Y.C. v. Superior Court

Filed 11/8/21 (see concurring opn.; see concurring & dissenting opn.)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

Y.C.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN A162063

MATEO COUNTY,

(San Mateo County

Respondent;

Super. Ct. No. 20JW0474)

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

After being detained on assault and firearm charges, 17-year-old Y.C.

agreed to participate in a mental health assessment conducted by a family

therapist, pursuant to an established protocol of the Juvenile Services

Division of the San Mateo County Probation Department. The therapist

provided a summary of her interview to the probation department, which

included the summary in a report provided to the juvenile court at Y.C.’s

detention hearings. In this writ proceeding, Y.C. contends the disclosure of

the assessment interview to the probation department and juvenile court,

and its use at his detention hearings, violated his constitutional right against

self-incrimination and his right to counsel, as well as various privacy rights

and privileges.

1

Because, during the pendency of this writ proceeding, Y.C. entered a

change of plea and was released from detention, we dismiss his petition as

moot to the extent it seeks relief relating to the detention order or to evidence

considered at the detention hearings. In all other respects, we deny the

petition.

BACKGROUND

A. The Charges

On November 10, 2020, the juvenile court issued an arrest warrant for

Y.C., then 17 years old. On the same day, the People filed a wardship petition

charging Y.C. with three felonies: assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245,

subd. (a)(2)); carrying a loaded firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (c)(4)); and

possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610). The first count

included a firearm-use enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)).

According to the detention report, Y.C. was alleged to have shot a suspected

rival gang member in the leg.

Arrested on November 11, 2020, Y.C. was taken to the Juvenile

Assessment Center (Assessment Center), where he met with a probation

officer and invoked his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

The probation officer spoke to Y.C.’s mother, who told the probation officer

she had been concerned with Y.C.’s behavior. Y.C.’s mother reported that

several months earlier, she had approached the Burlingame Police

Department for assistance controlling Y.C.’s behavior. The mother indicated

to police that she had noticed a “ ‘black flat thing, that is part of a gun’ ” in

the family home, reprimanded Y.C., and told him to get it out of the house.

B. The Assessment Center Interview

San Mateo County created its Assessment Center in response to the

need for “comprehensive early intervention with at-risk first-time offenders.”

2

The Assessment Center is part of a collaborative effort of the San Mateo

County Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council, which brings together the

county’s probation department, Behavioral Health and Recovery Services

(BHRS) agency, sheriff’s department, district attorney’s office, private

defender’s office, and judges of the juvenile court.

As part of the Assessment Center program, a multidisciplinary team

consisting of a probation officer, nurse practitioner, and psychiatric social

worker or therapist makes an intake assessment of a minor taken into

custody to determine the minor’s risk to the community and whether he or

she is in danger. Pursuant to this program, the probation officer referred Y.C.

to Linda Johnson, a licensed marriage and family therapist with San Mateo

County’s BHRS team. The purpose of the referral was for Johnson to assess

Y.C.’s needs, formulate a recommendation for a further mental health or

substance abuse evaluation, and potentially suggest future treatment.

On November 12, Johnson contacted Y.C. by telephone. At the

beginning of the call, Johnson informed Y.C. that he did not have to speak

with her and that if he did, the interview would not be confidential and would

be disclosed to the probation department and the court. Johnson also told

Y.C. that if he chose not to participate, she would report that fact to the

probation department and court. Y.C., without counsel, agreed to proceed

with the interview.

Johnson spoke with Y.C. for approximately two hours. They did not

discuss the charges against Y.C., and no reference to the circumstances

leading to his arrest appears in the report Johnson submitted to the

probation department. Johnson’s report summarized the substance of the

interview, discussing Y.C.’s physical and mental health history, including his

history of substance abuse. The report described Y.C.’s educational and

3

employment history, and his relationship with his family and friends.

Johnson recommended a psychological evaluation to “aid the Court in

determining an appropriate disposition and treatment plan” for Y.C. The

probation department included Johnson’s report in the detention report it

submitted to the juvenile court.

C. The Detention Hearings

Counsel for Y.C. first appeared in juvenile court on November 13, 2020,

for Y.C.’s initial detention hearing. Counsel objected to the court’s

consideration of Johnson’s report, but the court overruled the objection and

ordered continued detention for Y.C., determining detention was reasonably

necessary for the protection of the person or property of another and that

placement in Y.C.’s home was contrary to his welfare. (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 636, subd. (a).) 1 The record does not reflect the factual underpinnings of the

court’s findings.

The court invited Y.C.’s attorney to file a formal motion to suppress and

seal Johnson’s report, and scheduled a further hearing to reconsider

detention. Counsel then filed a written motion, arguing that the statements

Y.C. made to Johnson were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights

to counsel and against self-incrimination, and that the inclusion of his

statements in the detention report violated the federal Health Insurance

Portability and Accuracy Act (HIPAA) and state “privacy rights.” Y.C.

requested that the court “order the statements excluded from the detention

report and that they not be used against [Y.C.] by the government.” He also

requested that the court seal the detention report and direct the preparation

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

4

of a new detention report without the inclusion of Johnson’s interview with

Y.C.

At the December 22, 2020 hearing on the motion, Y.C. called Johnson

as witness. Johnson testified that her role with the BHRS team is to meet

with minors upon their arrival at the Assessment Center “to gather a

biopsychosocial history so that we can determine the needs for this youth and

their families.” Johnson explained, “The things that I look for are treatment

issues, resources that they need, history of abuse or neglect. My goal is to

help youth who potentially would fall through the cracks otherwise.” Johnson

said the probation department refers a minor to her for an assessment

generally within 24 hours after the minor has first been detained. In most

cases, the probation department informs Johnson of a minor’s name and date

of birth but provides no other details, including the reason for the minor’s

detention. For minors over 15 years old, Johnson did not contact counsel

before conducting an assessment; nor did she inquire whether the probation

department had contacted counsel. This was Assessment Center policy at the

time of Y.C.’s detention although, as discussed below, that policy changed

after an intervening change in state law.

Johnson meets with a minor alone 2; the probation department does not

participate. Johnson begins an assessment by introducing herself and

informing the minor that she is to conduct an assessment in order to

formulate a recommendation to the juvenile court regarding the need for a

further mental health or substance abuse evaluation, and to make

suggestions for future treatment. She reads a list of disclosures to the minor,

Prior to March 2020, Johnson would meet with minors in person at

2

the Assessment Center. Beginning in March 2020, Johnson began contacting

minors by telephone due to restrictions on in-person contact brought on by

the COVID-19 pandemic.

5

including (1) that the information provided by the minor can and will be

shared with the probation department and juvenile court, (2) that as a result

of the assessment, the BHRS team “will formulate a recommendation to the

Court regarding the need for further mental health or alcohol and other drug

evaluation, and . . . may make suggestions for future treatment,” (3) that the

minor may refuse to participate in the assessment, but any refusal must be

made known to the probation department and juvenile court; and (4) that the

minor may change his mind about participating at any time and refuse to

answer specific questions. Johnson does not read a minor his Miranda rights

and is not informed by the probation department whether the minor has

previously invoked his Miranda rights.

If a minor chooses to participate, Johnson’s interview covers a wide

range of categories, including education, family, social history, mental health,

physical health, abuse, neglect, trauma history, and alcohol and drug history.

Johnson does not ask about the nature of the charged crimes and, if a minor

attempts to speak about the charges, Johnson tells the minor to stop.

