Columbus Bar Assn. v. Okuley (Slip Opinion)

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Columbus Bar Assn. v. Okuley, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3225.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-3225

COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. OKULEY.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Okuley, Slip Opinion No.

2021-Ohio-3225.]

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,

including representing multiple clients with conflicting interests, continuing

to practice law while license suspended, false communication regarding

lawyer’s services, and failing to cooperate in disciplinary investigation—

Permanent disbarment.

(No. 2021-0231—Submitted March 31, 2021—Decided September 21, 2021.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme

Court, No. 2019-029.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, John Joseph Okuley, of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0076748, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2003. On

September 26, 2018, we suspended him from the practice of law for one year with

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six months conditionally stayed for his intentionally causing a collision with a

bicyclist, provoking a physical altercation with an eyewitness to the collision, and

making false statements about the incident to law enforcement and during the

ensuing criminal, civil, and disciplinary proceedings. Columbus Bar Assn. v.

Okuley, 154 Ohio St.3d 124, 2018-Ohio-3857, 111 N.E.3d 1173. We denied

Okuley’s amended motion for reinstatement in November 2019, and that

suspension remains in effect. Columbus Bar Assn. v. Okuley, 157 Ohio St.3d 1492,

2019-Ohio-4738, 134 N.E.3d 1204.

{¶ 2} In a seven-count second amended complaint filed on October 18,

2019, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged Okuley with professional

misconduct arising from his representation of multiple clients with conflicting

interests in litigation and in business transactions. The complaint further alleged

that Okuley had continued to practice law while he was under suspension, had

failed to update his online biographical information following his suspension, had

failed to cooperate in two of the ensuing disciplinary investigations, and is no

longer fit to practice law.

{¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulations of fact and numerous exhibits. A

three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct conducted a hearing and

heard testimony from Okuley and eight other witnesses. The panel issued a report

finding that Okuley committed most of the charged misconduct and recommending

that he be permanently disbarred.1 The board adopted the panel’s report in its

entirety and no objections have been filed.

{¶ 4} After independently reviewing the record in this case, we adopt the

board’s findings of misconduct with one exception, and we permanently disbar

Okuley from the practice of law in Ohio.

1. The panel unanimously dismissed 13 of the alleged rule violations based on the insufficiency of

the evidence. Because those dismissals included dismissing all the violations alleged in Count Four,

Count Four will not be discussed in this opinion.

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Misconduct

Counts One and Two: Conflicts of Interest Relating to the Rivers Edge Building

{¶ 5} In January 2009, Jerry Mueller, Gerald Smith, and Okuley practiced

at the law firm of Mueller, Smith & Okuley, L.L.C., which had offices located at

7700 Rivers Edge Drive in Columbus, Ohio. The Rivers Edge building was owned

by 7700 RED One, Ltd. (“RED One”). RED One was owned by Mueller and Smith,

Ltd., and B&O Capital, Ltd., which was owned by Okuley and his wife.

{¶ 6} Mueller left the firm in July 2011 following a dispute. The terms of

his departure and valuation of his membership interest in Mueller and Smith, Ltd.,

were set forth in a termination agreement. Upon Mueller’s departure, Okuley and

Smith began operating as Okuley Smith, L.L.C., in the Rivers Edge building.

Mueller and Smith, Ltd., then changed its name to Bluffview Edge, Ltd., and its

sole member going forward was the Gerald L. Smith Trust.

{¶ 7} In December 2011, Mueller filed a lawsuit against Smith, Okuley, and

a number of business entities including RED One, B&O Capital, and Bluffview

Edge to enforce the terms of his termination agreement (“the Mueller litigation”).

During the course of that litigation, Okuley appeared as legal counsel for RED One,

B&O Capital, and himself, and he also represented the interests of Bluffview Edge.

On one or more occasions, he also provided legal representation to Smith and to

other related business entities. Although the parties entered into a formal settlement

agreement in September 2016, disputes arose regarding the enforcement of that

agreement. All told, the Mueller litigation spanned more than seven years.

{¶ 8} In 2013, the members of RED One adopted a resolution authorizing

Okuley to serve as that entity’s chief operating officer and tax-matters partner and

to use the company’s funds to perform necessary repairs and maintenance to the

Rivers Edge building. By the end of 2016, the property taxes for the building were

delinquent, the building had heating and air-conditioning problems, and Okuley

Smith, L.L.C., was behind in its rent payments.

