Jon Hyde v. City of Willcox

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JON HYDE; MICHELLE HYDE, No. 21-15142

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

D.C. No.

v. 4:20-cv-00100-

JGZ

CITY OF WILLCOX; COCHISE

COUNTY; RAYMOND ROBINSON;

BRIAN PRALGO, Badge #6339, OPINION

Individually; S. BOHLENDER, Badge

#1757, Individually; S. GIJANTO; D.

NOLAND; JORDAN FAULKNER; M.

CALLAHAN-ENGLISH; J. VALLE,

AKA J. Villa, (#152), Individually;

DALE HADFIELD, Individually and as

the Director of Public Safety for the

City of Willcox,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 8, 2021

Pasadena, California

Filed January 6, 2022

2 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

Before: Carlos T. Bea and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges,

and Richard D. Bennett, * District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Lee

SUMMARY **

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the

district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, among other

things, that law enforcement officers used excessive force on

pretrial detainee Luke Hyde when they applied physical

force and a Taser to subdue him and failed to provide him

with adequate medical care.

Hyde stopped breathing 21 minutes after being put in a

restraint chair, and despite efforts by the officers to

resuscitate him, he died five days later. Hyde’s parents sued

on several theories under § 1983, including excessive force,

failure to train, failure to supervise, failure to provide

adequate medical care, and municipal liability. The district

court held that the officers used unreasonable force and were

not entitled to qualified immunity.

*

The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge

for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 3

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of the

motion to dismiss for the excessive force claim against

officers Pralgo and Callahan-English. The panel held that

the two officers used excessive force and violated clearly

established law when they used a Taser and put Hyde in a

head restraint, even after Hyde—who had his hands

handcuffed and legs shackled—had apparently stopped

resisting and posed no threat.

The panel reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss

for the excessive force claim as to the other officer

defendants, determining that they had reasonably used force

earlier in the altercation when Hyde resisted prior to being

subdued and restrained. The panel also reversed the district

court’s denial of dismissal on the claim that Hyde was denied

adequate medical care. The panel determined that the

complaint had not adequately alleged that the named officers

knew of Hyde’s mental health condition or that he was in

distress after the altercation. The panel therefore held that

qualified immunity barred the claim that individual officers

violated Hyde’s right to adequate medical care.

Finally, reviewing under pendent jurisdiction the district

court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the claims against the

municipal defendants, the panel reversed on the failure-to-

train and municipal liability claims. The panel stated that

while deliberate indifference can be inferred from a single

incident when “the unconstitutional consequences of failing

to train” are “patently obvious,” an inadequate training

policy itself cannot be inferred from a single incident.

4 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

COUNSEL

James M. Jellison (argued), Jellison Law Offices, PLLC,

Carefree, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellants.

Amy D. Sells (argued), William M. Fischbach, and Ryan P.

Hogan, Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix, Arizona, for

Plaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

LEE, Circuit Judge:

Luke Ian Hyde’s late-night return home from a road trip

was cut short by a traffic stop and then ended tragically in a

detention facility. Suffering from mental health issues and

deprived of his medication for several hours, Hyde tried to

flee and scuffled with several prison officers, who used

physical force and a Taser to subdue him. He stopped

breathing 21 minutes after being put in a restraint chair, and

despite efforts by the officers to resuscitate him, he died five

days later.

Hyde’s parents sued on several theories under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, including excessive force, failure to train, failure to

supervise, failure to provide adequate medical care, and

municipal liability. The district court held that the officers

used unreasonable force and were not entitled to qualified

immunity. We affirm that two officers used excessive force

and violated clearly established law when they used a Taser

and put Hyde in a head restraint, even after Hyde—who had

his hands handcuffed and legs shackled—had apparently

stopped resisting and posed no threat. But we reverse for the

other officers who reasonably used force earlier in the

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 5

altercation when Hyde resisted. We also reverse the district

court’s ruling on Hyde’s right to medical care because the

complaint has not adequately alleged that the named officers

knew of his mental health condition. Finally, we reverse on

the failure-to-train and municipal liability claims.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Luke Ian Hyde—a 26-year-old man with mental health

issues, including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder—managed his

condition through six prescription medications. 1 One night,

Hyde was driving through the City of Willcox towards his

parents’ home in San Antonio. Around midnight, Willcox

police detective J. Valle pulled Hyde over and arrested him

on suspicion of driving under the influence. Hyde arrived in

booking at around 1:30 a.m. and submitted to a blood draw.

