Opinion

National Labor Relations Board v. 15th Avenue Iron Works, Inc.

  • 964 F.2d 1336
  • 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2692
  • 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 12542
Court
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Filed
Jun 1, 1992
Status
Published
On the bench
Pratt, Mahoney, McLaughlin
Cited by
22 cases
Authority
More cited than 81.2%

following the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in holding “(1) that the NLRB is a ‘governmental unit,’ and (2) that NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings and enforcement proceedings are proceedings to enforce the NLRB’s police or regulatory powers” such that they are excepted from the stay by Section 362(b)(4)

How later courts described this case

  • following the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in holding “(1) that the NLRB is a ‘governmental unit,’ and (2) that NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings and enforcement proceedings are proceedings to enforce the NLRB’s police or regulatory powers” such that they are excepted from the stay by Section 362(b)(4)
  • adopting the majority view of the first, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth circuit that the NLRB is a “governmental unit,” and unfair labor practice hearings and enforcement actions are not stayed under § 362(b)(4)
  • allowing entry of a judgment requiring payment to various union funds but noting that “collection of that judgment after entry” would require leave of the bankruptcy court
  • "The ‘enforcement’ of the NLRB order that we command pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) allows the entry of this aspect of the NLRB’s order as, in effect, a 'money judgment' against 15th Avenue. The collection of that judgment after entry, on the other hand, is not authorized by this ‘enforcement’ proceeding, and requires a separate application to the bankruptcy court.” (citations omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

*1337

PER CURIAM:

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) moves for entry of a default judgment against respondent 15th Avenue Iron Works, Inc. (15th Avenue), enforcing the NLRB’s order in Case No. 29-CA-13601. For the following reasons, the NLRB’s motion is granted.

On January 28, 1992, the NLRB filed a petition for enforcement of its order against 15th Avenue. On February 3, 1992, 15th Avenue’s counsel informed this court by letter that his client had filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and had gone out of business shortly thereafter. On February 27, 1992, since 15th Avenue had not filed an answer within the twenty days allowed by Fed.R.App.P. 15(b), the NLRB moved for judgment by default.

While counsel for 15th Avenue has not entered an appearance in this case, nevertheless, in his February 3 letter to this court’s staff counsel, he indicated his belief that the motion for default judgment could not be acted upon by this court in light of the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code.

See

11 U.S.C. § 362 (a).

A petition filed under §§ 301, 302, or 303 of the bankruptcy code generally operates as an automatic stay of

the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under th[e bankruptcy code] * * *.

11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(1). However, the filing of such a petition does not operate as a stay “of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or regulatory power”. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4).

Although this circuit has not previously addressed the issue, we agree with the first, fifth, sixth, seventh and ninth circuits, each of which has concluded (1) that the NLRB is a “governmental unit”, and (2) that NLRB unfair labor practice proceedings and enforcement proceedings are proceedings to enforce the NLRB’s police or regulatory powers.

See NLRB v. Continental Hagen Corp.,

932 F.2d 828, 832-35 (9th Cir.1991);

NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc.,

923 F.2d 506, 511-12 (7th Cir.1991);

NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc.,

804 F.2d 934, 939-41 (6th Cir.1986);

Ahrens Aircraft, Inc. v. NLRB,

703 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir.1983)

(per

curiam);

NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co.,

639 F.2d 291, 292-93 (5th Cir.1981)

(per curiam).

We note that the NLRB’s order includes a requirement that 15th Avenue make payments to various union funds “[f]or certain periods after December 30, 1987.” The “enforcement” of the NLRB order that we command pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) allows the entry of this aspect of the NLRB’s order as, in effect, a “money judgment” against 15th Avenue.

See

11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(5);

Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources,

733 F.2d 267 , 275 (3d Cir.1984). The collection of that judgment after entry, on the other hand, is not authorized by this “enforcement” proceeding, and requires a separate application to the bankruptcy court.

See Continental Hagen,

932 F.2d at 832 ;

P*I*E Nationwide,

923 F.2d at 512 ;

Cooper Painting,

804 F.2d at 942-43 ;

Penn Terra,

733 F.2d at 275;

cf. Evans Plumbing,

639 F.2d at 293 (reserving the question).

Since the automatic stay provisions of the bankruptcy code do not apply to this proceeding, the NLRB’s motion for judgment by default is granted, and the NLRB’s . order in case number 29-CA-. 13601 is enforced by separate order being filed concurrently with this opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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