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{¶ 9} According to Okuley, B&O Capital in November 2016 was prepared

to invest in RED One to pay off tax liens on the building and to pay money that was

owed under the settlement agreement in the Mueller litigation. To that end, Okuley

prepared, executed, and recorded a $354,000 mortgage on behalf of RED One in

favor of B&O Capital—while he represented both RED One and B&O Capital in

the Mueller litigation. Following Smith’s death on January 3, 2017, Smith’s heirs

objected to the mortgage. That mortgage was never funded and Okuley eventually

released it.

{¶ 10} Okuley later arranged for RED One to borrow a total of $65,000

from Three Sisters Capital, Ltd., a company owned by his wife, his sister, and his

sister-in-law, to pay approximately one-half of the money owed under the terms of

the settlement that had been reached in the Mueller litigation. In an August 2017

filing with the Ohio secretary of state, Okuley represented that he was the attorney

for Three Sisters. He then prepared a mortgage to secure the $65,000 loan. Okuley

executed and recorded the mortgage on behalf of RED One on November 1, 2017.

By that time, Bluffview Edge and Smith’s son, as trustee on behalf of the Gerald L.

Smith Trust, had filed a motion in the ongoing Mueller litigation to place RED One

and the Rivers Edge property in receivership. That motion was granted on

November 17, 2017, and the building was sold in May 2018. RED One was

dissolved and the proceeds of the sale were distributed to various parties, with

Three Sisters receiving a $30,000 settlement for its $65,000 loan.

{¶ 11} At Okuley’s disciplinary hearing, Paul Rose, a professor at the Ohio

State University Moritz College of Law, the college’s director of the Law, Finance,

and Governance Program, and the Associate Dean for Strategic Initiatives, testified

regarding the business relationships at issue in this case. Rose—whose scholarship,

teaching, and work as a lawyer have focused on corporate and business-entity

formation and governance—spent approximately 17 hours reviewing documents

supplied by relator and wrote a comprehensive report.

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{¶ 12} Rose testified that the interests of RED One, Bluffview Edge, and

B&O Capital were clearly adverse by November 2016 when RED One executed

the mortgage in favor of B&O Capital. Not only was Okuley representing clients

on opposite sides of the transaction, he was acting as the chief operating officer of

RED One and had an ownership interest in B&O Capital, which also had an

ownership interest in RED One. Okuley also represented both sides of the

mortgage transaction between RED One and Three Sisters. Moreover, Rose

testified that those transactions were occurring because RED One was in financial

distress, Smith’s heirs had clearly expressed concerns in the motion for receivership

about conflicts of interest, and litigation regarding the various financial interests

was likely as the parties sought payment from a limited pool of funds.

{¶ 13} One of the stipulated exhibits submitted at the disciplinary hearing

was a letter dated March 12, 2013, that Okuley and another attorney at Okuley

Smith, L.L.C., purportedly had sent to Okuley, Smith, RED One, and Red One’s

members. That letter stated that “there could be conflicting interests between the

various defendants” in the Mueller litigation and that the law firm was willing to

provide legal representation “[s]o long as there is no actual conflict” and the

addressees “agree to waive any present conflicts.” It also informed the addressees

that they “should discuss the representation by Okuley Smith LLC with any other

counsel of your choosing.” But that letter was not signed by any of the addressees.

And there is no evidence that any of the clients that Okuley represented regarding

the Mueller litigation or the related mortgages ever gave informed, written consent

concerning any potential or actual conflicts that might have been created by

Okuley’s representation.

{¶ 14} The board found that Okuley’s representation of multiple parties in

the Mueller litigation and the related transactions created multiple conflicts of

interest. For example, Okuley represented RED One and its members, as well as

Three Sisters, when the interests of those entities were not aligned—most notably

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when they were on opposite sides of mortgage transactions. See Columbus Bar

Assn. v. Ewing, 63 Ohio St.3d 377, 379-380, 588 N.E.2d 783 (1992) (recognizing

that representation of both the lender and the borrower within the same transaction

creates a conflict of interest). The board found that the interests of Okuley’s clients

were adverse and that there was a substantial risk that Okuley’s ability to consider,

recommend, or carry out a course of action for any one of his clients was materially

limited by his responsibilities to his other clients and by his own personal interests.

Consequently, the board found that Okuley’s conduct violated

Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer’s continued representation of a client

if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client)

and 1.7(a)(2) (providing that a lawyer’s continued representation of a client creates

a conflict of interest if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent

the client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another

client, former client, or third person or by the lawyer’s own personal interests).

{¶ 15} The board also found that Okuley was unable to provide competent

and diligent representation to each of the affected clients due to the various conflicts

of interest. Moreover, there was no signed writing in which the clients gave their

informed consent to his representation of those conflicting interests. And to the

extent that Okuley’s representation involved one client’s claims for money against

another client in the same proceeding, those conflicts could not be waived.

