Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna

Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2021) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DANIEL RIVAS-VILLEGAS v. RAMON CORTESLUNA

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–1539. Decided October 18, 2021

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Daniel Rivas-Villegas, a police officer in Union

City, California, responded to a 911 call reporting that a

woman and her two children were barricaded in a room for

fear that respondent Ramon Cortesluna, the woman’s boy-

friend, was going to hurt them. After confirming that the

family had no way of escaping the house, Rivas-Villegas

and the other officers present commanded Cortesluna out-

side and onto the ground. Officers saw a knife in Cor-

tesluna’s left pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another of-

ficer were in the process of removing the knife and

handcuffing Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas briefly placed his

knee on the left side of Cortesluna’s back. Cortesluna later

sued under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging, as

relevant, that Rivas-Villegas used excessive force. At issue

here is whether Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified im-

munity because he did not violate clearly established law.

The undisputed facts are as follows. A 911 operator re-

ceived a call from a crying 12-year-old girl reporting that

she, her mother, and her 15-year-old sister had shut them-

selves into a room at their home because her mother’s boy-

friend, Cortesluna, was trying to hurt them and had a

chainsaw. The girl told the operator that Cortesluna was

“ ‘always drinking,’ ” had “ ‘anger issues,’ ” was “ ‘really

mad,’ ” and was using the chainsaw to “ ‘break something in

the house.’ ” Cortesluna v. Leon, 979 F. 3d 645, 649 (CA9

2020). A police dispatcher relayed this information along

with a description of Cortesluna in a request for officers to

respond.

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Rivas-Villegas heard the broadcast and responded to the

scene along with four other officers. The officers spent sev-

eral minutes observing the home and reported seeing

through a window a man matching Cortesluna’s descrip-

tion. One officer asked whether the girl and her family

could exit the house. Dispatch responded that they “ ‘were

unable to get out’ ” and confirmed that the 911 operator had

“ ‘hear[d] sawing in the background’ ” and thought that Cor-

tesluna might be trying to saw down the door. Cortesluna

v. Leon, 2018 WL 6727824, *2 (ND Cal., Dec. 21, 2018).

After receiving this information, Rivas-Villegas knocked

on the door and stated loudly, “ ‘police department, come to

the front door, Union City police, come to the front door.’ ”

Ibid. Another officer yelled, “ ‘he’s coming and has a

weapon.’ ” Ibid. A different officer then stated, “ ‘use less-

lethal,’ ” referring to a beanbag shotgun. Ibid. When Rivas-

Villegas ordered Cortesluna to “ ‘drop it,’ ” Cortesluna

dropped the “weapon,” later identified as a metal tool. Ibid.

Rivas-Villegas then commanded, “ ‘come out, put your

hands up, walk out towards me.’ ” 979 F. 3d, at 650. Cor-

tesluna put his hands up and Rivas-Villegas told him to

“ ‘keep coming.’ ” Ibid. As Cortesluna walked out of the

house and toward the officers, Rivas-Villegas said, “ ‘Stop.

Get on your knees.’ ” Ibid. Plaintiff stopped 10 to 11 feet

from the officers. Another officer then saw a knife sticking

out from the front left pocket of Cortesluna’s pants and

shouted, “ ‘he has a knife in his left pocket, knife in his

pocket,’ ” and directed Cortesluna, “ ‘don’t put your hands

down,’ ” “ ‘hands up.’ ” 2018 WL 6727824, *2. Cortesluna

turned his head toward the instructing officer but then low-

ered his head and his hands in contravention of the officer’s

orders. Another officer twice shot Cortesluna with a bean-

bag round from his shotgun, once in the lower stomach and

once in the left hip.

After the second shot, Cortesluna raised his hands over

his head. The officers shouted for him to “ ‘get down,’ ”

Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2021) 3

Per Curiam

which he did. Another officer stated, “ ‘left pocket, he’s got

a knife.’ ” Ibid. Rivas-Villegas then straddled Cortesluna.

He placed his right foot on the ground next to Cortesluna’s

right side with his right leg bent at the knee. He placed his

left knee on the left side of Cortesluna’s back, near where

Cortesluna had a knife in his pocket. He raised both of Cor-

tesluna’s arms up behind his back. Rivas-Villegas was in

this position for no more than eight seconds before standing

up while continuing to hold Cortesluna’s arms. At that

point, another officer, who had just removed the knife from

Cortesluna’s pocket and tossed it away, came and hand-

cuffed Cortesluna’s hands behind his back. Rivas-Villegas

lifted Cortesluna up and moved him away from the door.

Cortesluna brought suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claim-

ing, as relevant here, that Rivas-Villegas used excessive

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District

Court granted summary judgment to Rivas-Villegas, but

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 979

F. 3d, at 656.

The Court of Appeals held that “Rivas-Villegas is not en-

titled to qualified immunity because existing precedent put

him on notice that his conduct constituted excessive force.”

