Brown v. Brown

2020 UT App 146

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JERRY V. BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

YVONNE A. BROWN,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20190543

Filed October 29, 2020

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Derek P. Pullan

No. 154403120

Julie J. Nelson, Troy L. Booher, and Alexandra

Mareschal, Attorneys for Appellant

Ron W. Haycock Jr., S. Spencer Brown, and

Scarlet R. Smith, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which

JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and DIANA HAGEN concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Jerry V. Brown appeals the district court’s determination

in this divorce proceeding that his dental practice was marital

property and that his ex-wife, Yvonne A. Brown, was therefore

entitled to half its value. Jerry 1 also appeals the district court’s

award of $96,409.72 to cover pre-decree expenses Yvonne

incurred over nearly a two-year period while the divorce was

1. Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them

by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent

informality.

Brown v. Brown

pending. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for

revision of the divorce decree.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 1986, Jerry purchased a dental practice and building.

By 1996, he had completely paid off the purchase price. During a

portion of this ten-year period, Jerry was married to his first

wife, with whom he had four children. After Jerry and his first

wife divorced, Jerry and Yvonne married in 1996. Yvonne had

also been married previously and brought three children into the

marriage. In 1999, Jerry and Yvonne had a child together. They

divorced in 2011 but remarried approximately one year later.

¶3 Soon after their first marriage to each other, Yvonne

began working at the practice. After about a month, however,

Jerry and Yvonne decided that it was not a good fit. They

determined that Yvonne should stay home and care for their

blended family from then on, but she occasionally filled in at the

practice on an emergency basis. Regardless of the hours Yvonne

worked, the practice paid her a monthly salary, depositing her

paycheck into Jerry and Yvonne’s joint bank account.

¶4 During both his marriages to Yvonne, Jerry kept the

practice’s accounts separate from the couple’s joint accounts.

Jerry testified that he did not “at any time . . . put personal funds

from [his] personal account or [their] marital accounts into [the

practice].” And Yvonne testified that Jerry was “controlling with

finances” and threatened to fire his employees if they discussed

the practice’s finances with her. Yvonne’s sister, who worked at

the practice, testified that Jerry kept the finances “quiet” and

would not discuss them with Yvonne. She further testified that

whenever Yvonne would “come to the office, he’d empty the

cashbox and walk across the street and deposit all of the money

into the bank.”

¶5 In addition to drawing his regular salary, Jerry paid

expenses attributable to the marriage, such as the couple’s

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mortgage payments, vehicle payments, insurance bills, travel

expenses, and other obligations, using funds from the practice’s

account. Jerry also deposited $6,000 from the practice’s account

into the couple’s joint account each month, which Yvonne used

to pay household expenses. But because Yvonne did not have

access to any other bank accounts, if she needed extra money,

she “had to ask for it, and usually it became very heated because

[Jerry] controlled all of [the] finances.”

¶6 In 2002, Jerry and Yvonne built an $860,000 home that

came with a $5,722 monthly mortgage obligation. Around this

time, Jerry also renovated the practice’s building and financed it

solely by a loan secured by the building, which resulted in a

$4,000 monthly payment that he paid from the practice’s

revenue. Yvonne testified that the practice’s new debt affected

the family’s lifestyle, income, activities, and travel. She further

explained that they “had to make a lot of sacrifices financially at

the time to offset [the] income” that stayed in the practice instead

of being used to supplement the available marital funds. And

around 2004 or 2005, Jerry attempted to open a second office to

expand the practice, which proved unsuccessful. This

investment, too, was funded solely by the practice.

¶7 After the couple’s first divorce and their subsequent

remarriage in 2012, Yvonne began attending school to become an

esthetician and eventually obtained her master’s degree in that

field. Jerry paid for her schooling from the practice’s revenue. In

2013, Yvonne opened a spa at the practice, for which Jerry added

three rooms to the practice’s building. This new spa company

was a separate entity from the practice and had a separate bank

account. Jerry testified that he spent “well over $200,000” of the

practice’s revenue on spa equipment to help Yvonne get

established.