Therefore the board found that Okuley’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(b)

(prohibiting a lawyer from accepting or continuing the representation of a client if

such representation would create a conflict of interest, unless the lawyer would be

able to provide competent, diligent representation to each affected client, each

affected client gives informed consent in writing, and the representation is not

otherwise prohibited by rule or law) and 1.7(c)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from

accepting or continuing a representation if the representation would involve the

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assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer

in the same proceeding).

{¶ 16} Given the numerous conflicts of interests arising from Okuley’s

representation of multiple clients—including himself, his wife, Smith, and various

business entities—regarding the Mueller litigation and the related mortgages

without first obtaining informed consent to those conflicts in writing, the board also

found that Okuley violated the following disciplinary rules:

 Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from entering into a business

transaction with a client or knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory,

security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless (1) the terms

of the transaction are fair and reasonable and fully disclosed to the client in

writing, (2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of obtaining

independent legal counsel, and (3) the client gives informed consent in a

writing signed by the client to the essential terms of the transaction and the

lawyer’s role in the transaction);

 Prof.Cond.R. 1.13(a) (providing that a lawyer employed or retained by an

organization represents the organization acting through its constituents and

owes allegiance to the organization and not to its constituents or any other

person connected with the organization); and

 Prof.Cond.R. 1.13(e) (providing that a lawyer representing an organization

may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members,

shareholders, or other constituents, subject to the consent requirements of

Gov.Bar R. 1.7, and that if written consent is required, it shall be given by

an appropriate official of the organization—not by the individual who is to

be represented—or by the shareholders).

{¶ 17} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct.

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Count Three: Practicing Law While Under Suspension

{¶ 18} Okuley’s brother, who is also an attorney, worked for Okuley Smith,

L.L.C., from April 2017 through February 2018. In February 2018, April Cottle

met with Okuley and his brother and retained the law firm to represent her in a

trademark-registration matter regarding one of her business’s products. Cottle

corresponded with Okuley by e-mail and signed some documents connected to the

trademark application electronically in April 2018. She did not hear anything about

the status of her matter until Karie Gallegos, a secretary employed by Okuley

Smith, reached out to her in about late September of that year to confirm Cottle’s

e-mail address.

{¶ 19} On October 5, 2018—nine days after we suspended Okuley’s license

to practice law—someone sent an e-mail to Cottle from Okuley’s e-mail address

and copied Okuley’s brother and Gallegos on the e-mail. That e-mail stated that

the United States Patent and Trademark Office had rejected Cottle’s trademark

application as being “descriptive.” The e-mail informed Cottle that the registration

could be amended and placed on the “Supplemental Register” and that after five

years, it could then be moved to the principal register. The e-mail further explained

that “[w]hat this means is that if you ever needed to litigate on the trademark, you

would need to prove that the mark was distinctive and not merely descriptive” and

that “[i]n essence, the registers are a distinction without a significant difference to

your use of the mark.” The e-mail included an invoice for $300 and stated that with

Cottle’s authorization, Okuley’s brother could file the amendment.

{¶ 20} Gallegos forwarded the October 5, 2018 e-mail to Cottle at a

different e-mail address on November 8, 2018. On November 21, 2018, Okuley

called Cottle to discuss her trademark application and Cottle recorded the call.

During that conversation, Okuley explained the legal options set forth in the e-mail,

explained the timing and risks of those options, debated whether the law firm had

dropped the ball in handling her matter, and suggested that his brother had done

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most of the work in the matter and had sent the recent e-mail. Okuley also

expressed his opinion—based upon his knowledge and experience—that the only

people who would have had standing to oppose Cottle’s trademark were members

of Cottle’s own family.

{¶ 21} At his disciplinary hearing, Okuley admitted that the October 5 e-

mail to Cottle contained legal advice, but he denied that he had sent it. He claimed

that he had drafted and sent the e-mail to Cottle in September and had instructed

Gallegos to resend the e-mail to Cottle using his brother’s e-mail address in

October. But the documentary evidence shows that Okuley sent the e-mail to Cottle

on October 5 and then forwarded it to Gallegos on November 8, 2018, identifying

it as “the September letter to April,” and instructed Gallegos to forward it to Cottle.

Gallegos testified, and the documentary evidence verifies, that Gallegos forwarded

the content of the October 5 e-mail to Cottle later in the day on November 8 from

her own e-mail address with Okuley Smith. Additionally, Okuley’s brother

testified that he had not agreed to continue working on Cottle’s matter, directed

anyone to prepare a $300 invoice in that matter, or authorized Okuley to send any

e-mails on his behalf when he left the firm in February 2018. Okuley later

explained that he was trying to take care of Cottle while he was suspended from

practicing law and thought that he had an arrangement with his brother to help him.