He tested negative for alcohol but positive for

amphetamines, a finding consistent with his Adderall

prescription for his diagnosed attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder. For the next five and a half hours, Hyde napped,

ate, talked to officers on duty, and requested a phone to

contact a lawyer.

Hyde did not receive his prescribed medication, and by

7:30 a.m., he appeared restless. Minutes later, he charged

toward the door, fell to the floor, and injured his head.

Deputy Raymond Robinson and Sergeant Brian Pralgo

opened Hyde’s cell, while Jordan Faulkner, a medic, waited

1

The facts recited are taken as alleged in the complaint, and we

accept them as true for this appeal. See Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 757

(9th Cir. 2012).

6 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

in the booking area to examine Hyde’s head wound. Hyde

first emerged from his cell calmly, but then sprinted through

the booking area and into the female cell area while

Robinson, Pralgo, and Detention Officer Sam Bohlender

unsuccessfully tried to tackle him. Hyde reached a dead end

in the female cell area, where he stood with his back against

the wall, facing Robinson, Pralgo, and Bohlender. At this

point, Pralgo, and Robinson deployed their Tasers at Hyde

in a fast sequence three times.

In the doorway of the booking area, a scuffle ensued:

Pralgo, Robinson, and Bohlender heaped onto Hyde, and

tried to handcuff him to the door handle. Lieutenant Sean

Gijanto and Sergeant D. Noland then entered the fray. With

Hyde lying on the ground, Robinson delivered 11 close-

fisted peroneal strikes to Hyde’s legs while other officers

fastened leg irons on him. Pralgo again used his Taser twice

at Hyde’s thigh for about five seconds each.

At 8:02 a.m., Hyde was dragged to his feet and collapsed

to his knees as at least six officers lifted his body and

handcuffed Hyde’s hands behind his back. At 8:03 a.m.,

Pralgo retrieved the restraint chair, and four officers hoisted

Hyde’s body into it with his hands cuffed behind his back

and his legs fastened in leg irons. At 8:05 a.m., Pralgo again

used his Taser on Hyde’s thigh for about five seconds, while

Callahan-English used her arms to force Hyde’s head into a

restraint hold as four officers fastened Hyde into the chair.

Hyde was “fully restrained” in the chair at 8:06 a.m.

At 8:24 a.m., Hyde rolled his head back, gasping for air,

as four officers passed by him. Three minutes later, he

stopped breathing. A minute later, Pralgo, Valle, and

Faulkner found Hyde pulseless. They immediately removed

Hyde from the chair tried to revive him through chest

compressions and defibrillator shocks for the next ten

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 7

minutes. At the hospital, he regained his pulse but was later

put on life support. Several days later, Hyde’s parents

requested that he be removed from life support; he died the

next day, about a week after his arrest. According to the

autopsy, Hyde’s causes of death included blunt force

injuries, rhabdomyolysis (kidney damage caused by muscle

breakdown), cardiomegaly (enlarged heart), and coronary

artery atherosclerosis.

II. Procedural History

Hyde’s parents brought this Section 1983 action against

(i) the officers in their individual capacity for the use of

excessive force, (ii) the City and the County for their failure

to train, (iii) the Cochise County Sheriff Dannels and

Willcox Director of Public Safety Hadfield for their

supervisory liability for failure to train, and (iv) all

defendants for violating Substantive Due Process and Equal

Protection.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing,

among other things, that the individual defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity, and that Plaintiffs have failed

plausibly to plead a claim for municipal liability under

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The

district court denied the motion. The defendants appeal the

denial of qualified immunity and ask us to exercise pendant

appellate jurisdiction to review the Monell claim.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review

interlocutory appeals of the denial of qualified immunity.

See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). And as

explained in more detail below, we have pendent appellate

jurisdiction to review the claim against the municipal

8 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

defendants because “resolution of the issue properly raised

on interlocutory appeal necessarily resolves the pendent

issue.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1285 (9th Cir.

2000).

We review de novo a denial of a motion to dismiss based

on qualified immunity, accepting as true all well-pleaded

allegations of material fact and construing them in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. See Padilla, 678

F.3d at 757. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint should be

dismissed if it fails to include “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint’s claims

are plausible when the pleaded facts “allow[] the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009).

