24-60326 suffer requisite hardship must show, if the relative is accompanying applicant to the country of removal, “that adequate medical care for the claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country”

How later courts described this case

  • holding applicant claiming qualifying relative would 2 Case: 24-60326 Document: 36-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/31/2025 No. 24-60326 suffer requisite hardship must show, if the relative is accompanying applicant to the country of removal, “that adequate medical care for the claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country”
  • finding no exceptional hardship where applicant’s child “receives regular treatment for [a medical] condition in the United States, and there is no indication that she will be unable to continue treatment [in the country of removal] if 4 the respondent is removed” with her child
  • holding that, where a claim is based on a qualifying child’s health and the child will accompany the applicant to the country of removal, the applicant must show that adequate medical care for a serious condition is not reasonably available in that country
  • holding that applicant's daughter's hypothyroidism may constitute a serious medical condition but does not constitute an "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" because she could still receive medical care in Guatemala

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

Matter of J-J-G-, Respondent

Decided March 31, 2020

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) The exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for cancellation of removal is based

on a cumulative consideration of all hardship factors, but to the extent that a claim is

based on the health of a qualifying relative, an applicant needs to establish that the

relative has a serious medical condition and, if he or she is accompanying the applicant

to the country of removal, that adequate medical care for the claimed condition is not

reasonably available in that country.

(2) The Immigration Judge properly determined that the respondent did not establish

eligibility for cancellation of removal because he did not demonstrate that his qualifying

relatives will experience hardship, including medical, economic, and emotional

hardship, that rises to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual.

FOR RESPONDENT: Marjan H. Bahmani, Esquire, Encino, California

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Acting Chairman; CREPPY and CASSIDY, Board

Members.

MALPHRUS, Acting Chairman:

In a decision dated April 5, 2019, an Immigration Judge denied the

respondent’s applications for asylum, cancellation of removal, and

withholding of removal pursuant to sections 208(b)(1)(A), 240A(b)(1), and

241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1229b(b)(1), and 1231(b)(3)(A) (2018), and for protection

under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec.

10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.

A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States

Apr. 18, 1988) (“Convention Against Torture”). The respondent has

appealed from this decision.1 The appeal will be dismissed.

1

On appeal, the respondent contests the Immigration Judge’s decision to deny his

applications for cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture. He does not challenge the denial of his application for asylum,

so that issue is not before us. See Matter of Zhang, 27 I&N Dec. 569, 569 n.2 (BIA 2019).

808

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondent is a native and citizen of Guatemala who is present in the

United States without being admitted or paroled. After he was placed in

proceedings and found to be removable, he applied for relief from removal.

The sole issue regarding the respondent’s statutory eligibility for cancellation

of removal at his hearing was whether his removal would result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives.

The respondent presented evidence that he has six qualifying relatives—

his five United States citizen children and his lawful permanent resident

mother. At the time of the hearing, his four oldest children were 12, 11, 8,

and 5 years of age, and his youngest was 2 months old. The respondent

testified that his children would remain in the United States if he is removed.

However, his partner, the mother of his children, testified that the children

would relocate to Guatemala and indicated that she would also accompany

the respondent.2 She previously worked and helped to pay the family’s rent.

The respondent’s 8-year-old daughter has been diagnosed with

hypothyroidism, a condition she has had since birth. She requires regular

medication to treat this condition, and if she does not have it, she has

problems regulating metabolic functions, like the temperature of her body.

The medical costs of the respondent’s children are covered by State benefits,

and they receive food stamps. The respondent claims that he would be unable

to afford medication to treat his daughter’s hypothyroidism in Guatemala.

His partner stated that the medication costs $1,100 there, indicating that she

obtained this information from the internet. However, the respondent’s

mother testified that she had received medical care in Guatemala free of

charge and believes that it is still provided for free in that country.

The respondent’s oldest child went to counseling for about 3 months in

2016 for “aggressive and defiant behavior[],” but there is no indication that

he was diagnosed with any mental health or behavioral issues. The

respondent’s 11-year-old son attended the same counseling service for about

5 months in 2018 and was diagnosed with “Anxiety Disorder, unspecified”

and “Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, unspecified.” After the

counselors provided this child with coping strategies to alleviate his anxiety,

including watching fewer “scary movies” with his older brother, they

concluded that the relevant treatment goals had been met and that he had

“[s]uccessful[ly] complet[ed] therapy.” There is a letter from the counseling

2

The respondent’s partner did not address why her children would accompany the

respondent to Guatemala, even though the children’s medical conditions are a significant

aspect of this case, and both she and the respondent claimed that the children need to remain

in the United States to obtain proper treatment.