After interviewing the minor, Johnson formulates a working clinical

interpretation that can lead to a provisional diagnosis and additional

treatment. She also prepares a written summary of her assessment and

provides it to the probation department for inclusion in the detention report.

The probation department has no input on the contents of Johnson’s

summary. Johnson reviews her summary after it has been included in the

detention report to ensure its accuracy.

In Y.C.’s case, Johnson explained that she went through the standard

disclosures with Y.C., and that he agreed to proceed with the assessment.

Johnson testified that Y.C. was “surprisingly forthcoming and open” during

the interview and had “good insight for a youth with his history.”

6

Following Johnson’s testimony and the parties’ arguments, the juvenile

court denied Y.C.’s motion to seal and suppress. The court observed that the

Welfare and Institutions Code “specifically requires that probation do an

investigation and provide information to the court and that that investigation

includes the circumstances of the minor and the facts surrounding his or her

being taken into custody. Part of the way that is done is through the

interview” by BHRS. The court explained that the interview with Johnson

was “not an interrogation” because not “on an inculpatory basis,” and it

concluded there was no Fifth Amendment or Miranda violation, no due

process violation, and no “[S]ixth [A]mendment violation of the right to

counsel.” Further, the court concluded that because the interview was

“provided after an extensive discussion with the minor about how it was

going to be used, who was going to see it, and what was going to be done for

it,” there was no HIPAA violation.

After denying the motion to seal or suppress, the court considered

Y.C.’s motion to be released from the Assessment Center pending the

disposition of his case. Y.C.’s mother and a family friend both testified on

Y.C.’s behalf, explaining that each had a strong relationship with Y.C., that

Y.C. was a loving person who had made some poor choices, and that they

would work with him to provide necessary care if the court were to release

him. The court nonetheless determined, in an order dated December 23,

2020, that detention remained necessary for the protection of the person or

property of another, and that placement in the home of Y.C.’s mother would

be contrary to Y.C.’s welfare.

D. Court of Appeal proceedings

On February 22, 2021, Y.C. filed a petition for writ of mandate in this

court seeking to vacate the orders denying his motions to seal and suppress

7

and for immediate release. Y.C. also filed a separate motion to seal Johnson’s

report pending our review of the writ petition. After receiving preliminary

briefing, we issued an order to show cause. We denied the motion to seal

pending our review of the petition, but observed that the report of Johnson’s

interview remained confidential pursuant to section 827, which allows only

specified persons and entities access to a juvenile case file.

The County of San Mateo filed an application to appear as a real party

in interest. We denied the county’s application but accepted its proposed

opposition to Y.C.’s writ petition as an amicus curiae brief. 3

On May 5, 2021, the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss Y.C.’s

writ petition as moot. The Attorney General reported that two days earlier

Y.C. had pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a minor and battery

with serious bodily injury, and he was awaiting a dispositional hearing on

May 17. The Attorney General argued that Y.C.’s petition was moot because

we could no longer grant relief from Y.C.’s pre-adjudication detention. Y.C.

opposed the motion and we denied it.

We have since been advised that Y.C. received a disposition of 240 days

of confinement, which after application of predisposition credits resulted in

further confinement of four days. Y.C. was then released home on juvenile

probation subject to ankle monitoring.

3 We overrule Y.C.’s objections to exhibits attached to the amicus brief.

Although not considered by the juvenile court, the county resolution creating

the BHRS team’s Assessment Center procedure, the documents issued by

federal agencies regarding application of privacy rules in light of the COVID-

19 pandemic, and an executive order from Governor Newsom addressing

changes to privacy laws in light of the pandemic, though of limited relevance,

are properly subject to judicial notice.

8

DISCUSSION

I. Mootness

The disposition of Y.C.’s delinquency case does not moot the petition

before us, but it does substantially narrow the issues we must decide. Y.C.

has asked this court to vacate the juvenile court’s orders at his detention

hearings that deny: (1) the sealing and suppression of statements he made to

Johnson, and (2) his release from custody. We agree with the Attorney

General that, with Y.C.’s plea of no contest and his release from custody, this

court can no longer grant “effectual relief” from the detention order, and

Y.C.’s challenge to the order detaining him is accordingly moot. (Sturgell v.

Department of Fish & Wildlife (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 35, 43.) Y.C.’s challenge

to the sealing and suppression order is, for the same reason, partially moot.

To the extent Y.C. argues the statements he made to Johnson should not

have been used in deciding whether to detain him, that issue is moot now

that he is no longer detained. But the juvenile court’s order addressed

sealing, as well as suppression, and there the analysis is different.

To the extent Y.C. asks that the report containing his statements to

Johnson be sealed, returned, or destroyed to protect his privacy, that issue is

not moot. As the United States Supreme Court held in Church of Scientology

of California v. United States (1992) 506 U.S. 9, 13, when the Government

has obtained materials unlawfully, a court can “effectuate relief by ordering

the Government to return the records.” Although only “a partial remedy,” the

possibility of an order requiring such relief prevents a case from being moot.

(Ibid.)

Courts sometimes have discretion to decide an issue even when it is

moot, but we decline to do so in this case. A court has the power “to resolve an

issue rendered moot by subsequent events if the question to be decided is of

9

continuing public importance and is a question capable of repetition, yet

evading review.” (People v. Alsafar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 880, 883, 886.)

Courts may review the legality of pretrial detention on this theory because

“ ‘ “[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that

any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on appeal

before he is either released or convicted.” ’ ” (Alfredo A. v. Superior Court

(1994) 6 Cal.4th 1212, 1219.) But in this case we are skeptical that the moot

issues regarding Y.C.’s pretrial detention are likely to recur because of recent

changes to state law and to the policy of the San Mateo County probation

department.

When Y.C. was first detained in November 2020, section 625.6

protected only minors who were younger than Y.C. The statute provided:

“Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda

rights, a youth 15 years of age or younger shall consult with legal counsel in

person, by telephone, or by video conference. The consultation may not be

waived.” (Former § 625.6, subd. (a).)

Consistent with the former statute, the policy of the San Mateo County

probation department was to contact counsel for youths before referring them

to BHRS only if a minor was 15 years of age or younger. That changed on

January 1, 2021 because the Legislature amended section 625.6 so that it

applies to all minors. (§ 625.6, subd. (a).) Beginning on January 1, 2021, the

probation department amended its policy so that it contacts counsel for all

minors, including 16- and 17-year-olds, before referring them to BHRS. Given

this change in the probation department’s policy, it is unlikely that other

youths will raise similar challenges to the inclusion of BHRS interview

summaries with their detention reports. We accordingly decline to address

those aspects of Y.C.’s petition that are moot.

10

II. Constitutional Claims

Y.C. argues that use of his assessment center interview for any purpose

other than health care services violates his Fifth Amendment right against

self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 4 To the extent Y.C.

is using these arguments to challenge his detention order or to argue that

Johnson’s report should not have been considered at the detention hearings,

those issues are moot since Y.C. is no longer detained. And to the extent Y.C.

is using these arguments to have the summary of his interview with Johnson

sealed, returned, or destroyed to protect his privacy, that form of relief is not

available for either alleged violation.

The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person “shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.)

Compelled statements “of course may not be used against a defendant at

trial, [citation], but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation

of the Self–Incrimination Clause occurs.” (Chavez v. Martinez (2003) 538 U.S.