ANALYSIS

I. The Complaint Plausibly Alleges That Two of the

Officers Violated Hyde’s Clearly Established

Constitutional Rights.

To determine whether an officer enjoys qualified

immunity, the court asks, in the order it chooses, (i) whether

the alleged misconduct violated a constitutional right and

(ii) whether the right was clearly established at the time of

the alleged misconduct. See Hernandez v. City of San Jose,

897 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2018). A clearly established

right is one that is “sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable

official would have understood that what he is doing violates

that right.’” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)

(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

“Plaintiffs must point to prior case law that articulates a

constitutional rule specific enough to alert these deputies in

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 9

this case that their particular conduct was unlawful.” Sharp

v. Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 2017).

A. The complaint plausibly alleges that

Callahan-English and Pralgo used excessive force

under clearly established law when they

continued to use force after Hyde had been

restrained and was not resisting.

Use of force during pretrial detention is

unconstitutionally excessive if it is “objectively

unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397

(2015). Objective reasonableness turns on the “facts and

circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (quoting Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “A court must make

this determination from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the

time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citing

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Thus, a court must consider the

“‘legitimate interests that stem from the government’s need

to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,’

appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that in the

judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal

order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’”

Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540, 547 (1979)).

The following considerations may bear on the

reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of the force used: “the

relationship between the need for the use of force and the

amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any

effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of

force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff

was actively resisting.” Id. The most important factor is

whether the suspect posed an immediate threat. See Mattos

v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

10 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

This analysis is not static, and the reasonableness of force

may change as the circumstances evolve. See Jones v. Las

Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 873 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir.

2017).

1. Until Hyde was subdued and restrained, the force

used by officers Pralgo, Robinson, Bohlender,

Gijanto, and Noland was reasonable.

At the outset, the officers handled the situation

reasonably. After Hyde first violently injured himself in his

cell, he ran free through the booking area of the detention

center, despite three officers trying to contain him. Given the

need to quell a potentially dangerous situation, Pralgo and

Robinson justifiably used their Tasers against Hyde. See

Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 399 (emphasizing the government’s

legitimate interest in managing a jail); see also Jones, 873

F.3d at 1130 (concluding that it was reasonable to use a

Taser to subdue and restrain a suspect who was unarmed and

not suspected of a serious offense).

As more officers joined the fray, they justifiably

continued using intermediate force—the Taser and strikes on

Hyde’s leg—because (i) Hyde violently scuffled with the

officers, (ii) the officers had not yet restrained Hyde, and

(iii) the officers were “forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that [were] tense, uncertain,

and rapidly evolving.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

Plaintiffs rely on Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272

(9th Cir. 2001), to argue that we must consider Hyde’s

mental health issues in assessing the officers’ use of force.

In Deorle, we concluded that “where it is or should be

apparent to the officers that the individual involved is

emotionally disturbed, that is a factor that must be

considered in determining . . . the reasonableness of the

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 11

force employed.” Id. at 1283. But the complaint here does

not allege that these officers knew about Hyde’s mental

health condition. Instead, the complaint asserts that a cursory

inspection of Hyde’s medication would have alerted any

trained officer to his conditions, but it fails plausibly to

allege that any of the named defendants even knew Hyde

was taking medications. And unlike the plaintiff in Deorle—

who appeared to be a “deeply troubled, emotionally

disturbed individual . . . [who] repeatedly asked officers to

shoot him,” id. at 1280—there are no allegations here that

Hyde exhibited any similar behavior. To the contrary, the

complaint reflects that Hyde remained calm and cooperative

for several hours.

2. After Hyde was subdued and restrained, officers

Pralgo and Callahan-English used excessive force.

But the need for more force waned as circumstances

changed. By 8:03 a.m., Hyde had his hands handcuffed

behind his back and his legs shackled. Hyde appeared

“fatigued,” remained on his knees, and seven officers

surrounded him. Yet two minutes later, Pralgo used his Taser

on Hyde’s thigh again for about five seconds and Callahan-

English used her arms to force Hyde’s head into a restraint

hold, while four other officers fastened Hyde into the

restraint chair. This continued use of force by Pralgo and

Callahan-English was unreasonable. See Alexander v. City

& Cnty. of S.F., 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is

the need for force which is at the heart of the consideration

of the Graham factors.”).