¶8 In June 2015, the couple separated again. Around this

time, Yvonne started another spa company in a different location

and moved all the equipment that Jerry had purchased with

funds from the practice to this new location. After this

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Brown v. Brown

separation, Jerry and Yvonne continued to engage in financial

transactions. Jerry had refinanced the practice’s building in May

2015 and obtained $200,000, which he was solely responsible for

repaying, and gave half—$100,000—to Yvonne. For a time, he

continued to deposit $6,000 a month into a bank account for

Yvonne. Jerry also kept making monthly payments of $2,200 on a

laser he had purchased in 2015 for Yvonne’s business until it was

paid off in March 2019, even though Yvonne had agreed to make

the payments. Jerry also continued to help Yvonne by investing

over $120,000 in her new spa company. Jerry testified that he did

this because he was “hoping that [they] might be able to work

things out because [finances were their] biggest problem,” and

he hoped that those issues would be resolved if her business

became profitable.

¶9 In June 2017, Jerry and Yvonne realized that reconciliation

was no longer a possibility and decided to divorce once again.

Jerry made two more deposits of $6,000 in June and July into a

personal account for Yvonne, and in August he deposited

another $4,500. From September through December he deposited

only $2,500 a month, and he did not deposit any money from

January through July 2018. The court then ordered Jerry, starting

in August 2018, to pay Yvonne temporary alimony in the

amount of $1,607 per month, 2 which Jerry paid until trial in

April 2019.

¶10 After trial, the court entered its findings of fact and

conclusions of law, dividing the marital estate and deciding

other issues pertinent to the divorce. Only two parts of those

findings and conclusions, which were later folded into the

divorce decree, are relevant to this appeal. First, the court ruled

2. Following trial, the district court found that this amount was

too low “because Jerry had significantly understated his income”

and ruled that Jerry’s actual ability to pay was $2,687 per month.

The court established this amount as alimony going forward.

The court’s alimony determination is not at issue in this appeal.

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Brown v. Brown

that “[b]ecause marital funds were expended for the benefit of

[the practice, it] was converted from Jerry’s separate property to

marital property.” The court based this ruling on its finding that

[o]n two occasions, Jerry decided to use income

from [the practice] to reinvest in the practice. First,

in 2004 or 2005 Jerry opened a second dental

office. . . . Opening that office required capital.

Accordingly, through [the practice], Jerry secured a

loan. The monthly payment on the loan was $2,000.

The . . . office was a failed venture. . . . Jerry used

income from [the practice] to pay for this failed

expansion, thereby decreasing the funds he

routinely pulled from [the practice] to pay marital

expenses as he routinely had done.

Second, in 2003 during the first marriage Jerry

decided to renovate the [practice’s building]. The

renovation required capital. Jerry used available

funds from [the practice] as well as a loan to pay

for the renovation. . . . The monthly payment was

$4,000. This monthly obligation left less money for

Jerry to pull from [the practice] to pay for marital

expenses as he routinely had done. According to

[Yvonne], the renovation debt reduced the family

income and [a]ffected “what we did and how we

traveled.”[3]

3. In view of the brief hiatus between the parties’ two marriages,

corresponding to only one year in a twenty-three-year period

when the parties were otherwise married, in adjudicating their

second divorce, the district court essentially evaluated their

circumstances as though they were parties to a single continuous

marriage. In this atypical circumstance and on the facts of this

case, this approach seems entirely reasonable, the parties appear

(continued…)

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Brown v. Brown

¶11 Second, the court ruled that Yvonne was entitled to

$96,409.72 in “pre-decree reasonable monthly expenses.” The

court based this amount on the extent to which Yvonne’s

reasonable expenses from June 2017 until April 2019—found by

the court to be $9,464.45 per month—exceeded her monthly

income, i.e., the amounts Jerry made available to her, her own

earned income, and the amount she received from the sale of a

laser. Specifically, it found that

[Yvonne’s] monthly shortfall—for which she

should have had access to marital funds but did

not—can be calculated.

⦁ For the two months from June and July 2017,

[Yvonne’s] monthly income was $8,839.92, her

earned income plus the $6,000 Jerry paid to her.

Her monthly expenses exceeded her income by

$624.53 each month, for a total shortfall of

$1,249.00.

⦁ For August 2017, [Yvonne’s] monthly income was

$7,339.92, her earned income plus the $4,500 Jerry

paid to her. Her monthly expenses exceeded her

income by $2,124.53, the total shortfall for that

month.

