CountiesCommissioner County Powers –Whether Commissioner Counties May Provide for a Different Definition of "Newspaper" than Provided in Section 1-113 of The General Provisions Article – Whether a Change in the Definition of "Newspaper" Would Be an "Administrative Act" that Could Be Taken Without a Public Hearing

Gen. 111] 111

COUNTIES

COMMISSIONER COUNTY POWERS – WHETHER COMMISSIONER

COUNTIES MAY PROVIDE FOR A DIFFERENT DEFINITION

OF “NEWSPAPER” THAN PROVIDED IN SECTION 1-113 OF

THE GENERAL PROVISIONS ARTICLE – WHETHER A

CHANGE IN THE DEFINITION OF “NEWSPAPER” WOULD BE

AN “ADMINISTRATIVE ACT” THAT COULD BE TAKEN

WITHOUT A PUBLIC HEARING

November 5, 2021

The Honorable James Randy Guy

President, Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary’s County

On behalf of the Board of County Commissioners of St.

Mary’s County, you requested our opinion on two questions

concerning the County Commissioners’ power to define the terms

“newspaper” and “newspaper in general circulation.” First, you

ask whether the County Commissioners may adopt a definition of

those terms that is less restrictive than the definition in Md. Code

Ann., Gen. Prov. (“GP”) § 1-113, which applies, “[u]nless

otherwise provided,” to any “law, resolution, or court order,

judgment, or decree that refers to publishing a legal advertisement

or legal notice.” Second, assuming the County Commissioners

may adopt a different definition of “newspaper” and “newspaper in

general circulation,” you ask whether that redefinition would be an

“administrative act” that the County Commissioners may take

without holding a public hearing under Md. Code Ann., Local

Gov’t (“LG”) § 9-105.

As to your first question, we read GP § 1-113 to be exactly

what it appears to be—a default definition of two terms that often

appear in Maryland’s general and local laws. Although the

definition in GP § 1-113 applies “[u]nless otherwise provided,”

we do not read that phrase as delegating power to local

governments. Rather, the phrase merely recognizes a general

principle applicable to statutory definitions—that a particular law

may supplant a general definition with its own, specific definition.

Section 1-113’s definition therefore applies to a law that uses the

term “newspaper” or “newspaper in general circulation” “[u]nless

otherwise provided” in that law itself, which in turn means that a

legislative body can change the default definition only if it has

power to amend that other law. We also do not read § 9-107 of the

Local Government Article—which grants St. Mary’s County the

112 [106 Op. Att’y

authority to “provide for advertising, printing, and publishing

of . . . laws, ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted by the

county”—as authorizing the County to amend requirements on

advertising in “newspapers” that are imposed by State law,

including the criteria in GP § 1-113.

On that understanding, the St. Mary’s County Commissioners

may not redefine “newspaper” and “newspaper in general

circulation” for purposes of laws that the General Assembly has

enacted, including both public general and public local laws,

because commissioner counties lack the authority to amend the

General Assembly’s enactments. The County Commissioners may

generally redefine those terms for purposes of local ordinances that

the commissioners themselves have enacted. Even then, however,

if the local ordinance is based on a State enabling statute that

mandates notice in a “newspaper” or “newspaper in general

circulation,” the ordinance must conform to the enabling statute,

and thus must follow the definition in GP § 1-113 unless the

particular enabling statute provides otherwise. In other words, if

the St. Mary’s County Commissioners wish to change the

definition of “newspaper” or “newspaper in general circulation” in

a statute enacted by the General Assembly, they must seek action

from the General Assembly.

As to your second question, we conclude that a legislative act,

such as amending an ordinance, cannot be an “administrative act”

within the meaning of LG § 9-105. Because the definition of

“newspaper” in GP § 1-113 is incorporated into ordinances unless

the ordinance “otherwise provide[s],” a change to the definition of

“newspaper” in a local ordinance would constitute an amendment

to that ordinance and would therefore be a legislative act subject to

the public-hearing requirement.

I

Background

A. Commissioner Counties

Maryland has three forms of county government: “charter

home rule” counties are governed by Article XI-A of the

Constitution, “code home rule” counties are governed by Article

XI-F, and counties that have not chosen to adopt either form of

home rule are “commissioner counties,” governed by Article VII.

St. Mary’s County is among the counties that have chosen to retain

the traditional “commissioner county” form of government. As the

name indicates, a commissioner county is governed by an elected

Gen. 111] 113

Board of County Commissioners, which has both legislative and

executive authority. E.g., County Comm’rs for Carroll County v.

Forty West Builders, Inc., 178 Md. App. 328, 338-39 (2008).

In non–home rule counties, the powers and duties of the

county commissioners “shall be such as now are or may be

hereafter prescribed by law,” i.e., by the General Assembly. Md.

Const., Art. VII, § 2. The county commissioners may exercise only

those powers that the General Assembly has expressly granted by

statute, along with any implied powers that are necessary to carry

out their express powers. E.g., 89 Opinions of the Attorney General

48, 49 (2004). Statutory grants of power to commissioner counties

are strictly construed. E.g., 89 Opinions of the Attorney General at

50.

The General Assembly has delegated a range of powers to

the St. Mary’s County Commissioners. These include the power to

impose and collect a property tax, LG § 16-109; the power to define

violations punishable as misdemeanors or civil infractions, id.

§ 12-804; the power to adopt a zoning code, Md. Code Ann., Land

Use (“LU”) §§ 4-102, 4-103; and authority over roads in the

county, LG § 12-503; St. Mary’s County Code, ch. 109. As is

especially relevant here, the County Commissioners also have the

power to “provide for advertising, printing, and publishing of . . .

laws, ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted by the

county.” LG § 9-107(c).

But because St. Mary’s County is a commissioner county, the

General Assembly retains plenary authority and may regulate the

county “in virtually any manner it sees fit.” 76 Opinions of the

Attorney General 137, 137 (1991) (quoting 62 Opinions of the

Attorney General 275, 279 (1977)). In addition to enacting “public

general laws” applicable to the entire State or to multiple

commissioner counties, the General Assembly may enact “public

local laws” applicable to a single commissioner county. See, e.g.,

Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 428-29 (1968); see also

GP § 1-206 (noting that a public local law enacted by the General

Assembly takes precedence over a public general law in the event

of a conflict). Public local laws are usually codified in the county

code rather than the Maryland Code. See St. Mary’s County Code,

Div. 1. The County Commissioners, in turn, may enact ordinances

to carry out properly delegated powers and to “implement and

facilitate and insure the proper execution” of public general laws

and public local laws enacted by the General Assembly. See Scull

v. Montgomery Citizens League, 249 Md. 271, 281-82 (1968). But

114 [106 Op. Att’y

a public general or public local law enacted by the General

Assembly prevails over a local ordinance in the event of a conflict,

because “County Commissioners may only perform acts expressly

or impliedly permitted or conferred on them by the General

Assembly.” 43 Opinions of the Attorney General 138, 138 (1958).

