Ibarra v. Harris County Texas

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

June 28, 2007

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

No. 05-20259

_____________________

SEAN CARLOS IBARRA; ERIK ADAM IBARRA,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

versus

HARRIS COUNTY TEXAS; TOMMY THOMAS, Sheriff,

Individually and in his official capacity;

PRESTON FOOSE, Deputy, Individually and in

his official capacity; MANUEL MORENO, Deputy,

Individually and in his official capacity;

ALEXANDER ROCHA, Sergeant, Individually

and in his official capacity; JOHN PALERMO,

Deputy, Individually and in his official

capacity; DAN SHATTUCK, Deputy, Individually

and in his official capacity; ALBERT

RODRIGUEZ, Expert Witness,

Defendants - Appellants.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas, Houston

USDC No. 4:04-CV-186

_________________________________________________________________

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case, before us on interlocutory appeal, arises out of an

incident in which the Harris County Sheriff’s deputies raided the

Ibarra home after observing Sean Ibarra taking photographs of

deputies executing a search warrant at a neighbor’s residence. The

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

Defendants appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for

summary judgment on qualified immunity.

I.

At approximately 2:30 p.m. on January 4, 2002, members of the

Harris County Organized Crime Task Force arrived at 2911 Shady Park

Drive in Houston, Texas for the purpose of executing a search

warrant.1 Shortly before 3:00 p.m., Sean Ibarra returned to his

residence at 2907 Shady Park Drive. He observed marked police

vehicles in the street and several officers in uniform or wearing

“Police” or “Sheriff” jackets walking around the premises at 2911

Shady Park Drive. He saw children on the premises who were not

wearing coats and appeared to be cold. At some point in time, Sean

was told that one of the children had been assaulted by one of the

officers and that at least one of the children had urinated on

himself and had not been permitted to change clothing. Sean

continued to observe the children for almost an hour, during which

time none of the children were given additional clothing.

Some time later, Madalyn Valdez appeared at the front door of

the Ibarra residence, complaining about how the officers were

treating the children, some of whom were her grandchildren. She

asked to borrow a camera to document the manner in which the

children were being treated. Sean Ibarra offered to take the

1

Because we are reviewing the district court’s denial of

motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity on interlocutory

appeal, we relate the facts as alleged by the Ibarras. See Meadows

v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 2007).

2

photographs because he thought it would be safer for him to do so.

At this point, it was also decided that Erik Ibarra would park his

truck on the public street and videotape the scene, but Erik was

unable to because his truck was blocked in the driveway. Sean took

the camera and proceeded outside where he took pictures for

approximately 45 minutes. He remained on his property, the

sidewalk, or in the public street at all times, and did nothing to

interfere with the officers executing the search warrant.

At some point, a uniformed officer, Deputy Foose, observed

Sean taking photographs of the scene at 2911 Shady Park Drive.

Foose ordered Sean to stop taking photographs and to “come here.”

Sean hesitated, then took another photograph. Sean saw the officer

become agitated and yell to someone. He gave the camera to Ms.

Valdez and proceeded to follow her and his mother back toward his

house. By the time he reached his front door, Foose was

immediately behind him. Sean grabbed the frame of the front door

with his back to the officers and told them they were not welcome

in his house. At that point, Sean says that Foose struck him in

the back, kidneys, and on the side of his face. As he began to

fall, Foose hit him again in the head and he fell to the floor.

Foose then turned to Ms. Valdez who was holding the camera and

began to hit and assault her. He was stopped by another officer,

believed to be Deputy Shattuck.

Erik Ibarra was taping the scuffle on his video recorder.

Shattuck threatened to shoot him. Erik placed the video camera on

3

the bed and was told by Shattuck that they were all under arrest.

The camera and the video recorder were confiscated and everyone was

taken outside the residence. Erik and Sean report that they were

tripped, and then tightly handcuffed after they fell to the ground.

They both claim to have complained to the officers about their

treatment and were told to shut up.

