State v. Law

2020 UT App 74

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

JASON THOMAS LAW,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20180898-CA

Filed May 7, 2020

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy

No. 151900261

Debra M. Nelson and Michael R. Sikora, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Jeffrey S. Gray, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which

JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Jason Thomas Law was convicted of disarming a peace

officer based on conduct during a scuffle with a police officer

and hospital staff. Law argues on appeal that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to

present sufficient evidence of the required mens rea—that he

intentionally tried to take the firearm from the officer. We

disagree and affirm.

State v. Law

BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2014, Law was admitted to the emergency room of

Intermountain Medical Center (the Hospital) due to concerns

about him being suicidal. Following a mental health

examination, Law was determined to be a risk to himself, and his

rights to make his own medical decisions or refuse treatment

were suspended. The Hospital’s medical personnel decided that

Law would be transferred to LDS Hospital for inpatient care.

¶3 When he was told about the impending transfer, Law

responded, “I’ll kill myself before going to that hospital.”

Unbeknownst to the Hospital staff, Law believed that LDS

Hospital was responsible for the death of his grandmother. The

Hospital staff explained to him that he did not have a choice in

the matter and that if he “continued to make threats against staff

or himself, . . . he would have to be physically or chemically

restrained.”

¶4 At this time, several persons were with Law in the

hospital room: an off-duty police officer (Officer), two hospital

security guards, a critical care emergency room technician

(Technician), a nurse, and Law’s father. Officer was in his full

police uniform, which included a patrol firearm holstered on his

right hip. Shortly after reaching Law’s hospital room, Officer

began audio recording the events on his phone.

¶5 Law did not stop making threats regarding the transfer,

and the staff accordingly prepared to give him a sedative

injection. At this time, Officer was on one side of the hospital

bed, while one of the security guards (Guard) was on the other.

As Guard attempted to hold Law’s right arm in anticipation of

the injection, Law pulled away, “flailing his arms,” and fell off

the bed onto the hospital floor next to Officer. As Officer

“hunched over” Law, “trying to gain control over his arms,”

Law reached out and “grabbed a hold of” Officer’s holstered

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State v. Law

firearm and “began pulling on it, pulling up on it forcibly.”

Officer told Law that he made a “mistake,” and he delivered a

blow to Law’s “upper rib cage to get him to release his grip,

which was successful.” Law responded, stating that he was “not

trying to hurt [Officer]” but that he was “trying to kill” himself.

¶6 Following a continued struggle, Law eventually received

the sedative injection. The State subsequently charged Law with,

among other things, disarming a peace officer 1 and disorderly

conduct.

¶7 At trial, Officer, Guard, and Technician testified for the

State. While their testimonies differed on some of the

surrounding details, each testified that Law tried to take

Officer’s firearm during the altercation. Additionally, Officer’s

audio recording of the incident was played for the jury. The

recording picked up the following exchange, which Officer

testified occurred when Law tried to take his weapon:

Officer: Now you seriously made a mistake! You

understand that? When you go to the hospital, you

want to go to prison? Huh?

Law: I’m trying to take my life, not yours!

Officer: Too late for that.

¶8 Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on the

disarming a peace officer charge. As relevant here, defense

counsel argued that the State had not made its prima facie case

1. Disarming a peace officer, as provided in the Utah Code,

includes an attempted taking or removal of an officer’s firearm

as a variant of the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8(2), (3)(a)

(LexisNexis 2017).

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State v. Law

on that charge because it had not presented evidence on “the

intentional mental state required for that crime.” Specifically,

counsel argued that the State had not demonstrated that Law

“had created in his own mind the conscious objective of taking

the officer’s gun.” In response, the State argued that the jury

could infer Law’s intent based on Law’s words immediately

after he tried to take the gun—that he had been trying to take his

own life, not Officer’s. The trial court agreed with the State and

denied Law’s motion, reasoning that the evidence could support

an inference as to the required intent.