⦁ For the four months from September to December

2017, [Yvonne’s] monthly income was $5,339.92,

her earned income plus the $2,500 Jerry paid to her.

Her monthly expenses exceeded her income by

$4,124.53 each month, for a total shortfall of

$16,489.12.

(…continued)

to have acquiesced in it during the course of this proceeding,

and neither party challenges it on appeal.

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⦁ For the seven months from January to July 2018,

[Yvonne’s] monthly income was $2,839.92, her

earned income. Her monthly expenses exceeded

her income by $6,624.53 each month, for a total

shortfall of $46,371.71.

⦁ For the ten months from August 2018 to April

2019, [Yvonne’s] income was $4,446.92, her earned

income plus the $1,607 paid to her by Jerry. Her

monthly expenses exceeded her income by

$5,017.53 each month, for a total shortfall of

$50,175.30.

⦁ Prior to the decree, [Yvonne] sold one of the

lasers for $10,000.00 and used this money to pay

her monthly expenses.

¶12 Jerry appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶13 Jerry raises two issues. First, he asserts that the district

court erred when it determined that the practice had become a

marital asset. “[W]hether property is marital or separate is a

question of law,” which we review for correctness. Liston v.

Liston, 2011 UT App 433, ¶ 5, 269 P.3d 169.

¶14 Second, Jerry contends that the district court erred in

ordering him to pay Yvonne $96,409.72 in expenses incurred by

her during the pendency of the divorce proceeding that were not

covered by her income and marital funds. We review property

decisions and alimony awards with considerable deference,

reversing only where the district court has exceeded the sound

exercise of its discretion. See Hartvigsen v. Hartvigsen, 2018 UT

App 238, ¶ 4, 437 P.3d 1257.

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Brown v. Brown

ANALYSIS

I. The Practice

¶15 Jerry argues that the district court erred in concluding

that the practice—which was unquestionably his separate

property at the outset of his marriage to Yvonne—became a

marital asset based solely on the fact that practice funds were

frequently used to cover family expenses and, at times, the

amount of this marital subsidy was reduced to help expand the

practice. “The presumption is that marital property will be

divided equally while separate property will not be divided at

all.” Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 32, 392 P.3d 968.

“Married persons have a right to separately own and enjoy

property, and that right does not dissipate upon divorce.” Id.

“The general rule is that equity requires that each party retain

the separate property he or she brought into the marriage,

including any appreciation of the separate property.” Dunn v.

Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). “However,

separate property is not totally beyond a court’s reach in an

equitable property division.” Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83,

¶ 19, 45 P.3d 176 (quotation simplified). Utah law has identified

three circumstances that support an award of separate property

to the other spouse. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 33. These

circumstances are: (1) “when separate property has been

commingled” with marital property; (2) “when the other spouse

has augmented, maintained, or protected the separate

property”—otherwise known as the contribution exception; and

(3) “in extraordinary situations when equity so demands.” Id.

¶16 Here, the court did not rule that the practice had been

commingled 4 with marital property, or that this was an

4. We agree that the practice never became a marital asset under

the theory of commingling because Jerry kept the practice’s

accounts and the couple’s personal accounts separate at all

times. No money ever came back to the practice once it entered

(continued…)

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Brown v. Brown

extraordinary situation. Rather, it concluded that the

contribution exception applied. The contribution exception may

be satisfied in three ways: (1) “when one spouse brings assets

into the marriage and the other spouse’s prudent investment of

those assets substantially increases their value”; (2) “when

marital funds are expended or marital debt is incurred for the

benefit of one spouse’s separate property”; or (3) potentially,

“when one spouse works for a business owned by the other

spouse but is not paid a wage or salary.” Id. ¶ 35 (quotation

simplified).

¶17 Here, the first contribution variant does not apply because

it is undisputed that Yvonne did not play a role in investing the

practice’s assets to substantially increase their value. The third

variant is likewise inapplicable because although Yvonne did

work at the practice for a time, she was paid a monthly salary for

that work and, indeed, she was paid that salary even when she

did not work. Rather, the court relied on the second variation of

the contribution exception when it ruled, “Because marital funds

were expended for the benefit of [the practice, it] was converted

from Jerry’s separate property to marital property.” This

determination was erroneous because it is clear from the record

that no marital funds were ever used to benefit the practice; the

flow of funds was only in the opposite direction.

