Brown v. Sudduth

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 7, 2007

No. 05-61068 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

ERIC LAQUINNE BROWN

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ROBERT G. SUDDUTH, LARRY POOL, MIKE MCGOWAN, and

FRANKY DANIELS

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:02-CV-12

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case is before us for a third time. Eric Laquinne Brown, Mississippi

prisoner #K0577, filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Robert

Sudduth, Larry Pool, Mike McGowan, and Franky Daniels alleging that he was

arrested without probable cause or a warrant in violation of his Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages,

as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

No. 05-61068

The district court first sua sponte dismissed Brown’s complaint without

prejudice pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) on the ground that

a claim for damages under § 1983 would not accrue until Brown’s conviction or

sentence had been invalidated. This court reversed. See Brown v. Subbuth, No.

02-60257 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 2002). This court held that dismissal under Heck

was premature because Brown’s allegations did not clearly challenge the validity

of his confinement and did not reflect whether a favorable judgment on his

illegal arrest claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Id.

at *2. On remand, the district court again sua sponte dismissed Brown’s

complaint, this time with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted. According to the district court, nothing in the facts indicated

that Brown’s arrest was unlawful. This court reversed. See Brown v. Sudduth,

93 F. App’x 674 (5th Cir. Apr. 5, 2004). This court held that because Brown had

alleged both state action and the denial of a constitutional right, his complaint

stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.

On remand for a second time, service of process was effectuated on the

defendants, who then moved to dismiss Brown’s complaint and, alternatively, for

summary judgment, on three grounds: (1) Brown’s claims were Heck barred, (2)

probable cause existed to arrest Brown, and (3) Brown’s knowing and voluntary

guilty plea broke the chain of causation necessary to establish a § 1983 claim.

The district court again dismissed Brown’s complaint with prejudice. This time,

the district court gave three alternative bases for dismissing the complaint.

First, the district court held that Brown’s guilty plea waived any non-

jurisdictional defects to his conviction. Second, the district court held that

Brown’s claims were Heck barred. Third, the district court held that because

Brown did not suffer any physical injury, he was not entitled to any monetary

damages for mental or emotional injury under § 1983. Brown filed a timely

notice of appeal. We again reverse.

2

No. 05-61068

1. Guilty Plea and Waiver

The district court first held, without citation to authority, that because

Brown entered a plea of guilty waiving all non-jurisdictional defects to his

conviction, he also waived any § 1983 claim that he was arrested without

probable cause. The Supreme Court has flat out rejected this argument:

Under our past decisions, as the District Court correctly recognized,

a guilty plea results in the defendant’s loss of any meaningful

opportunity he might otherwise have had to challenge the

admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. It does not follow, however, that a guilty plea is a

“waiver” of antecedent Fourth Amendment claims that may be given

effect outside the confines of the criminal proceeding. The

defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment are not among the

trial rights that the necessarily waives when he knowingly and

voluntarily pleads guilty.

Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320-21 (1983). In fact, this court has explicitly

rejected the argument that a guilty plea in a Mississippi state court has any

collateral estoppel or res judicata effect on subsequent § 1983 actions challenging

the legality of an arrest. See Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1447-48 (5th

Cir. 1984). As the Seventh Circuit cogently explained:

[T]he existence of probable cause and a finding of guilt are two

distinct issues. Because [the plaintiff] did plead guilty to making a

threatening phone call to [the victim], it is tempting to say, ex ante,

that [the officer’s] belief that [the plaintiff] had committed the

offense of telephone harassment must have been reasonable.

However, there is no evidence that [the plaintiff’s] guilty plea

established what [the officer] knew at the time of the arrest -- the

relevant time period for the probable cause analysis. Thus, we

decline to conclude that [the plaintiff’s] § 1983 claim is barred by

collateral estoppel.

Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 766 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Mangieri v.

Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994) (relevant inquiry for § 1983 unlawful

arrest claim is whether arresting officers had probable cause at time of arrest,

3

No. 05-61068

not whether decision to arrest could be justified by information learned later).

Here, there is no evidence that Brown’s guilty plea established what the

defendants knew at the time of his arrest. Indeed, the circumstances

surrounding the arrest and the issue of probable cause were never even

mentioned -- let alone established -- during the plea colloquy. Accordingly, the

district court erred in concluding that the mere existence of Brown’s guilty plea

necessarily waived any subsequent § 1983 challenge to the legality of his arrest.