By 8:03 a.m., it was no longer a frantic and fast-evolving

situation requiring officers to make split-second decisions.

Two minutes had elapsed between Hyde being handcuffed

and shackled and Pralgo and Callahan-English using more

intermediate force. For two minutes, Pralgo and Callahan-

12 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

English saw an exhausted Hyde on his knees with both his

hands and feet restrained. They should have recognized that

Hyde had effectively stopped resisting and posed no threat

to the officers surrounding him. They thus had enough time

to reassess their use of force and understand that they no

longer needed to use a Taser or a head restraint.

The defendants argue that continued force was justified

because, according to their interpretation of the complaint,

Hyde is never plausibly alleged to have ceased fleeing,

resisting, or fighting before being “fully” restrained

8:06 a.m. Admittedly, the complaint confusingly does not

state what was occurring between 8:03 a.m. (when Hyde had

his hands and legs restrained) and 8:06 a.m. (when Hyde was

“fully restrained”). The parties also inexplicably did not

include the jailhouse video in the record. But we must

construe the complaint in favor of the non-moving party—

Plaintiffs—at this stage. See Padilla, 678 F.3d at 757. And

the complaint, when read as a whole and in Plaintiffs’ favor,

supports the claim that he was restrained, was not resisting,

and posed no threat by 8:03 a.m.

To start, the complaint alleges that—several minutes

before Pralgo’s final Taser use and Callahan-English’s head

restraint—Hyde had his hands handcuffed and feet shackled,

was too weak to stand, and was surrounded by seven

officers. Construing these facts in Plaintiffs’ favor, we

conclude that Hyde was not fleeing and could no longer

resist the officers. We also construe the statement that Hyde

was not “fully” restrained until 8:06 a.m. to mean that Hyde

had not been fastened into a restraint chair. And we have

never required that a suspect’s every inch be immobilized

before he is considered restrained for a reasonable force

analysis. To the contrary, our cases routinely call suspects

“restrained” after they have been handcuffed, e.g.,

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 13

Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d

1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003), or simply pinned down by

officers, e.g., Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 477

(9th Cir. 2019). 2 We thus conclude that, viewing the

complaint in the light most favorable to Hyde, Pralgo and

Callahan-English used excessive force after Hyde was

restrained and apparently no longer resisting.

3. Pralgo and Callahan-English violated clearly

established law.

Our cases clearly establish that the use of intermediate

force—such as a head restraint or Taser—on a restrained and

non-resisting suspect is unreasonable. For example, we have

held that “the use of a chokehold on a non-resisting,

restrained person violates the Fourth Amendment’s

prohibition on the use of excessive force.” Tuuamalemalo,

946 F.3d at 477. In Tuuamalemalo, we also relied on

Drummond in which we held that officers used excessive

force by “press[ing] their weight on [the suspect’s] neck and

torso as he lay handcuffed on the ground.” 343 F.3d at 1056.

It thus should have been clear to Callahan-English that the

use of a head restraint on Hyde was unreasonable when he

had both his hands and feet shackled for two minutes and no

longer could resist.

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has found the use of a Taser

excessive if the suspect does not pose an immediate threat.

For example, in Mattos, this court held that it was

unreasonable to use a Taser on a suspect who committed a

2

The defendants do not fare any better with their focus on the

allegation in the complaint that “[a]t all times, [Hyde] was fending

himself against three to seven officers.” In context, the more natural and

favorable interpretation of this phrase is that Hyde was outmatched by

three to several officers throughout the encounter.

14 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

minor offense and did not present an immediate threat to the

officers, even though she refused to exit the car. See 661 F.3d

at 445–46; 3 see also Bryan v. McPherson, 630 F.3d 805,

826–30 (9th Cir. 2010) (use of a Taser unreasonable because

suspect committed a minor traffic infraction and did not

present an immediate threat). Pralgo thus should have been

on notice that it was unreasonable to use the Taser on Hyde,

who was similarly not suspected of a serious crime, no

longer threatened the officers after being restrained for two

minutes and was no longer capable of resisting in the final

stages of the scuffle.