{¶ 22} The board found that Okuley continued to practice law while under

suspension in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from

practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession

in that jurisdiction) and that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer

from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation)

by attempting to mislead Cottle into thinking that his brother was the one who had

sent her the October 5, 2018 e-mail.

{¶ 23} We adopt these findings of misconduct.

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Count Five: Failure to Respond to a Disciplinary Investigation

{¶ 24} Relator commenced its investigation of Okuley’s misconduct in

January 2019. Okuley has stipulated that from January through August 2019,

relator sent him four letters of inquiry (two regarding the Cottle matter and two

regarding Okuley’s online biographical information) and that he failed to respond

to those letters.

{¶ 25} At his August 28, 2019 deposition, Okuley testified that due to the

aftereffects of chronic pain that he suffered as the result of injuries that he had

sustained in a 2016 automobile accident, he did not really care much about the

letters from relator. After that deposition, he responded to the letters regarding the

Cottle matter, but he never responded to relator’s inquiries regarding the

biographical information. The board found—and we agree—that Okuley’s failure

to respond to those letters of inquiry violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) (prohibiting a

lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a

disciplinary authority during an investigation).

Count Six: False Communication Regarding a Lawyer’s Services

{¶ 26} Following his suspension from the practice of law in September

2018, Okuley failed to update the biographical information over which he retained

control on the Internet. On January 7, 2019, the law firm’s website still identified

him as one of the attorneys working at the firm and stated that “Dr. Okuley is

admitted to practice law in Ohio.” On that date, his profile on the professional-

networking website LinkedIn stated that he was a patent attorney at Okuley Smith,

L.L.C. Neither the firm’s website nor Okuley’s LinkedIn profile indicated that he

had been suspended from the practice of law. Even after relator sent Okuley a letter

asking him to explain why he continued to hold himself out as an attorney on both

of those websites—and after relator filed its initial complaint in this case—the

information on those sites remained unchanged.

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{¶ 27} The board found that this conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 7.1

(prohibiting a lawyer from making or using false, misleading, or nonverifiable

communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services). We accept this finding

of misconduct.

Count Seven: Conduct Adversely Reflecting on Okuley’s Fitness to Practice Law

{¶ 28} In the final count of its second amended complaint, relator alleged

that Okuley engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law

in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). This court has held:

In order to find a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), there must be

clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer has engaged in

misconduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice

law, even though that conduct is not specifically prohibited by the

rules, or there must be proof that the conduct giving rise to a specific

rule violation is so egregious as to warrant an additional finding that

it adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.

Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d

500, ¶ 21.

{¶ 29} To support its allegation that Okuley had demonstrated that he was

unfit to practice law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), relator primarily relied

upon the facts that Okuley was being treated for depression and “avoidance” when

his misconduct occurred and that he suffered from posttraumatic migraines after he

was seriously injured in a 2016 automobile accident. The board found that although

Okuley blamed his medical conditions for his failure to respond to relator’s letters

of inquiry, he presented no medical evidence to establish the existence of those

conditions.

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{¶ 30} We have never found that the existence of mental or physical

disorders alone is sufficient to establish that a lawyer has engaged in conduct that

adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law in violation of

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). On the contrary, we have expressly declined to find a

violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) when a relator has relied solely on the fact that a

respondent has a mental or substance-use disorder to establish the existence of the

violation, noting that such conditions “often lead to ethical violations but are not

themselves ethical violations.” Columbus Bar Assn. v. Allerding, 123 Ohio St.3d

382, 2009-Ohio-5589, 916 N.E.2d 808, ¶ 13.

{¶ 31} Here, the board found that Okuley violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) by

falsely stating that (1) his brother was the responsible party in the law firm’s

handling of Cottle’s trademark registration, (2) he had instructed Gallegos to send

the October 5, 2018 e-mail to Cottle before he was suspended from the practice of

law, and (3) he could not access his firm’s website or his LinkedIn profile to remove

all references to his status as a licensed attorney. But relator did not allege those

facts with respect to this count and we have already found that Okuley’s

misrepresentations regarding the Cottle matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).

Moreover, relator has failed to establish that any other conduct with respect to this

alleged violation either adversely reflects upon Okuley’s fitness to practice law,

even though it is not specifically prohibited by the rules, or is so egregious as to

warrant an additional finding that it adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to

practice law, as required by our decision in Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-

3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, at ¶ 21. Consequently, we reject the board’s finding that

relator has established a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).

Sanction

{¶ 32} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the

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aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions

imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 33} The board found that five aggravating factors are present in this case.

