Sachin Gupta v. Chad Melloh

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 19-2723

SACHIN GUPTA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHAD MELLOH and

CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:18-cv-00427-JRS-DLP — James R. Sweeney II, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2020 — DECIDED DECEMBER 6, 2021

____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. ∗

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In the process of arresting a highly

inebriated Sachin Gupta, a police officer tugged on his

∗ Former Circuit Judge Barrett was a member of the panel that heard

arguments in this case. Upon her appointment to the Supreme Court, Jus-

tice Barrett was replaced by Judge Rovner, who reviewed the briefing, the

record, and a recording of the oral arguments.

2 No. 19-2723

handcuffed arm causing him to fall forward on his head and

chest and fracture a vertebra in his neck. The officer asserts

that he used a reasonable amount of force on a suspect who

was resisting arrest. Gupta asserts that the use of force was

excessive given that he was not resisting the arrest, and also

intoxicated, unsteady on his feet, and handcuffed with his

hands behind his back. As these conflicting accounts make

clear, there are material disputes of fact that make resolution

of this case on summary judgment inappropriate. We there-

fore reverse and remand to the district court for the appropri-

ate fact finder to determine which version of the facts might

prevail.

I.

Sachin Gupta drank too many alcoholic beverages on a

business trip and found himself extremely intoxicated and

struggling to use his key to open the lobby door of the Micro-

tel Inn in Indianapolis. The problem, however, was not with

the key card to the hotel, but with the fact that Gupta was, in

fact, a guest at a different hotel. Frustrated and belligerent,

Gupta began yelling at the front door clerk, who refused to

open the door and instead called the police. Between the time

Gupta first arrived in the vestibule of the hotel and when the

police arrived, he stumbled and wavered back and forth, at

times balancing himself against the wall. At one point, Gupta

stumbled backwards, and a surveillance video shows him ei-

ther throwing or knocking over a brochure rack onto the floor.

Officer Shawn Cook of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Po-

lice Department arrived at the hotel first. Cook noticed the

overturned brochure rack, and that Gupta was unsteady on

his feet, slurring his speech, and needed to hold on to a coun-

ter to keep from falling. It was readily apparent to Cook that

No. 19-2723 3

Gupta was highly intoxicated. Gupta complied when Cook

asked him to put his hands behind his back and was hand-

cuffed without any resistance, although Cook did need to

hold onto Gupta to steady him. Officer Chad Melloh arrived

a few minutes after Cook. Gupta was still in the same intoxi-

cated state and swaying unsteadily on his feet when Melloh

arrived. When Cook left the vestibule to speak with the hotel

clerk, he asked Melloh to supervise Gupta. Melloh later testi-

fied that he repeatedly asked Gupta to come outside but

Gupta refused and did not move.

At this point, the facts as recited by each party begin to

diverge. According to his brief, Melloh walked over to Gupta

and placed his right hand on Gupta’s left arm and then started

to walk toward the front door urging Gupta to come along.

Under Melloh’s account, Gupta stiffened his body and jerked

back away from the officer at which point Melloh concluded

that Gupta was resisting arrest and decided to give him a

more forceful tug to get him out the door. 1 Gupta, on the other

hand, denies that he resisted arrest and asserts that despite his

lack of resistance, and the fact that the video does not show

him stiffening or jerking his body, Officer Melloh forcefully

and unnecessarily jerked Gupta forward.

All parties agree in large part upon what happened next.

As Officer Melloh forcefully pulled on Gupta’s arm (the

amount of that force is contested), Gupta hurtled forward

and, without the use of his handcuffed arms to break his fall,

hit the floor face-down. Quickly thereafter Officer Melloh

1 Melloh’s version of events changes slightly from the probable cause

affidavit to his affidavit and deposition submitted to the district court. We

briefly detail each iteration of the facts below.