809

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

service in the record, stating that this son was scheduled for a “second intake

and re-assessment,” but no records of additional counseling were submitted.

With regard to the hardship of his lawful permanent resident mother, the

respondent testified that he provides support to her and that he, his partner,

and his children all live with, and pay rent to, his mother. The respondent

presented evidence that his mother has been diagnosed with hypertension,

but the evidence also indicates that State benefits cover all of her medical

expenses and that she is able to take the bus to medical appointments and

pick up her own prescriptions. Although the respondent and his mother claim

that she suffers from other medical conditions, no documentation was

submitted to corroborate this claim. She receives Social Security benefits

and has rented a room in her home for income in the past. The respondent’s

sister indicated that she could live with and take care of their mother, who

would remain in the United States in the event that her son is removed.

The respondent claimed that if his children accompany him to Guatemala,

they will face limited educational and economic opportunities in that country,

especially in light of his son’s attention deficit disorder. He also argued that

his mother and children will face emotional hardship in the event they are

separated from him.

Regarding his application for withholding of removal and protection

under the Convention Against Torture, the respondent claimed that gang

members in Guatemala threatened and harmed him after he refused to join

their gang in 1995 and 1996, when he was 12 and 13 years old, respectively.

In addition, he claims that the relatives of his ex-girlfriend threatened him in

2002 in Guatemala because they falsely believed that he was involved in the

death of her brother. He contends that the gangs and these individuals will

harm him further if he is removed to that country.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Cancellation of Removal

To establish eligibility for cancellation of removal, the respondent must

demonstrate, among other things, that his “removal would result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or

child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for

permanent residence.” Section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act. For the following

reasons, we will affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that the

respondent has not established that his removal would result in the requisite

level of hardship to his qualifying relatives.

810

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

1. Hardship Based on a Qualifying Relative’s Health

The respondent argues that his qualifying relatives would experience the

requisite level of hardship for cancellation of removal, at least in part based

on their medical conditions. He also asserts that medical care for these

conditions is unavailable in Guatemala. It is well settled that for purposes of

cancellation, we consider the “ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying

lawful permanent resident and United States citizen relatives.” Matter of

Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001). The exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship for cancellation of removal is based on a cumulative

consideration of all hardship factors, but to the extent that a claim is based

on the health of a qualifying relative, an applicant needs to establish that the

relative has a serious medical condition and, if he or she is accompanying the

applicant to the country of removal, 3 that adequate medical care for the

claimed condition is not reasonably available in that country.4

Whether a qualifying relative suffers from a serious medical condition

and whether adequate medical care for this condition is reasonably available

in the country of removal are findings of fact that are made by an Immigration

Judge and reviewed on appeal under a clearly erroneous standard. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2019). The applicant has the burden of establishing these

facts. Section 240(c)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B) (2018).

The Immigration Judge must evaluate whether an applicant’s testimony

regarding the seriousness of a qualifying relative’s medical condition and the

reasonable availability of medical care in the country of removal “is credible,

is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the

applicant has satisfied [his or her] burden of proof.” Id. Generally, an

3

It is the applicant’s burden to establish that a qualifying relative will accompany him or

her to the country of removal. See section 240(c)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(4)(B) (2018) (providing that an applicant “must comply with the applicable

requirement to submit information or documentation in support of the applicant’s

application for relief”). See generally Matter of Calderon-Hernandez, 25 I&N Dec. 885,

886 (BIA 2012) (discussing the presumptions and requirements of proof regarding whether

a qualifying relative child will remain in the United States or leave with the applicant);

Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880, 885–86 (BIA 1994) (same).

4

Our decision today is not inconsistent with our holding in Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N

Dec. 467, 470 (BIA 2002), that the hardship standard for cancellation of removal “is not

so restrictive that only . . . those who have a qualifying relative with a serious medical

condition[] will qualify for relief.” We do not discount the possibility that a qualifying

relative who does not suffer from a serious medical condition may, in light of other relevant

hardship factors, experience the requisite level of hardship as a result of an applicant’s

removal. However, we clarify in this decision that where an applicant seeks to establish

the required hardship based on a qualifying relative’s medical condition, he or she must

make the above showings.

