Opinion

City of Tahlequah v. Bond

  • 595 U.S. 9
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Oct 18, 2021
Status
Published
On the bench
Per Curiam
Cited by
149 cases
Authority
More cited than 86.1%

concluding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity when a suspect, more than six feet away from the officers, picked up a hammer and held it at shoulder level as if to swing it at them

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity when a suspect, more than six feet away from the officers, picked up a hammer and held it at shoulder level as if to swing it at them
  • reversing the Tenth Circuit for denying qualified im- munity where the precedent did not make it clear to an officer that the specific conduct at issue was unlawful
  • rejecting Tenth Circuit’s use of cases with “dramatically different” facts to support Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that officers violated clearly established law
  • explaining that the law must be clearly established when the incident happened

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2021) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CITY OF TAHLEQUAH, OKLAHOMA, ET AL. v. AUSTIN

P. BOND, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF

DOMINIC F. ROLLICE, DECEASED

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–1668. Decided October 18, 2021

PER CURIAM.

On August 12, 2016, Dominic Rollice’s ex-wife, Joy, called

911. Rollice was in her garage, she explained, and he was

intoxicated and would not leave. Joy requested police as-

sistance; otherwise, “it’s going to get ugly real quick.” 981

F. 3d 808, 812 (CA10 2020). The dispatcher asked whether

Rollice lived at the residence. Joy said he did not but ex-

plained that he kept tools in her garage.

Officers Josh Girdner, Chase Reed, and Brandon Vick re-

sponded to the call. All three knew that Rollice was Joy’s

ex-husband, was intoxicated, and would not leave her

home.

Joy met the officers out front and led them to the side

entrance of the garage. There the officers encountered Rol-

lice and began speaking with him in the doorway. Rollice

expressed concern that the officers intended to take him to

jail; Officer Girdner told him that they were simply trying

to get him a ride. Rollice began fidgeting with something

in his hands and the officers noticed that he appeared nerv-

ous. Officer Girdner asked if he could pat Rollice down for

weapons. Rollice refused.

Police body-camera video captured what happened next.

As the conversation continued, Officer Girdner gestured

with his hands and took one step toward the doorway, caus-

ing Rollice to take one step back. Rollice, still conversing

with the officers, turned around and walked toward the

back of the garage where his tools were hanging over a

2 CITY OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND

Per Curiam

workbench. Officer Girdner followed, the others close be-

hind. No officer was within six feet of Rollice. The video is

silent, but the officers stated that they ordered Rollice to

stop. Rollice kept walking. He then grabbed a hammer

from the back wall over the workbench and turned around

to face the officers. Rollice grasped the handle of the ham-

mer with both hands, as if preparing to swing a baseball

bat, and pulled it up to shoulder level. The officers backed

up, drawing their guns. At this point the video is no longer

silent, and the officers can be heard yelling at Rollice to

drop the hammer.

He did not. Instead, Rollice took a few steps to his right,

coming out from behind a piece of furniture so that he had

an unobstructed path to Officer Girdner. He then raised

the hammer higher back behind his head and took a stance

as if he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the

officers. In response, Officers Girdner and Vick fired their

weapons, killing Rollice.

Rollice’s estate filed suit against, among others, Officers

Girdner and Vick, alleging that the officers were liable un-

der 42 U. S. C. §1983, for violating Rollice’s Fourth Amend-

ment right to be free from excessive force. The officers

moved for summary judgment, both on the merits and on

qualified immunity grounds. The District Court granted

their motion. Burke v. Tahlequah, 2019 WL 4674316, *6

(ED Okla., Sept. 25, 2019). The officers’ use of force was

reasonable, it concluded, and even if not, qualified immun-

ity prevented the case from going further. Ibid.

A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit re-

versed. 981 F. 3d, at 826. The Court began by explaining

that Tenth Circuit precedent allows an officer to be held li-

able for a shooting that is itself objectively reasonable if the

officer’s reckless or deliberate conduct created a situation

requiring deadly force. Id., at 816. Applying that rule, the

Court concluded that a jury could find that Officer Girdner’s

Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2021) 3

Per Curiam

initial step toward Rollice and the officers’ subsequent “cor-

nering” of him in the back of the garage recklessly created

the situation that led to the fatal shooting, such that their

ultimate use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Id., at

823. As to qualified immunity, the Court concluded that

several cases, most notably Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F. 3d 837

(CA10 1997), clearly established that the officers’ conduct

was unlawful. 981 F. 3d, at 826. This petition followed.

We need not, and do not, decide whether the officers vio-

lated the Fourth Amendment in the first place, or whether

recklessly creating a situation that requires deadly force

can itself violate the Fourth Amendment. On this record,

the officers plainly did not violate any clearly established

law.

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officers from

civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009). As we have explained,

qualified immunity protects “ ‘all but the plainly incompe-

tent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. ___, ___ –___ (2018) (slip op.,

at 13–14) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341

(1986)).

We have repeatedly told courts not to define clearly es-

tablished law at too high a level of generality. See, e.g.,

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 742 (2011). It is not

enough that a rule be suggested by then-existing precedent;

the “rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is ‘clear

to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.’ ” Wesby, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,

at 14) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001)).

Such specificity is “especially important in the Fourth

Amendment context,” where it is “sometimes difficult for an

officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here

excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer

4 CITY OF TAHLEQUAH v. BOND

Per Curiam

confronts.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 12 (2015) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Tenth Circuit contravened those settled principles

here. Not one of the decisions relied upon by the Court of

Appeals—Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F. 3d 1204 (CA10

2019), Hastings v. Barnes, 252 Fed. Appx. 197 (CA10 2007),

Allen, 119 F. 3d 837, and Sevier v. Lawrence, 60 F. 3d 695

(CA10 1995)—comes close to establishing that the officers’

conduct was unlawful. The Court relied most heavily on

Allen. But the facts of Allen are dramatically different from

the facts here. The officers in Allen responded to a potential

suicide call by sprinting toward a parked car, screaming at

the suspect, and attempting to physically wrest a gun from

his hands. 119 F. 3d, at 841. Officers Girdner and Vick, by

contrast, engaged in a conversation with Rollice, followed

him into a garage at a distance of 6 to 10 feet, and did not

yell until after he picked up a hammer. We cannot conclude

that Allen “clearly established” that their conduct was reck-

less or that their ultimate use of force was unlawful.

The other decisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals

are even less relevant. As for Sevier, that decision merely

noted in dicta that deliberate or reckless preseizure conduct

can render a later use of force excessive before dismissing

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 60 F. 3d, at 700–701.

To state the obvious, a decision where the court did not even

have jurisdiction cannot clearly establish substantive con-

stitutional law. Regardless, that formulation of the rule is

much too general to bear on whether the officers’ particular

conduct here violated the Fourth Amendment. See al-Kidd,

563 U. S., at 742. Estate of Ceballos, decided after the

shooting at issue, is of no use in the clearly established in-

quiry. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 200, n. 4

(2004) (per curiam). And Hastings, an unpublished deci-

sion, involved officers initiating an encounter with a poten-

tially suicidal individual by chasing him into his bedroom,

screaming at him, and pepper-spraying him. 252 Fed.

Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2021) 5

Per Curiam

Appx., at 206. Suffice it to say, a reasonable officer could

miss the connection between that case and this one.

Neither the panel majority nor the respondent have iden-

tified a single precedent finding a Fourth Amendment vio-

lation under similar circumstances. The officers were thus

entitled to qualified immunity.

The petition for certiorari and the motions for leave to file

briefs amici curiae are granted, and the judgment of the

Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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