Our cases also make it clear that the officers must

reassess use of force in an evolving situation as the

circumstances change. For example, in Jones, we concluded

that the officers were at first justified in using a Taser on a

suspect who had run away from a traffic stop but neither

threatened the officers nor committed a serious offense. See

873 F.3d at 1130. But we held that “[b]y the time Jones was

prone and surrounded by multiple officers, there would have

been no continuing justification for using intermediate

force.” Id. Similarly, in Drummond, we said that while force

was justified in restraining a suspect, the calculus changed

“after he was handcuffed and lying on the ground.” 343 F.3d

at 1059.

To be clear, we are generally loath to second-guess law

enforcement officers’ actions in a dangerous situation by

analyzing each act without looking at the entire event and

considering the officers’ mindset amid the uncertainty and

chaos. We should not scrutinize an officer’s every minor

move in a frantic and chaotic situation as if we were

3

These facts come from Brooks v. City of Seattle which was

consolidated with Mattos for en banc proceedings.

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 15

examining the Zapruder film in slow-motion. But here,

Pralgo and Callahan-English had two minutes to realize that

Hyde—who was handcuffed, shackled, and exhausted—

could no longer resist and did not pose a threat. It is clearly

established that officers cannot use intermediate force when

a suspect is restrained, has stopped resisting, and does not

pose a threat. These two officers thus cannot shield

themselves by invoking qualified immunity. We affirm this

aspect of the district court’s ruling.

B. The complaint does not plausibly allege that the

officers violated Hyde’s right to adequate medical

care under clearly established law.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, pretrial detainees have a right to receive

medical treatment while in police custody. See Carnell v.

Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim under this

right “must be evaluated under an objective deliberate

indifference standard.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d

1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Castro v. Cnty. of L.A.,

833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016)). We have held that, as

of 2013, “medical personnel at jail facilities are required to

screen pretrial detainees for critical medical needs.” Gordon

v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 971 (9th Cir. 2021)

(“Gordon II”).

We have also long held that “prison officials violate the

Constitution when they ‘deny, delay or intentionally

interfere with’ needed medical treatment.” Sandoval v. Cnty.

of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 679 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jett

v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). That right,

however, hinges on the officer being “aware that an inmate

is suffering from a serious acute medical condition.” Id. at

680. And it was not until earlier this year that we clearly

established that “pre-trial detainees . . . have a right to direct-

16 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

view safety checks sufficient to determine whether their

presentation indicates the need for medical treatment.”

Gordon II, 6 F.4th at 973.

Plaintiffs claim that the defendants violated Hyde’s right

to adequate medical care in two ways: (i) by denying him

access to his medication, and (ii) by not providing him

medical care after the altercation. Both arguments fail.

First, while Hyde had a clearly established right to obtain

his medication, the complaint does not plausibly allege that

these defendants violated that right. For example, the

complaint fails to allege any facts that the individual

defendants played any role in denying Hyde his medication

and thus his right to medical treatment. The complaint thus

makes no plausible connection between the confiscation of

Hyde’s medicines and any of the individual defendants. And

while someone at the facility should have screened Hyde for

his need for medication, the complaint does not allege any

facts suggesting that the named individual defendants had

that duty.

Second, the complaint also does not plausibly allege that

the defendants denied him medical care after his melee with

the officers. The right to medical care depends on an officer

being “aware that an inmate is suffering from a serious acute

medical condition.” Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 680. The

complaint alleges no facts suggesting that the defendant

officers knew that Hyde was in distress. The complaint

alleges that Hyde “rolled his head back against the headrest,

gasping for air” as “four officers passed directly by” him.

But the complaint does not specify whether these four

officers were any of the ones named in the complaint. It also

alleges that Callahan-English at one point walked directly

past Hyde’s breathless body. But there is no allegation that

she noticed that Hyde was unconscious. And further

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 17

contradicting any claim of indifference to Hyde’s medical

needs, the complaint alleges that once Pralgo, Valle, and

Faulkner discovered that Hyde was pulseless, they

immediately tried to revive him. Finally, Plaintiffs’ brief

argues that the officers had a duty to check on Hyde’s

condition. But it was not clearly established until 2021 that

a detainee has a right to regular direct-view safety checks.

See Gordon II, 6 F.4th at 972.

In sum, because the complaint does not plausibly allege

that any individual defendant violated Hyde’s right to

adequate medical care, we reverse the district court and hold

that qualified immunity bars this claim.