¶9 The jury convicted Law of both disarming a peace officer

and disorderly conduct. 2 Law appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10 Law argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction for disarming a peace

officer. We ordinarily “review a trial court’s ruling on a motion

for directed verdict for correctness.” State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT

10, ¶ 21, 345 P.3d 1168. However, upon request, in the event

certain issues raised in the sufficiency challenge were not

preserved, we review them for plain error. See State v. Doyle,

2018 UT App 239, ¶ 20, 437 P.3d 1266.

ANALYSIS

¶11 Law argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for a directed verdict because the State “failed to

2. Law does not challenge his disorderly conduct conviction on

appeal.

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State v. Law

prove that [he] formed the required mens rea”—that he

intentionally tried to disarm the peace officer. On this basis, he

asserts that the evidence with respect to his intent was “too

inconclusive and speculative” to support the jury’s verdict.

¶12 The operative question on a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge is “simply whether the jury’s verdict is reasonable in

light of all of the evidence taken cumulatively.” State v. Ashcraft,

2015 UT 5, ¶ 24, 349 P.3d 664; see also Mackin v. State, 2016 UT 47,

¶ 29, 387 P.3d 986 (stating that the question on review of a

sufficiency challenge is “whether the evidence was so lacking

that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt” (cleaned up)). We will therefore affirm the

trial court’s denial of Law’s motion for a directed verdict and

affirm Law’s conviction if “some evidence exists” from which a

reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he

intentionally disarmed Officer during the altercation at the

Hospital. See State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 27, 345 P.3d 1168

(cleaned up). Indeed, if that standard is satisfied, we will affirm

the jury’s finding with respect to Law’s intent “even if the

evidence presented at the district court lends itself to multiple

reasonable interpretations,” see Mackin, 2016 UT 47, ¶ 29, or even

if “we can identify an ‘equally’ plausible alternative inference”

from the evidence, see Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 25; see also id. ¶ 27

(“The question presented is not whether some other (innocent)

inference might have been reasonable. It is simply whether the

inference adopted by the jury was sustainable.”).

I. There Is Sufficient Evidence Supporting the Verdict.

¶13 To prove that Law disarmed a peace officer, the State was

required to prove, as relevant here, that Law “intentionally” took

or removed, or attempted “to take or remove[,] a firearm . . .

from the person or immediate presence of a person the actor

knows is a peace officer.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8(2), (3)(a)

(LexisNexis 2017).

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State v. Law

¶14 As defined by the Utah Code, a person acts intentionally

“when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the

conduct or cause the result.” Id. § 76-2-103(1). Our courts have

repeatedly explained that a defendant’s intent is “rarely

susceptible to direct proof,” with the result that the jury may

“rely on reasonable inferences from the circumstances

surrounding the crime” to find the requisite intent. See, e.g., State

v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up); State v.

Carrell, 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 57, 414 P.3d 1030 (explaining that a

defendant’s intent “can be inferred from conduct and attendant

circumstances in the light of human behavior and experience”

(cleaned up)); State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71, ¶ 43, 274 P.3d

992 (“A jury can infer intent or knowledge from the defendant’s

acts, conduct, and remarks as well as from the circumstances

surrounding the alleged crime.”). A reasonable inference is one

that is “drawn from the evidence and is based on logic and

reasonable human experience.” State v. Harris, 2015 UT App 282,

¶ 9, 363 P.3d 555 (cleaned up); see also State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5,

¶ 18, 349 P.3d 664 (stating that an inference is reasonable “unless

it falls to a level of inconsistency or incredibility that no

reasonable jury could accept” (cleaned up)).

¶15 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence from

which a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a

reasonable doubt that Law intentionally attempted to take

Officer’s firearm. To begin with, the jury heard evidence that

Law was admitted to the Hospital due to general suicide

concerns and that, upon being told that he would be transferred

to LDS Hospital, Law clearly communicated that he would “kill

[himself] before going to that hospital.”