4 No. 19-2723

picked up Gupta by the back of the arms and dragged Gupta

out to the sidewalk and pulled him up into a seated position

on the sidewalk. Melloh asserts that he evaluated Gupta’s

condition before moving him. Gupta argues that the move oc-

curred immediately, without time for assessment. Photo-

graphs taken afterward show blood on the vestibule floor and

blood in Gupta’s nose and mouth. Gupta sustained a fracture

of the C5 vertebra in his neck. He sued Officer Melloh and the

City of Indianapolis claiming that Melloh used excessive force

in effectuating his arrest.

II.

A. The substantive claim of excessive force

The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive

force to seize a person in order to make an arrest. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). “An officer’s use of force

is unreasonable if, judging from the totality of the circum-

stances at the time of the arrest, the officer uses greater force

than was reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrest.” Phil-

lips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2012). A court

must evaluate whether the officer’s actions were objectively

reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

that officer. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (1989). “The test of reason-

ableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of pre-

cise definition or mechanical application.” Id. “[I]ts proper ap-

plication requires careful attention to the facts and circum-

stances of each particular case, including the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is ac-

tively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

Id. And because of this fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, we

have noted that “since the Graham reasonableness inquiry

No. 19-2723 5

nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual

contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, we have held

on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a

matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted spar-

ingly.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir.

2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In other

words, we cannot determine whether Officer Melloh used

greater force than was reasonably necessary during an arrest

until a fact finder resolves how much force he used and what

level of force he needed to use to effectuate the arrest.

This critical inquiry, therefore, requires a resolution of pre-

cisely those facts about which the parties disagree. Melloh as-

serts that Gupta resisted arrest. Gupta says he did not. Where

the material facts specifically averred by one party contradict

the facts averred by a party moving for summary judgment,

the motion must be denied. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497

U.S. 871, 888 (1990). A court’s job on summary judgment is

not to resolve swearing contests or decide which party’s facts

are more likely true. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.

2003). These credibility disputes are for fact finders to resolve.

Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir.

2014).

We have seen before the siren song that tempts courts into

making factual determinations at the summary judgment

phase. See, e.g., Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th

757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[N]o matter how tempting it might

be on summary judgment to be distracted by the sparkle of

seemingly compelling facts, our assigned task is to take the

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”);

Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We must

therefore construe the record in the light most favorable to the

6 No. 19-2723

nonmovant and avoid the temptation to decide which party’s

version of the facts is more likely true.”); Kodish v. Oakbrook

Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 507 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The

temptation is often difficult to resist in cases where the facts

and inferences appear to lead more strongly to one conclusion

than another.”); Payne, 337 F.3d at 771 (“[W]e have warned

before of falling for the trap of weighing conflicting evidence

during a summary judgment proceeding.”). But despite our

innate draw to truth-seeking, we must resist the allure of fact

finding and focus on our one and only task: “to decide, based

on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dis-

pute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne, 337 F.3d at 770 (quot-

ing Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.

1994)). On summary judgment we must take the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party and grant sum-

mary judgment only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-

ment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

In reference to the critical disputed moment, in his brief

Officer Melloh asserts that “[t]he undisputed designated evi-

dence shows that Gupta resisted Officer Melloh’s commands

after he was taken into police custody.” Melloh Brief at 28.

Officer Melloh also argues that “[s]ince Gupta has no memory

of what occurred, he relies solely on speculation and conjec-

ture to refute Officer Melloh’s testimony.” Melloh Brief at 36.