760, 767 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.); see also id., at pp. 777-779 (conc. opn. of

Souter, J.); New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 686 (Marshall, J.,

dissenting).) Because the privilege is focused on the use of statements during

a criminal case, the privilege “does not protect against the nonpenal adverse

use of officially compelled answers.” (Speilbauer v. County of Santa Clara

4 While the parties have focused their arguments on the Sixth

Amendment’s right to counsel, the right to counsel in delinquency

proceedings is derived from principles of due process rather than the Sixth

Amendment. (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 41.) We will presume the right to

counsel applies to minors in delinquency proceedings in the same manner as

to adult defendants in criminal cases. (See In re Elijah C. (2016) 248

Cal.App.4th 958, 964, fn. 5; but see In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 254

[“[t]he right of counsel in juvenile proceedings” is “not necessarily as broad as

the right to counsel in criminal proceedings”] disapproved on another point in

People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 695, fn. 4.)

11

(2009) 45 Cal.4th 704, 715.) Thus, in Spielbauer, the Supreme Court held

that “a public employee may be compelled, by threat of job discipline, to

answer questions about the employee’s job performance, so long as the

employee is not required, on pain of dismissal, to waive the constitutional

protection against criminal use of those answers.” (Id. at p. 710, italics

omitted.) The Fifth Amendment does not prevent compelling an employee’s

statements, the Court explained. “It simply forbids use of the compelled

statements, or the fruits thereof, in a criminal prosecution against the

employee.” (Id. at p. 727.)

Similarly, in People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, the Supreme

Court held that an un-Mirandized statement from a defendant about his

gang affiliation, elicited during jail booking, was not admissible in the

prosecution’s case-in-chief, but also observed that it remains “permissible to

ask arrestees” questions about gang affiliation during the booking process.

(Id. at p. 541.) The Court recognized, “[j]ail officials have an important

institutional interest in minimizing the potential for violence within the jail

population,” and they “retain substantial discretion to devise reasonable

solutions to the security problems they face. [Citation.] We simply hold that

defendant’s answers to the unadmonished gang questions posed here were

inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.” (Ibid.)

What these authorities make clear is that eliciting an unwarned, even

an involuntary, statement from a person in custody is not itself a Fifth

Amendment violation. It is the use in court proceedings of such a statement

that offends the Fifth Amendment. Here, the simple fact of Johnson’s

interview of Y.C. did not violate the Fifth Amendment, even if use of the

interview report during the detention hearing would have (an issue we do not

decide because it is moot). The Fifth Amendment is therefore unavailable as

12

a vehicle to order the sealing or destruction of any reference to Y.C.’s

statements to Johnson in his case file.

We reach the same result with respect to Y.C.’s right-to-counsel

argument, albeit for slightly different reasons. Once Sixth Amendment rights

attach, a violation of the right to counsel “occurs when the uncounseled

interrogation is conducted.” (Kansas v. Ventris (2009) 556 U.S. 586, 592.) The

right to counsel “renders inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief

statements ‘deliberately elicited’ from a defendant without an express waiver

of the right to counsel.” (Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 348.) But a

statement that is inadmissible as part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief may

be used for other purposes. For example, a statement obtained in violation of

the right to counsel can be used to impeach the defendant’s testimony.

(Ventris, at p. 594.) In addition, because the right to counsel is “offense

specific,” a defendant’s statements “regarding offenses for which he had not

been charged [are] admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses.” (Texas v. Cobb (2001)

532 U.S. 162, 168.) An uncounseled statement may even be considered at a

juvenile disposition hearing, as “there is no statutory or constitutional

prohibition on the consideration of illegally obtained evidence at a juvenile

delinquency disposition hearing,” as long as the evidence is reliable, not

obtained as a result of gross or shocking misconduct, and not obtained for

purposes of influencing the sentencing court. (In re Michael V. (1986) 178

Cal.App.3d 159, 172–173.)

Because there are permissible uses of a statement taken in violation of

the right to counsel, it would, once again, be inappropriate to seal or destroy

records of such statements so that they could never be considered for any

purpose. We do not here decide whether Y.C.’s statements to Johnson could

13

be used in any particular circumstance, as no other use of the statements is

before the court. We simply conclude, now that the challenge to the juvenile

court’s pretrial detention order is moot, that relief is no longer available for

any alleged violation of Y.C.’s right to counsel. Since neither this claim nor

Y.C.’s Fifth Amendment claim provides a vehicle for granting the sealing or

destruction relief he seeks, we deny (to the extent not dismissed) Y.C.’s writ

petition as to both federal constitutional claims.

III. Federal and State Privacy Laws

Y.C. asserts that disclosure of his assessment interview violated

(1) HIPAA and state regulations requiring compliance with HIPAA;

(2) California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA); (3) the

state constitutional right to privacy; (4) the psychotherapist-patient privilege;

and (5) state laws governing informed consent of medical decisions. He asks

that we “ensure all documents relating to the Assessment Center interview,

and copies thereof, are returned to respondent court without being further

read or consulted.” He also requests that we order the juvenile court to “seal

or destroy those documents.”

A. HIPAA and CMIA

HIPAA “prohibits the unauthorized disclosure or sharing of a person’s

medical information and imposes civil and criminal penalties on those who

do.” (County of San Diego v. Mason (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 376, 382.) When it

enacted HIPAA, “Congress expressed its concern for protecting the integrity

and confidentiality of personal medical records, and for preventing the

unauthorized use or disclosure of such records. (42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2).)”

(Bugarin v. Chartone, Inc. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1561–1562.)

Similar to HIPAA, CMIA “is intended to protect the confidentiality of

individually identifiable medical information obtained from a patient by a

14

health care provider, while at the same time setting forth limited

circumstances in which the release of such information to specified entities or

individuals is permissible.” (Loder v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846,

859.) “To provide such protection, the act specifies that ‘[n]o provider of

health care shall disclose medical information regarding a patient of the

provider without first obtaining an authorization . . .’ (Civ. Code, § 56.10,

subd. (a)), and then sets forth, in some detail, the requirements of a valid

authorization for the release of medical information ‘by a provider of health

care’ (id., § 56.11) or by an employer (id., § 56.21).” (Loder, at pp. 859–860.)

Y.C. argues that Johnson failed to follow the authorization and notice

requirements in HIPAA and CMIA, rendering disclosure of the assessment in

the detention report unlawful under both laws. Specifically, Y.C. argues that

Johnson failed to obtain signed, written authorization, as required by both

statutes (see 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1); Civ. Code, § 56.11), and that he was

not provided with a “Notice of Privacy Practices” or the opportunity to object

to disclosure of the assessment, as required by HIPAA’s regulations. (See 45

C.F.R. §§ 164.510, 164.520.) As to CMIA, Y.C. claims that BHRS conditioned

its services on his allowing disclosure of the information to the probation

department and court, in contravention of Civil Code section 56.37.

But Y.C. has not addressed key aspects of HIPAA and CMIA.

Y.C. asserts that BHRS is “plainly a HIPAA covered entity” based on a

BHRS policy memorandum describing BHRS’s procedure for complying with

HIPAA. However, Y.C. overlooks and does not address the portion of the

same memorandum stating that disclosure of protected health information by

BHRS is mandatory “[t]o the courts, (e.g., to the Juvenile Judge), as

necessary for the administration of justice, in accordance with federal and

California law.” (BHRS memorandum, Confidentiality/Privacy of Protected

15

Health Information (PHI), Feb. 25, 2003, p. 4

<https://www.smchealth.org/sites/main/files/file-

attachments/03.01confidentprivacyphitechedits1.14_0.pdf?1597426118> [as

of Nov. 8, 2021].) More importantly, Y.C. does not address HIPAA’s definition

of a “Covered entity” set out in title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

part 160.103: a covered entity is a “health plan,” a “health care

clearinghouse,” and a “health care provider who transmits any health

information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by

[HIPAA’s regulations].” (45 C.F.R. § 160.103.) These terms each have their

own definition under HIPAA, and Y.C. does not attempt to establish that any

of them encompasses the San Mateo County probation department or BHRS.