¶18 To reach its conclusion, the court determined that money

that stayed within the practice became marital property simply

because Jerry, having previously been more amenable to using

money from the practice to pay for family expenses, reduced the

amount of those transfers to help fund expansion of the practice.

The court reasoned that the practice was converted to a marital

(…continued)

the parties’ personal and joint accounts. Thus, it is clear that the

practice was never commingled with marital property, even

though practice funds were made available, when Jerry saw fit,

to subsidize the marital estate.

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Brown v. Brown

asset because funds that were normally diverted from the

practice to cover family expenses were instead retained to build

the practice. This premise does not satisfy the contribution

exception because the practice was at all times a separate asset,

and the flow of money went in only one direction: from the

practice’s accounts to the personal and joint accounts of Yvonne

and Jerry. Once this money left the practice and entered these

accounts, that money then became marital property. 5 Cf. Keiter v.

Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 19, 235 P.3d 782 (“[E]arned income

from employment or from rendering professional services

during a marriage falls within the usual definition of marital

property.”).

¶19 But this one-way flow did not convert the source of that

money, i.e., the practice, into a marital asset. The practice

therefore never lost its separate character because no money

from a marital source was ever used for the benefit of the

practice, even though the converse was true. Cf. Schaumberg v.

Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that

because husband used a marital loan to “maintain and augment”

a business asset, that “changed [the asset’s] character from a

personal asset to a marital asset”). And this is true even though

Jerry at times reduced the amount of money that left the practice

to help fund the family’s expenses. Given that Yvonne’s work at

the practice was financially compensated—indeed,

overcompensated—the only way that the practice in this case

could have become a marital asset is if money from Yvonne’s

and Jerry’s personal and joint accounts had been regularly used

to shore up the practice or the parties took out a marital debt to

fund the practice. See Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 35. Cf. Keiter,

2010 UT App 169, ¶ 24 (holding that a husband’s personal and

medical practice’s accounts were “inextricably commingled” and

both were marital assets because the husband deposited his

salary into both accounts and paid for business and personal

5. The district court considered Jerry’s historical use of business

funds to pay marital expenses in calculating alimony.

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Brown v. Brown

expenses from both accounts) (quotation simplified). Here, in

contrast, the court explicitly found, with our emphasis, that

“Jerry decided to use income from [the practice] to reinvest in the

practice.” Thus, the practice retained its separate character

because the money that became a marital asset after leaving the

practice never returned to the practice. Nor were other marital

assets used to subsidize the practice.

¶20 Yvonne claims that Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, requires

affirmance of the district court’s decision. There, the husband’s

income from his medical practice, which income was a marital

asset, see id. ¶ 19, “would be deposited along with his separate

earnings into his personal account [and] medical practice

account . . . [t]hen, both business and personal expenses would

be paid from those accounts,” id. ¶ 24. Given this routine, the

Keiter court determined that both accounts were marital assets

because “they were ‘inextricably commingled’ with both

separate and marital income.” Id. Yvonne claims that the same

scenario is present here because Jerry “deposited some income

into his joint account with [her], some into a personal bank

account, and some into [the practice’s] account [and] paid family

expenses from each account.” But the critical difference between

Keiter and the case at hand is that in Keiter the husband’s salary

was deposited into the medical practice’s and the marital

account, thus commingling the practice’s account with marital

funds, and he then used the funds from both accounts to pay for

both business and personal expenses, thereby using marital

funds to support and improve his separate property. That is

classic commingling, a theory that the district court here

correctly avoided. See supra ¶ 16 & note 4.

¶21 Unlike in Keiter, Jerry never deposited his salary—marital

income—into the practice’s account, which would have thereby

“inextricably commingled” marital funds with separate funds.

See Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ¶ 24 (quotation simplified).

Furthermore, Jerry never used marital funds to pay for business

expenses, as was the case in Keiter. Rather, Jerry’s salary left the

practice’s account and entered his personal account or a marital

20190543 11 2020 UT App 146

Brown v. Brown

account and was never used to cover the practice’s expenses,

which the district court specifically found when it stated that

only the practice’s own assets were used to expand the practice.