811

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

applicant will lack the firsthand knowledge and medical expertise needed to

provide persuasive and sufficiently specific testimony regarding the

seriousness of a qualifying relative’s medical condition and the availability

of care in the country of removal to meet that burden. The Immigration Judge

should therefore determine whether the applicant has submitted sufficient

reliable evidence to corroborate his or her testimony in this regard. See id.

The hypothyroidism the respondent’s daughter suffers may constitute a

serious medical condition, particularly given the consequences if it is left

untreated, but the record reflects that his daughter receives regular treatment

for this condition in the United States, and there is no indication that she will

be unable to continue treatment if the respondent is removed.5 Although the

respondent’s partner testified that she learned from the internet that treatment

for hypothyroidism costs $1,100 in Guatemala, the Immigration Judge found

that the respondent presented no evidence to corroborate her testimony. See

section 240(c)(4)(B) of the Act (providing that an Immigration Judge may

require the submission of corroborating evidence, even where the testimony

of an applicant or witness is credible). The Immigration Judge also

reasonably determined that the basis for her testimony was inadequate to

establish her assertion.6

Moreover, as the respondent concedes on appeal, his mother testified that

she received free medical care in Guatemala and believes that it continues to

be free there. In light of this testimony, the Immigration Judge was not

required to accept the assertions made by the respondent and his partner

regarding the cost and availability of treatment for hypothyroidism in

Guatemala. See Matter of D-A-C-, 27 I&N Dec. 575, 579 (BIA 2019) (“An

Immigration Judge ‘is not required to accept a respondent’s assertions, even

if plausible, where there are other permissible views of the evidence based

on the record.’” (citation omitted)).

The respondent has submitted evidence reflecting that medical facilities

in Guatemala provide a lower standard of medical care than facilities in the

United States. However, this evidence does not show that treatment for

hypothyroidism is not reasonably available in Guatemala. Moreover, it is

5

Although not at issue in this case, if a qualifying relative is receiving ongoing treatment

for a serious medical condition, evidence of detrimental consequences that would result

from disruption of the treatment regimen is relevant to establishing the requisite hardship.

6

Even if the respondent had submitted a printout from the internet indicating that medical

treatment for hypothyroidism costs $1,100 in Guatemala, the Immigration Judge would

still need to evaluate the relevance and reliability of the document and weigh it along with

the credible testimony presented to determine whether the respondent met his burden of

proof. See section 240(c)(4)(B) of the Act; cf. Badasa v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 909, 910 (8th

Cir. 2008) (noting that an Immigration Judge erred in relying on an internet document

without analyzing whether it was “a sufficiently reliable source” of information).

812

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

well settled that evidence that a qualifying relative will experience a “lower

standard of living” in the country of removal, including a lower standard of

medical care, “will be insufficient in [itself] to support a finding of

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N

Dec. at 63–64; cf. Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130, 134 (BIA 1984) (“The

fact that the medical facilities in Colombia may not be as good as they are in

this country does not mean that [the applicant’s] children . . . will suffer

extreme hardship there.” (emphasis added)).7

Further, although the Immigration Judge acknowledged that two of the

respondent’s children have received counseling for behavioral and emotional

problems, and one of them has been diagnosed with anxiety and attention

deficit disorders, there is no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s findings

that these are not serious ongoing medical conditions. The older of these two

children was not diagnosed with any mental health, emotional, or behavioral

conditions during counseling. Moreover, the record reflects that the younger

child successfully completed counseling and was given coping strategies for

his anxiety, and there is no indication that he has received further counseling

or treatment for either his anxiety or attention deficit disorders.

There is also no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s finding that if the

children remain in the United States and need treatment for their conditions,

they will be able to obtain it. The respondent does not argue that treatment

for these conditions is unavailable in Guatemala. Nor does he meaningfully

contest the Immigration Judge’s finding that the son who suffers from

anxiety will feel less anxious if he accompanies the respondent to Guatemala.

Finally, the Immigration Judge did not clearly err when she found that the

hypertension of the respondent’s mother was not serious and that she could

continue to obtain treatment for this condition in the United States. The

respondent’s mother testified that the medical expenses stemming from her

hypertension are covered by State benefits, she takes the bus to the doctor,

and she is able to pick up her own prescriptions. There is also no indication

that her hypertension prevents her from performing necessary tasks.