B. Notice by Newspaper Publication

When delegating powers to counties, the General Assembly

often prescribes procedures for the exercise of those powers. One

common requirement is that before exercising a particular power,

a county must publish notice of its proposed action in a

“newspaper” or “newspaper in general circulation.” For instance,

the St. Mary’s County Commissioners must annually hold public

hearings on the proposed county budget and must publish notice of

those hearings in one or more “newspapers of general circulation.”

St. Mary’s County Code § 27-5. The County Commissioners must

also publish newspaper notice before enacting ordinances in the

exercise of certain delegated powers. LG § 9-105(c)(2). Some

ordinances adopted by the County Commissioners themselves also

contain newspaper notice requirements. For example, the St.

Mary’s County Zoning Ordinance requires notice in a “newspaper

of general circulation” of a public hearing on any proposed

amendments to the zoning ordinance. St. Mary’s County Zoning

Ord. § 21.3.1.

Section 1-113 of the General Provisions Article defines

“newspaper” and “newspaper in general circulation” as follows:

Unless otherwise provided, in a law,

resolution, or court order, judgment, or decree

that refers to publishing a legal advertisement

or legal notice, words such as “newspaper” or

“newspaper in general circulation” mean a

publication that:

(1) has at least four pages;

(2) habitually contains news items, reports of

current events, editorial comments,

advertising matter, and other

miscellaneous information that is of

public interest and is found generally in

an ordinary newspaper;

(3) has been published and distributed, by

sale, from an established place of

business at least once a week for 6

Gen. 111] 115

months or more before publication of the

advertisement or notice;

(4) has general circulation throughout the

community where the publication is

published; and

(5) qualifies for Periodicals rates for mailing

through the United States Postal Service.

GP § 1-113(a). 1

Governments have traditionally used newspapers to give

formal public notice of their activities, especially activities that

could affect private rights. See Lauren A. Rieders, Old Principles,

New Technology, and the Future of Notice in Newspapers, 38

Hofstra L. Rev. 1009, 1010 (2010). Maryland, in particular, has a

long history of newspaper notice requirements. In 1784, for

example, the General Assembly directed the Baltimore Town

Commissioners to hold a public hearing on a local matter but only

after “giving twenty days[’] notice in the Baltimore news-papers.”

1784 Md. Laws, ch. 46. The early nineteenth century saw the

General Assembly adopt more general laws providing for

newspaper notice. See, e.g., 1805 Md. Laws, ch. 110 (newspaper

notice of insolvency petitions). The Constitution of 1867, as

originally ratified, contained a variety of newspaper notice

requirements. Md. Const. (1867) Art. II, § 20 (applications for

pardons); Art. VI, § 4 (cash balances in the Treasury); Art. XIV,

§ 1 (constitutional amendments).

Over time, the General Assembly began to impose newspaper

notice requirements on the counties as well, including St. Mary’s,

see, e.g., 1904 Md. Laws, ch. 401 (real estate tax sales); 1912 Md.

Laws, ch. 209 (sale of surplus road construction equipment), but

the Legislature also tightly controlled counties’ spending on

newspaper advertising, see, e.g., 1878 Md. Laws, ch. 290

(authorizing St. Mary’s County to spend up to $700 per year on

newspaper publication).

One recurring problem, both in Maryland and elsewhere, was

how to define a “newspaper” or “newspaper in general circulation”

given the many print publications available at the time. See Dale

R. Agthe, Annotation, What Constitutes Newspaper of “General

1

As discussed further below, a different definition applies in Prince

George’s County. GP § 1-113(b).

116 [106 Op. Att’y

Circulation” Within Meaning of State Statutes, 24 A.L.R.4th 822

(1983). The stakes could be high: in 1919, Baltimore City’s new

home rule charter was unsuccessfully challenged on the ground that

the newspapers where it was published before the election were not

newspapers of general circulation. Williams v. Broening, 135 Md.

226, 229 (1919).

In 1941, therefore, the General Assembly enacted the

predecessor of today’s GP § 1-113, entitled “an Act . . . defining

the publications in which legal notices and legal advertising shall

be inserted.” 1941 Md. Laws, ch. 905. The act added a new section

to the Code—Article 76, § 8—which provided that “[a]s used in

any law, ordinance, resolution, decree, or order of court, the term

‘paper,’ ‘newspaper,’ ‘newspaper in general circulation,’

‘newspaper devoted to the dissemination of general news,’ or terms

of similar import, shall be defined as a publication having the

following requirements,” and then listed the five criteria of today’s

GP § 1-113, which have not changed in substance.

In 1984, as part of the code revision process that created the

State Government Article, the definition of “newspaper” was

moved to Section 28 of Article 1 (“Rules of Interpretation”). 1984

Md. Laws, ch. 284, § 9. The introductory clause was edited to read:

In a law, resolution, or court order or decree

that refers to publishing a legal advertisement

or legal notice, words such as ‘paper’,

‘newspaper’, ‘newspaper in general

circulation’, or ‘newspaper devoted to the

dissemination of general news’ mean, unless

otherwise provided, a publication that . . . .

Id. The same five criteria followed. Id. The Revisor’s Note

indicated that these changes were not intended to substantively

alter the statute’s meaning. Id. (Revisor’s Note to Art. 1, § 28).

The Revisor’s Note also explained that “the phrase ‘unless

otherwise provided’ is added to note generally that, e.g., the law

that requires publication may expressly define ‘newspaper’ to have

another meaning.” Id.

