Brown v. Williams

2017 UT App 29

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARJORIE ANN BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

LENNIE WILLIAMS,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20150412-CA

Filed February 16, 2017

Second District Court, Ogden Department

The Honorable Ernest W. Jones

No. 130906495

J. Bradford DeBry and Zachary E. Lambert,

Attorneys for Appellant

Richard K. Glauser and David E. Brown, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

STEPHEN L. ROTH and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

TOOMEY, Judge:

¶1 This case involves an auto-pedestrian accident. Marjorie

Ann Brown appeals the district court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of the defendant, Lennie Williams. Brown

argues the court inappropriately applied workers’ compensation

law in a negligence suit. She also argues summary judgment

should have been denied because there is a genuine dispute as to

a material fact. We affirm.

Brown v. Williams

BACKGROUND

¶2 In January 2012, Brown was injured in an auto-pedestrian

accident while she was on her way to work for the Internal

Revenue Service in its Ogden, Utah office. The IRS building site

includes an employee-designated parking lot. For security

purposes, a fence surrounds both the building and the parking

lot. There is only one access point into the facility, which is

controlled by third-party security personnel. To enter the facility,

employees are required to show their IRS employee badges.

¶3 On the morning of the accident, after passing through

security and parking her vehicle, Brown was walking through

the parking lot toward the building when she was struck by a

vehicle driven by Alice Nelson, 1 another IRS employee.

¶4 After her federal workers’ compensation claim was

denied, 2 Brown filed a third-party negligence suit against

1. Alice Nelson, the original defendant, died after the complaint

was filed in the district court. On May 16, 2014, Nelson’s son,

Lennie Williams, as personal representative of Nelson’s estate,

substituted as the defendant. For simplicity, we will refer to the

defendant in this case as Williams, even if Nelson was the

defendant at the time of the reference.

2. During oral argument, Brown’s counsel confirmed this denial.

Williams attached to his brief a notice of decision issued by the

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (the Office), which

explains the ground for denying Brown’s claim. The Office

denied Brown’s claim because she did not provide sufficient

evidence showing the accident occurred on IRS premises. The

Office explained, however, that Brown could request that the

Office reconsider her claim by providing additional evidence

and filing the request within twelve months of the issuance of

(continued…)

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Brown v. Williams

Williams. Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing that

because the accident occurred on IRS premises, workers’

compensation law precluded the negligence suit under the

exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers’ Compensation

Act (the Act). 3 Brown opposed summary judgment, arguing the

Act did not apply and that the accident did not occur on IRS

premises. Brown arrived at this conclusion because the IRS does

not own the building or parking lot, and a private entity is

responsible for the security of the premises. The district court

granted Williams’s motion for summary judgment, concluding

Brown was entitled to workers’ compensation, because under

recent case law, an employer’s parking lot is considered a part of

its premises; therefore, workers’ compensation was Brown’s

(…continued)

the denial. Williams also attached to his brief a letter from the

Office to Brown outlining the provisional medical payments

Brown received before her claim was denied. Williams argues

the provisional payments bar Brown from obtaining other relief.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that “[b]y definition, if an

employee is collecting workers’ compensation benefits under the

Act, his injury occurred within the course of his employment

because that is a prerequisite to the receipt of benefits.” Stamper

v. Johnson, 2010 UT 26, ¶ 16, 232 P.3d 514. Neither the Office’s

notice of decision, nor the letter outlining the provisional

payments to Brown, were included in the record. We therefore

do not consider them and do not address Williams’s argument.

3. Although Brown and Williams were federal employees and

are not considered to be employees under section 34A-2-104 of

the Utah Workers’ Compensation Act, “[b]y bringing a

negligence action in state court, [Brown] must present a claim

under Utah law and is subject to the restrictions placed on her by

Utah statutes and case law.” Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102, 103 n.1

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

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Brown v. Williams

exclusive remedy. Accordingly, the court dismissed Brown’s

claim with prejudice. Brown appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 Brown raises two issues on appeal. First, she contends the

district court should have applied the “course of employment”

rules under tort law, rather than workers’ compensation law, to

determine whether Brown and Williams acted within the course

of their employment at the time of the accident. “Whether the

district court applied the correct legal standard is a question of

law, which we review for correctness.” Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw.

v. Royal Aloha Int’l, LLC, 2015 UT App 303, ¶ 6, 365 P.3d 161.