¶16 Next, the jury heard from Officer, Guard, and Technician,

who each testified that Law tried to take Officer’s firearm from

his holster once Law was off the hospital bed. Officer testified

that as he was trying restrain Law after Law had fallen off the

bed, Law “grabbed” his firearm and “forcibly” “began pulling

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State v. Law

on it,” while Technician testified that Law “placed his hands on

[Officer] and attempted to remove his gun.” And while Guard

did not directly observe Law take hold of Officer’s firearm after

Law was on the floor, he did see one of Law’s hands “going

towards the right hip of the officer,” which is the hip on which

the firearm was holstered. Guard further testified that the

incident with Law stood out in his mind as unusual because it

involved “someone going for the officer’s gun.”

¶17 The State also played for the jury Officer’s audio

recording of the incident. In that recording, Officer can clearly be

heard telling Law that he had “seriously made a mistake,”

asking him whether he “want[ed] to go to prison,” to which Law

responded, “I’m trying to take my life, not yours.” In his

testimony, Officer confirmed that this exchange took place at

“essentially . . . the moment where [Law] attempted to take” his

firearm. Additionally, Technician and Law’s father corroborated

the substance and timing of this exchange. Technician testified

that after Law tried to get Officer’s gun, Officer told him that he

had made “a very big mistake,” to which Law responded that he

was “trying to take [his] life, not [Officer’s].” Likewise, Law’s

father testified that, after Law had “fallen off the bed” and

Officer had “tackled him,” Officer asked Law whether he

“wanted to go to jail tonight,” and that Law responded that he

was “not trying to hurt [Officer]” but that he was “trying to kill

[him]self.”

¶18 Considered in its totality, we conclude that this is

sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably

inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Law intentionally tried

to take Officer’s firearm. See Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶¶ 22, 27

(evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence “cumulatively,” and

“in light of the totality of the evidence”); O’Bannon, 2012 UT App

71, ¶ 43 (explaining that state of mind may be inferred from “the

defendant’s acts, conduct, and remarks as well as from the

circumstances surrounding the alleged crime”).

20180898-CA 7 2020 UT App 74

State v. Law

¶19 To start, the above evidence reasonably supports a jury

determination that Law’s physical conduct manifested an

attempt to take Officer’s firearm; Officer, Guard, and Technician

each testified to that effect. Further, the testimony along with the

audio recording supports a reasonable inference that Law acted

with a conscious objective to take the firearm. See Ashcraft, 2015

UT 5, ¶ 18 (defining a reasonable inference). In addition to the

testimony with respect to Law’s physical conduct, multiple

witnesses testified that, right after Law attempted to take

Officer’s firearm, Officer told him that he had made a “big

mistake” and that Law responded to Officer that he was “trying

to take [his] life,” not Officer’s. Given the timing and

surrounding circumstances, a jury could have reasonably

understood this statement as a declaration of Law’s intention in

attempting to take Officer’s firearm. And from the substance of

Law’s response to Officer as well as his prior statements that he

would kill himself before being transferred, the jury could have

reasonably inferred that Law’s physical attempt to take the

firearm arose from a conscious objective to do so for the purpose

of killing himself. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1)

(defining “intentionally”).

II. Law’s Challenges Are Unavailing.

¶20 Law disagrees with the above assessment, claiming that

the evidence is “speculative and did not demonstrate [his]

culpability any more than it showed his innocence.” He first

asserts that the evidence supports an “equally reasonable”

inference that he was merely fighting with Officer, Guard,

Technician, and others to avoid being transferred to LDS

Hospital but that he did not try to take Officer’s gun. He also

contends that the testimonies of Officer, Technician, and Guard

did not support a reasonable inference that he intentionally tried

to take Officer’s gun. We conclude that both challenges are

unavailing.

20180898-CA 8 2020 UT App 74

State v. Law

A. Law’s “Equally Reasonable” Challenge

¶21 Law claims that the evidence presented with respect to

his intent was insufficient to convict because “equally

reasonable” explanations negating that he acted intentionally

could have been drawn from the evidence. For example, he

claims that it was “equally reasonable” to infer that he

accidentally “brushed up against or jostled” Officer’s firearm

during the scuffle. He also points to the audio recording, noting

that it contained no reference to an effort to take the firearm, and

suggesting this absence supports a reasonable inference that he

did not try to take Officer’s firearm.