The only substantive change came in 2001, when the General

Assembly provided an alternative definition of “newspaper in

general circulation” for purposes of public general laws in Prince

Gen. 111] 117

George’s County. 2 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 709. While that legislation

was pending, our Office advised a member of the House of

Delegates that because Prince George’s County is a charter home

rule county, an act of the General Assembly would be necessary

only to change the definition of “newspaper” for purposes of public

general law, and not for purposes of public local law or local

ordinances. Letter from Robert A. Zarnoch, Counsel to the General

Assembly, to Del. Obie Patterson (Mar. 14, 2001) (“Patterson

Letter”). The advice letter reasoned that the statutory definition of

“newspaper in general circulation” “does not preempt this area of

the law” because it “state[s] a rule of construction ‘unless otherwise

provided,’” and that “implicit in the express powers of the charter

counties to legislate is the authority to specify notice rules

governing the administration of its own ordinances.” Id. at 1-2.

Finally, in 2014, as part of the code revision process that

created the General Provisions Article, the General Assembly

transferred the definition to its current location at GP § 1-113, and

adopted its current wording as set forth above. 2014 Md. Laws, ch.

94, § 2. The introductory clause was revised somewhat, including

by moving the phrase “unless otherwise provided” to the

beginning, but the changes were again intended as non-substantive.

Id. § 4.

II

Analysis

You have explained that the St. Mary’s County

Commissioners wish to adopt a definition of “newspaper” that

would omit the requirement in GP § 1-113(a)(3) that a newspaper

be distributed “by sale,” such that St. Mary’s County would be able

2

Specifically, Chapter 709 of 2001 added what is now GP § 1-113(b),

which reads: “Subject to subsection (a) of this section and for purposes

of the public general laws of the State, in Prince George’s County,

‘newspaper in general circulation’ includes a newspaper that: (1) is

designated by the County Council as a newspaper of record; or (2)(i)

qualifies under subsection (a) of this section with respect to Prince

George’s County; and (ii) is published by a small business as defined in

§ 14-201 of the State Finance and Procurement Article.” It is our

understanding that, soon after its enactment, subsection (b) was

challenged in circuit court as a violation of the dormant Commerce

Clause of the United States Constitution. See News World

Communications, Inc. v. James, Case No. CAL 01-20482 (Prince

George’s Cir. Ct.). Because subsection (b) is not at issue here, however,

we need not address its constitutionality.

118 [106 Op. Att’y

to publish notices in a free newspaper. With that background, we

turn to your questions: (1) whether St. Mary’s County may adopt

its own definition of “newspaper” and “newspaper in general

circulation” for local purposes, and (2) if so, whether the County

Commissioners may do so without holding a public hearing.

Because commissioner counties’ powers derive entirely from

statute, see 89 Opinions of the Attorney General at 49, the answer

to both of your questions is a matter of statutory interpretation.

“The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and

effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature.” Lockshin

v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274 (2010). In ascertaining legislative

intent, Maryland courts “look first to the language of the statute,

giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.” Sabisch v. Moyer, 466

Md. 327, 350 (2019). However, especially when the language of

the statute is not clear, courts will also consider other “external

manifestations” of legislative intent, including the statute’s context,

legislative history, and “other material that fairly bears on the

fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal.” Kaczorowski v.

Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 (1987).

Where multiple statutes deal with the same subject, we will attempt

to harmonize them to the greatest extent possible. Government

Emps. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm’r, 332 Md. 124, 132 (1993).

A. Local Definition of “Newspaper” and “Newspaper in

General Circulation”

Your first question requires us to consider the relationship

between GP § 1-113—the General Assembly’s definition of

“newspaper” and “newspaper in general circulation”—and the

delegated powers of St. Mary’s County, a commissioner county

without home rule. We begin by considering whether St. Mary’s

County may redefine “newspaper” and “newspaper in general

circulation” for purposes of statutes enacted by the General

Assembly, including public general laws and public local laws. We

then examine whether the County Commissioners may redefine

those terms for purposes of local ordinances. 3 As we will explain,

neither GP § 1-113 nor LG § 9-107—which delegates to counties

the power to “provide for advertising, printing, and publishing” of

certain materials—authorizes St. Mary’s County to amend the

General Assembly’s enactments, including the statutory definition

of “newspaper” incorporated into those enactments. The County

3

For the sake of conciseness, in the remainder of this opinion we will

primarily refer to the word “newspaper,” but the same analysis applies

to the phrase “newspaper in general circulation” or any other similar

phrases intended to be covered by the definition in GP § 1-113.

Gen. 111] 119

Commissioners may, however, adopt a definition of “newspaper”

in local ordinances that departs from GP § 1-113’s default, unless

the local ordinance’s publication requirement implements a State

statute that itself requires publication in a “newspaper.”

1. Local Authority to Redefine “Newspaper” for

Purposes of State Laws

We first consider whether St. Mary’s County may redefine the

term “newspaper” for purposes of laws enacted by the General

Assembly. Section 1-113 of the General Provisions Article states

that, “[u]nless otherwise provided,” it governs any “law, resolution,

or court order, judgment, or decree that refers to publishing a legal

advertisement or legal notice.” GP § 1-113(a) (emphasis added).

Both public general laws and public local laws are therefore clearly

within GP § 1-113’s scope.

So what effect does GP § 1-113 have on those public general

and public local laws that use the word “newspaper”? A statutory

definition like GP § 1-113 is generally understood as establishing

the default meaning of a term. That is, although the statutory

definition ordinarily controls the meaning of the term, a specific

law—even one within the scope of the definitional statute—may

contain its own definition of the same term that is intended to

control in that specific context. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 141

Md. App. 371, 378-79 (2001) (“The language of [a] specific section

prevails over the definition . . . in [a] general definitions

section[.]”); cf. Bostetter v. Fahrney-Keedy Mem’l Home for the

Aged, Inc., 20 Md. App. 234, 241-42 (1974) (standing for the

similar principle that the default statutory definition of a term might

not apply to a specific statute when the context of that specific

statute and other indicia of legislative intent suggest that the term

was intended to have a different meaning); 105 Opinions of the

Attorney General 3, 28 (2020).

But the “default” status of the definition in GP § 1-113 does

not mean local governments have carte blanche to ignore that

definition when the word “newspaper” appears in a State statute.