We see no way the probation department or BHRS could be considered a

“health plan” or “health care clearinghouse.” 5 And assuming, without

deciding, that the probation department or BHRS is a “health care provider,”

we see no indication that either transmitted health information “in

connection with a transaction” covered by HIPAA’s regulations. The

5 “Health plan” is defined as “an individual or group plan that provides,

or pays the cost of, medical care.” The definition provides a non-exclusive list

of 17 types “health plans,” such as a group health plan, a health insurance

issuer, an HMO, and a variety of government programs such as Medicare and

Medicaid. A “Health care clearinghouse” is a “public or private entity,

including a billing service, repricing company, community health

management information system or community health information system,

and ‘value-added’ networks and switches, that does either of the following

functions: [¶] (1) Processes or facilitates the processing of health information

received from another entity in a nonstandard format or containing

nonstandard data content into standard data elements or a standard

transaction[;] [¶] (2) Receives a standard transaction from another entity and

processes or facilitates the processing of health information into nonstandard

format or nonstandard data content for the receiving entity.” Nothing in the

record before us suggests the probation department and BHRS satisfies these

definitions. (45 C.F.R. § 160.103.)

16

regulations define “Transaction” as the “transmission of information between

two parties to carry out financial or administrative activities related to

health care” (45 C.F.R. § 160.103), which is not something Y.C. claims

occurred in this case. We decline to wade further into the regulatory thicket

in search of arguments Y.C. might have made to support his HIPAA claim. It

is enough to observe that he fails to carry his burden of establishing that the

trial court erred when it found no HIPAA violation. (See Denham v. Superior

Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)

As for CMIA, it contains a number of exceptions that seem to permit

disclosure of Y.C.’s assessment interview to the probation department,

juvenile court, and other parties participating in Y.C.’s treatment and care.

CMIA permits disclosure of medical information when “specifically

authorized by law” (Civ. Code, § 56.10, subd. (c)(14)), a provision that

“legitimizes a myriad of situations the Legislature may not have cared to

spell out.” (Shaddox v. Bertani (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1414.)

Disclosure of the assessment interview in this case appears authorized by the

Welfare and Institutions Code provision requiring a probation officer to

“investigate the circumstances of the minor” (§ 628, subd. (a)), and to provide

a report to the juvenile court, which the court must consider with any other

evidence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.760(a)). Similarly, applicable regulations

require the administrator of a juvenile facility to “develop and implement

written policies and procedures for assessment and case planning,” that allow

“for the multi-disciplinary sharing of health information,” and “for providing

information to the court, child supervision staff and to probation.” (Cal. Code

Regs., tit. 15, §§ 1355, 1407(a).) Separately, CMIA also authorizes a provider

of health care to disclose medical information to a probation officer “or any

other person who is legally authorized to have custody or care of a minor for

17

the purpose of coordinating health care services and medical treatment

provided to the minor.” (Civ. Code, § 56.103, subd. (a).)

Even if HIPAA or CMIA were violated in the manner asserted by Y.C.,

the “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision found in article I, section 28 of our

state Constitution prohibits the juvenile court from sealing or destroying the

summary of Johnson’s interview with Y.C. This constitutional provision

provides, in relevant part: “relevant evidence shall not be excluded . . . in any

trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile

or adult court.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2).) Our Supreme Court has

explained that this provision “was intended to permit [the] exclusion of

relevant, but unlawfully obtained evidence, only if exclusion is required by

the United States Constitution.” (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890.)

Neither HIPAA nor CMIA authorizes a court to exclude otherwise relevant

evidence as part of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. (See Elder-Evins v.

Casey (N.D.Cal., July 3, 2012, No. C 09-05775 SBA (LB)) 2012 U.S. Dist.

Lexis 92467, p. *28 [2012 WL 2577589, p. *8] [“HIPAA’s general penalty

provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1), does not include a suppression remedy,”

but rather “a civil penalty that can be assessed only against covered entities

and their business associates”]; United States v. Streich (9th Cir. 2009) 560

F.3d 926, 935 (conc. opn. of Kleinfeld, J.) [“HIPAA does not provide any

private right of action, much less a suppression remedy”]; cf. Civ. Code,

§ 56.35 [listing compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees

as remedy for CMIA violation, in addition to any other remedies available at

law].) Nor has Y.C. cited authority holding that the federal Constitution

requires exclusion of information obtained in violation of HIPAA or CMIA.

Because, as far as we are aware, Y.C. remains on juvenile probation and

under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the Right to Truth-in-Evidence

18

provision counsels against the court sealing or destroying relevant evidence

in his case file. Whether such evidence could be used in any future court

proceeding should remain for decision another day.

Finally, we note that section 827 restricts access to juvenile case files to

specified persons and entities, balancing the Legislature’s belief “that

juvenile court records, in general, should be confidential” with its intent “to

provide for a limited exception to juvenile court record confidentiality to

promote more effective communication among juvenile courts, family courts,

law enforcement agencies, and schools to ensure the rehabilitation of juvenile

criminal offenders.” (§ 827, subd. (b)(1); see also § 827, subd. (a)(1); In re Gina

S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1081.) Tellingly, Y.C. has cited no authority

stating that the protections of section 827 are insufficient to protect a youth’s

privacy rights during or after juvenile court proceedings.

B. Right to privacy, psychotherapist-patient privilege, and

informed consent

Y.C. also argues that the disclosure of Johnson’s assessment to the

probation department and juvenile court violated his state constitutional

right to privacy, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and state laws

governing informed consent.

We disagree that the disclosure violated Y.C.’s constitutional right to

privacy. The California Constitution does recognize a right of privacy (Cal.

Const., art. I, § 1), but the party asserting the right must establish “an

objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances.”

(Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) Y.C. could not

reasonably have expected that information he provided during the

assessment interview would not be disclosed to the probation department or

the juvenile court because Johnson explicitly advised Y.C. that any

information he shared would be disclosed to the probation department and

19

juvenile court. Johnson also reminded Y.C. that he could stop participating at

any time. We recognize that within a short span of time Y.C. was arrested by

police, detained at the Assessment Center, brought before a probation officer,

and then referred to Johnson for an assessment interview—all undoubtedly

stressful for any youth. However, we cannot agree that any uncertainty Y.C.

may have had concerning the consequences of participating in the assessment

interview changes this basic fact: he had no objectively reasonable

expectation that the interview would not be shared with the probation

department and the juvenile court.

For similar reasons, we disagree with Y.C. that his interview with

Johnson was protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The

psychotherapist-patient privilege grants a patient the right to refuse to

disclose, and to prevent others from disclosing, a confidential communication

between himself and a psychotherapist. (Evid. Code, § 1014.) But Johnson’s

interview with Y.C. cannot be considered a completely confidential

communication. She informed Y.C., without qualification, that “[a]ny

information disclosed by you during this Assessment can and will be shared

with Probation and the Court.” She also informed him that she was a

mandated reporter, so that if she “suspected that you pose a danger to

yourself or others I am also required to report those concerns to the

appropriate persons and/or agencies.” To the extent that Johnson told Y.C. in

advance she would share his statements, those statements are not protected

by the psychotherapist privilege. (Accord People v. Henderson (1977) 19

Cal.3d 86, 97–98 [defendant interview with jail psychotherapist not

confidential when defendant advised of constitutional rights and informed

interview was being conducted at request of district attorney], overruled on

other grounds by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 484.)