Sean and Erik were transported to Harris County Jail where

they were charged with Evading Detention and Resisting Arrest. The

criminal charges against the Ibarras were subsequently dismissed.

The camera was returned broken and the film was destroyed. The

video recorder was returned without the memory stick.

Sean and his brother Erik Ibarra brought this lawsuit against

Harris County, Sheriff Thomas, and the deputies in December 2003 in

state court, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous

state law claims. The Ibarras later amended their complaint to add

law enforcement expert witness, Albert Rodriguez, and Assistant

District Attorney, Sally Ring. The defendants removed the case to

federal court and filed separate motions for summary judgment. In

March 2005, the district court denied the summary judgment motions

of Harris County, Sheriff Thomas, Foose, Shattuck, Moreno, Rocha,

and Palermo. In April 2005, the district court denied the summary

judgment motions of Ring and Rodriguez. The defendants timely

appealed.2

2

We lack jurisdiction over Harris County’s appeal because

municipal governments do not enjoy the same right to interlocutory

4

II.

A.

In reviewing an interlocutory appeal from the denial of

qualified immunity, this court does not apply the typical summary

judgment standard. See Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 348 (5th

Cir. 2004) (en banc). Rather, we consider de novo “whether the

district court erred in assessing the legal significance of the

conduct that the district court deemed sufficiently supported for

purposes of summary judgment.” Id. at 349. Our jurisdiction is

limited to issues of law. See Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d

391, 393 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The presence of a

genuine issue of material fact regarding qualified immunity will

preclude us from exercising jurisdiction. Glenn v. City of Tyler,

242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001).

The district court found that the facts of this case, taken in

the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, do not demonstrate that

the defendant officers had probable cause to arrest the Ibarras.

The district court also found that the defendant officers acted in

accordance with an unconstitutional policy set by County Sheriff

Thomas. The district court therefore denied qualified immunity as

to all of the defendants. On appeal, the defendants assert that

appeal as their officials. See Gentry v. Lowndes County, 337 F.3d

481, 484 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing McKee v. Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409,

412 (5th Cir. 1989)). The County’s appeal is therefore dismissed.

On October 12, 2006, this court granted the Ibarras’ unopposed

motion to dismiss Defendant Ring from this appeal.

5

the Ibarras failed to allege that the officers’ actions violated

their constitutional rights. They further argue that they are

entitled to statutory immunity under Texas law.

1.

“Government officials performing discretionary functions are

entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability to the extent

that ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir.

2006)(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The

qualified immunity analysis is a two-step process. First, we

determine whether the plaintiff properly alleged the violation of

a clearly established right. Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252,

257 (5th Cir. 2005). “A right is clearly established if its

contours are ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. at 238

(quoting Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 919 (5th Cir.

2000)). If the plaintiff can meet that burden, we then consider

whether the official’s conduct was objectively reasonable under the

law at the time of the incident. Id. (citing Sanchez v. Swyden,

139 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Sean Ibarra claims that his First and Fourth Amendment rights

were violated when Deputy Foose attempted to detain him for taking

photographs of the scene at 2911 Shady Park Drive, and then

arrested him for failing to comply with Foose’s order to stop. The

6

law is clearly established that a detention is objectively

unreasonable if the police officers lacks reasonable suspicion to

believe that the person is engaged in criminal activity, Brown v.

Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979), and that a warrantless arrest is

objectively unreasonable if the officer lacks probable cause.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-424 (1976). Here Sean

has alleged that Foose attempted to detain him without reasonable

suspicion and arrested him without probable cause. Sean has

therefore satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity

analysis by alleging a violation of his clearly established Fourth

Amendment rights.

We therefore consider whether Foose’s actions were objectively

reasonable. Both parties agree that taking photographs of police

activity is not, in and of itself, a criminal act. Deputy Foose

argues that he had reasonable suspicion to detain Sean Ibarra

because he feared that Sean planned to use the photos to retaliate

against the officers.3 At summary judgment, Foose offered no

evidence to support his belief that Sean planned to use these

photographs to engage in this criminal activity in the future,

other than the bare fact that Sean was taking photographs of the

scene.4 Foose has pointed to no other facts in the summary

3

Under § 36.06 of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits the

offense of retaliation if he intentionally or knowingly harms or

threatens to harm another on account of that person’s status as a

public servant.