¶22 In advancing this argument, Law relies heavily on State v.

Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, 238 P.3d 1096, for the proposition

that “[w]hen the evidence supports more than one possible

conclusion, none more likely than the other, the choice of one

possibility over another can be no more than speculation.” Id.

¶ 16. However, as we recently noted in State v. Wall, 2020 UT

App 36, that proposition is inconsistent with our supreme

court’s clarification in Ashcraft that the identification of “an

equally plausible alternative inference is not nearly enough to set

a verdict aside.” Id. ¶ 54 (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Ashcraft,

2015 UT 5, ¶ 25, 349 P.3d 664). We are bound to follow, and do

follow, Ashcraft over Cristobal. See Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates

LLC, 2016 UT App 131, ¶ 30, 379 P.3d 18 (explaining that the

Court of Appeals is “bound by vertical stare decisis to follow

strictly the decisions rendered by the Utah Supreme Court”

(cleaned up)). Indeed, as this court’s opinion in Wall made clear,

we no longer view Cristobal’s statement regarding equally

plausible inferences as valid.

¶23 Therefore, Law’s conviction is not reversible on that basis.

As explained in Ashcraft, on review of a sufficiency challenge,

the “question presented is not whether some other (innocent)

inference might have been reasonable. It is simply whether the

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inference adopted by the jury was sustainable.” 2015 UT 5, ¶ 27;

see also Mackin v. State, 2016 UT 47, ¶ 29, 387 P.3d 986

(explaining, with respect to a sufficiency challenge, that “we will

affirm a jury’s finding of fact even if the evidence presented at

the district court lends itself to multiple reasonable

interpretations”). Even assuming that Law’s alternative

explanations are reasonable, “the jury was by no means

compelled to accept the existence of reasonable doubt” he posits

on appeal. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶¶ 25, 29; see also Mackin, 2016 UT

47, ¶ 29 (explaining that the relevant question is only “whether

the evidence was so lacking that no reasonable jury could find

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” (cleaned up)).

Rather, so long as there is some evidence to sustain the jury’s

determination—which we have already concluded there is in

this case—we must affirm, even in the face of potentially

plausible alternative inferences that might have been drawn

from the evidence. See Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 30 (stating that on

review “[w]e cannot disturb the jury’s conclusion just because it

could have reasonably come to a different one”).

B. Law’s Challenges to the Witnesses’ Testimonies

¶24 Law also challenges any reliance by the jury on Officer’s,

Guard’s, and Technician’s testimonies, arguing that they cannot

reasonably support an inference that he intentionally attempted

to take Officer’s firearm.

1. Officer’s and Guard’s Testimonies

¶25 First, Law contends that Officer’s and Guard’s testimonies

cannot be relied on to support a finding of intent because they

contradict both each other and the audio recording. As to Guard,

Law notes that Guard testified that Law “used his left hand” to

reach for Officer’s firearm, while Officer testified that Law had

used his right hand; that Guard “admitted he never saw Law

actually touch [Officer’s] firearm”; and that Guard’s recounting

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State v. Law

of what Officer said about Law’s attempt to grab Officer’s

firearm does not align with the audio recording. As to Officer,

Law claims that Officer testified that he told Law he made a

mistake in trying to take his weapon, but that in the audio

recording Officer did not specifically refer to his weapon.

¶26 However, as our supreme court has explained, on review

it is not “our function to determine guilt or innocence or the

credibility of conflicting evidence and the reasonable inferences

to be drawn therefrom,” and accordingly, the existence of

“contradictory testimony alone is not sufficient to disturb a jury

verdict.” Mackin, 2016 UT 47, ¶ 29 (cleaned up). Thus, the fact

that Officer’s, Technician’s, and Guard’s recollections of the

event might not have been perfectly consistent with one another

or with the audio recording is not, without more, a sufficient

basis on which to reverse the verdict. “After all, the jury, not the

appellate court, is the exclusive judge of both the credibility of

witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence.” State

v. Granados, 2019 UT App 158, ¶ 28, 451 P.3d 289 (cleaned up).