20

Last, we conclude that the doctrine of informed consent has no bearing

on whether the contents of Johnson’s interview should be sealed or destroyed.

The doctrine of informed consent “imposes a duty on the physician to provide

material information about any proposed treatment, such as risks and

alternative procedures.” (Conte v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Medical

Group, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267.) Y.C. claims Johnson failed to

inform him about what use the probation department would make of the

information he supplied, and failed to explain what rights he had to

alternative mental health services or legal assistance. But even if Y.C. could

establish that Johnson breached a duty to provide him material

information—an issue we do not decide—that breach would not entitle Y.C.

to the sealing order he seeks. Y.C. points to the black-letter principle that

breach of a professional’s obligation to obtain informed consent renders any

purported consent void. (Citing Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP

v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 59, 87.) But Y.C. fails to

explain how this principle translates into a right to the relief he seeks.

Nothing in our analysis presupposes that Y.C. provided informed consent to

Johnson’s interview, so Y.C.’s effort to nullify such consent is beside the

point. Although we have established that once Johnson advised Y.C. the

contents of his interview would be disclosed to the probation department and

juvenile court, it was not objectively reasonable for Y.C. to believe otherwise,

that is a different matter.

In sum, none of Y.C.’s statutory or state constitutional claims entitle

him to the sealing or destruction order he sought from the juvenile court.

DISPOSITION

To the extent petitioner seeks relief from the juvenile court’s detention

order or the court’s consideration of the challenged statements during the

21

detention hearings, the petition for writ of mandate is dismissed as moot. In

all other respects, the petition for writ of mandate is denied.

TUCHER, P.J. *

I CONCUR:

POLLAK, P.J.

*Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,

Division Three, sitting by assignment pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the

California Constitution.

22

POLLAK, P.J. — I concur but write separately to emphasize that although

we do not decide the constitutional issues raised by Y.C. because they are

moot as to him, we do not imply that we would agree with his contentions

were we to decide them. To the contrary, the constitutional provisions cited

by Y.C. are designed to prevent the forced or uninformed disclosure of

incriminating information. (See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S.

291, 301, fn. 5; United States v. A.R. (3d Cir. 1994) 38 F.3d 699, 703–705;

United States v. Mitchell H. (1999) 182 F.3d 1034, 1035.) Here, in my view,

there is no indication that Y.C.’s participation in the interview with a

therapist from the county’s Behavioral Health and Recovery Services was

either compelled or lacking in informed consent, 1 and the interview was

designed and implemented to avoid discussion of Y.C.’s alleged offenses or of

any potentially incriminating information. The therapist’s interview was no

more than an extension of the probation officer’s interview, designed “not to

elicit evidence of guilt — the function of police questioning — but to assist the

probation officer in deciding at the outset of the case whether the minor need

be further detained pending a court hearing,” which our Supreme Court

approved in In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 601. There the Supreme

Court held that statements made during such an interview “are not

admissible as substantive evidence, or for impeachment, in any subsequent

1 The advisement that failure to participate would be reported to the

court was hardly a threat. The therapist never stated or implied Y.C. would

receive less favorable treatment from the court if he declined to participate,

or suggested that he would receive more favorable treatment if he did

participate. (See People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 116.) Indeed, the

therapist could be faulted only if she had failed to make that disclosure. In

addition, the therapist interview with Y.C. has no resemblance to the coercive

and threatening questioning that was present in other cases in which a

minor’s statement was found involuntary. (See In re T.F. (2017) 16

Cal.App.5th 202, 221; In re Elias V. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 568, 583–584.)

1

proceeding to determine criminal guilt, whether juvenile or adult,” but “may,

of course, be admitted and considered in hearings on the issues of detention

and fitness for juvenile treatment.” (Id. at p. 602.)

As to the asserted violation of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act (HIPAA), which I agree does not apply, I would add one

observation. Even were the statute applicable, neither the therapist nor the

court ran “roughshod” over Y.C.’s rights under its provisions as Y.C.

contends. The therapist’s failure to obtain a signed, written authorization

from Y.C. was a consequence of restrictions on in-person contact at the

Juvenile Assessment Center caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Although

the therapist interviewed Y.C. over the telephone, her admonishments

covered HIPAA’s principal requirements for a valid authorization, including

an advisement of the purpose of the interview and identification of the

persons to whom disclosure of information would be made. (See 45 C.F.R.

§ 164.508(c)(1).) Under the circumstances, there was substantial compliance

with the HIPAA safeguards.

In short, and without belaboring the arguments, the approach adopted

by the San Mateo County Probation Department is well designed to

accomplish its legitimate purpose without compromising the minor’s rights or

violating any statutory or constitutional restrictions. Prompt evaluation of

the mental health of a minor taken into custody is to be desired. The

therapist in this case breached no duty of loyalty or confidentiality, was fully

cognizant of her obligation to avoid eliciting potentially incriminating

information from Y.C., and complied with that obligation.

POLLAK, P. J.

2

STREETER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

The collaborative, multidisciplinary approach San Mateo County took

to establishing its Juvenile Assessment Center (the Assessment Center or the

Center) appears to have been well intentioned. But no matter how well

intentioned in concept, in practice the Assessment Center carries out two

functions that are at war with each other. The Center offers detained youth

mental health services while at the same time, through the required sharing

of information among its constituent members—specifically in this case, the

dissemination to a probation officer of a psychologist’s assessment of a 17-

year-old youth held in custody, charged with felony offenses—it also supports

the prosecutorial function carried out by the probation department and the

district attorney. Whether Linda Johnson, the department of Behavioral

Health and Recovery Services (BHRS) psychologist who conducted the

assessment, understood this conflict is beside the point. Wittingly or not, the

fact is that her professional duties of loyalty and confidentiality to her young

patient were compromised.

If the BHRS saw fit to accommodate some kind of protocol of the

probation department by sharing Ms. Johnson’s clinical assessment, that

does not excuse the resulting violations of law. Nor does the fact that the

probation department is a constituent member of the Assessment Center

transform the BHRS into an arm of the probation department. Indeed, in her

testimony at the detention hearing, Ms. Johnson emphasized that she does

not work for the probation department. She said she is “part of the BHRS

forensic team.” By embedding a clinical psychologist in a collaborative body

that also includes the probation department, San Mateo County cannot

render inoperative the obligations of confidentiality that arise out of the

1

psychologist’s professional responsibility to her patient. Ms. Johnson had the

obligation to recommend mental health treatment for Y.C., if warranted; the

probation officer had the obligation to pursue his prosecution, if warranted.

Because these professional roles are fundamentally incompatible with each

other, it was up to Ms. Johnson to level with Y.C. about the potential

jeopardy she was putting him in, or at least put him in a position to

understand that disclosure of her assessment summary to the probation

department might not be in his best interests. For a lawyer in comparable

circumstances, we would never tolerate this kind of conflict absent full

disclosure and knowing waiver, even for sophisticated clients.