4

The one case Foose cites in support is distinguishable. In

7

judgment record that would support a reasonable officer’s belief

that Sean Ibarra was engaged in criminal activity.5 Viewed in the

light most favorable to the Ibarras, Deputy Foose unreasonably

violated Sean Ibarra’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights

by attempting to detain him without reasonable suspicion.6 The

United States v. Raibley, 243 F.3d 1069 (7th Cir. 2001), the

suspect was observed surreptitiously videotaping a young woman who

worked at Walmart as she walked across the parking lot. Id. at

1071. When the man realized he had been observed, he drove away

from the scene “in a hurry.” Id. The man later returned to the

Walmart and then sped away again, apparently after seeing a marked

patrol vehicle parked in front of the store. Id. The Seventh

Circuit found that the police officer who stopped Raibley had

reasonable suspicion to believe that he was engaged in the criminal

offense of stalking, id. at 1074-75, which under Illinois law

requires a showing that the defendant placed another person under

surveillance on at least two separate occasions and placed that

person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, sexual assault,

confinement, or restraint. Id. at 1074.

In contrast to Raibley, Sean Ibarra was openly taking pictures

from his front lawn -- and attempted to retreat to his house only

after Foose started toward him. Furthermore, there was no

evidence other than the fact that Sean was taking photographs that

would have indicated that Sean planned to use them to engage in

retaliation.

5

Foose further argues that he had probable cause to arrest

Sean because Sean failed to obey the order to stop and fled. The

law is clearly established that disregarding an unlawful police

order does not create reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-52; Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202

F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 2000). Because Foose is unable to

demonstrate based on the summary judgment record that his attempt

to detain Sean was lawful, he cannot show that Sean’s subsequent

arrest was supported by probable cause.

6

Because the record before us indicates a violation of Sean

Ibarra’s Fourth Amendment rights, we need not reach the question of

whether his First Amendment rights were violated to resolve this

interlocutory appeal. If necessary, this question may be addressed

in a subsequent appeal after the evidence as to both claims is

developed at trial.

8

district court’s denial of qualified immunity with respect to

Deputy Foose is therefore affirmed.7

2.

We find, however, that the district court erred in not

considering each deputy’s individual role in the arrest when

determining whether he was eligible for qualified immunity. See

Longoria v. Texas, 473 F.3d at 593 (holding that the “court erred

in using these factual disputes as a blanket justification for

denial of summary judgment to the defendants as a class, without

further considering their individual roles in the disputed

incidents.”); Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 540-41 (5th Cir.

2004). We therefore address each officer’s argument in turn.

Deputy Shattuck claims that he is entitled to qualified

immunity because he acted reasonably in assisting Foose with the

Ibarras’ arrest. There is a disputed question of fact as to how

much Shattuck saw of the interaction between Foose and the Ibarras.

In his incident report, Shattuck claimed to have witnessed the

entire sequence of events. He has since claimed that he never saw

Sean Ibarra taking photographs, and only came out of 2911 Shady

Park Drive in time to see Foose pursuing a fleeing suspect. The

Ibarras maintain that Shattuck was present for the entire incident.

7

Our determination here is based solely on our reading of the

record under the summary judgment standard for purposes of

determining qualified immunity, and is in no way preclusive of a

contrary finding by the jury with respect to the ultimate merits of

the constitutional claim.

9

This factual dispute precludes summary judgment on qualified

immunity, because the extent of Shattuck’s knowledge as to events

leading up to the arrest will affect the determination whether his

actions with respect to the Ibarras were objectively reasonable.

We therefore dismiss Shattuck’s interlocutory appeal for lack

jurisdiction.