A statutory definition, when it does apply, is more than a mere

interpretative suggestion; it is part of the law. So when a law uses

a statutorily defined term, and no legislative intent to adopt a

different definition can be discerned from that law, see Bostetter,

20 Md. App. at 241-42, the statutory definition applies and is

effectively incorporated by reference; it controls the scope of the

law and binds anyone subject to the law. See, e.g., Bryant v. State,

120 [106 Op. Att’y

393 Md. 196, 206 (2006); F.D.R. Srour P’ship v. Montgomery

County, 179 Md. App. 109, 129-30 (2008); Gambo v. Bank of Md.,

102 Md. App. 166, 175, 184 (1994); see also, e.g., National

Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Mosher, 22 P.3d 531,

533 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (“To ignore a definition section is to

refuse to give legal effect to a part of the statutory law of the

state.”); 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland

Statutory Construction § 47:7 (7th ed. 2020) (explaining that a

legislature in enacting a statutory definition “exercises its

legislative power”). 4

A statutory definition such as GP § 1-113’s definition of

“newspaper” thus governs “[u]nless otherwise provided” in the law

that uses the defined term. So, for example, in a statute enacted by

the General Assembly requiring publication of notice in a

“newspaper,” such as LG § 9-105(c)(2) (a public general law) or

Section 27-5 of the St. Mary’s County Code (a public local law),

we look only to the General Assembly’s enactment to determine

whether it has overridden the default definition in GP § 1-113. See

1984 Md. Laws, ch. 284, § 9 (Revisor’s Note to Art. 1, § 28). And

because statutory definitions are part of the law, a legislative body

cannot adopt a conflicting definition for purposes of a particular

law unless it has power to amend that law, i.e., the law that uses the

defined term. 5 This means, as our Office has previously advised,

that a home rule county cannot change the definition of a term as it

is used in public general law. See Patterson Letter, supra, at 1. It

also means, as relevant here, that a commissioner county cannot

change a definition in any law enacted by the General Assembly,

including a public local law, because the County Commissioners

lack power to amend the General Assembly’s enactments. See 43

Opinions of the Attorney General 138, 138 (1958) (“Such powers

as [commissioner counties] have are all delegated and may be

changed or added to only by the Legislature.”).

4

To be clear, the definition itself is also subject to ordinary principles

of statutory interpretation, including consideration in light of context.

See Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615, 623-24 (1949).

5

Administrative agencies are sometimes delegated power to define

terms in a statute. See Maryland Pennysaver Grp., Inc. v. Comptroller,

323 Md. 697, 708 (1991). Even in such cases, however, the agency’s

definition cannot contradict the statute. See, e.g., Fogle v. H & G

Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 453 (1995) (“Agency regulations must be

consistent with the letter and the spirit of the law under which the agency

acts.”). Nor will courts defer to an agency’s regulation interpreting a

statute if the agency’s interpretation conflicts with the unambiguous

terms of the statute. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller,

69 Md. App. 458, 472-73 (1986).

Gen. 111] 121

GP § 1-113’s qualifying phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided”

aligns with that understanding. That phrase, which was added to

the statute during a non-substantive code revision more than forty

years after its enactment, is best understood as merely recognizing

this general principle of statutory interpretation—that a specific

statute may override a general statutory definition—and not as

delegating new authority to commissioner counties to amend the

General Assembly’s enactments. See Comptroller v. Blanton, 390

Md. 528, 538-39 (2006) (changes to statutory wording in code

revision are presumptively non-substantive); 1984 Md. Laws, ch.

284, § 9 (Revisor’s Note to Art. 1, § 28) (explaining that “the

phrase ‘unless otherwise provided’ is added to note generally that,

e.g., the law that requires publication may expressly define

‘newspaper’ to have another meaning” (emphasis added)). GP § 1-

113 no more authorizes commissioner counties to redefine

“newspaper” in statutes enacted by the General Assembly than it

authorizes them to delete a statutory “newspaper” publication

requirement altogether.

But that conclusion does not end our analysis, even as to State

statutes; we must also consider whether LG § 9-107 delegates

authority that GP § 1-113 does not. As noted above, that statute

grants the St. Mary’s County Commissioners authority to “provide

for advertising, printing, and publishing of . . . laws, ordinances,

resolutions, or regulations adopted by the county.” LG § 9-107(c). 6

The question, then, is whether LG § 9-107(c) grants the St. Mary’s

County Commissioners greater power over newspaper notice

requirements than they would otherwise have, including the power

to relax notice requirements imposed by the General Assembly.

Because the statute does not further specify what it means to

“provide for” advertising and printing, we examine its context and

history. The General Assembly enacted the predecessor of LG § 9-

107 in 1947, as part of a new code of delegated powers for the

commissioner counties. 1947 Md. Laws, ch. 730; see Md.

Legislative Council, Report to the General Assembly of 1945, pt.

II, at 37-38; id. pt. III, at 148-50. 7 One reason for Chapter 730’s

6

As we will explain later in Part II.B of our opinion, although the

statute’s text refers only to particular categories of publication, the

provision is best read as also extending to other categories of publication

that are not explicitly enumerated, including newspaper notices.

7

Numerous counties, including St. Mary’s County, were originally

excluded from Chapter 730’s grant of powers. 1947 Md. Laws, ch. 730,

§ 1. These exclusions were gradually eliminated, including for St.

Mary’s County in 1965. 1965 Md. Laws, ch. 228.

122 [106 Op. Att’y

enactment was that counties, fearing strict application of the rule

that all expenditures by the county commissioners require

legislative authorization, would request at each session a large

volume of bills authorizing expenditures for particular purposes.

Md. Legislative Council, The Problem of Local Legislation in

Maryland 8 (1940); see Peter v. Prettyman, 62 Md. 566, 571, 576-

77 (1884) (holding Montgomery County Commissioners could not

pay Clerk of the Circuit Court for preparing an index of real

property instruments without legislative authorization). Chapter

730 therefore delegated to the counties the authority to provide for

matters of recurring expenditure, see The Problem of Local

Legislation, supra, at 8, such as newspaper notices, 1947 Md.

Laws, ch. 730 (enacting Art. 25, § 2A(j)).

But nothing in the text, context, or history of what would

become LG § 9-107(c) indicates that the General Assembly meant

to grant counties authority to alter or relax procedural limitations it

had imposed on other powers delegated to the counties, such as a

requirement that notice of certain actions be published in a

“newspaper” as defined by GP § 1-113. Indeed, we have at least

three reasons to doubt such a delegation occurred.

First, a statute enabling commissioner counties to relax or

repeal statutorily prescribed procedural limitations on their own

powers—such as the requirement that the county give notice of

certain actions in a newspaper satisfying all of GP § 1-113’s

criteria—could raise constitutional concerns. Only the General

Assembly can increase the powers of the commissioner counties.

See Md. Const., Art. VII, § 2; 43 Opinions of the Attorney General

at 138. And only home rule counties have express constitutional

authority to amend public local laws the Legislature has enacted,

while no local government has express constitutional authority to

amend public general laws. See Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3; Art.