2. Heck v. Humphrey

The district court, relying on Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1995)

and Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1995), next held that Heck barred

Brown’s § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus. . . . Thus, when a state prisoner seeks

damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether

a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint

must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the

district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if

successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding

criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed

to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

512 U.S. at 486-87. In Wells, this court addressed the applicability of Heck to §

1983 unlawful arrest claims and held that Heck bars any such claim when the

underlying conviction is for resisting a search. 45 F.3d at 96. As this court

explained, “Wells’s proof to establish his false arrest claim, i.e., that there was

no probable cause to arrest either for disorderly conduct or for resisting a search,

4

No. 05-61068

would demonstrate the invalidity of Wells’s conviction for resisting a search.”

Id. at 95 (emphasis in original). Heck compelled this result. Indeed, in Heck, the

Supreme Court specifically noted that § 1983 unlawful arrest claims cannot lie

in cases in which “[a] state defendant is convicted of and sentenced for the crime

of resisting arrest, defined as intentionally preventing a peace officer from

effecting a lawful arrest. . . . [because] he would have to negate an element of the

offense of which he has been convicted.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.6.

The district court interpreted Wells -- and Heck -- to mean that any

conviction arising out of an arrest necessarily precludes a § 1983 plaintiff from

challenging the legality of his arrest. However, this interpretation ignores the

central holding in Heck, which limited its bar to § 1983 actions that necessarily

would imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction or sentence. Otherwise,

the Supreme Court explained:

[A] suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable

search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that

was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983

plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like

independent source and inevitable discovery, . . . and especially

harmless error, . . . such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would

not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.

Id. at 487 n.7 (internal citations omitted). In short, because a valid conviction

may follow an illegal arrest, a successful § 1983 unlawful arrest action does not

necessarily imply the invalidity of an underlying conviction. See Mackey, 47

F.3d at 746; see also Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir.

1999); Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998); Reynolds

v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 766-67 (7th Cir. 2007); Whitmore v. Harrington, 204

F.3d 784, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2000); Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d

553, 558-59 (10th Cir. 1999); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.

2003).

5

No. 05-61068

Here, it can hardly be said that the proof required to establish Brown’s

unlawful arrest claim necessarily would imply the invalidity of his underlying

murder conviction. See Brown, 721 F.2d at 1448 (“There is nothing necessarily

inconsistent between the arrest being illegal and [the] conviction being proper.”);

see also Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 126 n.5 (holding that Heck did not toll statute

of limitations for false arrest claim because proof of claim would not invalidate

drunk driving conviction); Reynolds, 488 F.3d at 766-67 (holding that plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claim for false arrest does not impugn the validity of conviction for

telephone harassment); Whitmore, 204 F.3d at 784-85 (holding that success of

plaintiff’s unlawful-investigative stop claim would not necessarily imply

invalidity of subsequent drug conviction); Beck, 195 F.3d at 558-59 (holding that

plaintiff’s challenge to arrest would not implicate any element of rape conviction

or probation revocation). Thus, the district court erred in concluding that

because Brown was ultimately convicted of the crime for which he was arrested,

Heck necessarily bars his unlawful arrest claim.2

In Mackey, this court again addressed the applicability of Heck to § 1983

unlawful arrest claims. This court first noted that “a claim of unlawful arrest,

standing alone, does not necessarily implicate the validity of a criminal

prosecution following the arrest.” Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746 (emphasis in original)

(citations omitted). However, in Mackey, the underlying criminal case was still

pending. This court held that dismissal under Heck is premature under such

circumstances. Id. As this court explained:

2

The district court also cited Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999).

However, Sappington is distinguishable. In Sappington, the plaintiff was convicted for

aggravated assault on a police officer. In holding that Heck barred the plaintiff’s § 1983

excessive force claim, this court reasoned, “the question whether the police applied reasonable

force in arresting him depends in part on the degree of his resistance, which in turn will place

in issue whether his resistance (the basis of his conviction for assaulting a police officer) was

justified, which, if it were, necessarily undermines that conviction.” Id. Here, Brown’s

unlawful arrest claim does not necessarily undermine his murder conviction.

6

No. 05-61068

If Mackey is tried and convicted and in his contested criminal case

no evidence is presented resulting directly or indirectly from any of

his arrests, it is difficult to see how any illegality in any of his

arrests could be inconsistent with his conviction. On the other

hand, if he is convicted and evidence is presented by the prosecution

at his criminal trial which is a direct or indirect product of one or

more of his arrests, then his section 1983 damage claims

challenging the validity of his arrests would appear to undermine

the validity of his conviction and hence be barred by Heck.