Simply put, that the jury weighed the evidence differently than

Law believes it should have is not enough to persuade us that

the evidence of his intent was insufficient. See State v. Howell, 649

P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982) (explaining that a jury is not “obligated

to believe the evidence most favorable to [the] defendant” and

that the “existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting

inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury’s verdict” on

appeal).

2. Technician’s Testimony

¶27 Second, Law asserts that Technician’s testimony cannot be

used to support an inference of intent because it is “inherently

improbable” under State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288.

Our supreme court explained in Robbins that a conviction must

be based on “substantial reliable evidence” and that, although a

court “must ordinarily accept the jury’s determination of witness

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State v. Law

credibility, when the witness’s testimony is inherently

improbable, the court may choose to disregard it.” Id. ¶¶ 14–16

(cleaned up); see also State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 38, 392 P.3d

398 (explaining that the court in Robbins reached its inherent

improbability determination by relying on “inconsistencies in

the [witness’s] testimony plus the patently false statements the

[witness] made plus the lack of any corroboration”).

“[T]estimony is inherently improbable and may likewise be

disregarded if it is (1) physically impossible or (2) apparently

false.” Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 16; see also Prater, 2017 UT 13,

¶¶ 32–33, 42–43 (explaining that testimony is inherently

improbable in circumstances where it is “physically impossible”

or “incredibly dubious” such that it is “apparently false,” but

emphasizing that the existence of corroborating evidence

ordinarily defeats an inherent improbability claim (cleaned up)).

¶28 Law claims that Technician’s “description of what

occurred in Law’s room was materially inconsistent, was

patently false, and lacked corroboration on every point from the

testimony of the other witnesses[] and from [Technician’s]

original witness statement.” As support, he points to

Technician’s testimony that Law tried to retrieve Officer’s

firearm from a “standing position” and that Law had “actually

undone the retention strap” on Officer’s firearm, which he

contends is in “direct contrast” to Officer’s testimony that “the

retention strap on his firearm could not be undone” without

depressing the lever and hood from “the inside closest to

[Officer’s] body.” (Cleaned up.) He also generally claims that

Technician’s testimony is not corroborated by the audio

recording.

¶29 Law’s specific challenge to Technician’s testimony as

inherently improbable is unpreserved. “To preserve an issue for

appeal, a party must present it to the trial court in such a way

that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” State

v. Doyle, 2018 UT App 239, ¶ 13, 437 P.3d 1266 (cleaned up). As

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this court explained in Doyle, a Robbins challenge to a witness’s

testimony must be specifically raised before the trial court to be

preserved. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17–19.

¶30 Here, in his directed verdict motion, Law merely argued

that the State had failed to make its prima facie case because it

did not present sufficient evidence that Law intended to disarm

Officer. Law did not argue to the court that the evidence was

insufficient for the additional reason that Technician’s testimony

should be rejected as inherently improbable or request that the

court consider the sufficiency of the evidence only after

excluding Technician’s testimony as such. See id.; see also State v.

Skinner, 2020 UT App 3, ¶¶ 23–29, 457 P.3d 421 (concluding that

a general directed verdict motion was insufficient to preserve the

issue of whether a witness’s testimony was inherently

improbable under Robbins); State v. Gallegos, 2018 UT App 112,

¶ 14, 427 P.3d 578 (“Where a motion for a directed verdict makes

general assertions but fails to assert the specific argument raised

on appeal, the directed verdict motion itself is insufficient to

preserve the more specific argument for appeal.” (cleaned up)).