None of the remaining officer defendants were aware of the

events leading up to the arrest, and on the record before us they

are entitled to qualified immunity for their participation.8

Moreno responded to a request from other deputies for assistance

and watched Sean and Erik Ibarra outside after they had been

arrested. Palermo also responded to the other deputies’ call for

assistance. He entered the Ibarra residence, saw Sean struggling

with Deputy Foose, escorted Sean out of the house, and forced Sean

to the ground to handcuff him because he was noncompliant. Like

Moreno, Palermo did not know why the Ibarras had been arrested and

his response upon arriving on the scene was not unreasonable. He

is therefore entitled to immunity. Deputy Palermo is also entitled

to qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim because the

8

Because none of the remaining officers were aware of the

events leading up to the arrest, they cannot be held liable as

bystanders. A bystander liability claim requires the plaintiffs to

show that the officer was present at the scene and did not take

reasonable measures to protect a suspect from excessive force.

Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995). None of the

remaining defendants knew why the Ibarras were being arrested or

had a reasonable opportunity to intervene. Moreno, Palermo, and

Rocha are entitled to qualified immunity on the Ibarras’ bystander

liability claims.

10

Ibarras offer no argument or evidence to support their claim that

Palermo’s use of force against Sean was unreasonable under the

circumstances.

Sergeant Rocha was inside the residence at 2911 Shady Park

when he heard a deputy outside shouting that an officer needed

assistance. He ran over to 2907 Shady Park, where he saw Madalyn

Valdez attacking Foose. Rocha grabbed Valdez by the arm and

handcuffed her. Rocha did not help with the apprehension or arrest

of Sean Ibarra or Erik Ibarra, and did not touch them, speak to

them, or transport them to the Harris County Jail. He had no

knowledge of the events giving rise to the arrests. He did not act

unreasonably, given the circumstances, and therefore is entitled to

qualified immunity based on his personal participation in the

arrest.

The Ibarras also argue that Sergeant Rocha is liable as a

policymaker and because he ratified the actions of the deputies

involved. Rocha cannot be liable as a supervisor because the acts

of his subordinates do not trigger § 1983 liability. Alton v.

Texas A & M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1999). Moreover,

Rocha is not an “authorized policymaker in whom final authority

rested regarding the action ordered.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish

Council, 279 F.3d 273, 289 (5th Cir. 2002). The Ibarras make

several conclusory allegations that Rocha ratified Foose’s actions,

but offer no evidence in support. This argument is therefore

abandoned. Rocha is entitled to qualified immunity.

11

3.

As a supervisory official, Sheriff Thomas may not be held

liable under § 1983 for the acts of his subordinates based on a

theory of respondeat superior. See Alton, 168 F.3d at 200.

Sheriff Thomas may, however, be held personally liable if either

(1) he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation;

or (2) a sufficient causal connection exists between his wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. Thompkins v. Belt, 828

F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987). As chief law enforcement

policymaker in Harris County, Sheriff Thomas may be held personally

liable if he implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy

itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving

12

force of the constitutional violation,” Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 289.9

The district court determined that Sheriff Thomas maintained

and acquiesced in an unconstitutional policy permitting officers to

effectuate the warrantless seizure of cameras and video recorders

and to destroy the film therein. The court noted that Thomas

stated in his deposition that he approved of Foose’s actions in

this case and that Foose had acted in accordance with the

department’s word of mouth or standard operating procedures. The

court further noted that Sergeant Petruska testified about a

previous incident that the deputies had handled the same way, and

that the testimony of Petruska, Shattuck, and Rocha indicates that

9

An official policy is defined as:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision that is officially adopted and

promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking

officers or by an official to whom the

lawmakers have delegated policy-making

authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of city

officials or employees, which, although not

authorized by officially adopted and

promulgated policy, is so common and well-

settled as to constitute a custom that fairly

represents municipal policy. Actual or

constructive knowledge of such custom must be

attributable to the governing body of that

municipality or to an official to whom that

body had delegated policy-making authority.

Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992).

