Opinion

State v. Brown

  • 927 S.W.2d 722
  • 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 2993
  • 1996 WL 396096
Court
Court of Appeals of Texas
Filed
Jul 17, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Starr
On the bench
Starr
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 97.7%

trial court’s ruling “fell outside zone of reasonable disagreement”

How later courts described this case

  • trial court’s ruling “fell outside zone of reasonable disagreement”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

OPINION ON REMAND

STARR, Justice.

This case comes to us on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In our original opinion, we reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the introduction into evidence of a brown paper sack containing crack cocaine. In granting the motion to suppress, the trial court necessarily found by implication that the sack was seized during an unlawful detention. We held that the trial court abused its discretion in maldng this finding because Brown abandoned the sack before the police took any action that could be characterized as an unlawful detention. State v. Brown, No. 06-94 — 00038-CR, slip op. at 5 (Tex.App.—Texarkana, Aug.24, 1994, n.w.h.)(not designated for publication).

On petition for discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case for our reconsideration in light of State v. Carter, 915 S.W.2d 501 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), and DuBose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The court in Carter and DuBose held that in reviewing a trial judge’s decision granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court is not to conduct a de novo review of the record, but is instead to limit its review of the trial court’s rulings, both as to the facts and the legal significance of those facts, to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Carter, 915 S.W.2d at 505 ; DuBose, 915 S.W.2d at 496 .

Without conducting a de novo review of the record, we again hold that the trial court in this case abused its discretion in suppressing the evidence. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, and giving deference to the trial court’s role as to the credibility of witnesses, as well as the weight and legal significance of the facts before the court, the trial court’s conclusion that the sack was seized as the result or fruit of an unlawful detention falls so far outside the zone of reasonable disagreement as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See DuBose, 915 S.W.2d at 496-97 .

*723 We hold that the evidence is admissible and remand the cause to the trial court for trial.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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