The issues raised in this case are not unique to San Mateo County, or

to California. Commentators with expertise in this specialty area have

surveyed the problems arising in psychological assessment interviews of

minors at the intake stage of juvenile justice systems across the country. 1

One of the unfortunate aspects of the way in which these issues have arisen

1 Lore, Pretrial Self-Incrimination in Juvenile Court: Why a

Comprehensive Pretrial Privilege Is Needed to Protect Children and Enhance

the Goal of Rehabilitation (2009) 47 U. Louisville L.Rev. 439, 442–443,

fn. omitted (“Often, children will make self-incriminating statements during

the pre-adjudication stage of a juvenile court case while being evaluated or

receiving rehabilitative or therapeutic services. . . . [¶] The issue of children

making self-incriminating statements at the pre-adjudication stage has

grown in importance recently because of the trend within the juvenile justice

system to provide earlier screening and assessment . . . , often immediately

after arrest, but prior to any official court or attorney involvement. At an

initial screening, where children are often assessed for any immediate needs

such as mental health or substance abuse problems, [they] are generally

unrepresented. This lack of counsel increases the likelihood that they may

make self-incriminating statements that could drastically impact their

lives.”); see Rosado, Outside the Police Station: Dealing with the Potential for

Self-Incrimination in Juvenile Court (2012) 38 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 177,

182–183.

2

here is that the objective of making sure psychological assessments are

undertaken as an adjunct to the probation department’s reporting

responsibility to the court—as the lead opinion puts it, to “ ‘aid the Court in

determining an appropriate disposition and treatment plan’ ” (lead opn., ante,

at p. 4)—could just as easily be carried out by the Assessment Center as a

collaborative endeavor after the detention hearing, the point in time when

Y.C. was guaranteed the assistance of counsel by statute. (Welf. & Inst.

Code, 2 § 634.) 3 Ms. Johnson admitted in her testimony that any urgent need

for mental health services prior to the detention hearing can be handled

independently, without consulting a probation officer. She also testified that

a court order is unnecessary for the provision of urgent services at that point.

Thus, it is the timing of the collaboration between BHRS and the probation

department that is most problematic here, not the fact of it.

Because only a slight timing adjustment would have brought the

Assessment Center into compliance with governing law at no cost to the

prompt delivery of mental health services to juvenile arrestees, the issues

that have arisen here could have been avoided quite easily. Why all the

controversy surrounding this writ proceeding then? That seems plain to see. I

would have thought that, by now, all these years after Miranda v. Arizona

2All subsequent statutory references, as in the lead opinion, are to the

Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted.

3 Indeed, for youths like Y.C., who the court finds are beyond effective

parental control and thus for whom immediate return to their parents is not

a viable option, that is exactly what the statutory scheme contemplates.

(§ 636.1, subd. (a) [“When a minor is detained pursuant to Section 636

following a finding by the court that continuance in the home is contrary to

the minor’s welfare and the minor is at risk of entering foster care, the

probation officer shall, within 60 calendar days of initial removal, or by the

date of the disposition hearing, whichever occurs first, complete a case

plan.”].)

3

(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, it would be

beyond debate that a juvenile accused of a felony has the right to counsel

during any custodial interrogation. But apparently not. Although counsel

must be appointed for all juvenile arrestees at their detention hearings, for a

brief period prior to that point these young arrestees sit in jail unrepresented.

At stake here is whether the San Mateo County Probation Department,

indirectly through BHRS psychologists, may be given access to uncounseled

juvenile arrestees before a lawyer enters the picture. 4

Which highlights another unfortunate aspect of the case: Because Y.C.

has now been released pursuant to an agreed disposition, and because a

recent amendment to section 625.6 gives all minors a mandatory, unwaivable

right to consult with counsel before submitting to any type of interrogation

while in custody, 5 any endorsement of the Center’s past practices appears to

be pointless. I therefore join the lead opinion in concluding that the case is at

least partially moot, and to the extent it is moot, in further concluding that

we should decline to apply the recurring-but-evading-review exception to the

mootness doctrine. I would go further, however. I think the entire case is

4 The fact that Y.C. was an apparently fully capable 17 year old is of no

moment. He was a minor. In 2011, the United States Supreme Court drew

attention to how the psychological pressures of custodial interrogation that it

warned against in Miranda can be especially powerful in breaking the will of

a juvenile. (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 272.) The Court’s

sensitivity to this issue is not new. (See Gallegos v. Colorado (1962) 370 U.S.

49, 53–55; Haley v. Ohio (1948) 332 U.S. 596, 599–601 (plur. opn. of Douglas,

J.).)

5 Section 625.6, subdivision (a) (“Prior to a custodial interrogation, and

before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth 17 years of age or younger

shall consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by video

conference. The consultation may not be waived.”). Until January 1, 2021,

only youths 15 years of age or younger were covered by this statute.

4

moot and that we should say so, without more. I do not think Church of

Scientology of California v. United States (1992) 506 U.S. 9, which addresses

Article III mootness in the federal courts, compels a contrary conclusion. That

case involved a taxpayer’s request for return of its own records. The high

court observed that “[t]axpayers have an obvious possessory interest” in their

records. (Church of Scientology of California, supra, at p. 13.) The document

at issue here is a detention report prepared by the San Mateo County

Probation Department. What gave rise to all of Y.C.’s objections, and

ultimately to this writ proceeding, is that Ms. Johnson authored a section of

the probation department’s detention report. I fail to see how that could

possibly have given Y.C. a possessory interest in the detention report itself.

He could complain about the probation department’s use of the detention

report, which is what he did via his motion to suppress, but he could not

demand it back or have it treated like it was his property, since it was never

his.

Because I see no possible basis for any return, sealing, or destruction of

records, I do not think we should be issuing what amounts to an advisory

opinion on the claims requesting those remedies, since we cannot award

effective relief on them. I will say, though, that having concluded we still

have a live controversy here to an extent, Presiding Justice Tucher has done

an admirable job setting forth an analysis that deftly tacks back and forth

from merits discussion to mootness discussion, while keeping our merits

rulings relatively narrow. I appreciate that, though I am concerned about the

clarity of what we say here, since, at least as to some of the claims, the

analysis seems to suggest both that we are rejecting them on the merits and

that we deem them moot. For an opinion that seeks to garner agreement from

two colleagues with polar opposite views on this particular case, as our

5

separate opinions surely demonstrate, I suppose some opaqueness is to be

expected.

To the extent we are reaching the merits, explicitly or impliedly, I must

dissent. I will comment briefly on only two sections of the lead opinion. First,

I would find a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq.) on this record.

HIPAA prohibits a “covered entity” from using or disclosing protected health

information. (45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2020).) Covered entities include a

“health plan,” a “health care clearinghouse,” and a “health care provider who

transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a

transaction” under HIPAA. (45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a) (2020).) The disclosure of

“psychotherapy notes” is specifically mentioned in the regulations as a

disclosure for which authorization is required. (45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2020).)

In my view, BHRS—a public health agency that delivers mental health

services to juveniles—is clearly a “covered entity” since it is a “health care

provider.” It violated HIPAA because the information gathered by its

employee, Ms. Johnson, was “health information” (42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4)), the

disclosure of which was prohibited (42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6) absent patient

consent (45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2020). Patient consent is governed by strict

regulatory standards. (See 45 CFR 160.102(a)(3) (2020) [applicability of

regulatory standards to a “healthcare provider”].) Ms. Johnson failed to

secure Y.C.’s consent in the form of a “valid authorization” written in “plain

language” advising Y.C. of the purpose of the disclosure, describing in

“specific and meaningful fashion” the information to be disclosed, telling Y.C.

his right to treatment was not conditioned on consent to disclosure, and

warning Y.C. of the prospect that any disclosed information could lose its

protected status under HIPAA. (45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(i), (iv), (vi) and

6

(c)(3) (2020).) Nor is there any basis for excusing the failure to obtain an

effective consent. The exception for disclosures made in connection with

judicial and administrative proceedings—which appears to be what the

mandatory governmental disclosure proviso in BHRS’s policy memorandum

is about—does not apply in the absence of a court order, subpoena or

assurance that steps have been taken to secure a protective order. (45 C.F.R.