XI-F, § 3. A statute authorizing commissioner counties to delete

procedural restrictions in their own enabling legislation would raise

questions under both of those principles. When possible, we avoid

interpreting statutes in a manner that calls their constitutionality

into doubt. See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewery

Co., 308 Md. 746, 763 (1987).

Second, interpreting LG § 9-107 as authorizing commissioner

counties to alter procedural requirements the General Assembly

has imposed on the counties’ own powers would also run afoul of

the rule that the delegated powers of commissioner counties should

be strictly construed. See 89 Opinions of the Attorney General at

50; cf. 76 Opinions of the Attorney General at 140-41 (concluding

that the power to impose civil remedies, as a power not normally

Gen. 111] 123

delegated to commissioner counties, would not be implied in the

absence of an express grant from the Legislature); 43 Opinions of

the Attorney General at 138-39 (same for power to impose

penalties).

Third, Chapter 730, when read as a whole, suggests an overall

intent to preserve the fundamentals of the relationship between the

State and commissioner counties—allowing such counties to adopt

and amend ordinances implementing public general and public

local laws while still requiring them to comply in full with the

requirements of the enabling laws themselves. See Md. Legislative

Council, Local Government: A Comparative Study 55 (1944)

(explaining that the legislative proposal that became Chapter 730

“would introduce nothing unusual or novel into county

government” and that the powers it would confer “already are

conferred upon many counties in Maryland”). Indeed, no other

provision of Chapter 730 appears to delegate power to loosen legal

requirements imposed by the Legislature; on the contrary, several

of the provisions of Chapter 730 were expressly subjected to

existing public local law. Subsection (c), for example, empowered

counties “[t]o grant franchises as provided under existing Public

General or Public Local Laws,” and subsection (d) authorized them

“[t]o provide for the appointment and removal of all county officers

and employees except those whose appointment or election is

provided for by the Constitution or Public General or Public Local

Laws.” 1947 Md. Laws, ch. 730. For those reasons, we do not read

LG § 9-107 as delegating power to local jurisdictions to define

“newspaper” differently from GP § 1-113 for purposes of State

statutes that follow the default definition.

In sum, then, when a public general or public local law

enacted by the General Assembly incorporates GP § 1-113’s

default definition, the St. Mary’s County Commissioners may not

alter it. Section 1-113’s “[u]nless otherwise provided” language

merely recognizes that the State statute itself may define

“newspaper” differently, and LG § 9-107 does not delegate to

commissioner counties the authority to amend the Legislature’s

enactments.

2. Local Authority to Redefine “Newspaper” for

Purposes of Local Ordinances

We next consider whether the County Commissioners may

adopt a new definition of “newspaper” for purposes of local

ordinances that currently use GP § 1-113’s default definition.

124 [106 Op. Att’y

Section 1-113’s text does not expressly include local ordinances,

so the statute is ambiguous as to whether it applies to such

ordinances by default. But the statute’s history confirms that it

includes local ordinances as well as General Assembly enactments.

As originally enacted, the statute explicitly covered “ordinance[s]”

as well as “law[s].” 1941 Md. Laws, ch. 905. The word

“ordinance” was deleted during the code revision process, and

there is no evidence that the deletion was meant to change the

statute’s meaning. See 1984 Md. Laws, ch. 284, § 9; Blanton, 390

Md. at 538-39. Although the Revisor’s Note does not explain the

change, the reasoning may have been that the word “law” already

encompassed all enactments with the force of law, including valid

local ordinances. See Herman v. Mayor & City Council of

Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 195 (1947) (“[A]n ordinance passed in

pursuance of express legislative authority is a law within the

meaning of the Constitution[.]”); cf. Secretary, Dep’t of Pub. Safety

& Corr. Servs. v. Demby, 390 Md. 580, 606-08 (2006) (legislative

regulations can be “laws” subject to the ex post facto prohibition of

Article 17 of the Declaration of Rights). 8 The reference to “law[s]”

in GP § 1-113 is thus best read as including local ordinances.

However, because the power to define or redefine

“newspaper” in legislation—to replace the default definition with

another—flows from the power to amend that legislation, the

County Commissioners may generally alter the definition of

“newspaper” for purposes of local ordinances that the County

Commissioners themselves have passed, assuming that the

ordinance is otherwise within the County Commissioners’

delegated authority. See Patterson Letter, supra, at 1; see also

Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, to Del.

Michael D. Smigiel, Sr., at 3 (July 21, 2011) (“Smigiel Letter”)

(concluding that GP § 1-113 governs publication requirements in

local ordinances “unless the local jurisdiction has adopted a

separate definition”). The St. Mary’s County Commissioners

undoubtedly have power to amend their own ordinances. See Dal

Maso v. Board of County Comm’rs of Prince George’s County, 182

Md. 200, 206-07 (1943). And as we have explained, a particular

law may adopt a specific definition that varies from the definition

provided by a more generally applicable definitional statute. See

McDonald, 141 Md. App. at 378-79; cf. Bostetter, 20 Md. App. at

241-42; 105 Opinions of the Attorney General at 28.

8

But see Police Patrol Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 378

Md. 702, 714-15 (2003) (holding that a local ordinance did not qualify

as “law” under the Public Information Act given the structure of that

specific statute).

Gen. 111] 125

One might argue that GP § 1-113 sets universal standards for

legal notice in Maryland, meaning a local government could not

adopt a different definition even in local legislation it had enacted

on its own initiative or otherwise had the power to amend. Whether

GP § 1-113 should be understood this way is a question of

legislative intent. Cf. Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 332

Md. 279, 300-01 (1993) (whether State has preempted local

legislation in a particular field turns on legislative intent).

In analyzing the intent of GP § 1-113, the first and most

important consideration is its text: the General Assembly put the

statute in the form of a definition. On its face, GP § 1-113 only

defines the specific terms “newspaper” and “newspaper in general

circulation,” and only when one of those terms appears “in a

law . . . that refers to publishing a legal advertisement or legal

notice.” The statute’s form thus suggests that the General

Assembly’s primary intent was simply to provide a default

definition of “newspaper” and “newspaper in general circulation,”

terms that had fostered uncertainty both in Maryland and

elsewhere. See, e.g., 7 Opinions of the Attorney General 183, 183-

84 (1922) (concluding that a newspaper that had only recently

resumed publication after a suspension could still qualify as a

“newspaper”); 24 A.L.R.4th 822 (collecting cases in other states).