Therefore, Melloh asserts that without any evidence from

Gupta himself, the only facts that this court can use to form

its conclusions must come from the affidavit and the deposi-

tion testimony of Melloh which are that Gupta “tensed his

No. 19-2723 7

muscles” and “jerked back” when Melloh tried to escort him

from the vestibule. Melloh Brief at 35–36. Based on these facts,

he concludes, we must affirm Melloh’s version of events and

grant summary judgment for him. This is simply false. Taking

the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

does not mean that the facts must come only from the non-

moving party. Sometimes the facts taken in the light most fa-

vorable to the non-moving party come from the party moving

for summary judgment or from other sources. Although it is

certainly true that a court need not give credence to facts

based on speculation or conjecture (see Eaton v. J. H. Findorff &

Son, Inc., 1 F.4th 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2021)), in this case, the facts

in the light most favorable to Gupta do not come from his con-

jecture, but rather come from three sources: first, the video ev-

idence; second, Melloh’s affidavit, and third, Melloh’s depo-

sition testimony. Gupta has satisfied the requirement that he

identify specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a

genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Grant v. Trustees

of Indiana Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). 2

2 Melloh’s brief also claims that Gupta failed to cite to any surveillance

video depicting the alleged events, and thus the only designated evidence

that establishes what transpired off camera are the deposition testimony

and affidavits from Officer Melloh and the hotel clerk, Jan Eweda. See

Melloh Brief at 22. But Gupta did indeed cite to the surveillance video—

by our count, more than forty times, and extensively and specifically cites

to these particular events on the surveillance video at page 9 of his brief.

See Gupta Brief at 5–16. Although it would have been helpful had he re-

peated the specific page number references in his argument section (as

opposed to simply in the fact section), his failure to do so does not mean

that the surveillance video evidence is not part of the record evidence that

Gupta has presented in his brief.

In addition, Melloh’s various claims that Gupta has waived other ar-

guments are based on an overly technical application of waiver. “Waiver

8 No. 19-2723

The critical moment on which we must focus lasts only

seconds—when Officer Melloh placed his hands on Gupta’s

arm and pulled him forward. Depending on which version of

the story one credits, that pull was either an appropriate and

reasonable use of force to subdue an actively resisting suspect

or was an unreasonable and excessive use of force against a

passive, compliant, intoxicated suspect whom the police

made vulnerable to injury by handcuffing his hands behind

his back.

Most of the incident was recorded by an audio-less video

recorder in the hotel vestibule. See R. 49-18, 49-19. It is true

that the video evidence does not hand a slam dunk to either

party; the video camera is positioned such that only the top of

Gupta’s head is visible for a good portion of the video, includ-

ing the critical moment when Gupta allegedly resisted arrest

and when Melloh allegedly used excessive force. Neverthe-

less, a viewer can see the general movement of the bodies and

the immediate aftermath of that movement. A reasonable ju-

ror could determine any number of things from that video,

including that Gupta did not resist arrest, did not stiffen and

jerk backwards, and that Officer Melloh deliberately knocked

Gupta to the ground and jumped on top of him. A reasonable

jury could also conclude both that Officer Melloh could see

visible signs that Gupta was unsteady on his feet, and had

other clues that Gupta was impaired. Furthermore, a juror

might also conclude that the events occurring on the video

did not match Officer Melloh’s testimony in his deposition

is not meant as an overly technical appellate hurdle, and the nuances of a

litigant’s arguments may differ from their stance in the district court with-

out resulting in waiver.” Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott

Lab'ys, Inc., 782 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).

No. 19-2723 9

and affidavit about what happened, or the probable cause af-

fidavit drafted shortly after the event.3 In short, the video is

far from conclusive and reasonable jurors could certainly dis-

agree about what it reveals about the events of the night.

In his brief, Officer Melloh states, “It defies reason to con-

tend that the video depicts Officer Melloh ‘forcibly pulling

him forward,’ when the video only depicts the tops of their

heads.” Melloh Brief at 21. Yet at oral argument, Melloh’s law-

yer conceded, “I believe that the video does conclusively

demonstrate that Officer Melloh forcibly grabbed Mr. Gupta

after Mr. Gupta failed to comply with Officer Melloh’s com-

mands to exit the lobby. I don’t think there is any dispute

about that.” Oral argument at 14:00–14:25. And, in fact, based

on Officer Melloh’s affidavit and testimony, his counsel’s con-

clusion must be correct. For example, in Melloh’s affidavit he

describes this critical moment as follows:

I calmly walked back over to Gupta and placed

my right hand on Gupta’s arm. I then started to

walk towards the direction of the front door and

said “Come on” [a] couple of times. Gupta stiff-

ened his body and jerked back away from me.

