Opinion

Doris TAGGART, Appellant, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT UNIT, Appellee

  • 915 F.2d 396
  • 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21
  • 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,288
  • 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 17451
  • 1990 WL 143205
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed
Oct 3, 1990
Status
Published
On the bench
Fagg, Beam, Woods
Cited by
14 cases
Authority
More cited than 87.5%

following *948 Brown Group but questioning its interpretation of Patterson

How later courts described this case

  • following *948 Brown Group but questioning its interpretation of Patterson
  • expressing disagreement with Hicks, but following for reasons of precedent
  • following Brown Group but questioning its interpretation of Patterson
  • criticizing Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir.1990)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PER CURIAM.

Doris Taggart appeals from a district court order dismissing her claim for racially discriminatory termination brought against the Jefferson County Child Support Enforcement Unit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). We reverse and remand.

The district court dismissed Taggart’s claim after concluding that

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,

— U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), bars discriminatory discharge claims under section 1981. Following the district court’s ruling, a panel of this court took the position “that

Patterson

d[oes] not address whether [discriminatory] discharge is prohibited by [sjection 1981,”

Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc.,

902 F.2d 630, 638 (8th Cir.1990), and held that a claim for discriminatory discharge “[remains] actionable under [s]ection 1981 after

Patterson.” Id.

at 656. Because “[o]ne panel of this [c]ourt is not at liberty to disregard a precedent handed down by another panel,”

Drake v. Scott,

812 F.2d 395, 400 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied,

484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 455 , 98 L.Ed.2d 395 (1987), we must reverse the district court’s dismissal order and remand the case for further proceedings.

Absent the panel opinion in

Brown Group,

however, we would affirm the district court. In our opinion, the Supreme Court’s decision in

Patterson

precludes section 1981 suits for discriminatory termination of employment.

See Brown Group,

902 F.2d at 656-57 (Fagg, J., dissenting). Four circuit courts of appeals agree with this view.

See Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co.,

909 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir.1990);

McKnight v. General Motors Corp.,

908 F.2d 104, 108-09 (7th Cir.1990);

Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental,

899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir.1990);

Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair,

897 F.2d 805, 807-08 (5th Cir.1990). Although we disagree with the

Brown Group

panel’s interpretation of

Patterson ,

“[a] decision of a panel of this court is the law of the circuit and we are compelled to follow it.”

Dudley v. Dittmer,

795 F.2d 669, 673 (8th Cir.1986). Only the court en banc can disregard this precedent.

Drake,

812 F.2d at 400 .

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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