§ 164.512(e) (2020).) 6

Second, under the due process principles enunciated in In re Gault,

supra, 387 U.S. 1, I think Y.C.’s assessment interview violated Y.C.’s

privilege against self-incrimination (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454,

468–469) and right to counsel (Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201,

205–206), which means it was error to admit into evidence and consider at

the detention hearing the portion of the detention report that set forth Ms.

Johnson’s summary of Y.C’s psychological assessment, just as it would have

been error to consider it in the state’s affirmative case at a jurisdictional

hearing or subsequent criminal proceedings on the same charges. In re Wayne

H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, a key case relied upon by the Attorney General, and

cited by Presiding Justice Pollak as well, is not to the contrary. The appellant

in Wayne H. received a Miranda warning and made a considered choice to

6 Obviously, the BHRS cannot declare an exemption that is broader

than the governing regulations allow. And to the extent the lead opinion

suggests the BHRS is not covered at all by HIPAA—which is of course

inconsistent with BHRS’s own policy memorandum concerning its HIPAA

compliance practices—I read 45 Code of Federal Regulations part 160.103

(2020) to be directed toward the handling of billing and other support

functions carried out by entities that provide services to a “health care

provider.” That regulation does not govern the core confidentiality standards

applicable directly to a “health care provider.” Reading the regulations as a

whole to apply only to “financial or administrative activities related to

healthcare,” as the lead opinion apparently does (lead opn., ante, at p. 17),

has the effect of gutting the statute.

7

participate in a section 628 interview after being advised of his right to

counsel. Y.C. never had that opportunity. Under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S.

436, unwarned statements in a custodial interrogation are presumed to have

been coerced.

There is no question here that Ms. Johnson’s interview of Y.C. took

place in a custodial setting. Nor can there be any genuine question about

whether the interview qualifies as an “interrogation” for Fifth Amendment

purposes. “Interrogation” simply means “questioning” (Miranda, supra, 384

U.S. at p. 461), and even without an expressly communicated inquiry, may

include “any words or actions” the examiner should know “are reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” (Rhode Island v.

Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, fn. omitted.) The Fifth Amendment privilege

“not only permits a person to refuse to testify against himself at a criminal

trial in which he is a defendant, but also ‘privileges him not to answer official

questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or

informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal

proceedings.’ ” (Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, 426, italics added.)

The Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is equally applicable. Once

charges are filed accusing a person of a crime (People v. Bustamante (1981)

30 Cal.3d 88, 106–107), there is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at any

“stage of the proceedings [that is] a critical one from [the] defendant’s

standpoint.” (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1136.) A “critical stage”

includes any pretrial event “at which crucial decisions affecting [the

defendant’s] defense [are] to be made, and where his counsel could [take]

steps” toward “protect[ing] and further[ing] [his] substantial rights” (ibid.).

8

For Y.C.—from his standpoint—I believe Ms. Johnson’s interview was a

“critical stage” of the proceedings against him. 7

A significant thrust of the Attorney General’s argument in opposition to

Y.C.’s Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment claims, echoed in Presiding

Justice Pollak’s concurrence, is that Ms. Johnson’s assessment interview was

part of the probation officer’s fact-gathering process under section 628, and

that, as a result, Wayne H. not only bars the use of any statements in the

interview to prove guilt at the jurisdictional hearing but expressly permits

their use at the detention hearing. The detention hearing, the Attorney

General argues, was a neutral proceeding that did not bear upon guilt. He

cites by analogy United States v. A.R. (3d Cir. 1994) 38 F.3d 699 and United

States v. Mitchell H. (9th Cir. 1999) 182 F.3d 1034. These federal cases are

problematic for a number of reasons (see Commonwealth v. Brown (2011)

26 A.3d 485, 501–502), but the premise of this line of argument collapses if

there is no Wayne H. use immunity. I say that because Wayne H. has no

constitutional foundation. Because Wayne H. is based solely on an

interpretation of section 628 and the statutory scheme of which that

provision is part, I doubt its rule of use immunity survived the passage of

article I, section 28, subdivision (f )(2) (formerly subdivision (d)) of the

7 When Ms. Johnson visited Y.C., the stakes for him at the detention

hearing turned out to be more consequential than he could possibly have

known without the assistance of counsel. When finally released, still without

a jurisdictional hearing, he had spent six months behind bars, far beyond the

presumptive maximum period of 15 judicial days’ temporary detention

contemplated by the statutory scheme. (§ 657, subd. (a)(2).) That is one of the

most troubling aspects of this case. In the circumstances Y.C. faced—whether

because of the alleged use of a gun, the alleged involvement of gangs, or some

concern about his family ties to a foreign country—he was entitled to counsel

to advise him of the potential that he might be deemed a flight risk and a

danger to public safety, and kept behind bars for an extended period of time

before his case came on for trial.

9

California Constitution, passed as Proposition 8 in 1982. (Cf. Ramona R. v.

Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 806–811 [use immunity for juvenile’s

transfer hearing testimony and statements to probation officer in advance of

that hearing is founded on article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution

and is therefore valid under Proposition 8 by virtue of the savings clause for

constitutionally based privileges in Evid. Code, § 940].)

It is not the case that, because the questioning at Ms. Johnson’s

assessment interview concerned only matters relating to Y.C.’s personal life

and mental health, we may conclude that nothing Y.C. said in the interview

was potentially incriminating. The felony assault and weapons charges in

this case alleged that Y.C. shot a gang member. Without revealing any

clinical diagnoses or recommendations for treatment set forth in

Ms. Johnson’s assessment interview summary, suffice it to say that the

interview covered a variety of topics concerning Y.C.’s personal background,

including his family’s immigrant story and some information concerning the

nature of his friendships. Together with independent evidence coming from

his mother that Y.C. may have been involved with drugs and might have

been in possession of a gun, it is not difficult to see how Y.C.’s statements to

Ms. Johnson could have been used against him in a case alleging gang

involvement.

The issue here is whether there was an incriminatory hazard, not

whether there was actual incrimination. “An ordinary witness need not

actually prove the existence of an incriminatory hazard, as that would

surrender the very protection which the privilege against self-incrimination

was designed to guarantee. Instead, the privilege forbids compelled

disclosures which could serve as a ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to

establish guilt of a criminal offense; in ruling upon a claim of privilege, the

10

trial court must find that it clearly appears from a consideration of all the

circumstances in the case that an answer to the challenged question[s]

cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the witness.” (Prudhomme v.

Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326, disapproved on other grounds in

Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 371–372; see Hoffman v.

United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486–488.) I am not convinced we can say

the assessment interview of Y.C. could not “possibly have a tendency to

incriminate” him. That interpretation of the record accepts on faith

Ms. Johnson’s professed desire only to help this young man, while ignoring

the fact that the prosecutor might react to the information in her assessment

summary in a wholly different way, and use it to build a case against him.

The lead opinion relies on a line of cases holding there is no Fifth

Amendment protection beyond the “core” privilege not to have incriminating

statements used adversely in later criminal proceedings. (Spielbauer v.

County of Santa Clara (2009) 45 Cal.4th 704, 714–715, 727; Chavez v.

