Ernest Falls v. Mark Goins

12/21/2021

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

October 5, 2021 Session

ERNEST FALLS ET AL. V. MARK GOINS ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 20-0704-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2020-01510-COA-R3-CV

This case concerns the restoration of voting rights of a Tennessee citizen who was

convicted of a felony in Virginia and subsequently granted clemency by the Governor of

Virginia. Because the voting applicant did not provide evidence that he paid outstanding

court costs, restitution, and/or child support as is required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-

202, the election commission denied his application to vote. The voting applicant appealed

the election commission’s decision to the circuit court. The circuit court upheld the

election commission’s decision as valid. We agree with the trial court and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,

JR., P.J., M.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.

William L. Harbison, Lisa K. Helton, and Christopher C. Sabis, Nashville, Tennessee, and

Danielle Marie Lang, Blair Bowie, and Caleb Jackson, Washington, D.C., for the appellant,

Ernest Falls.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, Andrée Blumstein, Solicitor

General, Janet Irene M. Kleinfelter, Deputy Attorney General, and Alexander S. Rieger,

Assistant Attorney General, for the appellees, Mark Goins, in his official capacity as

Coordinator of Elections for the State of Tennessee, Tre Hargett, in his official capacity as

Secretary of State of the State of Tennessee, and Herbert Slatery, III, in his official capacity

as the Attorney General for the State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In 1986, Ernest Falls was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia. He

served his sentence and was released from prison in 1987. Mr. Falls relocated to Grainger

County, Tennessee in 2018. In February 2020, the Governor of Virginia restored his rights

of citizenship in Virginia. The document restoring Mr. Falls’s rights states:

COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA

Executive Department

TO ALL WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME – GREETINGS

WHEREAS, Ernest L. Falls after being convicted and sentenced for

crime(s) committed prior to January 14, 2020, when the Executive completed

review of the particulars of the individual’s case; and

WHEREAS, Ernest L. Falls, by reason of conviction(s), suffers

political disabilities, to wit denial of the right to vote, to hold public office,

to serve on a jury, to be a notary public and to ship, transport, possess or

receive firearms; and

WHEREAS, it appears that Ernest L. Falls has rejoined society free

from state supervision and it seems appropriate to the Executive to remove

certain of those political disabilities by restoring the right to vote, hold public

office, serve on a jury, and to be a notary public;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ralph S. Northam, Governor of the

Commonwealth of Virginia, by virtue of the authority vested in me, do

hereby remove the political disabilities, except the ability to ship, transport,

possess or receive firearms, under which Ernest L. Falls labors by reason of

conviction as aforesaid, and do hereby restore the rights to vote, hold public

office, serve on a jury, and to be a notary public.

On June 4, 2020, Mr. Falls attempted to register to vote in Tennessee and disclosed

his 1986 felony conviction. The Grainger County Administrator of Elections denied his

registration because Mr. Falls failed to provide evidence that he owes no fees or restitution

for his Virginia conviction.1

1

There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Falls actually owes any fees, restitution, or child support;

however, he has not provided evidence that he does not owe any of these financial obligations.

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On July 21, 2020, Mr. Falls and Arthur Bledsoe, a Tennessee citizen who had been

convicted of a felony in North Carolina,2 filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and

Injunctive Relief against state officials, Mark Goins, Tre Hargett, and Herbert Slatery, III

in their official capacities as Tennessee’s Coordinator of Elections, Secretary of State, and

the Attorney General, respectively (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). The trial

court entered a memorandum and order denying the motion for temporary injunction,

finding that Mr. Falls had not demonstrated a “substantial likelihood of success on the

merits.” On August 21, 2020, Mr. Falls filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that

his full rights of citizenship had been restored by the Governor of Virginia, as required by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3), and therefore, he was entitled to vote in Tennessee. He

asserted that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202, a statute requiring disenfranchised voters to

pay restitution, court costs, and any outstanding child support, did not apply to him.

Defendants filed their response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment

asserting that until Mr. Falls provided evidence of compliance with the re-enfranchisement

provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202, he was not entitled to vote in Tennessee.