Id. Thus, this court concluded, “[t]he [district] court may -- indeed should -- stay

proceedings in the section 1983 case until the pending criminal case has run its

course, as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any,

between the two.” Id.

The district court below interpreted Mackey to mean that § 1983 plaintiffs

may only challenge the legality of their arrests if they were convicted at trial as

opposed to by guilty plea. Nothing in Mackey -- or Heck for that matter -- limits

§ 1983 plaintiffs as such. In fact, this court has permitted § 1983 claims

challenging the legality of an arrest notwithstanding the existence of a guilty

plea. See Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that

district court erred in determining Heck barred § 1983 action in case involving

Alford plea); see also Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 185 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting

per se rule that judicial estoppel automatically applies to facts admitted during

plea colloquy in § 1983 action); Reynolds, 488 F.3d at 767 (“Whether Officer Darr

had probable cause to arrest Reynolds has no bearing on the validity of his

subsequent guilty plea and criminal conviction.”); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394

F.3d 689, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that Heck does not bar § 1983

action unless action necessarily impugns underlying conviction even if product

of guilty plea); Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 879, 884 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that

district court erred in determining that Heck barred § 1983 excessive force action

in case involving guilty plea). Moreover, this court has explicitly rejected the

7

No. 05-61068

argument that guilty pleas have any collateral estoppel or res judicata effect on

subsequent § 1983 claims challenging the legality of an arrest. See Brown, 721

F.2d at 1447-48.

In short, having read Wells too broadly and Mackey too narrowly, the

district court erred in concluding that Heck necessarily barred Brown’s § 1983

claim on the basis that he had been convicted following a guilty plea.

3. Monetary Damages

The district court finally held that because Brown seeks only monetary

damages and he has not alleged a physical injury, his claim for compensatory

damages must fail. “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner

confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional

injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Here, Brown sought compensatory damages for the sole

alleged injury of liberty deprivation. Having not alleged a physical injury, the

district court correctly concluded that Brown’s claim for compensatory damages

must fail. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (holding that a prisoner is not entitled

to recover compensatory damages stemming from an unlawful search that does

not cause actual, compensable injury, but instead causes only the injury of being

convicted and imprisoned); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005)

(“Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges

a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages for mental or

emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury.”).

However, “[t]he law is well-established in this Circuit that plaintiffs may

recover nominal damages when their constitutional rights have been violated

but they are unable to prove actual injury. . . . [and j]ust as nominal damages are

allowed without proof of injury, ‘a punitive award may stand in the absence of

actual damages where there has been a constitutional violation.’” Williams v.

Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Louisiana

8

No. 05-61068

ACORN Fair Housing, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298, 302-03 (5th Cir. 2000)).3

This court has not addressed the issue of whether § 1997e(e) bars a claim for

nominal and punitive damages absent an allegation of physical injury. We need

not do so today because the issue of damages is premature given that there has

been no determination of whether Brown has even suffered a constitutional

violation in the first place.4

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the district court and

remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.5

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

3

Brown maintains that he is entitled to nominal damages in his brief, though he does

not appear to seek such damages in his complaint.

4

We do note, however, that the issue has divided our sister circuits. See, e.g.,

Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1997e(e) does not bar

recovery for nominal and punitive damages); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251-52 (3d Cir.

2000) (same); Calhoun v. Detella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); Munn v. Toney, 433

F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998)

(same); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 880-81 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); but see Harris v.

Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1282, 1287-88 & n. 9 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated & reh’g en banc granted

by 197 F.3d 1059, reinstated in pertinent part by 216 F.3d 970 (2000) (holding that § 1997e(e)

bars recovery for punitive damages, but reserving issue of whether it also barred nominal

damages); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same).

5

The defendants argue that the district court’s decision should be affirmed on the

alternative basis that the evidence establishes that probable cause existed to arrest Brown.

However, the district court did not rule on this basis and we hesitate to make a probable cause

determination for the first time on appeal. Cf. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 156 (2004)

(declining to address issue of probable cause in the first instance on appeal); Mahoney v. United

States, 387 F.2d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 1967) (“Reasonableness and probable cause are, in the first

instance, for the district court to determine.”).

9