¶6 Second, Brown contends summary judgment was

inappropriate because there is a genuine issue of material fact.

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2015). 4 “In cases where the

facts are in dispute, summary judgment is only granted when,

viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing

summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment.”

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991).

“The determination of whether the facts, viewed in this light,

4. Although rule 56 was amended in 2016, we cite the rule that

was in effect at the time the motion was filed. See State v. Clark,

2011 UT 23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829 (“[W]e apply the law as it exists at

the time of the event regulated by the law in question.”).

Williams filed his motion for summary judgment in January

2015, and we therefore cite the 2015 version of rule 56. The

amendment, among other things, moved the language setting

forth the summary judgment standard to subsection (a). See Utah

R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2016). Although it is now found in a new

subsection, the summary judgment standard did not change.

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justify the entry of judgment is a question of law,” which we

review for correctness. Id. at 1039–40.

ANALYSIS

¶7 There are two issues before us. First, whether the district

court correctly applied workers’ compensation law in lieu of tort

law, where Brown brought a negligence suit. Second, whether

the court appropriately granted summary judgment.

I. Applicable Law

¶8 We must determine whether the district court correctly

applied workers’ compensation law instead of tort law. To

decide this issue, we first look to the Act. It states, in relevant

part:

The right to recover compensation pursuant to this

chapter for injuries sustained by an employee,

whether resulting in death or not . . . is the exclusive

remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of

the employer and the liabilities of the employer

imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all

other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or

otherwise, to the employee . . . on account of any

accident or injury or death, in any way contracted,

sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee

in the course of or because of or arising out of the

employee’s employment, and an action at law may

not be maintained against an . . . employee of the

employer based upon any accident, injury, or death

of an employee.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (LexisNexis 2015) (emphases

added). Thus, where an employee has the right to recover

workers’ compensation, this is her exclusive remedy. If the

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injury occurred within the course of employment, the Act

prevents an employee from choosing the arena in which to bring

a claim. In other words, if an employee is injured during the

course of employment, and thus has a right to workers’

compensation, the employee may not forgo that right and

instead bring a tort claim.

¶9 Moreover, as the Utah Supreme Court has stated, the Act

“should be liberally construed,” and where there is doubt as to

whether a worker qualifies as an employee under the Act, it

should be resolved in favor of determining that the worker is an

employee. Utah Home Fire Ins. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77, ¶¶ 18–19,

985 P.2d 243 (determining that a temporary employee qualified

as an employee under the Act); Bennett v. Industrial Comm’n of

Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 428, 430–31 (Utah 1986) (concluding that a

subcontractor’s employee was an employee of the general

contractor for purposes of workers’ compensation).

¶10 To determine whether Brown had the right to workers’

compensation, we must first determine whether, under Utah

law, the accident occurred during the course of employment. See

Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102, 103 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (“In

determining whether or not a federal employee’s acts are within

the scope of his employment, this Court is bound to apply state

law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶11 As a general rule under workers’ compensation law in

Utah, “an employee’s injury does not arise out of and occur in

the course of employment if the injury is sustained while going

to or coming from work.” Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm’n,

2007 UT 4, ¶ 19, 153 P.3d 179. This is referred to as the “coming

and going rule.” Id. ¶ 27. Although this is the general rule, there

are some exceptions. Relevant to our case is the “premises rule”

exception. Under the premises rule, “the accident is covered if it

occurs on the employer’s premises, even if the employee has not

yet arrived at his work site or has already left the work site.”

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Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 1985).

Utah courts view the premises rule as a bright line test: if the

accident occurred within the employer’s property lines, the

employee acted within the course of her employment. See id. at

1167. This is “based on the logic that while the employee is on

the employer’s premises, his connection with employment is

both ‘physical and tangible.’” Id. (quoting 1 A. Larson, The Law of

Workmen’s Compensation § 15.12(a) (1985)).