C. Dannels and Hadfield are entitled to qualified

immunity on the supervisory liability for failure-

to-train claim.

Under Section 1983, supervisors cannot be held liable

for the acts of their reports under a respondeat superior

theory. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989). But supervisors “can be held liable for: 1) their own

culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or

control of subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the

constitutional deprivation of which a complaint is made; or

3) for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference

to the rights of others.” Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1292.

To prevail on a claim of supervisory liability for failure

to train, the plaintiff must show that the official was

“deliberately indifferent to the need to train subordinates,

and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional

harm or deprivation of rights.” Flores v. Cnty. of L.A., 758

F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011)). Under this standard, the

plaintiff must allege facts to show that the official

18 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

“‘disregarded [the] known or obvious consequence’ . . . that

a particular omission in their training program [would cause]

[municipal] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional

rights.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (quoting Bd. of the Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)).

Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Dannels and Director of

Public Safety Hadfield failed to train the officers in crisis

intervention training that would have better prepared the

officers to deal with detainees suffering from mental illness.

They also allege that inadequate training led Hyde to be

denied his medication.

But Plaintiffs offer no factual support for their

allegations of defective training, and they argue in their brief

that the claims are supported by the “events giving rise to the

excessive force and inadequate medical care claims.” The

district court seemingly adopted this reasoning when it held

that the complaint supports a plausible inference that neither

the city nor the county properly trained its officers. The

district court also held that the consequences of such a failure

were known or obvious such that Plaintiffs did not have to

identify a pattern of violations to support a plausible

inference of deliberate indifference. In other words, the

district court inferred from a single incident both that the

training was defective and that the defendants were

deliberately indifferent to its unconstitutional consequences.

We reject this attempt to circumvent the pleading

requirement for a failure-to-train claim. While deliberate

indifference can be inferred from a single incident when “the

unconstitutional consequences of failing to train” are

“patently obvious,” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61, an inadequate

training policy itself cannot be inferred from a single

incident. See Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24

HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX 19

(1985) (plurality opinion); 4 see also City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) (explaining that

“adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the

fact that they do says little about the training program”).

Otherwise, a plaintiff could effectively shoehorn any single

incident with no other facts into a failure-to-train claim

against the supervisors and the municipality. Because

Plaintiffs pleaded no facts even suggesting that the training

here was defective, they have failed to state a claim of failure

to train against Dannels and Hadfield. We reverse the district

court on this issue.

II. We Have Jurisdiction to Hear the Appeal of the

Monell Claim and Reverse the District Court’s Denial

of the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.

Besides the denial of a motion to dismiss based on

qualified immunity, we “may [also] exercise ‘pendent’

appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise nonappealable

ruling if the ruling is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a claim

properly before [the Court] on interlocutory appeal.” Kwai

Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir.

2004) (citations omitted). This occurs when “(a) [the two

issued are] so intertwined that we must decide the pendent

issue in order to review the claims properly raised on

interlocutory appeal, or (b) resolution of the issue properly

raised on interlocutory appeal necessarily resolves the

pendent issue.” Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1285.

4

This was in the context of a Monell claim. The concurring opinion

agreed with the plurality on this point: “To infer the existence of a city

policy from the isolated misconduct of a single, low-level officer . . .

would amount to permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat

superior liability rejected in Monell.” Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 831 (Brennan,

J., concurring).

20 HYDE V. CITY OF WILLCOX

That is the case here. As discussed, Dannels and

Hadfield are entitled to qualified immunity because the

complaint did not plausibly plead facts for supervisory

liability. That conclusion applies equally to the City and the

County because the complaint relies on the same facts. Thus,

the failure to plausibly plead the existence of inadequate

training sinks both claims equally.

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motion to

dismiss for the excessive force claim against officers Pralgo

and Callahan-English, REVERSE the denial of dismissal

for the remaining individual defendants for the excessive

force claim and all individual defendants for to all other

claims, 5 and REVERSE the denial of dismissal for the

failure-to-train claim against the municipal defendants.

5

Plaintiffs make no effort to defend their substantive due process

and equal protection claims. We thus consider them abandoned. See

Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians v. California, 547 F.3d 962, 968

n.3 (9th Cir. 2008).