Reading GP § 1-113 as a universal rule for legal notice would

also conflict with our prior advice. In 2001, as the Legislature was

considering amending GP § 1-113 to provide a different definition

for Prince George’s County, our Office advised that GP § 1-113

permits a charter home rule county to set its own definition of

“newspaper” for purposes of local laws, but not public general

laws. Patterson Letter, supra, at 1. That advice relied on GP § 1-

113’s use of the phrase “[u]nless otherwise provided,” and on

charter home rule counties’ implied authority to make procedural

rules governing the exercise of their powers. Id. 9 To acknowledge

that distinction, the bill was amended to insert the phrase “for

9

The Express Powers Act, which delegates powers to home rule

counties, also contains a provision similar to LG § 9-107, although the

letter did not reference it. See LG § 10-308 (“A county may provide for

advertising, printing, and publishing of county documents[.]”). In

addition, the Constitution imposes a newspaper-publication requirement

for proposed and amended “laws and ordinances” in charter home rule

jurisdictions other than Baltimore City. Md. Const., Art. XI-A, § 3. For

present purposes, however, we need not interpret LG § 10-308 nor

decide how GP § 1-113 interacts with the constitutional mandate in

Article XI-A, § 3.

126 [106 Op. Att’y

purposes of the public general laws of the State” into the new,

Prince George’s County-specific provision. Amend. No.

182610/1, H.B. 1189, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. A note accompanying

the amendment, as originally introduced, in the bill file explained

that “[n]either the amendment nor the bill affects the existing

authority of the County Council to determine what newspapers are

used for notice required under county ordinances.” Amend. No.

723122/1, H.B. 1189, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. Then, in 2011, our

Office advised again—in response to a question regarding Cecil

County, a commissioner county at the time—that GP § 1-113

governs local publication requirements “unless the local

jurisdiction has adopted a separate definition.” Smigiel Letter,

supra, at 3. Thus, our consistent position has been that, for at least

some local laws, local governments can set their own definition of

“newspaper,” GP § 1-113 notwithstanding.

We recognize that there is some contrary evidence that could

reflect a legislative intent to establish across-the-board standards

for legal notice. The statute’s original title was “an Act . . . defining

the publications in which legal notices and legal advertising shall

be inserted,” 1941 Md. Laws, ch. 905, rather than a title clearly

treating the statute as definitional, such as “an Act defining the

terms ‘newspaper’ and ‘newspaper in general circulation.’” The

General Assembly also inserted the provision into what was then

Article 76 of the Code (“Publication of Laws”), rather than Article

1 (“Rules of Interpretation”). What is more, the statute as

originally enacted did not contain the qualifying phrase “unless

otherwise provided”—an omission that might indicate that the

General Assembly intended the statute to apply across the board.

Id. And more recently, the Revisor’s Notes for the General

Provisions Article described the GP § 1-113 definition as “more

substantive than definitional in nature.” 2014 Md. Laws, ch. 94, § 2.

But none of these indications is strong enough to overcome

the clarity of the statute’s text, which has been framed as a

definition since 1941. Although a statute’s title can be evidence of

its meaning, we generally do not invoke the title to create ambiguity

in otherwise clear text. See Tidewater/Havre de Grace, Inc. v.

Mayor & City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 347 n.7

(1995). The statute’s initial placement in Article 76 also has

limited significance, because definitional provisions can appear

anywhere in the Code; in fact, by later moving the provision to

Article 1 in code revision, the General Assembly confirmed that it

was intended as definitional in spite of its original placement. 1984

Md. Laws, ch. 284, § 9 (enacting Art. 1, § 28). The insertion of

“unless otherwise provided” in code revision is of similarly limited

Gen. 111] 127

significance. As we have explained, because this phrase was added

during non-substantive code revision, 1984 Md. Laws, ch. 284, § 9

(Revisor’s Note to Art. 1, § 28); Blanton, 390 Md. at 538-39 (code-

revision changes are ordinarily non-substantive), it is best

understood as making explicit what is already implicit in a

definitional statute: the definition it provides can be overridden by

contrary legislative intent in a particular provision that uses the

defined term, see McDonald, 141 Md. App. at 378-79. Finally, the

more recent Revisor’s Note characterizing the provision as “more

substantive than definitional” during codification of the General

Provisions Article could merely have been recognizing that the GP

§ 1-113 definition may be narrower than the ordinary meaning of

“newspaper.” Cf. 7 Opinions of the Attorney General at 183-84

(prior to the enactment of what is now GP § 1-113, approving

publication in a “newspaper” that would not appear to qualify

under the current statute because it had not published and

distributed any recent issues). In our view, the best understanding

of the General Assembly’s intent in enacting what is now GP § 1-

113 is that the Legislature wanted to set a default definition of a

commonly used term, not to limit local governments’ authority to

define terms in the local laws they enact themselves.

A local government’s power to redefine “newspaper” in local

ordinances does have at least one important limitation, however.

In some cases, a local ordinance will adopt a newspaper notice

requirement because State law mandates that one be included. For

example, before a public hearing on any amendment to the St.

Mary’s County Zoning Ordinance, the County must give notice in

a newspaper in general circulation. St. Mary’s County Zoning Ord.

21.3.1. This provision implements a mandate of public general

law, which requires public hearings and newspaper notice on

amendments to zoning regulations, as a condition on the delegation

of zoning power to counties, see LU § 4-203, and which (as is

important here) uses the defined phrase “newspaper of general

circulation,” id. § 4-203(b)(2)(i). When county commissioners

exercise a delegated power such as zoning, they must comply with

all procedural limitations that State law imposes on that power.

See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Revere Nat’l Corp., 341 Md. 366,

391-92 (1996); Walker v. Board of County Comm’rs of Talbot

County, 208 Md. 72, 86 (1955); Crozier v. County Comm’rs of

Prince George’s County, 202 Md. 501, 506 (1953); see also 2A

McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 10:10 (3d ed.) (“[A]

municipal corporation can exercise the powers expressly conferred

on it only in the manner prescribed by the statute.”). So when a

commissioner county adopts an ordinance with a newspaper-

128 [106 Op. Att’y

publication requirement in order to comply with a State statute

mandating “newspaper” publication, the local ordinance must

comply with the definition of “newspaper” in GP § 1-113. 10

In sum, although local ordinances that use the word

“newspaper” incorporate the GP § 1-113 definition by default, the

County Commissioners may substitute a different definition for

purposes of any local ordinance’s newspaper publication

requirement, unless the requirement was adopted to comply with a

State law that itself mandates publication of notice in a

“newspaper” or “newspaper in general circulation.”