At that point, Gupta was actively resisting my

commands to leave, so I decided to give him [a]

more forceful tug to get him moving towards

the door.

3 Although the vestibule video lacks audio, a guest of the hotel rec-

orded a cell phone video recording that includes audio, but lacks any

views of Gupta himself. Put together, the audio-less videotape from the

vestibule and the visually-lacking audio from the cell phone recording

give a fuller account of the situation than either alone. See R. 49–20.

10 No. 19-2723

R. 49-1 at 2.

In describing this same critical moment in his deposition,

he says, “I casually just walked over, and that’s when I put

my hand on his arm to try to, you know, nudge him to come

with me.” R. 49-8 at 13. He then describes using his right hand

on Gupta’s left bicep with

just a firm hold, but not squeezing real hard and

just trying to get him to come with me. I’m

nudging him, I’m leaning forward and using

my arm to nudge him forward to come with me.

I’m trying to make a step. … And he tenses his

muscles, you know, flinches, tenses his muscles

and doesn’t move. I do another lean, another

nudge. “Come on, let’s go,” and that’s when he

jerks—he jerks back; still being tense, but he

jerks in the opposite direction. …And I mean

then I realized he was going to be an active re-

sister. He’s actively resisting. So then I just gave

him another tug, a stronger tug to come with

me, a more, you know, “Now we’re leaving.” …

This was more forceful, yes, a lot more forceful.

R. 49-8 at 14-15.

In the video-recorded demonstration that Melloh per-

formed at his deposition, he describes putting his hand on

Gupta’s bicep and saying “come on let’s go” two times while

he gently nudges his arm forward. Deposition Video Demon-

stration at 0:48-0:57; R. 48-21. Melloh describes Gupta jerking

backward three times, once more powerfully. Id. at 1:11–1:27.

These renditions differ slightly from the probable cause affi-

davit which states, “Officer Melloh advised that Gupta pull

No. 19-2723 11

[sic] away from Officer Melloh and he then pulled on Gupta

to keep control of him and he then pulled away a second time.

… Gupta fell face first on the ground and Officer Melloh was

not able to get a firm footing to hold Melloh up.” R. 59-4 at 1.

In short, the video evidence, which Gupta asserts supports his

factual assertions about excessive force, conflicts with

Melloh’s testimony in a number of ways.

The determination of excessive force may also turn on

other material disputes in the case. For example, the parties

appear to disagree about Officer Melloh’s knowledge of the

extent of Gupta’s impairment. Because an analysis of exces-

sive force depends on the unique circumstances that a police

officer encounters at the time of the arrest, a court might con-

sider whether the officer engaged in action that “would not

ordinarily harm an arrestee, [but would] nevertheless cause

pain or injury to the particular individual being placed under

arrest,” for example, one who is inebriated and unsteady on

his feet. Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2009).

This inquiry therefore depends on resolving the fact dispute

about what Officer Melloh understood about Gupta’s level of

impairment due to his intoxication.

Melloh’s position appears to be that only Officer Cook and

not Officer Melloh could have understood the extent of

Gupta’s intoxication and impairment. Melloh Brief at 20–21.

Gupta, however, notes that the surveillance video demon-

strates that he was swaying and almost fell when Melloh was

standing just in front of Gupta. Gupta Brief at 7 (citing Sur-

veillance Video 2 at 00:36:45-00:38-44; R. 49-18), and that both

officers testified that they knew Gupta was intoxicated and

that they could not understand what he was saying at times.