¶31 Nonetheless, Law asks that we review his sufficiency

claim for plain error if we determine that it is unpreserved (as

we have done). To establish plain error in the context of a

sufficiency claim, Law must establish that the insufficiency is

“obvious and fundamental.” Doyle, 2018 UT App 239, ¶ 20

(cleaned up). “An example of an obvious and fundamental

insufficiency is the case in which the State presents no evidence

to support an essential element of a criminal charge.” Prater,

2017 UT 13, ¶ 28 (cleaned up). Law has not established that the

trial court plainly erred.

¶32 Law generally argues, with reference to the

inconsistencies and contradictions he identified in Technician’s

testimony, that the trial court obviously erred because “a

straightforward application of Utah law establishes that verdicts

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cannot be supported by speculation and conjecture” and because

the testimony does not support that he had the requisite intent.

We disagree.

¶33 A Robbins challenge is a narrow exception to the general

rule that courts “are not ‘in the business of reassessing or

reweighing evidence’ already considered by a jury.” Skinner,

2020 UT App 3, ¶ 24 (quoting Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 32); see also

State v. Rivera, 2019 UT App 188, ¶ 23 n.6, 455 P.3d 112 (stating

that a case that “actually falls within the Robbins-Prater rubric is

exceedingly rare”). Indeed, the court in Robbins reached its

inherent improbability conclusion only because of the

“inconsistencies in the [witness’s] testimony plus the patently

false statements the [witness] made plus the lack of any

corroboration.” Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 38; see also Rivera, 2019 UT

App 188, ¶ 24 (stating that “if an appellant fails to show all three

elements [set out in Robbins]—material inconsistencies plus

patent falsity plus lack of corroboration—a judge is likewise

precluded from reconsidering witness credibility”). In this

respect, one witness’s testimony is not inherently improbable

simply because there are inconsistencies in it or as compared to

other witness testimony. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶¶ 38–39; Skinner,

2020 UT App 3, ¶¶ 31, 35. Likewise, the presence of

corroborating evidence apart from the allegedly improbable

testimony defeats the claim. See Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 19 (“The

existence of any additional evidence supporting the verdict

prevents the judge from reconsidering the witness’s

credibility.”); see also Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶¶ 42–43; Skinner, 2020

UT App 3, ¶¶ 31–34; Rivera, 2019 UT App 188, ¶¶ 24–27.

¶34 Although Law cites inconsistencies between Technician’s

testimony, Officer’s testimony, and the audio recording to

support his inherent improbability claim, inconsistencies and

contradiction alone are not enough. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶¶ 38–39

(concluding that the inconsistencies in three witnesses’ accounts

“by themselves [were] insufficient to invoke the inherent

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improbability exception” (cleaned up)); Skinner, 2020 UT App 3,

¶¶ 31, 35. Moreover, as discussed above, supra ¶¶ 15–19, apart

from Technician’s testimony, the jury had before it Officer’s,

Guard’s, and even Father’s testimonies as well as the audio

recording—all of which, taken together, provided the jury some

evidence to support beyond a reasonable doubt the inference

that Law intentionally attempted to take Officer’s firearm.

¶35 Thus, even assuming that Technician’s testimony differed

from Officer’s testimony or the audio recording, or otherwise

contained inconsistencies, we cannot conclude that the trial court

plainly erred in failing to sua sponte deem Technician’s

testimony inherently improbable. 3

CONCLUSION

¶36 We conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented

to support the jury’s verdict. On this basis, we affirm.

3. Law also cites some of the prosecution’s closing argument

statements with respect to what Law “knew” he was doing,

claiming that the prosecutor failed to rely on an “intentional”

rather than a “knowing” mens rea in establishing the offense.

However, other than characterizing the prosecutor’s closing

argument in this way, Law does not suggest that we should

reverse because of it; indeed, he does not place his

characterization into a recognizable legal frame and argue for

reversal on such a basis. Instead, such references appear to be an

attempt to generally buttress his overall argument regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence about his intent. Therefore, we do not

view this as though it were a discrete issue or a potential basis

for reversal.

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