And while personal expenses were often covered with

additional funds from the practice’s account, this was a one-way

flow—no marital funds were ever used to pay for business

expenses. The district court therefore erred in treating the

practice as a marital asset and awarding Yvonne a portion of the

value of the practice.

II. Pre-decree Expenses

¶22 Jerry next argues that the district court exceeded its

discretion by ordering him to “reimburse [Yvonne] for almost all

of her claimed expenses during the twenty-two-month[6]

pendency of their separation.”

¶23 “Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property

acquired by parties to a marriage is marital property, owned

equally by each party.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126, 459 P.3d

276. “For this reason, it is improper to allow one spouse access to

marital funds to pay for reasonable and ordinary living expenses

while the divorce is pending, while denying the other spouse the

same access.” Id.

¶24 Here, the district court ruled that, “[p]ursuant to the rule

articulated in Dahl, [Yvonne]—like Jerry—was entitled to access

marital funds to pay her reasonable monthly expenses incurred

while the divorce was pending.” The court then ordered Jerry,

who effectively had control of the marital funds, to pay Yvonne

6. Jerry refers to this period as twenty-two months but it is clear

that the time frame in question is actually twenty-three months.

This is calculated from the time the couple separated in June

2017 up until trial in April 2019. When including June 2017 and

April 2019 in the calculation, this is a twenty-three month

period.

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Brown v. Brown

for her expenses insofar as they exceeded the income she earned

plus amounts Jerry advanced while the divorce was pending.

The net amount, with a further offset for the value of a laser she

sold for $10,000, amounted to $96,409.72.

¶25 Jerry argues that the district court improperly applied our

Supreme Court’s holding in Dahl. In that case, the Court held

that the district court erred in requiring the wife, who was not

living in the marital home and had no access to the marital estate

during the pendency of the divorce, to repay her ex-husband

money that he had paid her from the marital estate during

the course of the divorce proceedings for her living expenses.

Id. ¶ 125. The Court ruled that because these funds came from

the marital estate and were used to pay the wife’s pre-decree

living expenses, she was not obligated to repay the money.

Id. ¶¶ 128–129.

¶26 Jerry argues that Dahl does not apply to this case and does

not “stand for the proposition that the spouse with access to the

marital estate must pay all of the other spouse’s living expenses

during the pendency of the divorce.” This argument reflects a

misunderstanding of Dahl. The point of Dahl is not that only one

spouse may have “access to the marital estate” but that both do,

and both are entitled to rely on it to cover their “reasonable and

ordinary living expenses” pending entry of the divorce decree. 7

Id. ¶ 126.

¶27 It is true that Dahl is on a slightly different footing than

this case. In Dahl, our Supreme Court held that the wife did not

7. Pursuant to Dahl, the marital estate must pay for the

“reasonable and ordinary living expenses” of each party during

the pendency of their divorce proceedings. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT

79, ¶ 126, 459 P.3d 276. While Yvonne’s expenses during the

relevant period may seem high, Jerry has made no claim that

these expenses, as found by the district court, were unreasonable

in light of the marital standard of living.

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Brown v. Brown

have to repay the money she received from the marital estate,

rather than, as here, directing that the marital estate would cover

the shortfall in her expenses. 8 The Court in Dahl explicitly stated,

“Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property acquired by

parties to a marriage is marital property, owned equally by each

party,” and “it is improper to allow one spouse access to marital

funds to pay for reasonable and ordinary living expenses while

the divorce is pending, while denying the other spouse the same

access.” Id. (emphasis added). It further elaborated that

“allowing both spouses equal access to marital funds during the

pendency of a divorce promotes the goal of a fair, just, and

equitable distribution of marital property.” Id. (emphasis added)