2. Other Hardship Considerations

With regard to the financial hardship that would allegedly result from his

removal, the respondent does not contest the Immigration Judge’s finding

7

Although Matter of Correa held that evidence of lower quality medical facilities in the

country of removal was insufficient to establish “extreme hardship” to a relative for

purposes of suspension of deportation under former section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254(a)(1) (1994), it is instructive since the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

“standard for cancellation of removal is a higher one than that under the suspension of

deportation statute.” Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. at 59 (emphasis added).

813

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

that he could financially support his family if his children and partner

accompany him to Guatemala. Nor does he meaningfully challenge the

Immigration Judge’s finding that, in the event his children and partner remain

in the United States, his partner could return to work and help support the

children. The respondent’s mother testified that she receives Social Security

benefits and has rented one of the rooms in her home for income in the past.

She is currently renting space to the respondent and his family. The

respondent’s sister also stated that she could live with and care for the

respondent’s mother in the event the respondent is removed.

While the respondent’s children may face fewer economic and

educational opportunities in Guatemala than they would if they remained

in this country, both in the short and long term, economic detriment is

generally insufficient to support a finding of the required hardship. See

Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). Difficulties of this

nature are an unfortunate consequence of removal in many cases. The

respondent has not shown that his children “would be deprived of all

schooling or of an opportunity to obtain any education” in Guatemala. Id.

Furthermore, since his children are citizens of the United States, they may

return to this country later to pursue economic and educational opportunities.

Finally, we acknowledge the emotional hardship the respondent’s

relatives may experience as a result of their separation from him if they

remain in the United States. However, we agree with the Immigration Judge

that it does not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship. Moreover, the respondent has waived any challenge to the

Immigration Judge’s finding that his son, who suffers from anxiety disorder,

will be less anxious if he accompanies his father to Guatemala.8

Considering all of the hardship factors in this case cumulatively,

including the hardships that may result from the medical, economic, and

emotional factors, the respondent’s qualifying relatives will not experience

hardship that rises to the level of extremely and exceptionally unusual. The

hardship must be “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would

normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family

members here.” Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. at 65 (noting the “high

level of hardship” of hardship that Congress established); cf. Matter of

Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 463, 472 (BIA 2002) (finding that the hardship was

sufficient to warrant a grant of relief). In fact, the application of the

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard must be “limited to

8

The respondent argues for the first time on appeal that the Immigration Judge should

have considered the risk to his children’s safety in Guatemala and the “derivative” hardship

his qualifying relatives will experience as a consequence of the hardship his partner may

face upon his removal. These arguments were not advanced or articulated below, and we

will not address them. See Matter of E-R-A-L-, 27 I&N Dec. 767, 768 n.2 (BIA 2020).

814

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

‘truly exceptional’ situations.” Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. at

62 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996)); see also Matter of

Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664, 669 (A.G. 2019) (stating that cancellation

of removal should be granted “only to the most deserving candidates”).

Therefore, on the facts of this case, the Immigration Judge properly

determined that the respondent has not established eligibility for cancellation

of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act.9

B. Withholding of Removal

We will likewise uphold the Immigration Judge’s decision to deny the

respondent’s application for withholding of removal under section

241(b)(3)(A) of the Act. The respondent argued that he experienced past

persecution in Guatemala based on his membership in two groups—

(1) Guatemalan males who are accused of causing another’s death; and

(2) individuals targeted by family members of a drug cartel. However, the

respondent does not challenge the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that these

groups lack validity for purposes of withholding of removal, and we consider

any challenge in this regard to be waived. See Matter of Zhang, 27 I&N Dec.

569, 569 n.2 (BIA 2019).

The respondent also contends that he was targeted on account of his

political opinion in opposition to gang activity in Guatemala. We do not

agree. There is no indication that the gang members and relatives of the

respondent’s ex-girlfriend, who targeted him decades ago in Guatemala,

were motivated to do so because he was politically or ideologically opposed

to the gang, or to gang activity in general, or that the gang imputed any

particular political belief to him. The respondent does not claim that he is

involved in any political party or that any political activity was imputed to

him. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 589 (BIA 2008), clarified by

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014), and Matter of W-G-R-,

26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014), vacated in part and remanded on other

grounds, Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Barrios

v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by

Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The

record evidence suggests that gang members targeted the respondent because

they sought to “increas[e] the size and influence of their gang.” Matter of

S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 589. The evidence also indicates that the relatives

of the respondent’s ex-girlfriend were motivated to target him because they

suspected he was involved in the death of her brother. “[T]hese motivations

do not constitute persecution on account of political opinion” or any valid

9

In light of this disposition, we need not address the Immigration Judge’s alternative

determination to deny the respondent’s application in the exercise of discretion.