Gupta also points to Melloh’s deposition testimony in which

12 No. 19-2723

he admitted that based on his own observations, he con-

cluded that Gupta was intoxicated, explaining that “[a]s soon

as I walked in, I definitely smelled the strong odor of an alco-

holic beverage, and just his mannerisms and his anger and his

outbursts made me believe he was intoxicated on alcohol.”

R. 49-8 at 11–12.

Thus, to recap, when we take the undisputed facts in the

light most favorable to Gupta we have the following scenario:

Gupta was highly intoxicated, struggling to keep his balance,

handcuffed with his hands behind his back, and standing

amidst a floor full of glossy brochures and an overturned bro-

chure rack when Officer Melloh grabbed his arm with one

hand and forcibly tugged him forward causing him to fall and

fracture his neck. Here we have essential material facts in dis-

pute: Gupta asserts that he was not resisting arrest and that

the extent of his impairment was obvious. Melloh alleges that

Gupta was resisting arrest and that he had no reason to know

how unsteady he was, and thus the level of force he used to

move him was reasonable in light of the circumstances.

The district court thus erred when it concluded that Gupta

was non-compliant and that Melloh’s force was “minimal.”

R. 86, Order at 6, 8. These were contested factual determina-

tions. We can conclude, therefore, that summary judgment is

inappropriate in this case where there are disputes of material

fact about the level of force used and the amount of force nec-

essary that are essential to the question of the reasonable use

of force. 4

4 The parties also dispute whether the training Melloh received on

how to treat intoxicated, back-handcuffed suspects is relevant to the dis-

trict court’s determination of the substantive claim of excessive force or

No. 19-2723 13

B. Qualified Immunity

For this same reason, it is impossible to conclude on sum-

mary judgment whether Melloh was entitled to qualified im-

munity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects govern-

ment officials from liability for civil damages in situations in

which their conduct does not violate a clearly established stat-

utory or constitutional right. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231 (2009). Qualified immunity under § 1983 extends to police

officers unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or consti-

tutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was

“clearly established at the time.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.

658, 664 (2012). We need not consider the prongs in order.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. “’Clearly established’ means that, at

the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was ‘sufficiently

clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing’ is unlawful.” D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,

589 (2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

In order to be “clearly established, there need not be a case

directly on point but existing precedent must make the ques-

tion beyond debate.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, No. 20-1539,

2021 WL 4822662, at *2 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2021). “This inquiry

‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case,

not as a broad general proposition.’” Id. (quoting Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)). In other words,

in the Fourth Amendment context, an officer will have to de-

termine “how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force,

will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Kisela

v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (finding that it was far

from obvious that shooting an erratic woman swinging a

the determination of qualified immunity. We find it unnecessary to re-

solve that question.

14 No. 19-2723

large kitchen knife near others would violate the Fourth

Amendment).

As the Supreme Court noted, its Fourth Amendment juris-

prudence recognizes that some amount of physical coercion

might be necessary in order to effectuate an arrest, but that

“its proper application requires careful attention to the facts

and circumstances of each particular case, including the se-

verity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an im-

mediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. “The calculus of

reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that po-

lice officers are often forced to make split-second judg-

ments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rap-

idly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in

a particular situation.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting Gra-

ham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). “[I]n an obvious case, these stand-

ards can ‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without a body

of relevant case law.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199. But ordinarily,

as we noted, the result “depends very much on the facts of

each case.” Id. at 201.

In this case, the crime was not at all severe; it involved

public drunkenness. Gupta was loud and obnoxious, and per-

haps had caused some mess and disorder in the lobby, but he

had quickly and readily succumbed to handcuffing. Gupta

did not pose a threat to the officers or others—he was hand-

cuffed with his hands behind his back and there was no one

in the immediate vicinity. There was no immediate need to

move him, and no split-second judgment was required. The

circumstances were not tense, uncertain, or rapidly evolving.