The chancery court denied Mr. Falls’s motion for summary judgment but granted

summary judgment to Defendants upon its conclusion that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202

requires that Mr. Falls “must pay the court costs and restitution associated with [his]

criminal conviction[] before [he is] eligible to vote in Tennessee.” The trial court noted

that “[r]equiring the Plaintiffs to comply with the laws of this state, including complying

with child support obligations, restitution orders, and other court orders, is both rational

and constitutional.” Mr. Falls appeals raising the following issue for our review:

Whether Appellant Ernest Falls has been unlawfully denied the right to vote

under the Tennessee Constitution Art. I, § 5 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-

143(3)—which states that Tennesseans convicted of felonies in other states

are disenfranchised unless they have their full rights of citizenship restored

by the governor of the state of conviction, by the law of the state of

conviction, or under the law of Tennessee—where Appellant Falls only has

a felony conviction from Virginia and has had his full rights of citizenship

restored by the Governor of Virginia.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment by the trial court. We

review a trial court’s summary judgment determination de novo, with no presumption of

correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn.

2015). This means that “we make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of

Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Id. Summary

judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

2

Mr. Bledsoe has not joined in this appeal; therefore, this Opinion will focus solely on Mr. Falls.

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admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.04.

In this case, the parties agree that there are no factual disputes. Rather, the dispute

hinges on statutory construction and application of the statutes to the undisputed facts of

Mr. Falls’s situation. “The proper interpretation of a statute is an issue of law that may

commonly be decided on summary judgment.” Najo Equip. Leasing, LLC v. Comm’r of

Revenue, 477 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). Our review of the construction and

application of statutes is de novo, affording no deference or presumption of correctness to

the decision of the lower court. Heirs of Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 71 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tenn.

2002).

Our Supreme Court has explained that when interpreting a statute, we must

“‘ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding

[the] statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.’” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee

Child. & Fam. Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 74 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 908

S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)). When determining legislative intent, “we first must look

to the text of the statute and give the words of the statute ‘their natural and ordinary

meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.’”

Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 694 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc.,

360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012)). We need not consider sources of information outside

the text of the statute when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. Id. (citing

Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tenn. 2016)). However, “statutes should not be

interpreted in isolation. The overall statutory framework must be considered, and ‘[s]tatutes

that relate to the same subject matter or have a common purpose must be read in pari

materia so as to give the intended effect to both.’” Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. City of

Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832, 846 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533,

552 (Tenn. 2015)). When “resolving potential conflicts between statutes, courts seek a

reasonable construction which avoids statutory conflict and provides for harmonious

operation of the laws.” O’Neal v. Goins, No. M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL

4083466, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July, 29 2016) (citing LensCrafters Inc. v. Sundquist, 33

S.W.3d 772, 777 (Tenn. 2000)). Furthermore, when two statutes exist on the same topic,

“the more specific of two conflicting statutory provisions controls.” Tennessean v. Metro.

Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 872 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Graham v. Caples, 325

S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tenn. 2010)); see also Cont’l Tenn. Lines, Inc. v. McCanless, 354

S.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Tenn. 1962) (quoting Wade v. Manning, 28 S.W.2d 642, 649 (Tenn.

1930)) (“‘Specific provisions relating to a particular subject must govern in respect to that

subject, as against general provisions in other parts of the law which might be broad enough

to include it.’”). Finally, “a more recent enactment will take precedence over a prior one

to the extent of any inconsistency between the two.” Moorcroft v. Stuart, No. M2013-

02295-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 413094, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015). With these

principles in mind, we turn to the substance of the appeal.

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ANALYSIS

We begin with the Constitution of the State of Tennessee which states that “the right

of suffrage . . . shall never be denied to any person entitled thereto, except upon a conviction

by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and

judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5.3 The

Tennessee Constitution further provides that every voter who meets constitutional

qualifications “shall be entitled to vote in all federal, state, and local elections held in the

county or district in which such person resides” except that “[l]aws may be passed

excluding from the right of suffrage persons who may be convicted of infamous crimes.”

Id. at IV, §§ 1, 2. Under the Tennessee Constitution, suffrage is a “self-executing”

constitutional right; however, the legislature is empowered to curtail the right of suffrage

when a person has been convicted of an infamous crime. Crutchfield v. Collins, 607

S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). “[A] state may constitutionally disenfranchise

convicted felons, . . . and . . . the right of felons to vote is not fundamental.” Wesley v.

Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742,

746 (6th Cir. 2010) (reiterating that felons who lose their right to vote no longer have a

“fundamental interest [in voting] to assert”).

The Tennessee Legislature has exercised its authority to disenfranchise persons

convicted of “infamous” crimes and has also enacted laws to restore the right to vote to

some citizens with such convictions. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-112

considers infamous crimes to include “any felony” conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-

112 (“Upon conviction for any felony, it shall be the judgment of the court that the

defendant be infamous and be immediately disqualified from exercising the right of

suffrage.”). Subsection (3) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143 concerns the right of suffrage

for persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes and states:

(3) No person who has been convicted in another state of a crime or

offense which would constitute an infamous crime under the laws of this

state, regardless of the sentence imposed, shall be allowed to register to vote

or vote at any election in this state unless such person has been pardoned or

restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor or other appropriate

authority of such other state, or the person’s full rights of citizenship have

otherwise been restored in accordance with the laws of such other state, or

the law of this state.

3

The United States Constitution allows for disenfranchisement for “participation in rebellion, or other

crimes.” U.S. CONST., amend XIV, § 2; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (“[T]he exclusion

of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in s 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

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Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3). Accordingly, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-112

and Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143, any person convicted of a felony is disenfranchised in

Tennessee until the franchise is restored.4

There is no dispute that Mr. Falls was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in

Virginia, a felony that constitutes an infamous crime in Tennessee. His loss of voting rights

survives his sentence and remains in effect until his right of suffrage is restored. It is also

undisputed that Mr. Falls was disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage when he

moved to Tennessee in 2018. The central question in this appeal is whether, pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3), Mr. Falls was immediately re-enfranchised in Tennessee

when the Governor of Virginia restored his Virginia citizenship rights in 2020, or whether

he is subject to the additional preconditions to re-enfranchisement established by Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-29-202(b) and (c).

In 2006, the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-29-201 to -205,

providing a voting-rights-restoration pathway to “any person who has been disqualified

from exercising” the right to vote due to being convicted of an infamous crime if he or she

meets certain criteria.5 Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-201(a). Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-29-201(a) states in full that the “provisions and procedures of this part shall

apply to and govern restoration of the right of suffrage in this state to any person who has

been disqualified from exercising that right by reason of a conviction in any state or federal

court of an infamous crime.”6 Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202 states:

(a) A person rendered infamous and deprived of the right of suffrage by the

judgment of any state or federal court is eligible to apply for a voter

registration card and have the right of suffrage restored upon:

4

We note that there is a gap in Tennessee’s disenfranchisement history in which persons convicted of

an infamous crime between January 15, 1973 and May 17, 1981 are not deprived of the right to vote. See

Crutchfield v. Collins, 607 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); see also Restoration of Voting Rights,

TENNESSEE SECRETARY OF STATE, https://sos.tn.gov/elections/guides/restoration-voting-rights (last

accessed Dec. 13, 2021).

5

Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-29-201 to -205 were ostensibly adopted to “streamline and

standardize” felony disenfranchisement laws and to eliminate “any requirement that a person seeking

[voting] restoration petition for that right and litigate the issue in court.” Voting Rights Restoration Efforts

in Tennessee, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-

work/research-reports/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-tennessee; See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-29-201 to -

204 (providing a pathway for persons rendered infamous to petition the circuit court for restoration of their

right to vote).

6

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204 provides a list of certain persons with criminal

convictions that will “never be eligible to register and vote in this state” including, inter alia, those

convicted for voter fraud, treason, murder in the first degree, or aggravated rape.