815

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

protected ground. Barrios, 581 F.3d at 856 (citation omitted); see also Zetino

v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free

from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang

members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).

The respondent also claims that he will experience future persecution in

Guatemala based on his membership in a social group comprised of

Guatemalan men who are living and working in the United States for decades

and are removed. However, we agree with the Immigration Judge that this

social group is not valid for purposes of withholding of removal. See Matter

of E-R-A-L-, 27 I&N Dec. 767, 771 (BIA 2020) (reviewing the validity of a

social group under a de novo standard); see also Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder,

714 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

“An applicant seeking . . . withholding of removal based on his or her

membership in a particular social group must ‘establish that the group is

(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic,

(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in

question.’” Matter of E-R-A-L-, 27 I&N Dec. at 769 (citation omitted). The

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction

this case arises, has rejected similarly defined social groups after concluding

that they lacked the requisite particularity. See Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d

1053, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that a group of “individuals

‘returning to Mexico [from] the United States [who] are believed to be

wealthy’” is “too broad to qualify” as a valid social group (alterations in

original)); Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1138 (same with regard to “deportees from the

United States to El Salvador”); Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226,

1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (same with regard to “imputed wealthy Americans”);

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (per

curiam) (same with regard to “returning Mexicans from the United States”).

Like the groups rejected by the Ninth Circuit, the respondent’s proposed

group of Guatemalan men who are living and working in the United States

for decades and are removed is “too amorphous, overbroad and diffuse” to

satisfy the requirement of particularity because the group encompasses all

males removed to Guatemala, regardless of their age, the number of decades

they lived and worked in the United States, “the reasons for their removal, or

the recency of their removal.” Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1139. In addition, the

respondent has not demonstrated that this group is perceived to be socially

distinct in Guatemalan society; he does not point to any evidence in the

record that would establish this claim. Thus, he has not demonstrated that

this proposed social group is valid for purposes of establishing his eligibility

for withholding of removal. See Matter of E-R-A-L-, 27 I&N Dec. at 769.

Finally, there is no indication that the gang members and other

individuals who threatened and harmed the respondent decades ago in

816

Cite as 27 I&N Dec. 808 (BIA 2020) Interim Decision #3981

Guatemala are still interested in him or would seek to do him harm. In light

of the significant passage of time since the respondent was last harmed by

these individuals in Guatemala and the fact that other family members who

remain there have not been contacted or harmed by them since he left over

15 years ago, the Immigration Judge did not clearly err when she found that

the respondent fears random crime and violence in that country, rather than

harm inflicted on account of his proposed social group. See Zetino, 622 F.3d

at 1016. We will therefore affirm the Immigration Judge’s finding that the

respondent has failed to demonstrate, in accordance with applicable circuit

precedent, that it is more likely than not that a valid protected ground

will be “a reason” for any persecution he may experience in Guatemala.

Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).

C. Convention Against Torture

Finally, we will uphold the Immigration Judge’s decision to deny the

respondent’s application for protection under the Convention Against

Torture. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a) (2019). As noted, it has

been nearly two decades since the respondent was last threatened in

Guatemala, and he has not shown that the gang members or other individuals

who threatened and harmed him in that country are still interested in locating

him today, let alone torturing him. See Xiao Fei Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d

829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding the denial of an application for

protection under the Convention Against Torture where the torture claim was

speculative and not established). Further, although the respondent has

submitted generalized evidence of violence and crime in Guatemala that is

not particular to him, this evidence is insufficient to establish that it is more

likely than not that he will be tortured in that country by or with the consent

or acquiescence of a Guatemalan official or an individual acting in an official

capacity. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam). Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and

willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the

order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the

time and place required for removal by the Department of Homeland

Security, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper

the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent

shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $799 for each day the

respondent is in violation. See Section 274D of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d

(2018); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2019).

817

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.