Okuley has prior discipline, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed

multiple offenses, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, and refused to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (3),

(4), (5), and (7). The board also found that none of the mitigating factors set forth

in Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C) are present and noted that although Okuley suggested that

health issues may have contributed to some of his misconduct, he did not submit

any evidence to establish those conditions as qualifying mitigating disorders under

Prof.Cond.R. V(13)(C)(7).

{¶ 34} In a posthearing brief, relator argued that Okuley’s misconduct

warranted permanent disbarment. Although the panel chair gave Okuley the

opportunity to respond to relator’s brief and to submit character letters after the

hearing, Okuley did not avail himself of those opportunities.

{¶ 35} In determining the appropriate sanction for Okuley’s misconduct,

the board considered several cases in which we imposed indefinite suspensions on

attorneys who continued to engage in limited instances of the practice of law while

their licenses were under suspension and then failed to cooperate in the ensuing

disciplinary investigations. In those cases, the attorneys largely continued to

practice law in violation of continuing-legal-education and registration

suspensions—conduct for which we have routinely imposed indefinite suspensions.

See Columbus Bar Assn. v. Squeo, 133 Ohio St.3d 536, 2012-Ohio-5004, 979

N.E.2d 321; Disciplinary Counsel v. Higgins, 117 Ohio St.3d 473, 2008-Ohio-

1509, 884 N.E.2d 1070. In this case, however, Okuley continued to engage in the

practice of law in violation of a suspension imposed for dishonesty and other related

misconduct.

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{¶ 36} Relying on a number of cases in which we permanently disbarred

attorneys who continued to engage in the practice of law while their licenses were

under suspension for professional misconduct, the board recommends that we

permanently disbar Okuley.

{¶ 37} For more than 25 years, we have recognized that “[a]bsent any

mitigating circumstances, the normal penalty for ignoring previous orders of the

court and continuing to practice law while under suspension is disbarment.”

Disciplinary Counsel v. Chavers, 80 Ohio St.3d 441, 443, 687 N.E.2d 415 (1997),

citing Disciplinary Counsel v. McDonald, 71 Ohio St.3d 628, 646 N.E.2d 819

(1995). Following that line of cases in Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Cicirella,

133 Ohio St.3d 448, 2012-Ohio-4300, 979 N.E.2d 244, ¶ 11, we acknowledged that

“disbarment is the presumptive sanction for continuing to practice law while under

suspension.” We then disbarred Cicirella for drafting living trusts and agreeing to

perform additional legal services—all while her license was suspended for other

professional misconduct. No mitigating factors were present. Aggravating factors

included Cicirella’s prior discipline, dishonest or selfish motive, multiple offenses,

failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful

nature of her conduct, and harm to a vulnerable client.

{¶ 38} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Fletcher, 135 Ohio St.3d 404, 2013-Ohio-

1510, 987 N.E.2d 678, an attorney continued to represent two existing clients and

began to represent two additional clients while his license was suspended for

professional misconduct. He identified himself as an attorney, counseled those

clients, appeared and represented them in court, and filed documents on their behalf

for more than a year. He also neglected the legal matter of one of those clients and

offered false testimony during a deposition about his conduct. Although Fletcher

cooperated in the resulting investigation and made timely restitution to his clients,

we agreed with the board’s assessment that those mitigating factors did not justify

a departure from the presumptive sanction of permanent disbarment.

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{¶ 39} We have also permanently disbarred an attorney who prepared a

letter for clients while his license was under suspension for professional

misconduct, signed the letter using the name of another attorney without that

attorney’s permission, and prepared a complaint on behalf of those clients.

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Shabazz, 74 Ohio St.3d 24, 656 N.E.2d 325 (1995).

{¶ 40} Here, Okuley continued to practice law by giving legal advice to

Cottle on two occasions after we had suspended his law license and then attempted

to blame his brother and his secretary for his actions. The presumptive sanction for

that misconduct alone is permanent disbarment. But Okuley also committed

additional misconduct before and after his license was suspended. The totality of

that misconduct, combined with the significant aggravating factors present in this

case—including Okuley’s failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his

misconduct—and the complete absence of mitigating evidence make permanent

disbarment particularly appropriate here.

Conclusion

{¶ 41} Accordingly, John Joseph Okuley is hereby permanently disbarred

from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs are taxed to Okuley.

Judgment accordingly.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART,

and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.

_________________

Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., and Joanne S. Beasy; Anne M.

Valentine; and Kent R. Markus, Bar Counsel, and Thomas E. Zani, Deputy Bar

Counsel, for relator.

John Joseph Okuley, pro se.

_________________

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