It was almost one o’clock in the morning when the events

No. 19-2723 15

occurred, and although a pizza delivery team arrived to de-

liver pizza, the entrance to the hotel was otherwise empty. Of-

ficer Cook had just stepped inside to talk with the front desk

clerk and would have been available within minutes to help

escort Gupta. No crowd had gathered; Gupta was not threat-

ening violence; there were no environmental factors making

it important to vacate quickly. And, most critically, according

to Gupta, he was not evading arrest.

The evaluation of qualified immunity therefore requires

the same assessment of the material fact at issue in this case

on the substantive claim of excessive force. It “requires careful

attention to the facts and circumstances” of the situation in

which Officer Melloh found himself, including, the severity

of the crime and how much of a risk Gupta posed to himself,

the officer, and others, and most importantly for our pur-

poses, it includes an assessment of whether Gupta was ac-

tively resisting arrest. Graham, 490 U.S.at 396. Our case law

has long put police officers on notice that they “do not have

the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens

without any provocation whatsoever,” Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d

1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996), and that significant force is unrea-

sonable after a suspect is subdued or has stopped resisting or

evading arrest or is, at most, passively resisting arrest. Miller

v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2014). But in this case,

we have no concessions about the facts of provocation or re-

sistance that would allow us to determine reasonableness as

a matter of law.

C. Allegations of a falsified affidavit

The district court also granted summary judgment to

Melloh on Gupta’s claim that Melloh violated his Fourth

Amendment rights by falsifying allegations in the probable

16 No. 19-2723

cause affidavit. The district court called this a claim for “un-

reasonable prosecution.” Melloh refers to it as a “malicious

prosecution” claim. We have noted that after the Supreme

Court case in Manuel, “’Fourth Amendment malicious prose-

cution’ is the wrong characterization. There is only a Fourth

Amendment claim—the absence of probable cause that

would justify the detention.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois,

903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet,

Illinois, 137 S. Ct. 911, 917–20 (2017)).

The briefing and discussions of this claim are a bit mud-

dled, perhaps because the law on malicious prosecution was

evolving in the Supreme Court and in this court just as this

case was progressing. See id. Nevertheless, we can boil our

conclusions down to a few simple observations. First, the Su-

preme Court decision in Manuel, makes clear that a plaintiff

can bring a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful detention

either before or after the start of the legal proceedings. Ma-

nuel, 137 S. Ct. at 918–19. Second, falsifying the factual basis

for a judicial probable-cause determination violates the

Fourth Amendment. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477

(7th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).

It should be clear by this point that however this claim is

framed, it also cannot be decided on summary judgment. We

cannot determine whether Melloh violated Gupta’s Fourth

Amendment rights unless we know whether he falsified the

evidence needed for the probable cause determination, and

that, in turn, depends on resolution of a contested factual dis-

pute—whether or not Gupta resisted arrest. As we have con-

cluded, that is a material disputed fact to be resolved at trial.

No. 19-2723 17

D. State law battery claim

Our conclusions thus far should make our last determina-

tion equally obvious. Indiana’s excessive force standard effec-

tively parallels the federal Fourth Amendment. See O'Bannon

v. City of Anderson, 733 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Walsh

v. City of Michigan City, No. 3:19-CV-419 DRL-MGG, 2021 WL

1854378, at *4 (N.D. Ind. May 10, 2021); Bowden v. Town of

Speedway, Ind., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1110 (S.D. Ind. 2008); Fid-

ler v. City of Indianapolis, 428 F. Supp. 2d 857, 866 (S.D. Ind.

2006). The Indiana Supreme Court has held that because the

Indiana Code limits police officers to using only the force that

is reasonable to effectuate an arrest, an officer’s use of exces-

sive or unreasonable force is not shielded from liability or

subject to immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. Wil-

son v. Isaacs, 929 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ind. 2010). The state law bat-

tery claim rises or falls on the resolution of the same disputed

material facts as the federal claim. For this reason, we

REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings before the

district court.