Martinez (2003) 538 U.S. 760, 767–773 (plur. opn. of Thomas, J.); see Chavez,

at pp. 777–778 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.).) Even under this analysis, the

central contention Y.C. makes in this case, that the assessment interview

summary should have been excluded at the detention hearing—a contention

we say is moot in light of Y.C.’s release, but not moot in light of his request

for affirmative relief—qualifies as an attack on a later use of his statements

that posed an incriminatory hazard at the detention hearing. At that hearing,

Y.C. faced a significant threat to his physical liberty, and along with it the

potential stigma of extended incarceration. Gault traches that those things

are by no means neutral or rehabilitative. (In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at

pp. 49–55.) The fact that there may be other, “permissible uses” (lead opn.,

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ante, at pp. 13–14) of Y.C.’s statements to Ms. Johnson does not erase the

underlying Fifth Amendment violation.

Notably, moreover, Spielbauer and Chavez are civil cases in which the

prospect of criminal exposure was not immediately in view. Gault definitively

rejected the idea that juvenile delinquency proceedings are “civil” in nature

and thus that there is no possibility of criminal exposure warranting

application of the Fifth Amendment. (In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at pp. 49–

55.) And in any event, to the extent the narrow Spielbauer and Chavez

conception of the Fifth Amendment applies in a scenario where criminal

charges are pending, our Supreme Court has invoked those cases only where

a defendant who knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment privilege had yet to

face any questions at all. (See Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th

1112, 1127–1128 [where represented criminal defendant made strategic

choice to put his mental state in issue, protective order entered in advance of

mental examination sought by prosecution not justified by the Fifth

Amendment since scope of defendant’s waiver could only be determined at

the examination].)

There was no knowing waiver on this record. (See Miranda, supra,

384 U.S. at p. 475 [“this Court has always set high standards of proof for the

waiver of constitutional rights”]; Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464–

469 [“intelligent waiver” requires “intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of known right or privilege”].) Where there is no waiver and

there is clear criminal exposure—or its equivalent, a pending trial in

delinquency proceedings—the prophylactic sweep of the Fifth Amendment

under Miranda extends beyond simple prohibition on direct evidentiary use

of compelled statements in the state’s case-in-chief on the issue of guilt at

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trial. It also prohibits the use of such statements outside the courtroom to

build a case for guilt. 8

The lead opinion’s citation to People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523,

is no more illuminating than Spielbauer and Chavez. If anything, that case

tends to support Y.C.’s claim of a Fifth Amendment violation here. Elizalde

holds that, in a case involving gang allegations, the collection of information

about gang affiliation, even if gathered for permissible purposes—there, the

questions were asked at jail intake in order to ensure the safety of inmates

and staff—does violate the Fifth Amendment. (Elizalde, at pp. 530–532.)

“Any number of questions posed to arrestees, such as whether they are

injured or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and how they came to be

so, may be both necessary and highly incriminating. In-custody defendants

generally retain their Fifth Amendment protections even if the police have

good reasons for asking un-Mirandized questions,” the court explained. (Id. at

p. 536, italics added.) The remedy for this violation, the court held, was

suppression of the defendant’s “unadmonished answers” at trial (id. at

p. 540), though the failure to do so in that case was not prejudicial (id. at

p. 542). My colleagues appear to confuse the issue of whether there was a

violation of the Fifth Amendment with the issue of remedy. In this case, it is

enough to say that Y.C. is not entitled to the remedy he seeks. Instead, we

hold, incorrectly I believe, that there was no violation at all. (Lead opn., ante,

8 This is why courts distinguish use immunity from derivative use

immunity. See, e.g., People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 803 (holding

that the rule of judicially declared immunity for statements made in a

compelled mental competency examination fully protects a defendant against

any nonevidentiary uses of statements obtained from the defendant during

the competency hearing to the same extent he or she is protected by the

privilege against self-incrimination).

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at p. 12 [“the simple fact of Johnson’s interview of Y.C. did not violate the

Fifth Amendment”].)

If Y.C. had been ordered to participate in a psychological assessment

interview (§ 711), he would have enjoyed full use and derivative immunity for

any statements made to Ms. Johnson. (People v. Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th

at p. 803.) Y.C. may have chosen to participate in the interview—under

duress, and without adequate warning that his statements could be used

against him—but unless we recognize his participation as effectively

compelled, he was not entitled to full immunity from the use of his

statements, “either directly or as a lead to other evidence, to bolster the

prosecution’s case against the defendant.” (Maldonado v. Superior Court,

supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) The Attorney General cannot have it both ways

on this issue. If, as the Attorney General contends, Y.C.’s participation in the

assessment interview was voluntary, he enjoyed at most a narrow, statutorily

derived use immunity under Wayne H. prohibiting the prosecution from

seeking later admission of any incriminating statements he made to

Ms. Johnson as substantive evidence of guilt of a criminal offense. But

Wayne H. does not shield him from indirect, nonevidentiary use of anything

else that might have bolstered the prosecution’s case against him in a later

proceeding. And, worse, if the pure use immunity conferred by Wayne H. is no

longer valid, as I have suggested above is likely the case, then he had no

protection at all—even in this juvenile proceeding. These may seem like

subtleties, but ultimately they explain why Y.C. faced a significant risk of

incrimination in answering questions that seemed both necessary and

benign, as the defendant in Elizalde did, not just at the detention hearing,

but at the jurisdictional hearing and beyond. Y.C. may not have confessed at

the assessment interview, but he supplied information that the state was free

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to use either in building a case for guilt or in arguing he was dangerous

enough to justify an extended period behind bars. 9

STREETER, J.

9 In light of that risk, had there not been an agreed disposition in this

case—which moots the issue—I would have favored granting some form of

writ relief designed to give Y.C. use and derivative use immunity,

affirmatively barring the prosecution from nonevidentiary use of

Ms. Johnson’s assessment summary in any further investigation of whether

he committed the offenses charged against him. The statutory confidentiality

and sealing to which he is automatically entitled under section 827 and

rule 5.552 of the California Rules of Court do not provide sufficiently broad

protection to accomplish that. I mention this in closing because I suspect

there is an 800-pound gorilla in the room here: an unstated concern on the

part of the BHRS and the probation department that, if counsel for juvenile

arrestees were involved, that would disrupt psychological assessment

interviews of the kind at issue in this case. A similar concern has been

recognized and taken into account by our Supreme Court in comparable

circumstances. (People v. Pokovich (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1240, 1252.) Going

forward here, I see no reason why full use and derivative use immunity could

not be conferred by a negotiated protective order applicable to assessment

interviews. If that level of protection were granted, the BHRS and the

probation department may be surprised to find that defense counsel—who

surely understand their paramount duty to protect the welfare of their young

clients, as do all other professionals involved in juvenile delinquency

proceedings—would not impede or stand in the way of these interviews.

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Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial judge: Honorable Susan Jakubowski

Counsel for petitioner: Michelle May Peterson

Lana M. Kreidie

Counsel for amicus curiae on behalf Abigail Trillin, Executive Director

of petitioner Legal Services for Children

Jesse Hahnel, Executive Director

National Center for Youth Law

Meredith Desautels, Staff Attorney

Youth Law Center

Counsel for respondent: No appearance

Counsel for real party in interest: Rob Bonta

Attorney General of California

Matthew Rodriquez

Acting Attorney General of

California

Lance E. Winters

Chief Deputy Attorney General

Jeffrey M. Laurence

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Seth K. Schalit

Supervising Deputy Attorney

General

Eric D. Share

Supervising Deputy Attorney

General

Y.C. v. Superior Court for the County of San Mateo (A162063)

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