¶12 Applying the premises rule is not uncharted territory for

this court. Indeed, in Hope we applied the premises rule to a

similar set of facts. 756 P.2d at 102–03. There, two federal

government employees were involved in an auto-pedestrian

accident on their way to work. Id. at 102. The plaintiff was struck

by a co-employee’s vehicle while she was walking from the

parking lot to the building. Id. The plaintiff applied for and

received workers’ compensation benefits but also filed a

negligence claim against her co-employee in state court. Id. The

district court granted the co-employee’s motion for summary

judgment, concluding that the workers’ compensation benefits

constituted the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. Id. at 102–03. On

appeal, we held that because the parking lot and building were

on the same property, “both parties were in the scope and course

of their employment when the accident occurred,” and therefore,

the workers’ compensation benefits constituted the plaintiff’s

exclusive remedy. Id. at 103–04.

¶13 Hope is controlling in the present case. 5 There is no

dispute that the accident here occurred within the fenced portion

5. Brown urges us to overturn Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah

Ct. App. 1988), on the ground that the Utah Supreme Court

effectively overruled it in a series of cases. See Ahlstrom v. Salt

Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4, ¶ 1, 73 P.3d 315 (negligence claim

against city by driver who was injured when a police officer’s

(continued…)

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of the IRS property between two co-employees. There is likewise

no dispute that the parking lot was designated for IRS

employees. Accordingly, we conclude that the accident occurred

on IRS premises and that Brown has a right to workers’

compensation benefits. Thus, workers’ compensation benefits

are Brown’s exclusive remedy, and the district court properly

dismissed Brown’s negligence claim.

II. Summary Judgment

¶14 Brown argues the district court “made findings of fact on

disputed issues of critically important fact,” and that summary

judgment is inappropriate. We disagree with Brown’s

characterization of the court’s determinations.

¶15 The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permit a court to grant

summary judgment only where there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

(…continued)

vehicle collided into the driver’s car); Clover v. Snowbird Ski

Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1038 (Utah 1991) (claim by ski resort guest

against the ski resort for injuries caused by resort employee);

Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1989) (claim

by patient against the county for misconduct by her therapist).

Brown’s argument misses the mark. Hope remains good law.

Each of the cases upon which Brown relies involves respondeat

superior claims that did not involve an accident between two co-

employees on their employer’s premises. See Ahlstrom, 2003 UT

4, ¶¶ 6, 15; Clover, 808 P.2d at 1040; Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1055. In

these cases, there was no need to apply workers’ compensation

law, as they were squarely within the province of tort law.

Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court applied the course of

employment rules under tort law, and these cases have no

bearing on Hope or the present case.

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matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2015). But here, there is no

genuine issue of material fact. Brown contends that, because the

IRS did not own and control the premises, including the

building and parking lot, the accident did not occur on IRS

premises. Williams does not dispute that the IRS does not own

and control the building and parking lot, but that is not

dispositive to our analysis. There is likewise no dispute that the

accident occurred within the fenced portion of the IRS premises.

While Brown makes a creative argument, it is a legal argument

cloaked as a factual dispute.

¶16 Even after recognizing that Brown makes a legal

argument, and addressing it in that light, we are not persuaded.

Consider the situation, as here, where an employer rents its

workspace. If ownership and control were dispositive to the

premises rule analysis, the employer’s own building would not

be considered a part of its premises. In addition, Brown does not

cite any case law or direct us to any provision of the Act

requiring that an employer own and control its parking lot to

establish that the space is a part of the employer’s premises. This

stance conflicts with the majority rule applied in these situations:

As to parking lots owned by the employer, or

maintained by the employer for its employees,

practically all jurisdictions now consider them part

of the “premises,” whether within the main

company premises or separated from it. This rule is

by no means confined to parking lots owned,

controlled, or maintained by the employer. The

doctrine has been applied when the lot, although

not owned by the employer, was exclusively used,

or used with the owner’s special permission, or just

used, by the employees of this employer.

2 Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 13.04(2)(a)

(Matthew Bender rev. ed. (2016)) (footnotes omitted). Although

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it appears no Utah case has specifically adopted the majority rule

as it relates to parking lots, we see no reason it would not apply

in the circumstances here. The parking lot rule squarely aligns

with our policy of liberally construing the Act to resolve doubts

in favor of finding that the employee was in the course of

employment. See Utah Home Fire Ins. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77,

¶¶ 18–19, 985 P.2d 243. Accordingly, the court properly granted

summary judgment, as there was no genuine issue of material

fact, and Williams was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We conclude the district court correctly applied workers’

compensation law. In addition, summary judgment was

appropriate because workers’ compensation benefits are

Brown’s exclusive remedy and there were no material issues of

fact for trial.

¶18 Affirmed.

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