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(1) Receiving a pardon, except where the pardon contains special

conditions pertaining to the right of suffrage;

(2) The discharge from custody by reason of service or expiration of

the maximum sentence imposed by the court for the infamous crime;

or

(3) Being granted a certificate of final discharge from supervision by

the board of parole pursuant to § 40-28-105, or any equivalent

discharge by another state, the federal government, or county

correction authority.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a person shall not be eligible to apply for

a voter registration card and have the right of suffrage restored, unless the

person:

(1) Has paid all restitution to the victim or victims of the offense

ordered by the court as part of the sentence; and

(2) Beginning September 1, 2010, notwithstanding subsection (a), a

person shall not be eligible to apply for a voter registration card and

have the right of suffrage restored, unless the person has paid all court

costs assessed against the person at the conclusion of the person’s

trial, except where the court has made a finding at an evidentiary

hearing that the applicant is indigent at the time of application.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a person shall not be eligible to apply for

a voter registration card and have the right of suffrage restored, unless the

person is current in all child support obligations.

We must apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202

to the case at hand keeping in mind that “‘[s]tatutes that relate to the same subject matter

or have a common purpose must be read in pari materia so as to give the intended effect

to both.’” Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 574 S.W.3d at 846 (quoting In re Kaliyah S., 455

S.W.3d at 552). These statutes both relate to the restoration of an out-of-state felon’s right

to vote. Mr. Falls insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) functioned to automatically

restore his right to vote once his citizenship rights were restored in Virginia. However,

adopting Mr. Falls’s interpretation would require us to ignore another section of the code

that our legislature implemented to “govern restoration of the right of suffrage in this state.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-201(a). We must read the two statutes in pari materia rather

than in isolation.

Mr. Falls is now a citizen of the state of Tennessee. Tennessee is empowered to

legislate different standards than other states for restoration of its citizens’ rights to vote.

When Mr. Falls moved to Tennessee in 2018, he was disqualified from voting in Tennessee

because of his Virginia conviction: “No person who has been convicted in another state of

a crime or offense which would constitute an infamous crime under the laws of this state,

regardless of the sentence imposed, shall be allowed to register to vote or vote at any

election in this state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3). Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §

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40-20-201, he is, regardless of his Virginia pardon in 2020, a “person who has been

disqualified from exercising [the right to vote] by reason of a conviction in any state or

federal court of an infamous crime.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-201. Therefore, the

procedures and provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 apply to him. Those

procedures impose preconditions to the restoration of a convicted felon’s voting rights

related to the satisfaction of certain court-ordered financial obligations. Specifically, Mr.

Falls was required to confirm he had paid restitution and court costs related to his

conviction as well as to show he was current on child support obligations. “Tennessee

possesses valid interests in promoting payment of child support, requiring criminals to

fulfill their sentences, and encouraging compliance with court orders.” Johnson, 624 F.3d

at 747. It is undisputed that Mr. Falls has not provided evidence that these financial

obligations have been satisfied, and therefore he is not eligible to vote in Tennessee until

he does so.

We have reviewed the caselaw Mr. Falls cites in support of his assertion that Tenn.

Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) operated to immediately re-enfranchise him such that he was not

subject to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202, and we are not persuaded that the cases he cites

operate to vitiate the additional re-enfranchisement requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-

29-202. Indeed, none of the cases he cites—Burdine v. Kennon, 209 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn.

1948); Crutchfield v. Collins, 607 S.W.2d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Gaskin v. Collins,

661 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1983)—involve the interplay between and applicability of the

statutes at issue in this case. While these cases do stand for the proposition that our general

assembly must specifically enact legislation before persons convicted of infamous crimes

are disenfranchised or re-enfranchised, our legislature has done so via Tenn. Code Ann. §§

40-20-112; 2-19-143; and 40-29-202. We cannot put Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143 into a

silo and ignore subsequent legislative enactments regarding re-enfranchisement. Because

we must construe the statutes in pari materia and harmoniously, with more recent

enactments taking precedence, we hold that the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-

29-201 to -205 supplement the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143 by providing

additional requirements for the reinstatement of voting rights for convicted felons

regardless of their state of conviction. See Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 574 S.W.3d at 846;

O’Neal, 2016 WL 4083466, at *4. The additional prerequisites outlined in Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-29-202 apply to Mr. Falls, and he cannot be re-enfranchised until he provides

evidence that he has paid court-ordered restitution and costs related to his crimes (if

applicable) and has satisfied his child support obligation (if any exists).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment to

the Defendants. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellant, Ernest Falls, for

which execution may issue if necessary.

_/s/ Andy D. Bennett________________

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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