13

Foose acted in accordance with procedures deemed appropriate.10 The

court concluded that there was no factual dispute about the

existence or character of the procedures under which the plaintiffs

were incarcerated -- and that Sheriff Thomas’s acquiescence in this

practice showed deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs’

constitutional rights.

Although we agree with the district court that viewed in the

light most favorable to the Ibarras the evidence indicates that

Sheriff Thomas acquiesced in an unconstitutional policy, we

disagree with the district court’s conclusion that no factual

disputes exist as to existence and scope of a custom or policy, and

as to Thomas’s knowledge of this policy. On appeal, Sheriff Thomas

specifically challenges the district court’s finding that any such

unofficial custom or policy exists and argues that the Ibarras have

produced insufficient evidence showing a pattern of constitutional

violation under official County regulations. Because Sheriff

Thomas primarily argues that evidence in the record is insufficient

to support the Ibarras’ version of the facts, the resolution of his

qualified immunity claim turns on a contested question of fact. We

therefore dismiss Sheriff Thomas’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

See Connelly v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 484 F.3d 343, 345-

46 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 347 (5th

Cir. 2004) (en banc)).

10

He explained: “We took the film. Took the camera, took the

film, gave them their camera back.”

14

B.

Each of the officers also claims immunity from suit for the

state-law claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act because the

Ibarras made an irrevocable election to sue only the County. They

rely upon § 101.106(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code, which states that “[t]he filing of a suit under this chapter

against a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by

the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery

by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the

governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.” Because the

Ibarras sued the County, the Defendants argue, their lawsuits

against the individual officers are barred.

The defendants misread the statute. Subsection (b) of §

101.106 states the converse of subsection (a): suing an employee

constitutes an irrevocable election and bars suit against the

governmental unit. Subsection (e) states that if both the

employees and the governmental unit are sued “the employees shall

immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the

governmental unit.”

In this case, both Harris County and its employees were sued;

therefore, subsection (e) controls. Harris County has never filed

a motion to dismiss its employees; therefore, the defendant

officers have no automatic right to dismissal. Subsection (e) does

not explicitly prohibit suits against both employee and

governmental unit. See Newman v. Obersteller, 960 S.W.2d 621, 622

15

(Tex. 1997) (judgment for school district rendered employee immune

under § 101.106). Harris County’s presence in this case does not

entitle the individual officers to immunity from the state-law

claims.11 Because Harris County failed to file the appropriate

motion, the district court did not err in denying summary judgment

on basis of statutory immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.12

C.

In its one-page order of April 27, 2005, the district court

summarily denied Rodriguez’s motion for summary judgment.

Rodriguez appealed, arguing that the district court erred in

denying him absolute immunity as an expert witness. We agree. See

Mowbray v. Cameron County, 274 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2001)

(citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983)).

See also Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 352 (5th Cir. 2004) (en

banc) (“[N]o distinction between fact witnesses and expert

witnesses ... [is] drawn in cases involving the absolute immunity

that protects witnesses from civil liability arising from their

testimony.”). The Ibarras argue that Rodriguez was not sued

because he was an expert witness, but because he conspired with

others to commit perjury. This argument fails, however, because as

11

Appellants Thomas, Shattuck, Rocha, Moreno, and Palermo

incorporate this argument in their briefs.

12

The appellants offer no other arguments in support of their

claim for qualified immunity as to the Ibarras’ state law claims.

16

Rodriguez correctly notes, immunity also covers allegations of

conspiracy to commit perjury. Mowbray, 274 F.3d at 277-78

(“absolute witness immunity bars § 1983 suits for conspiracy to

commit perjury”). Rodriguez is entitled to absolute immunity.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court denying qualified immunity on the federal claims

with respect to Foose. The appeals of Shattuck and Thomas are

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. We AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court denying immunity under the Texas Torts Claims Act to

Foose, Shattuck, Thomas, Moreno, Palermo, and Rocha and we REVERSE

the district court’s judgment denying qualified immunity on the

federal claims to Moreno, Palermo, Rocha, and Rodriguez.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and DISMISSED in part.

17