B. Redefining “Newspaper” Without a Public Hearing

Having concluded that the St. Mary’s County Commissioners

may adopt their own definition of “newspaper” in some limited

circumstances, we turn to your second question, which asks

whether the County Commissioners may do so without holding a

public hearing under § 9-105 of the Local Government Article.

Under LG § 9-105, the county commissioners of a

commissioner county “may not adopt an act, an ordinance, or a

resolution until 10 days after a public hearing has been held on the

proposed act, ordinance, or resolution.” LG § 9-105(c)(1). The

public hearing must be advertised for two weeks in advance of the

hearing, in a newspaper in general circulation. Id. § 9-105(c)(2).

These requirements apply only to the exercise of a statutory power

“that specifically references” section 9-105. Id. § 9-105(b)(1); see

also Md. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 78-101 (1978) (unpublished). And,

as relevant here, the requirement specifically exempts “an

administrative act of the county commissioners of . . . St. Mary’s

County.” LG § 9-105(b)(2). 11

10

Even in such cases, though, a county might be able to adopt an

additional publication requirement that goes beyond the State-law

requirement—again assuming the county otherwise has power to

legislate on the subject. That is, although there is no need to decide this

question here, when State law requires a county to publish notice of a

certain action in one “newspaper,” a county might also require itself to

publish in a second newspaper, which would not necessarily have to

comply with GP § 1-113. See Letter from Richard E. Israel, Assistant

Attorney General, to Sen. Frederick C. Malkus, Jr., at 2 (Oct. 13, 1992)

(“Malkus Letter”); Reed v. President & Comm’rs of Town of North East,

226 Md. 229, 249 (1961).

11

We understand that the County would adopt any redefinition of

“newspaper” or “newspaper in general circulation” at an open meeting. See

Gen. 111] 129

As a threshold matter, we must consider whether redefining

“newspaper” for purposes of locally imposed notice requirements

implicates a delegated power that “specifically references” LG § 9-

105. In our opinion, the answer is yes: a county’s adoption of a

newspaper-publication requirement that goes beyond the

requirements of State law implicates the power delegated by LG

§ 9-107(c) to “provide for advertising, printing, and publishing.”

To be sure, LG § 9-107(c)’s text is limited to publication of

“laws, ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted by the

county” as well as the county’s annual financial statements. LG

§ 9-107(c). It does not expressly cover notice of other matters, such

as upcoming public hearings. But the statute’s purpose and history

suggest that it was intended to confer power to provide for

advertising and publishing more generally.

In its original text (which has since been modified only in

non-substantive code revision, 2013 Md. Laws, ch. 119), Chapter

730 granted commissioner counties the power “[t]o provide for

county advertising, printing and publishing of all laws, ordinances,

resolutions or regulations, adopted by the County Commissioners

and the annual statements of receipts and expenditures of the

County.” 1947 Md. Laws, ch. 730, § 1 (enacting Art. 25, § 2A(j)).

This original language, in our view, is best read as allowing

counties to “provide for” three separate categories of publication:

(1) “county advertising,” (2) “printing and publishing of all laws,

ordinances, resolutions or regulations, adopted by the County

Commissioners,” and (3) “the annual statements of receipts and

expenditures of the County.” Id. 12 We do not think the more

LG §§ 9-101, 9-512(d). Your question is instead whether that meeting

would also need to be a “public hearing.” Under the County

Commissioners’ usual practice, a “public hearing” is apparently

distinguished from an open meeting in that members of the public are

given the opportunity to speak at a public hearing. But you have not

asked us to define “public hearing,” and we need not do so for purposes

of this opinion.

12

A parallel provision for municipalities, enacted two days later,

supports this reading by more clearly recognizing the three separate

categories. That parallel provision authorizes municipalities “[t]o

provide for municipal advertising, for the printing and publication of

statements of the receipts and expenditures of the municipality, and the

publication and codification of all laws, ordinances, resolutions, or

regulations adopted by or affecting the municipality.” 1947 Md. Laws,

ch. 731, § 1 (enacting Art. 23A, § 2(1)). Additionally, the legislative

130 [106 Op. Att’y

recent, non-substantive code revision was intended to change that

meaning. See Blanton, 390 Md. at 538-39.

The statute’s purpose also suggests that it is not limited to

publication of laws and ordinances. Rather, the General Assembly

apparently intended to give counties a degree of autonomy with

respect to printing and advertising generally, see Md. Legislative

Council, Local Government: A Comparative Study 38-39 (1944),

replacing the earlier regime under which the Legislature had tightly

controlled counties’ spending on printing and publishing of all

kinds, not just of laws and ordinances, see, e.g., 1878 Md. Laws,

ch. 290 (St. Mary’s County); Prince George’s County Code of

Public Local Laws § 322 (1930); Cecil County Code of Public

Local Laws § 138 (1930). We thus read § 9-107(c), in light of its

history and purpose, as granting commissioner counties general

authority to provide for printing, publishing, and advertising,

provided that they remain within the bounds set by other State

statutes. See Part II.A.1; see Malkus Letter, supra, at 2 (advising

that LG § 9-107’s predecessor statute authorizes counties to “give

notice . . . of meetings, procurement, and other activities for which

State law does not specifically prescribe the notice to be given”).

We recognize that county commissioners may well have had

some implied authority to adopt new notice requirements for the

exercise of their own delegated powers even before LG § 9-107.

See Scull, 249 Md. at 281-82 (recognizing that even before

adopting home rule, a county could pass regulations and ordinances

to “implement and facilitate and insure the proper execution” of the

General Assembly’s public local laws); cf. Patterson Letter, supra,

at 1-2 (recognizing charter home rule counties’ implied authority

to adopt notice rules). But nothing prevents the General Assembly

from codifying a formerly implicit power of commissioner

counties and, in doing so, qualifying that power with a new

procedural limitation, such as a public-hearing requirement. See

76 Opinions of the Attorney General at 137; Prince George’s

County Comm’rs v. Mitchell, 97 Md. 330, 337 (1903) (recognizing

history indicates that the General Assembly intended to grant

commissioner counties a power “substantially like” the power conferred

on charter counties by the original Express Powers Act: “[t]o provide

for county advertising, printing and publishing, including that of all

ordinances, by-laws or resolutions adopted by the County Council and

of annual statements of expenses of the County Government.” 1918 Md.