(quotation otherwise simplified). Thus, Dahl stands for the

proposition that both spouses are entitled to equal access to the

marital estate to fund their reasonable and ordinary living

expenses pending the divorce. In accordance with this

proposition, the district court appropriately ordered the marital

estate to reimburse the shortfall in Yvonne’s pre-decree living

expenses with reference to the expense level it deemed

reasonable, to the extent those expenses exceeded her earned

income, asset sale, and the diminishing amounts Jerry made

8. Jerry characterizes the district court’s order to reimburse

Yvonne for her monthly expenses as requiring him to pay it. But

Jerry mischaracterizes what the court actually did. Conceptually,

it did not order him to pay all her expenses but ordered the

marital estate to cover Yvonne’s expenses, an estate in which

Yvonne had equal share and to which she should have had equal

access. See id. Jerry further argues that he should have to pay

only half, at most, of the court’s pre-decree expenses award. This

argument is unavailing, however, because Jerry took control of

the marital estate to continue to cover his own expenses but

deprived Yvonne of that same benefit. Thus, Jerry is required to

cover the shortfall in Yvonne’s living expenses from the marital

estate, to which he deprived Yvonne access while their divorce

was pending.

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Brown v. Brown

available to her. 9 At this point, while Jerry might be signing the

check, the adjustment is conceptually made from the marital

estate—not from funds that are his own separate property. See

supra note 8.

¶28 Jerry further argues that the district court’s award should

have been offset by the $100,000 he gave Yvonne in May 2015,

the value of the equipment he bought for her spa business, the

$120,000 he additionally contributed to her business, and other

money that he transferred to her from the practice’s accounts.

This argument is unavailing. First, the equipment assisted

Yvonne in earning an income and paying her bills. That earned

income reduced the amount of Yvonne’s monthly shortfall. The

cost of that equipment cannot, years later, be used as an offset

against Yvonne’s pre-decree living expenses, especially where

Yvonne’s earned income already offset those expenses. Second,

because the majority of these transactions occurred before the

couple’s decision in 2017 to seek a divorce, it was not

unreasonable for the court to ignore these transactions when

making its award for living expenses after that decision was

made, as Yvonne was still entitled to the benefit of the marital

estate to help cover those living expenses, as was Jerry, up until

the divorce decree was entered. 10

9. As explained above, see supra ¶ 11, once the decision was

made to divorce, Jerry initially channeled $6,000 in marital funds

per month to Yvonne, leaving a shortfall of only a little over $600

per month. When that allowance dropped to zero for seven

months in 2018, the monthly shortfall increased by more than

tenfold, to over $6,600.

10. There is, however, an expense that Jerry calls to our attention

that is on a different footing, namely the $2,200 monthly

payment for a laser that he continued to make even after the

couple’s June 2017 decision to divorce, and which he continued

to pay until March 2019, as specifically found by the district

(continued…)

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Brown v. Brown

¶29 The court did, however, make a simple calculating error

when it ruled that “[f]or the ten months from August 2018 to

April 2019, [Yvonne’s] income was $4,446.92, her earned income

plus the $1,607 paid to her by Jerry. Her monthly expenses

exceeded her income by $5,017.53 each month, for a total

shortfall of $50,175.30.” Both parties agree that the time period

actually amounted to nine months, not ten. Thus, the award

corresponding to that period should be reduced by $5,017.53. On

remand, the district court needs to adjust its pre-decree expense

award accordingly.

CONCLUSION

¶30 The district court erred in concluding that the practice

had become a marital asset because no marital funds were used

to enhance the practice and the practice had not otherwise lost

its character as a separate asset. Beyond a simple calculating

error and the apparent oversight detailed in note 10, however,

the court did not exceed its discretion in its pre-decree expense

(…continued)

court. It is undisputed that Yvonne agreed to make those

payments, but she did not do so. The court did not circle back

and deal with these payments when determining its award of

pre-decree expenses to Yvonne, even though the court allowed

an offset for the $10,000 Yvonne realized upon sale of another

laser that Jerry financed, which surely seems analogous. Jerry’s

argument that he should have had a further offset for half of the

payments made for this laser during the relevant period is

persuasive. (As explained above, and as consistent with the

district court’s approach, this offset would be only for the

payments made between the time the couple decided to divorce

in June 2017 and the time Jerry paid off the laser in March 2019.)

On remand, the court should deal with this loose end and

further adjust the award for Yvonne’s pre-decree expenses as

may be appropriate.

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ruling that required the marital estate to cover the shortfall in

Yvonne’s reasonable living expenses, as found by the court,

because Yvonne had an equal right to the marital estate to pay

those expenses.

¶31 We remand to the district court to amend its decree to

incorporate appropriate changes, in accordance with this

opinion.

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