Id., at 654. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Ap-

peals relied solely on LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204

F. 3d 947 (CA9 2000). The court acknowledged that “the

officers here responded to a more volatile situation than did

the officers in LaLonde.” 979 F. 3d, at 654. Nevertheless,

it reasoned: “Both LaLonde and this case involve suspects

who were lying face-down on the ground and were not re-

sisting either physically or verbally, on whose back the de-

fendant officer leaned with a knee, causing allegedly signif-

icant injury.” Ibid.

Judge Collins dissented. As relevant, he argued that “the

facts of LaLonde are materially distinguishable from this

case and are therefore insufficient to have made clear to

every reasonable officer that the force Rivas-Villegas used

4 RIVAS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA

Per Curiam

here was excessive.” Id., at 664 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

We agree and therefore reverse. Even assuming that con-

trolling Circuit precedent clearly establishes law for pur-

poses of §1983, LaLonde did not give fair notice to Rivas-

Villegas. He is thus entitled to qualified immunity.

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-

tional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (per cu-

riam) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). A

right is clearly established when it is “sufficiently clear that

every reasonable official would have understood that what

he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S.

7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). Although “this Court’s case law does not require a case

directly on point for a right to be clearly established, exist-

ing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitu-

tional question beyond debate.” White, 580 U. S., at ___

(slip op., at 6) (alterations and internal quotation marks

omitted). This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposi-

tion.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth

Amendment context, where . . . it is sometimes difficult for

an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here

excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer

confronts.” Mullenix, 577 U. S., at 12 (alterations and in-

ternal quotation marks omitted). Whether an officer has

used excessive force depends on “the facts and circum-

stances of each particular case, including the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he

is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989); see

Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2021) 5

Per Curiam

also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the

officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses

a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to

others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent es-

cape by using deadly force”). However, Graham’s and Gar-

ner’s standards are cast “at a high level of generality.”

Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 199. “[I]n an obvious case, these

standards can ‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without

a body of relevant case law.” Ibid. But this is not an obvi-

ous case. Thus, to show a violation of clearly established

law, Cortesluna must identify a case that put Rivas-Ville-

gas on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful.

Cortesluna has not done so. Neither Cortesluna nor the

Court of Appeals identified any Supreme Court case that

addresses facts like the ones at issue here. Instead, the

Court of Appeals relied solely on its precedent in LaLonde.

Even assuming that Circuit precedent can clearly establish

law for purposes of §1983, LaLonde is materially distin-

guishable and thus does not govern the facts of this case.

In LaLonde, officers were responding to a neighbor’s com-

plaint that LaLonde had been making too much noise in his

apartment. 204 F. 3d, at 950–951. When they knocked on

LaLonde’s door, he “appeared in his underwear and a T-

shirt, holding a sandwich in his hand.” Id., at 951.

LaLonde testified that, after he refused to let the officers

enter his home, they did so anyway and informed him he

would be arrested for obstruction of justice. Ibid. One of-

ficer then knocked the sandwich from LaLonde’s hand and

“grabbed LaLonde by his ponytail and knocked him back-

wards to the ground.” Id., at 952. After a short scuffle, the

officer sprayed LaLonde in the face with pepper spray. At

that point, LaLonde ceased resisting and another officer,

while handcuffing LaLonde, “deliberately dug his knee into

LaLonde’s back with a force that caused him long-term if

not permanent back injury.” Id., at 952, 960, n. 17.

The situation in LaLonde and the situation at issue here

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diverge in several respects. In LaLonde, officers were re-

sponding to a mere noise complaint, whereas here they

were responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic

violence possibly involving a chainsaw. In addition,

LaLonde was unarmed. Cortesluna, in contrast, had a

knife protruding from his left pocket for which he had just

previously appeared to reach. Further, in this case, video

evidence shows, and Cortesluna does not dispute, that Ri-

vas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than

eight seconds and only on the side of his back near the knife

that officers were in the process of retrieving. LaLonde, in

contrast, testified that the officer deliberately dug his knee

into his back when he had no weapon and had made no

threat when approached by police. These facts, considered

together in the context of this particular arrest, materially

distinguish this case from LaLonde.

“Precedent involving similar facts can help move a case

beyond the otherwise hazy borders between excessive and

acceptable force and thereby provide an officer notice that

a specific use of force is unlawful.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584

U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (per curiam) (slip op., at 5) (internal

quotation marks omitted). On the facts of this case, neither

LaLonde nor any decision of this Court is sufficiently simi-

lar. For that reason, we grant Rivas-Villegas’ petition for

certiorari and reverse the Ninth Circuit’s determination

that Rivas-Villegas is not entitled to qualified immunity.

It is so ordered.