Laws, ch. 456 (enacting Art. 25A, § 3(D)) (emphasis added); see Md.

Legislative Council, Local Government: A Comparative Study 38

(1944).

Gen. 111] 131

that General Assembly may alter or diminish commissioner county

powers). Because an ordinance or resolution adopted under LG

§ 9-107 is expressly subject to the procedural provisions of LG § 9-

105, see LG § 9-107(b), the public-hearing requirement would

apply to such an enactment unless the redefinition of “newspaper”

qualifies as an “administrative act.” 13

In determining the meaning of “administrative act” as applied

here, the history of the exemption in LG § 9-105 for “administrative

act[s]” is instructive. LG § 9-105’s predecessor originally applied

to every “act, ordinance or resolution” exercising one of the

Chapter 730 powers, without exception. 1947 Md. Laws, ch. 730

(enacting Art. 25, § 2A(r)). In 1965, the General Assembly added

an exception for an “administrative act or resolution adopted by the

County Commissioners of Harford County.” 1965 Md. Laws, ch.

211. The Legislature went on to extend the “administrative act”

exception to several counties, including St. Mary’s County in 1974.

1974 Md. Laws, ch. 499.

At the time the General Assembly first enacted the

“administrative act” exception in 1965, the Court of Appeals had

recently established a test for distinguishing between “legislative”

functions and so-called “administrative” or “executive” functions

of county governments, Hormes v. Baltimore County, 225 Md. 371,

377-78 (1961)—a distinction that is especially important in

commissioner counties because the commissioners in such counties

exercise both legislative and executive functions, see Forty West,

178 Md. App. at 338-39. The Court explained that “[t]he crucial

test for determining what is legislative and what is administrative

has been said to be whether the ordinance is one making a new law

or one executing a law in existence.” Hormes, 225 Md. at 377-78

(quoting 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 10:06 (3d ed.)).

Cases shortly after 1965 reaffirmed that test and the distinction

between legislative and administrative acts for both home rule and

13

This opinion addresses only whether the adoption or amendment of

a local newspaper-publication requirement is authorized by LG § 9-107

and thus is subject to the procedural mandate of LG § 9-105. We do not

consider what procedural requirements may apply to other acts of

publication. For example, if a commissioner county were to enact an

ordinance, in compliance with LG § 9-105, authorizing publication of

documents under certain specified conditions, then individual

publications under the terms of the ordinance would presumably not

implicate LG § 9-105 and thus presumably would not require a separate

hearing.

132 [106 Op. Att’y

non–home rule counties, see Scull, 249 Md. at 282 (explaining that

a measure will ordinarily qualify as legislative if it is “an enactment

of general application prescribing a new plan or policy”); City of

Bowie v. County Comm’rs for Prince George’s County, 258 Md.

454, 463-64 (1970) (same), as have more recent court decisions and

opinions from our Office, see Queen Anne’s Conservation, Inc. v.

County Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s County, 382 Md. 306, 326-27

(2004); 66 Opinions of the Attorney General 253, 257-58 (1981);

Md. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 77-001 (1977) (unpublished). 14 So while

we need not define “administrative act” for all purposes, we can

conclude that acts that are legislative in nature do not qualify, in

light of the general legal background in 1965 that recognized the

“legislative” and “administrative” categories as distinct and

mutually exclusive.

Based on that understanding of the statute, it is clear that

adopting a new definition of “newspaper” that differs from GP § 1-

113 would not be an “administrative act.” Because a statutory

definition is a part of a law that uses the defined term, and an

existing definition cannot be changed without amending the law in

question, see Part II.A.1, supra, a change to the definition of

“newspaper” in local ordinances would necessarily be a legislative

act, not an administrative one. Such an act would alter existing law

(that is, it would amend earlier legislative acts), rather than merely

implement existing law. See 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations

§ 21:1 (3d ed.) (“Amendment to an ordinance is a legislative act

and when amending a council is acting in a legislative capacity.”);

see also Town of New Market v. Milrey, Inc.-FDI P’ship, 90 Md.

App. 528, 541 (1992) (amendment to annexation resolution is

subject to the same procedural requirements as original resolution);

accord Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297, 303-04 (Colo.

1981); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 569

(Cal. 1980). The adoption of a new definition of “newspaper” in a

particular ordinance would also be legislative in that it would be

14

Consistent with that well-understood distinction between legislative

and administrative acts, when the General Assembly enacted the law that

extended the “administrative act” exception to St. Mary’s County, the

Legislature also added a provision to the St. Mary’s County Code which

established the same procedural requirements as LG § 9-105 but

affirmatively applied them only to “ordinance[s],” defined as

“permanent rule[s] of law enacted by the County Commissioners.” 1974

Md. Laws, ch. 499. This parallel provision was later repealed, possibly

as superfluous. See 1980 Md. Laws, ch. 235. Read together, these two

provisions of Chapter 499 contemplated that in St. Mary’s County the

public-hearing requirement would at a minimum apply to ordinances,

defined as measures establishing permanent rules of law.

Gen. 111] 133

“an enactment of general application prescribing a new plan or

policy” for notice under the affected ordinance. See, e.g., Queen

Anne’s Conservation, Inc., 382 Md. at 326 (quoting City of Bowie,

258 Md. at 463). The adoption of a new definition of “newspaper”

thus would not qualify for the exemption from the public hearing

requirement in LG § 9-105 for “administrative” acts.

III

Conclusion

In our opinion, the St. Mary’s County Commissioners may

adopt a definition of “newspaper” and “newspaper in general

circulation” that differs from the definition in GP § 1-113, but only

for purposes of local ordinances rather than public general laws or

public local laws enacted by the General Assembly and, even then,

only when the local ordinance in question is based on State

enabling legislation that does not itself require publication of notice

in a “newspaper” or “newspaper in general circulation.” It is also

our opinion that, if the St. Mary’s County Commissioners seek to

amend the definition of “newspaper” or “newspaper in general

circulation” for purposes of local ordinances, the amendment

would not be an “administrative act,” and would be subject to the

procedural requirements of LG § 9-105, including the requirement

of a public hearing.

Brian E. Frosh

Attorney General of Maryland

Thomas S. Chapman

Assistant Attorney General

Patrick B. Hughes

Chief Counsel, Opinions & Advice